Binding Dionysus: agent & person in Euripides' Bacchae by van Schoor, David Jude
Zurich Open Repository and
Archive
University of Zurich
Main Library
Strickhofstrasse 39
CH-8057 Zurich
www.zora.uzh.ch
Year: 2016
Binding Dionysus: agent person in Euripides’ Bacchae
van Schoor, David Jude
Posted at the Zurich Open Repository and Archive, University of Zurich
ZORA URL: https://doi.org/10.5167/uzh-152951
Dissertation
Published Version
Originally published at:
van Schoor, David Jude. Binding Dionysus: agent person in Euripides’ Bacchae. 2016, University of
Zurich, Faculty of Arts.
 
 
 
 
Binding Dionysus 
 
Agent & Person  
in  
Euripides’ Bacchae 
 
Thesis presented to the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences 
of the University of Zurich 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
by 
David Jude van Schoor 
 
 
Accepted in the Fall Semester 2016 
on the recommendation of the doctoral committee: 
 
Prof. Dr. Christoph Riedweg 
Prof. Dr. Christoph Uehlinger 
Prof. Dr. Ulrich Eigler 
 
 
Zürich 2018 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 3 
 
 
 
Binding Dionysus  
Agent & Person in Euripides’ Bacchae 
 
 
 
Abhandlung zur Erlangung der Doktorwürde der Philosophischen 
Fakultät 
der 
Universität Zürich  
HS 2016 
 
 
 
 
David Jude van Schoor 
 
  
 4 
Preface 
 
 
Writing a dissertation incurs many great debts. I wish to thank firstly my Doktorvater, Prof. 
Christoph Riedweg for his kindness and generous support. Throughout my stay in Zürich 
he extended his very warm-hearted support. I offer my thanks: to Prof. Uli Eigler and Prof. 
Christoph Uehlinger for their readiness to adjudicate this work; to all my friends and 
colleagues at the University of Zürich, especially Michael Räber, Raphael Schwitter, Fabian 
Zogg, Lena Vidoni, Farida Stickel, Perl Muheim and Andrea Grieder. Amongst those friends 
I owe a very special thanks to Minh Tran for her helpfulness, for the pleasure of her 
company in sharing our languages. Thanks to Frau Burkert-Schmoll and to the Burkert 
family for their unforgettable generosity. I record my warm gratitude to Claudia Meyer for 
all of her help, she made moving to Switzerland and living there all the easier. These and 
many others made my time in Zürich the unforgettable period of happy discovery that it has 
been. Had it not been for a scholarship from the Swiss Federal Commission for Education, 
none of this would have been possible. My very warmest thanks and gratitude to the Swiss 
Governement, the Embassy of Switzerland in Pretoria, especially Mrs Deidre Petersen and 
the so exemplarily gastfreundliche people of Helvetia, whom I have come to admire for many 
reasons. 
 
I wish to record my thanks to friends, colleagues and family in South Africa: Graeme 
Cowley, Daniel Malamis and Nina van Schoor for saving me from many mistakes and 
giving so much of their own time in the editing and revising of this book; Rhodes University 
and Jaine Roberts, for their generous support; Samuel Sadian, for his stimulating 
conversation and many helpful suggestions; Fred and Monica Hendricks, have been 
encouraging friends always. To Selina and Catherine van Schoor many thanks for 
encouragement over the years. 
 
Above all I address my profoundest thanks and record an unrepayable debt to my family. 
To those sweetest of persons, Mairi and Maximilian I shall always dedicate my most 
agentful attending and to Nina I dedicate this book with love. 
 
 
Index of Contents 
 
i. Preface 
 
ii. Index of Contents 
 
iii. Texts, Abbreviations, Citation 
 
1. Introduction: Towards an Anthropology of Agency and Personhood in 
Greek Poetry 
 
1.1 The Subject of Bacchae: Identifying the Object of Interpretation 
1.2 Ti boulomai gar? 
1.3 Views on Agency and Personhood: Was soll werden? 
1.4 The Organization of this Book 
 
Part I – Tragic Agents 
 
2. Hopoios ēthel’: The Agency of Desire and Choice in Bacchae 
 
2.1 Introduction 
2.2 Exōthen: Aristotle on Volition, Choice and Deliberation 
2.2.1.1 Akousion, Hekousion 
2.2.1.2 Heterorrepēs 
2.2.2 Theban error: anapherein tēn hamartian 
2.2.3 Kei mē thelei 
2.2.4 First Episode: 170-369 
2.2.5 Second Episode: 435-518 
2.2.6 Third Episode: 576-861 
2.3 Proairesis: Authentic Choice 
2.4 Thumon ekpneōn: Passion 
2.5 Ei bouloio: Desire 
2.6 Sun mainomenai doxai: Judgement: 
2.7 Bouleusis: Deliberation 
2.8 The Horizon of Articulacy 
2.9 Summary 
 
 6 
3. Ah. Tragedy’s Articulacy 
 
3.1 Dionysus’ Desire 
3.2.1 Agents and failing agency 
3.2.2 Tragic Agency, Tragic Person 
3.3 Defining Person, Defining Agency: Charles Taylor 
3.3.1 Theban Stratagems 
3.3.2 Concern: Proximate and Ultimate 
3.3.3 Melein: Dionysiac Attending 
3.3.4 Looking Again 
3.3.5 Strong and Weak Evaluations 
3.3.6 The Contrastiveness of Strong Evaluation 
3.3.7 Depth & Articulacy – articulacy about depth 
3.3.8 Clarity: [to saphes ou sapheia]* 
3.3.9 ‘Radical Choice’ is not Agentful 
3.3.10 Identity 
3.3.11 Identity & Choice: Tragic Cases-Studies 
3.3.12 Imports 
3.3.13 Subject-reference 
3.3.14 Dimension: Tragic Subjectivity as Depth 
3.4 Summary 
 
  
 7 
Part II – Tragic Persons 
 
4. Adēlotes – Belief and the uncertainty of persons 
 
4.1 Introduction: seeing hearts and minds as objects  
4.1.1 Anticipating Intention: Theory of Mind 
4.1.2 External and Internal Conceptions of Theory of Mind 
4.1.3 Exōthen: Mind always “external” 
4.2 Aphanēs Nóos 
4.2.1 Polis: An endless Crisis of Solidarity 
4.2.2 Dolos 
4.3 Just Keep Dancing: Belief as Stratagem 
4.3.1 Morphēn brotēsian: Anthropomorphisms 
4.3.2 Agency Detection 
4.3.3 Underdetermined and always coming into being 
4.3.4 Wagering on Divinity: si vous perdez, vous ne perdez rien 
4.3.5 The Precipitative Context of Drama 
4.3.6 Morphēn d’ameipsas: Metamorphosis and strategizing for unpredictability 
4.3.7 Krubdēn mēd’ anaphanda: Concealed, not manifestly 
4.3.8 Philoxeinoi and nóos theoudēs: “Welcoming strangers and having a god-
fearing mind” 
4.3.9 Pollai Morphai 
4.4 Barabaroi: Stranger Talk 
4.5 Polis as Palē: “The struggles you must face await you” 
4.6 The Lebenswelt of Agents  
4.7 Summary 
  
 8 
 
5. Ou raidion zētēma: Abducting Dionysus & Detecting Agency 
 
5.1 Introduction 
5.2.1 Art’s Agents 
5.2.2 A Causal Milieu 
5.2.3 Index 
5.2.4 Abduction 
5.3.1 Pyr, keraunos: Contained fire, uncontained fire 
5.3.2: Where there is fire 
5.3.3 A Still Living Flame: The spot where the first ‘sign’ had led one to expect its 
appearance 
5.4 Bacchic Hair 
5.5 Gelān 
5.5.1 A Smirking Man 
5.5.2 Polygethes Dionysos: Bacchic Laughter 
5.5.3 Gelōs: Waving or drowning? 
5.5.4 “Calmly sitting . . . laughing” 
5.6 Summary 
 
6. Ōps ops: A Voice in the Aithēr, a Face in the Clouds 
 
6.1.1 Presence and Appearance 
6.1.2 Prosōpopoiia: Apostrophe 
6.2.1 Horōn horōnta: Co-presence is face-to-face encounter 
6.2.2 Subject as Object of a Moment 
 
6.3 Facing Dionysus 
6.3.1 Prosōpon: Face, Prop, Mask, Masque 
6.3.2 Identity as the Capacity for Change of Identity 
6.3.3 Dionysus qua Mask  
 
6.4 Facialité 
6.5 The Captivation of Others 
6.6 Summary 
  
 9 
 
7. Conclusion: Silhouette of an Anthropology of Tragic Subjects 
 
7.1 En merei/ en telei: A Meristic Reading 
7.2 Silhouette – A Tentative and Hazardous Tracing 
7.3 In Conclusion 
 
 
Works Cited 
 
 
 
  
 10 
 
 
Texts, Abbreviations, Citation 
 
Bernabé = Bernabé, A. [ed.] 2013. Redefining Dionysos. Berlin. 
Bruhn = Bruhn, E. 1891. Ausgewählte Tragödien des Euripides. Erstes Bändchen: Die Bakchen. 
Berlin. 
Chantraine = Chantraine, P. 1968. Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque. Histoire des 
mots. Paris. 
Di Benedetto = Di Benedetto, V. [ed., trans., comm.] 2004. Euripide. Le Baccanti. Milan. 
Diggle = Diggle, J. [ed.] 1994. Euripidis Fabulae – Tomus III. Oxford. 
Dodds = Dodds, E.R. 1960 [ed., comm.] {2nd edition} (1944).  Euripides. Bacchae. Oxford. 
GR = Burkert, W. 2011 [1977]. Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche  
{Zweite, überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage}. Stuttgart. 
Grégoire & Meunier = Grégoire, H. & Meunier, J. [edd., trans.] 1961. Euripide. Tragedies – 
Tome  VI 2e partie. Les Bacchantes. Paris. 
Guidorizzi = Guidorizzi, G. [trans., comm.] 1989. Euripide. Baccanti. Venice. 
Kirk, G.S. [trans. & comm.] 1970. The Bacchae of Euripides. Cambridge. 
Kopff, E. C. [ed.] 1982. Euripides. Bacchae. Leipzig. 
LIMC = 1986. Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae. Vol. III, 2. Zürich/ Munich 
LSJ = Liddell, H.G. & Scott, R. {revised & augmented Jones, H.S., McKenzie, R.} 1940. A 
Greek English Lexicon. Oxford. 
Masks = Carpenter, T.H. & Faraone, C.A. [edd.] 1993. Masks of Dionysus. Ithaca, New York. 
Rijksbaron = Rijksbaron, A. 1991. Grammatical Observations on Euripides' “Bacchae”. 
Amsterdam. 
Roux = Roux, J. [ed.] 1970/1972 Euripide, Les Bacchantes. Tome 1 & 2.  Paris. 
Schlesier = Schlesier, R. 2011. [ed.] A Different God? Dionysos and Ancient Polytheism. Berlin/ 
Boston. 
Seaford = Seaford, R. 1996. [trans. & comm.] Euripides. Bacchae. Warminster. 
Stuttard = Stuttard, D. [ed. & trans.] 2016. Looking at Bacchae. London/ New York. 
Susanetti = Susanetti, D. [trans. & comm.] 2010. Euripide. Baccanti. Rome. 
 
The conventions for abbreviation adopted in this book have been those of The Oxford 
Classical Dictionary [edd.] Hammond, N.G.L. & Scullard, H.H. 1970. Oxford. 
 
 11 
The primary text used for quotation from Bacchae has been Diggle. When line numbers 
appear sans reference to author or text (for example “24-6” as opposed to Eur. Her. 24-6), 
then those numbers should be read as line references to Bacchae – e.g. “24-6” = “Eur. Ba. 24-
6”. Works other than Bacchae have always been cited with their author text abbreviation. 
 
Occasional reference is made to L and P, these are the conventional designations for the 
Byzantine manuscripts on which modern editions are based. For a succinct account these, 
texts see Dodds: li-lix. 
 
  
 12 
Part I 
Tragic Agents 
 
 
1 
 
Introduction 
 
Towards an Anthropology of Agency and Personhood in Greek Poetry 
 
 
ἢ οὐκ ᾔσθησαι ὅτι ἔστιν τι /εταξὺ σοφίας καὶ ἀ/αθίας; 
Τί τοῦτο;    
 
¾ Or have you not perceived that there is something in between wisdom and 
ignorance? 
¾ What is that?1  
 
 
1.1 The Subject of Bacchae: Identifying the Object of Interpretation 
 
Dionysus is difficult. He is difficult to understand, hard to locate, never pinned down and 
impossible to retain, even if he is momentarily grasped. Our notion of what the human 
subject is will determine how we appraise the representation of subjects and what we expect 
to find there. The same may be said of human subjectivity, the mind, consciousness, 
‘whatever we ought to call’2 the essential property of persons that we value so dearly in 
ourselves and in others, which we say is their unique, personal identity. Identity and the 
nature of persons – what these are and their quality as agents of themselves and their own 
desires, judgements and choices – these are the strands of the enigma at the heart of 
Euripides’ Bacchae. In the first encounter between god and man, Dionysus is giving loaded, 
incomprehensible replies to the king. He is frustrating understanding, rather than 
communicating; casting shadows rather than light. He is speaking ‘complexly’: at certain 
levels but simultaneously also across certain levels and purposes. Pentheus is speaking 
                                                        
1 Pl. Sym. 202a 2-4. 
2 Cf. Alcibiades’ mildly aporetic remarks at Pl. Sym. 217e 6-18a 5: τὴν καρδίαν γὰρ ἢ ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸ ὀνοµάσαι. 
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simply, “from his heart, clearly, without ulterior purpose, epitēdes”, as Menelaus puts it in 
Iphigenia at Aulis, the play performed for the first time just hours before Bacchae at the 
Dionysia in 405 BCE3.  
 
Pentheus will wish to have the Stranger bound, having lost the easy confidence he showed 
at the opening of the exchange, when, with assurance, he told the guard to undo the captive, 
for he was “in our trammels, not quick enough to escape me now”4. Dionysus warns that he 
must not be bound, that Pentheus is not in his right mind5. Pentheus in turn replies that he 
will have him bound, because he has “more power”, kuriōteros6. For Dionysus it is a 
profounder question than who has more force; it is a problem here of identity that is at issue: 
it is not power that defines identities and how they relate to each other; identity is anterior, 
by Dionysus’ logic. Pentheus does not recognize the deeper, divine identity of Dionysus or 
the meaningfulness of his rites, their substantial ‘contents’. He does not recognize his own 
identity either, which is not the obvious one it seems, 506-7: 
 
Di. οὐκ οἶσθ' †ὅτι ζῆς† οὐδ' ὃ δρᾶις οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ.7 
Pe. Πενθεύς, Ἀγαυῆς Fαῖς, Fατρὸς δ' Ἐχίονος. 
 
Di. You don’t know †what (life) you are living†, not what you are 
doing nor even who you are.  
Pe. Pentheus, Agauē’s child, by Echion the father. 
 
It is the meaning within forms that Pentheus consistently fails to discern. He cannot interpret 
the riddle of his own identity, wrapped up in the meaning of a sign very close to him – his 
own name – the import of which he fails to decipher, 508: ἐνδυστυχῆσαι τοὔνο/' 
ἐFιτήδειος εἶ, “You are suited [epitēdeios] by your name to be unfortunate”8. He is a man 
who hits on the truth only inadvertently, involuntarily – akousion – and cannot piece 
together even the meaning of his own claims or the contents of signs most “at hand”, 
paronta. His name has the ulterior meaning inside itself, penthos, “woe”, “grief”, which this 
inferrer of the motives and meanings of others imprudently fails to heed. Tellingly does 
Teiresias, mantis, the diviner whom he repudiates, say to him in the first episode, 358-9: 
 
                                                        
3 Eur. IA 475-6: ἦ µὴν ἐρεῖν σοι τἀπὸ καρδίας σαφῶς / καὶ µὴ 'πίτηδες µηδέν, ἀλλ' ὅσον φρονῶ. 
4 451-2: µέθεσθε χειρῶν τοῦδ'· ἐν ἄρκυσιν γὰρ ὢν / οὐκ ἔστιν οὕτως ὠκὺς ὥστε µ' ἐκφυγεῖν. 
5 504: αὐδῶ µε µὴ δεῖν, σωφρονῶν οὐ σώφροσιν. 
6 505: ἐγὼ δὲ δεῖν γε, κυριώτερος σέθεν. 
7 On this textually problematic line, see also below p. 73 § 2.2.1.2 n. 122. 
8 Cf. also Teiresias’ 367-9: Πενθεὺς δ' ὅπως µὴ πένθος εἰσοίσει δόµοις / τοῖς σοῖσι, Κάδµε· µαντικῆι µὲν οὐ λέγω, / τοῖς πράγµασιν δέ· 
µῶρα γὰρ µῶρος λέγει. 
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   ὦ σχέτλι', ὡς οὐκ οἶσθα Fοῦ Fοτ' εἶ λόγων· 
/έ/ηνας ἤδη, καὶ Fρὶν ἐξεστὼς φρενῶν. 
 
Oh wretched man [schetli’], how you do not even know what you are saying; 
You are by now raving mad, you were out of [exestōs: “stood outside of”] 
your mind [phrenes] even before.  
 
Pentheus is ignorant of how he stands in relation to his own words – Fοῦ Fοτ' εἶ λόγων lit. 
“where ever you are [in relation to] your words” – his own contents, which he keeps spilling 
out uncomprehendingly. 
 
The subject of Bacchae is not what theatre is, but what persons are. It shows forms and acts 
but its interest is in the motivations of acts and the contents of forms. Dionysus is not a god 
for whom ritual actions suffice and he does not only introduce ritualistic formulae in 
Euripides’ vision: the meaning of himself and of the acts and moods he introduces is at stake 
and matters to him. The play wants the meaning within rites and the motivation predicting 
actions and choice to matter to its mortal spectators too.  
 
It does happen that “person” is theatrical and the agency of persons is a tragic and comic 
drama. In what does identity consist, that it means so much to humans? What is the 
relationship between roles and reality, between acts and character? What is this property, 
which gives lives their value, that is also so hard to define, that is only ever approached 
obliquely? People ought to “know themselves”, so what is this self which is the subject of 
the knowledge that always arrives too late in Tragedy? By what means does one secure this 
knowledge? These are the questions opened up in the play, and they are not entirely 
resolved. If Bacchae is about representation, that is because in the complicated enigma of 
representation, dissemblance, eirōneia and its relation to truth, the strangeness of human life 
and the fictional character of personhood, in which performance and a certain kind of social 
and cognitive theatricality seem to be indispensable, are divulged. In Bacchae “person” and 
the quality of “agency” are opened up and made manifest. It is revealed that desire, 
judgement and choice, and how we articulate our desires, will constitute what kind of insides 
– what kind of inner identity – we may be said to have. “Person” is not like the naïve 
conception of “structure”, criticized by Anthony Giddens9; it is not a scaffold or framework 
on which character is hung, like a flowing saffron gown on a staff10.  
 
                                                        
9 See Giddens, 1979, 1984 for the critique of structuralism and functionalism and the dynamic “structuration” he offers in place. 
10 As Dionysus was figured in cult and at such festivals as the Anthesteria, see § 6.2-4. 
 15 
In the late 1970s and early 1980s, Giddens was one of the important voices – like Clifford 
Geertz and Cornelius Castoriadis in the early 1970s or Ian Hodder’s Cambridge archaeology 
seminar – seeking to balance the distortions introduced by the timeless modalities of 
structuralist and functionalist objectivism with a re-articulated conception of agency and its 
fundamental place in historical life11. There is, for Giddens, a naïve conception of structure, 
which is “closely connected to the dualism of subject and social object”, associated with the 
functionalists “and, indeed, the vast majority of social analysts”12. This conception typically 
imagines structure visually. Structure here is “akin to the skeleton or morphology of an 
organism or to the girders of a building”13. Most significant for us is the observation that in 
such a Vorstellung, structure is conceived as “‘external’ to human action, as a source of 
constraint on the free initiative of the independently constituted subject”14. Structure by this 
common-sense view will be determining for the civic subject, the protagonist of history and 
its framed representation in myth, the tragic protagonist. It is important to be conscious of 
this: if we have this understanding of structure it will shape the possibilities we admit for 
humans as social actors. It will define the parameters of our analysis. 
 
The more subtle and “interesting” conceptualization of structure, found among the post-
structuralists, will have peculiar resonance for the student of the Epiphaniengott, Dionysus. 
There, structure is “not thought of as a patterning of presences, but as an intersection of 
presence and absence; underlying codes have to be inferred from surface manifestations.”15 It 
is fundamental to Giddens’ theory that he seeks to reconcile these two conceptualizations – 
external, substantial girding and insubstantial, inferred intersections of absence and 
presence – in a more differentiated picture of structure, which he calls structuration. To this 
end, he introduces the distinctions of “structure” and “system” and essentially aligns the 
former with ‘a paradigmatic dimension’: “a virtual order of ‘modes of structuring’ 
recursively implicated” in the reproduction of situated practices16.  
 
There is not some transcendent, essential part that determines acts and thoughts here, that 
has not been projected. Acts, thoughts and emotions are what constitute persons, just as 
                                                        
11 Geertz, 1973; Castoriadis, 1975; Hodder, 1979. 
12 Giddens, 1984: 16. 
13 Giddens, 1984: 16. Cf. the ‘axes’, horizontal and vertical in the world of Bacchae, according to Charles Segal, 1997 [1982]: 78-157. 
Revealing metaphors: cf. Burkert’s notion of Civilization, i.e. “culture” as a “Kruste”, a thin membrane easily pierced: in Homo Necans, 
Burkert, 1972: “Wir wissen heute, daß Theophrast und viele andere Romatiker sich über die entwicklung der Menscheit entäuscht habe: es 
ist vielmehr der alte Jagdinstinkt, der die Kruste der Zivilsation durchbricht. Längst hatte sich hinter der Heiligkeit des Altars die Aggression 
gestaut, die ihr Opfer erwartet und findet.” See also GR, 2011 (1977): 90. 
14 Giddens, 1984: 16. 
15 Giddens, 1984: 16. The structure of society then is not like that of molecules but rather like that of flashing atoms that appear when they 
are looked for. 
16 Giddens, 1984: 17. 
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culture does not represent what societies are; it is what society is. A person is not a skeleton 
wearing the flesh and clothing of passing culture, but is itself something virtual, a thread, 
we may say, that binds together acts over time. Our saying so is itself the creative, 
constitutive binding gesture. Person is not there. And yet the sufficient condition for a 
personhood that matters most is embodied personhood. Something in humans longs for 
physical co-presence, as Achilles in Hades longs for mortal life and a body, even as the 
lowest serf, rather than to be the king in an empire of bodiless presences. It appears when 
we make the more valid or commensurate connection between things or events over time, as 
Pentheus fails to do. Articulation is constitutive, for it is ‘intersective’, in a very real sense 
momentarily binding together presence and absence and making codes manifest on the 
‘surface’ of discourse. This intersecting quality, the dynamic relation between absence and 
presence, is in fact the most characteristic quality of Dionysus. 
 
‘Looking at Bacchae’, as one recent book on the play is cleverly called17, means being in 
Dionysus’ vicinity for a while, being made to experience, to see and even feel the effects of 
Dionysus’ presence – that is the ingenious effect also of Euripides’ artfulness. The audience 
comes to know, as if empirically, bacchic inspiration and mania, to learn both its divinely 
regenerative and sickly human forms. The Dionysiac experience is transformative: it is like a 
form of wealth, which is not simply the accumulation of objects or a learning, not merely the 
addition of contents of knowledge, but which changes the nature of the vessel and its 
contents. The experience – pathos – of Dionysus represents always the acquisition of a 
transformative knowledge – mathos. When this is healthy it has a “perfective”, 
“consummative” power, teleios. It binds a person together to be seen as a whole, not a set of 
momentary acts dispersed over time. This is what takes place in drama and this is what 
happens to the initiate in Dionysiac rites.  
 
In English we speak of “initiation” and “rites”, but while sacrifice is “initiatory”, archesthai, 
what Dionysus does, says the Greek, is “consummatory”: it completes persons, it makes 
them “whole”. At least for a time, it transforms their identity in time by making them 
“finished”, telestos. Joyless Pentheus, abaccheutos, and Thebes, for which he stands 
synechdochically, remains obdurately atelestos18. He will become literally and forever an 
incomplete thing because he never availed of Dionysus’ gift to mortals: an identity that is 
spiritually intact. It is the lot of mortals while they live to be unfinished, ununified beings 
(and that even in the Homeric Afterlife where they are sorrowful, longing identities). They 
are disputatious and contentious creatures of agōn – struggling with others in a social world 
                                                        
17 Stuttard. 
18 40: ἀτέλεστον οὖσαν τῶν ἐµῶν βακχευµάτων. 
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of perpetual frictions, struggles with self –mermēra– dilemma, doubt, debate and anxiety. 
Dionysus brings an extraordinary respite to humans, relief from one another and from 
oneself. His gift is self-transcendence for the polis and self-transcendence for the individual. 
His gift is a gift of grace, which he alone gives – his presence, himself. And recursively his 
presence – in the happy sociality of wine-drinking, symposion, revel, festival, dramatic 
spectacle, chorus – is signalled when this relief from the day-to-day durée and from the 
vigilance of sober consciousness is being experienced.  
 
 
1.2 Ti boulomai gar?19 
 
Dionysus requires interpretation. Few can agree what the manifest god, a person of the most 
dramatic self-revelations, means. One cannot but be aware, with every claim made about 
him, of objections that will flow from those claims20. It is not intended to set this argument 
beyond dispute, on the contrary one of the main premises here is related to this generally 
recognized point: Euripides’ Dionysus complicates how he himself is to be known and 
Bacchae problematizes knowledge, inference and interpretation in themselves. There is a 
meta-interpretive dimension called for in engagement with this god and with Euripides’ 
play, so marked by ambiguity and opaqueness. We are asked not simply to interpret but to 
become aware of the judgements involved in interpretation21.  
 
Dionysus is epiphanic and revelatory, but thwarts recognition of himself. He takes many 
forms in time, but has one super-temporal identity. He is one person, son of Zeus and 
Semelē, but becomes many different shapes, morphai. The play does not simply reflect 
popular religion or piously allude to mysteries through a suggestive hush. It is itself an 
interpretive act. It modifies what Dionysus is, and this interpretation has an ulterior motive. 
This, in part, is to identify and explore what the form and contents of an ethical existence 
may be; how inaccessible to people that kind of existence mostly is; what the doorway or 
portal to such a life might be, or what it might only seem to be. Euripides may entertain and 
he may record religious-historical data, but the position taken in this study is that he also, if 
not primarily, has an ethical and philosophical objective, telos. His religious vision is not 
simply a transmission of form or formulae, but the communication of that religion’s 
                                                        
19 τί βούλοµαι γάρ; Eur. IA 485: “what do I want?” see below p. 88 § 2.7 n. 324 and p. 135 § 3.3.8 n. 250. 
20 Cf. Versnel, 1990: 96 “Every reader gets the Bacchae he deserves. No two scholars agree on the meaning of the play, let alone on the 
intention of its author. So, from the middle of the last century onwards we can perceive a discouraging procession of conflicting 
interpretations, expanding alarmingly in the last few decades.”  
21 This fact about Bacchae is what gives rise to so many reflections amongst scholars on the “meta-tragic” in the drama and the “meta-
poetics” of Euripides; see Segal, 1997; Bierl, 1991; Thumiger, 2009; Torrance, 2013; Schwartz, 2013. 
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emotional and ethical contents. This telos is shown to be indistinct from that of traditional 
belief; not a matter for philosophes, and not arrived at through the rational processes of 
elenchus. It is the product of a certain kind of knowledgeability, which is of time and does not 
stand outside of time. Its location is in this world, between persons. It issues from feeling 
and a certain quality of responsiveness and receptiveness; it is not transcendentally remote, 
looking down upon existence as if from the outside. 
 
The ambition of this study is twofold and necessarily modest. I set out, firstly, to show how 
ancient and modern philosophical perspectives – those of Aristotle and Charles Taylor – can 
be adapted to illuminate Bacchae as a dynamic and differentiated picture of desire, 
judgement, choice, deliberation and values. The attempt is made to demonstrate the 
centrality of an ethics and psychology of volition in Bacchae. Humans are potentially 
“agentful” subjects. The value judgement that Euripides seems to make is that they ought to 
meet their potential, they ought to wish to be more fully “agentful”, and not simply the 
unreflective objects of emotional and spiritual forces they have not recognized and 
articulated. This ought carries much weight and only opens more questions. Bacchae is a 
world of contradiction. What will it mean to be “more agentful”? What is the identity of the 
self? Is it that which does not wish as it ought; which wishes it did wish as it ought; which 
reflects on the nature of its wishes? Or is it that which simply spontaneously wishes? Which 
is the more authentic, and how is it that one should be ontically privileged over the other?  
These are problems of authority and verification and they run like currents under the 
surface of the play. 
 
Human subjects are filled up with emotions, desires, libidinal energy, preferences and 
aversions. They are marked by a surfeit of desires that present themselves simultaneously 
and, when consciously, as alternatives. Uniquely, they do not just feel desire for things 
outside of themselves. They are not mere conduits of natural process or playthings of 
external, daemonic forces. They also feel the desire to have certain desires and not others. 
They feel that it matters to be one kind of person and not another. This is the nub of agency 
as it will be conceptualized here. It is the capacity to project an identity and evaluate it.  
 
Subjects are entities that by a kind of cognitive and psychological theatricality, can look 
upon themselves as if from an outside viewpoint. They can select, edit and judge 
themselves, articulate what is inside. They evaluate, weighing things up and contrasting one 
value against another. Agency is a potential of beings that have language. It consists of the 
ability to wish differently, to desire certain desires and repudiate others: the potential to 
become different. On the virtual screen of consciousness, a perpetually ad hoc skēnē, subjects 
have this power to project themselves qua self; to project an identity somehow objective, 
 19 
transcending time and bodily life, and therefore to examine self and modify what it is that 
one is or shall be. This does not mean that persons are subjective or objective, only that there 
is a constant cinematographic quality of mind, through which, enigmatically, and with a 
dizzyingly dynamic recursiveness, subjects can study themselves as objects; through which 
objects seem to be animated with the living character of subjects of themselves, looking out, 
feeling and conceiving. 
 
Dionysus, celebrated by some as the god of spontaneous liberation from a constricting social 
order, is not simply a releaser in Bacchae, but in his person and acts represents the promise of 
a different kind of binding together of subjects – a binding of persons in a kind of ‘intactness 
with self’ and in a compactness with their social others. He reveals a rhythm between 
authority and license, between the centripetal and centrifugal, between the gathering 
together of person and its dispersion. We discern exactly this tension in the world of Thebes 
in Bacchae, a tension between visions of the healthy community of persons on one hand, and 
of the disorderly breakdown of the supra-individual person – community – on the other. 
Dionysus’ thiasos of barbarian bacchants represents a utopian picture of community, 
unanimous and perfectly united. The maenads of Thebes, individuals bound to one another 
but alienated from themselves; and the isolated Pentheus, a king whose role it is to “hold 
together the house” and the polis, finally a body torn apart and a destroyer of his own 
household, vividly realize the consequences of the negative of that ideal. Dionysus makes 
manifest the problem of human desire in the spectacle of resistance and its gradual 
dissipation. The irresistible god makes manifest the absolute, determining importance of the 
quality of human desiring, its great power and terrible weakness. He brings into vivid relief 
agency and its nature, which alone would potentially preserve and healthily nurture mortals 
for a good life, for eudaimonia. 
 
The second, related aspect of the twofold ambition of this study is an exploration of the 
difficult question of person or personhood. This is the ontological quality of the being with 
the potential for agency, entangled in a complex social world with others “like self”. This 
world is defined among other things by its radical subjection to time and succession. The 
person is marked by the possession of memory, and by the sense of a future – a biographical 
conception of itself. Conscious humans synthesize different events and moments in time, 
binding them together into what we call a life, bios, from which we infer the qualities of a 
character. Person and identity is a fundamental theme of Bacchae, a play in which the 
recognition, mistaking, loss, transformation and regaining of identities form the very stuff of 
the plot. If a division between “agent” and “person” is not always strictly adhered to, that is 
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because there is an organic interpenetration of these two properties in human beings. 
Interpretation needs to be commensurately flexible, as far as that is coherently possible22.  
 
Bacchae presents human life as an ethical and an ontological riddle. Like the riddle of the 
Sphinx at Thebes, this one concerns the identity and shape of the human subject, a changing 
profile in time and over time. As with the Sphinx’s riddle, its manner of solving will be 
determining for the existence of the self and the polis. “What do I wish for?” asks Menelaus, 
in Iphigenia at Aulis23: he is a protagonist who undergoes a radical transformation in his 
desires during that play. What the Thebans have wished for and failed to wish for, and 
failed to authentically wish for, will be the cause of their downfall in Bacchae. “What do I 
desire?” is a question prior even to the question that Snell found to be defining for drama: ti 
drasō? “what do I do?”. But what is a person if it is made up or inferred from such properties 
as desires, thoughts, talk and acts, which are immaterial, constantly slipping into the virtual 
world of the past – cedit et succedit – inaccessible, and therefore hard to shape and govern?  
 
Pentheus is told that he is not what he thinks he is; we are told that Dionysus is not the form 
he has taken, nor even the “man’s nature” that he has put on24. Kadmos and Harmonia will 
lose their anthropic form, becoming snakes but retaining their human identities, and 
ultimately join the society of the Blessed Ones. A man is not a head or a mask. He is not a 
body that can be transformed into a serpent or stag, as Actaeon was, or shockingly reduced 
to an object, or even abject matter, scattered on the earth. Physical form cannot be said to 
really constitute the person. Thought is not object as matter is, it has not the stability or 
permanence of things, and person is not co-extensive with the body. Human person is 
neither body nor mind but the co-presence, or society, of body and mind. It is something 
more like the relationship by which the local, particular and unique is connected to that 
which can seem to stand outside of space-time, viz. the mind, (but which is really always 
one interpenetrated dimension of an entangled, historical reality in space and time). Person 
is more like an environment, a shifting context of relation, one that is imperfectly served by 
too neat a dichotomy of “subject” and “object”.  
 
A person, the identity of others, is hard to locate. One thing it must be, is in time. A person is 
not the act of a moment or what is said in one instance (although the only way we 
experience historical persons is in a succession of instances). Instead, a person is some 
                                                        
22 I have, furthermore, introduced other scholarship, such as that of Stewart Guthrie on the “detection of agents”, for example, that does not 
make this distinction or for which the ethical dimension of agency is not at issue. 
23 Eur. IA 485: τί βούλοµαι γάρ; see below p. 126 § 2.7 n. 324 and p. 197 § 3.3.8 n. 252; and the contrast with Snell, 1928: 1-33, on the 
defining tragic question being “ti drasō?”, “What shall I do?”. 
24 53-4: ὧν οὕνεκ' εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω / µορφήν τ' ἐµὴν µετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν. 
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property we infer, stretched over time. Personhood is something inferred, produced by 
interpretation; not a phenomenon straightforwardly registered or perceived. Like agency it 
is not easy to demonstrate objectively, since it is a property of the subjectivity of subjects, 
their being self-reflexive, their having the consciousness of “self” the way that all beings are 
conscious of external objects. We react to and see narrative and dramatic fictions as persons, 
as subjects, just as we, subjects of our own experience, can look upon ourselves as objects.  
 
Characters on stage are persons, although they are clearly only virtual identities. They are 
fungible: different actors can play them, they are not attached to specific, singular bodies. 
Gods are persons; we think and speak of them and relate to them as such. In “art situations”, 
such as in the theatre, we begin to understand the fictive character of all persons, not only 
those imaginative creations of poetry, but also historical persons. The society of persons, or 
Lebenswelt, is made up of: those with us, co-present; those alive but absent, our 
contemporaries; our predecessors, the dead and the previous generation moving closer to 
death; and the not yet born or matured, our successors. And in Greek poetry it is a special 
kind of person, inspired with a very Apollonian or Dionysiac power25 – mania mantikē26 – who 
has the sensitivity to apprehend the meanings of the preceding, current and succeeding 
world of persons: τά τ' ἐόντα τά τ' ἐσσό/ενα Fρό τ' ἐόντα27.  
 
Gods, characters in drama, the dead: we might call these effective persons, for living humans 
relate with these virtual beings as if they were there. They are virtual, however, lacking 
something in common: they are not in time, they are not there in the way that historical 
persons are there, having a densité de présence. Human historical persons are tragically 
subject to contingency and time, to a constant unfolding. You can hold humans in your arms 
and they will be responsive, to put it simply. When a loved one dies, as in Bacchae, and their 
body is held in one’s arms, one is mournful, for this responsiveness is extinct; one cannot 
have a relationship of mutuality any longer, the loved one is no longer subject to time. 
Personhood is not co-extensive with the body, its apprehending is not always contingent on 
fullest presence; it is shared in common with beings that need not exist in the common 
historical sense of “existent”. A visiting ghost will be, effectively, the person. But a ghost is 
not in space-time as an historical person is. Representations, idols, art works, memory, 
apparitions, gods – these are very often effective as persons, but insufficient for a fully 
reciprocal relation marked by the defining condition of historical persons, which is the ad hoc 
                                                        
25 298-9: µάντις δ' ὁ δαίµων ὅδε· τὸ γὰρ βακχεύσιµον/ καὶ τὸ µανιῶδες µαντικὴν πολλὴν ἔχει· 
26 Notwithstanding Plato’s schema of the division of forms of mania, in which to Apollo belongs prophetic inspiration and to his brother 
Dionysus the telestic, Pl. Phdr. 265b 2-4: Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα µέρη διελόµενοι, µαντικὴν µὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, 
Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν. In Tragedy Dionysus is often explicitly linked with the prophetic, mantikē, powers. 
27 Hom. Il. 1.70, the human Lebenswelt with its definingly temporal, successive character; a past, present and future, with which the mantis 
Kalchas is familiar. 
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character of their experience, their subjection to time and its perpetual shifting and 
uncertainty. This historical personhood – physical proximity and the mutuality of co-
presence in space and time – is the condition which one might call sufficient personhood. 
Whatever it is, it seems a riddle underlying or overshadowing the events of Bacchae. This 
study is an exploration of its significance and the manner in which it invests the work with 
such an electric, enigmatic quality of something as if alive, as if, indeed, a person. 
 
Among other things, Shakespeare’s Hamlet is a Tragedy in which a super-natural being 
solicits a son for vengeance.28 The son cannot be sure of the nature or identity of the spirit. 
With the young Danish prince this doubtfulness of the phantom’s true identity, its being 
apistos or adēlotēs, becomes a pretext or opportunity for elaborate and quite astonishing 
reflections on the nature of personhood an sich, the nature of mortality and the relationship 
between imagination and reality. Moments in Bacchae recall the scene in Hamlet, where the 
prince addresses Yorick’s skull29. What was Yorick ever that his japes and gibes still echo 
through the mind, while Yorick the historical man is reduced to bones, a skull 
apostrophized so pathetically as if the person? When Kadmos addresses the mask of 
Pentheus, he addresses a future, only virtual Pentheus, who, after the young king’s violent 
death, will not be there in future, as he is not “here” in Kadmos’ present30. Pentheus is 
reduced, like Yorick or Alexander the Great31, to sheer matter and this is absolute aporia, 
perplexing the mind out of thought.  
 
Here is a strange, impenetrable enigma of existence, one seeming to thwart logic: persons 
are matter and some quality animating matter, some quality of mind and desire and 
mindless vitality and pre-rational urge. The body is empsuchos and it becomes apsuchos, and 
this is definitive: being alive is being internally self-moving, having this minimal autonomy. 
What persons are looks very like language, those contents that more or less stream out of 
them. It is not, however, exhausted by language or consciousness, “words, words, words”, 
as the bookish, young tyrannos of Elsinore put it aporetically. The presence of other persons, 
which can be so troublesome, and their absence, which can be so sorrowful, mean a great 
deal to human persons, who are nothing if not social. Yet they have this fictional texture and 
they are opaque. Humans are instinctive and thoughtful, thoughtless and calculating, 
inspired and imprudent. They are defined by their unique articulacy and the tragic 
                                                        
28 In more obvious ways it recalls Orestes and his Horatio, Pylades, tormented by nightmares and sleeplessness; hater of a usurper, having a 
treacherous mother and being pursued by phantoms, inexorably to a dubious revenge. 
29 Shakespeare Ham. 5.1. 
30 As Agamemnon in Iphigenia at Aulis (performed alongside Bacchae, also 405 BCE) pathetically addresses a projected, dying daughter 
(who is in fact not yet being killed, only absent), and a pathetic, crying infant Orestes and faraway Helen and Paris. Eur. IA 462-8. 
31 Shakespeare Ham. 5.1. 202-4: To what base uses we may return, Horatio! Why may/ not imagination trace the noble dust of Alexander, / 
till he find it stopping a bung-hole? 
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muteness of their desires, and by a blindness when they turn their minds upon themselves. 
Bacchae does not solve these profound problems, but it certainly raises them as problems.  
 
This study will brush against some difficult and central philosophical problems. The late 5th 
Century was a time when many of the questions that endured for millennia as the central 
riddles of a thinking person’s life were first formulated as philosophy, as problems and 
questions with answers worth pursuing, however unattainable. The 20th Century was a time 
in which humans became redefined as psychological subjects, but also objects of historical or 
structural forces. In Classics, the last century has been a time of re-exploration of the ritual, 
mystical and irrational aspects of Tragedy, especially in this drama of the god Dionysus. But 
Bacchae is a set of questions deliberately opened up and they are not neatly resolved. The 
nature of these is self-consciously philosophical, a complex seeking after sophia. Whatever 
that may be, it is not limited to a cognitive property of persons, and cannot be subsumed by 
the categories of rationalist philosophizing.  
 
Humans define themselves through relationships, but these are impalpable and unstable. 
Things matter to humans, but why they should do so and what ought to matter, is terminally 
uncertain. Humans are intensely social but hard to get on with. They wish to be recognized 
by others, but what it is that is being recognized and who deserves highest recognition is 
changing, unclear and disputed. What is a person that its ability to recognize itself and be 
recognized as such by others comes and goes, is not a given? What is the difference between 
mortal persons and immortal ones, and is the defining quality of mortal persons their 
impressive rational capacity or their insuperable mortality, their being in time? Humans are 
marked by their having desires, deliberating, judging and choosing or failing to do so. They 
feel sometimes powerful and effective and other times the playthings of forces they cannot 
understand. Their desires and emotions feel sometimes their own – governed from within, 
endothen – and other times as if external forces – exōthen – own them. All of these questions 
and problems are implicated in the events of Bacchae.  
 
Perhaps the greatest paradox in this thoroughly ironic and paradoxical context is that 
human identity, personhood and agency are seen to be somehow constituted of the same 
stuff as fiction. It partakes, somehow, of the imaginative fabric, thread by the flying hands of 
mind. There is no self, in one realistic sense. There is no part of humans that survives time 
and its entropy, unless it is fictive. Transcendent beings or transcendent parts are purely 
notional. And yet, nothing is more real, nothing more valuable to humans, nothing more 
determining for their lives, its quality and significance, than these intractably immaterial 
fictions. Fictions are not real in an objective, demonstrable, measurable sense, and yet 
nothing is more efficacious than the identities, values and effectively transcendent persons that 
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the human mind both discovers and projects; the persons and personhood with which the 
world is so richly populated.  
 
I have not set out to, nor will we solve any philosophical problems in the course of this 
study of Bacchae, but I hope to show that, not merely a reflection of ritual practices nor only 
a social ritual to bring cathartic relief or a feeling of civic solidarity, Bacchae is a living fiction 
and its identity is, strange as it may sound, like that of a person. It engages and is engaged. 
We may personify it and say that it has desires, it makes judgements and it engages us as 
persons, as subjects that also judge and choose and reflect. Like Dionysus as a mask hung on 
a shaft in the Anthesteria, or as with his initiates in Bacchae, it “sees being seen”; it watches 
us, knowing it is itself being watched, as it transmits its special knowledge: ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα, 
καὶ δίδωσιν ὄργια, 470. We know it by inference, and interpret it into life, so to speak, in the 
same way that we only ever know that elusive property, the identity of person. It has values. 
Exactly like the private rituals, orgia, of Dionysus, which “hate the man who practises 
impiety” – ἀσέβειαν ἀσκοῦντ' ὄργι' ἐχθαίρει θεοῦ, 476 – Attic dramas, these ancestral 
teletai, public rituals32, have the quality of human persons: they lay claims, interact, have 
sense and make judgements. Bacchae makes value judgements, it evaluates other persons, 
modifies how we read its own predecessors and successors, and summons a certain quality 
of evaluativeness from its spectators.  
 
 
1.3 Views on Agency and Personhood: Was soll werden? 
 
In this section I briefly sketch the development of perspectives on the Greek views of self, 
agent and person in the 20th Century. When agency was discussed by Classicists in the last 
hundred years or so, it was largely as a topic in the philosophy of free will and individual 
autonomy. Normative notions on the subject, derived from Cartesian, Kantian and 
vestigially Christian views of the self, governed assumptions among many of the earlier 
interpreters of Greek poetry in this period. Until the 1970s a view of “progress”, 
development or gradual “Entdeckung” in Greek views of agency and person dominated. 
Bruno Snell and Arthur Adkins are representative of this assessment of the history of Greek 
culture as a development from supposedly more primitive forms to more recognizably 
modern, complex notions of the self as a unique individual having depth. Such notions 
allegedly begin to be discerned in Attic Drama, by the beginning of the 5th Century33. The 
unspoken philosophical bias motivating these assumptions is articulated by Jean-Pierre 
                                                        
32 Cf. Ar. Ran. 368: κωµῳδηθεὶς ἐν ταῖς πατρίοις τελεταῖς ταῖς τοῦ Διονύσου, “Ridiculed in the ancestral rites [patriois teletais] of 
Dionysus.” 
33 Snell, 1928, 1930, 1955. Adkins, 1960, 1970. 
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Vernant and later, more elaborately, by Christopher Gill34. They, especially the latter, aim to 
correct the imbalances in the analysis of the subject in Greek thought and poetry introduced 
by an under-theorized or simply normative, modern notion of the self, against which Greek 
conceptions have been implicitly and distortingly measured.  
 
In this study I seek to further develop the task of articulating an interpretation 
commensurate with the tragic poet’s own views of agency and personhood, rather than 
applying unexpressed Enlightenment, anti-Enlightenment or post-Enlightenment 
assumptions to the reading of the work. An important theme of the play is desire and its 
relationship with knowledge. Bacchae complicates the identity of the subject of desires, the 
subject of knowledge and the true and only apparent objects of these, in sophisticated ways. 
I study the problems of desire, passion, decision and the articulacy of the self in Bacchae by 
the light of the philosophies of agency found in Aristotle and in the contemporary work of 
Charles Taylor.  
 
Nevertheless, the fundamental premise of this work is that we require not only a more 
nuanced, less anachronistic, approach to the question of the self and its agency, from the 
point of view of philosophy, but that our implicit and explicit anthropology of the human 
subject and its Lebenswelt will be determining for the answers we finally arrive at. Bacchae, as 
will be shown, challenges our views, not only on personal freedom and choice, but on the 
identity of persons, their relationship with language, the nature of divine persons as 
opposed to mortal, and our manner of knowing other persons and ourselves. We may say 
that in the play we have the opportunity to discern what the necessary elements or 
conditions of agency and personhood are, what elements will qualify for an effective or 
socially and cognitively competent personhood, and what would constitute sufficient 
personhood in the Dionysiac context. “Sufficient” here means adequate or commensurate 
with the peculiar completeness called for by Dionysus, which is not presence of mind but 
the co-presence of mind with body, wholesomely integrated with feeling and a healthy kind 
of desiring, which is itself a desiring for health and wholeness.  
 
The purpose of this book then is to study Bacchae closely, cognizant of the philosophical 
premises that will shape our sketch of the work, and to bind together the outlines of a 
“silhouette of an anthropology of the tragic subject”35, such as we discover in Euripides’ play. 
The view of agency and person taken here is not confined to, or even primarily, the 
traditional philosophical one, nor does it adopt the position of criticism seeking to 
“counteract” traditional views, taken by Gill and Vernant. The great interest in this study 
                                                        
34 Vernant, in Vernant & Vidal-Nacquet, 1972; Gill, 1986, 1990, 1996, 2006. 
35 Cf. Gell, 1998: 10-11. 
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will be seen not in the question of subjectivity understood in terms of autonomy or free will, 
or of subjectivity versus objectivity, but in terms of the anthropological posture taken by a 
Greek poet on the human subject as, in time, forming part of a Lebenswelt; being 
intersubjective; being a container concealing insides, phrenes; being more or less competent 
as a social actor; being embodied; being born, impulsive, articulate, communicating; feeling 
communicated with; consuming, expelling, dying; and, definingly, feeling concern in all 
manner of ways.  
 
Freud famously defined the project of psychoanalysis with the Delphically resounding 
utterance: “Wo Es war, soll Ich werden.”36 Such is the therapeutic task of psychology, to 
identify and illuminate the hidden causes and motivations of psychic life. The Freudian telos 
is to cure disorder, so far as that may be possible, by turning the concealed objects shaping 
psychic life into the recognized and handled elements of a subject’s more articulated self. 
Freud employs scientific method towards an ethical, human end: personal wholeness 
through examination of the self. The project of Claude Lévi-Strauss can in certain lights 
seem to have been the very reverse of Freud’s, in its negation of the individual subject and 
any kind of personal agency and Ich37. The most influential figure in 20th Century 
anthropology had little patience for the privileging of individual subjectivity in the analysis 
of culture. Par excellence, he embodies the scientific, objectivist impulse in the modern study 
of human culture. He “hated” phenomenology and the “shopgirl’s metaphysics” – “une 
sorte de métaphysique pour midinette” – of existentialism, repudiating the subject and its 
personal, affective experience as having no heuristic value38. In the final paragraphs of his 
great memoir he paraphrases Pascale39, writing famously: “Le moi n'est pas seulement 
haïssable: il n'a pas de place entre nous et rien.”40 
 
                                                        
36 In the semester of 1916/17, in lectures he delivered at the Viennesse Psychiatric Clinic, Freud famously defined the objective of 
psychoanalysis as follows: “Ihre Absicht ist ja, das Ich zu stärken, es vom Über-Ich unabhängiger zu machen, sein Wahrnehmungsfeld zu 
erweitern und seine Organisation auszubauen, so daß es sich neue Stücke des Es aneignen kann. Wo Es war, soll Ich werden.“ (Freud, 1933 
Neue Folge der Vorlesungen zur Einführung in die Psychoanalyse). 
37 Although, in fact, Freud was a Diotima to the young anthropologist, Freudian psychology was one of Lévi-Strauss’ earliest and formative 
maîtresses, along with Marx and geology. See Lévi-Strauss, 1955: 52-64 “Comment on devient ethnologue”. 
38 Lévi-Strauss, 1955: 61.  
39 Pascale in his Pensées § 597 [ed. Lafuma] had written “Le moi est haïssable. Ainsi ceux qui ne l’ôtent pas, et qui se contentent seulement 
de le couvrir, sont toujours haïssables.” In Pascale, the motivation is Christian selflessness, the rejection of egocentrism. Nevertheless, that 
is perhaps a true antecedent of the selflessness of modern, scientific objectivism. 
40 Lévi-Strauss, 1955: 496. Cf. Shatz, 2011: “Lévi-Strauss saw himself as a spiritual medium more than an author. ‘I don’t have the feeling 
that I write my books,’ he said. ‘I have the feeling that my books get written through me . . .  I never had, and still do not have, the 
perception of feeling my personal identity.’ In Tristes Tropiques, his memoir of his fieldwork among the Indians of Brazil, he called the self 
‘hateful’. Everything he wrote aimed to puncture the notions of will and agency that cluster around the human subject. The critique of the 
subject was central to structuralism.” 
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Although the self was Freud’s defined object of study and attention, and that may seem to 
be as absolute a privileging or affirmation as there may be, Freud’s work is decidedly not 
metaphysical or romantic (on the face of it), nor in its clinical ambitions can it be impugned 
as denying objective scientific method. The implications of Freud’s work, especially his 
structuring of the self and defining of the ineradicable and fundamental character of the 
unconscious, have, like those of Lévi-Strauss’ work, been adapted in various ways by 
Classical scholars. The position taken by interpreters with respect to first-order objectivism 
or explanation, on the one hand; and with respect to second-order, subjective experience or 
interpretation, on the other, will be determining for the conclusions they draw. The broad 
trend in recent times may be crudely described as an increasingly determined resolution to 
apply to Greek texts and culture the objective criteria of the sciences; to identify where a 
distorting, normative view of the self as transcendent or outside of history has coloured 
interpretation and method, and to correct that. In philology, as in most humanistic 
disciplines, the prestige of scientific method and the relativizing of “the subject” both as 
category and as absolute value, have served to displace the traditional Enlightenment view, 
which defined unspoken parameters for understanding the self until at least the Second 
World War.  
 
The view of Ancient Greek culture, and in particular Greek religion and its Dionysiac 
expression, has also been shaped by the assumptions of late 19th Century anthropology, such 
as are found in the work of Tylor and Frazer (and also in Robertson Smith’s and Durkheim’s 
work on cult and religion)41. Tylor and Frazer were informed by the ethnological outlook on 
supposedly primitive cultures taken by Western culture of the time. Assumptions about the 
primitive versus the modern have been decisive for positions taken with regard to Ancient 
Greek culture and religious practice; for the ways in which these are spoken of, celebrated 
and explained. Jane Harrison, Francis Cornford and Gilbert Murray (when it comes to 
Dionysus and Bacchae, especially Murray) played an important role in establishing a new 
science of ritual-functionalism as the interpretive frame through which to understand 
Tragedy and its god42. This interpretive posture would find its most sophisticated and 
persuasive permutation in the body of work produced by Walter Burkert from 1960 until the 
early 21st Century. 
 
The work of Freud clearly constitutes the most important revolution in the view of the 
human subject of the early 20th Century. Frazer and the Frazerian elements of the so-called 
Cambridge Ritual School quickly became obsolete with the emergence of Malinowski’s new, 
                                                        
41 On anthropology and the tradition of classical philology, see Schlesier, 1994. For a comprehensive account of the development of the 
view of the subject in anthropology, see Morris, 2014. 
42 Harrison, 1922, 1927; Murray, 1906, 1913, 1955. 
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scientific anthropology and Durkheim’s sociology of religion43. But the ritualism of Murray 
and Harrison received new life and a cutting-edge Freudian boost from the scholar whose 
work has been most definitive for the interpretation of Bacchae since 1945, E.R. Dodds44. If 
Nietzsche has enjoyed the most enduringly popular influence on the conception of Dionysus 
for people who study Greek, since the publication of his dithyrambic Die Geburt der Tragödie 
in 1872, it is Dodds whose work has been most important, both through the text, 
commentary and interpretive essay of his 1944 edition (updated in 1960), and through his 
seminal The Greeks and the Irrational, 1951 (which is dedicated to Murray). 
 
Dodds’ work and spirit may be said effectively to have displaced that of Otto. Otto’s 
Dionysos (1933) is rich in insights but resolutely unscientific, ahistorical and symbolist, a 
rejection of anthropology, the new “science of man”, and its application to Greek culture. 
Everything following Dodds’ work, however, must reckon with it. His influence is 
everywhere, but perhaps most effectively transmitted through the major studies that 
followed his and further disseminated his views. Other works, as much as his own, have 
established the ‘Doddsian’ as the mainstream reading45. Bacchae would become fairly well 
established as a reflection of cult, a kind of impersonal vehicle of belief and practice and an 
expression of psycho-social function. According to this reading was most significantly 
determined not by any given subjective outlook, nor was it a study in individual character, 
but served rather to smooth away individual difference, in a way to make subjects “thyrsus-
bearers”, the carriers of objects and objective cultural and historical resources or, in the case 
of Pentheus, a kind of blockage in the waterworks of a properly functioning psychological 
system of libidinal reticulation. Any question of the individual agent or problems of 
subjectivity and interpretation had effectively been circumvented; they simply had no 
bearing here. Bacchae reflected collective life and its doings, having little to do with 
individuals: it in fact enacted the effacement of individuality. Hence the play becomes a 
resource in the history of “Dionysiac religion”, “Maenadism”, and a kind of re-established 
ritualism with Freudian overtones46. 
 
                                                        
43 Frazer, unlike the fieldworker Malinowski, was essentially an armchair scholar, his sources being often colonial ethnological reports of 
questionable or uneven scientific value. On Frazer and the “Cambridge Ritualists”, see Ackerman, 2002. 
44 On Dodds’ Freudian assumptions, a tacit psychology of Bacchae, (Dodds, editor of the canonical modern edition “offers no explicit 
affiliation to a body of theoretical material”), see Goldhill in Easterling, 1987 (the quote here from 342-3). 
45 As, for example, through Jeanmaire, 1951 on Dionysus and his cult; Adkins’ very influential works on related questions in Greek culture 
and its interpretation, 1960, 1970; on Bacchae Roux, 1972; on the origins of tragedy and on Greek religion generally, Burkert 1966, 1972, 
1977; and on the reading of Bacchae in terms of ritual, Seaford, 1996; Di Benedetto, 2004. 
46 On “maenadism” and Dionysiac religiosity, see for example Jeanmaire, 1951; Dodds, 1940, 1951; Henrichs, 1969, 1978; Bremmer, 1984; 
Goff, 2004; and Schlesier’s “Der bakchische Gott” in Schlesier: 173-202.  
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Richard Seaford remains one of the most important recent contributors to scholarship on 
Dionysus, and Bacchae in particular. Amongst Dionysosforscher he also represents the most 
complete realization of the ritualism or neo-ritualism in which personhood or agency is 
displaced by ritual patterning: a morphological approach that has something in common 
with the pattern-recognitions of structuralism and post-structuralism, but showing a great 
commitment to the local and historical evidence, rather than trying to force that evidence 
into conformity with the universal. His work was contemporary with that of Charles Segal, 
who could stand well for the fullest realization of the structuralist and post-structuralist 
permutation of the interpretation of Bacchae47. Segal’s most important work on Bacchae was 
the exhaustive study Dionysiac Poetics and Euripides’ “Bacchae” (1997 [1982]), which will 
perhaps be most remembered for its adept introduction into the interpretation of the play of 
contemporary literary theory and the influential idea of its “metatheatrical” qualities.  
 
The crucial point here is that any interpretation finding the play to be a study in ēthos or the 
nature of the good and the good life, or an ethical judgement of the divinity – which in the 
earlier 20th Century had been fairly common –  has largely disappeared in the interests of a 
more objectivist kind of approach. It has been replaced by interpretation of the play as the 
expression of scientifically analysable psychological conditions, sociologically or 
functionally explicable rituals, or systematically classifiable structures of signification. Thus, 
interpretation of Bacchae can be said to recapitulate the rhythms of the broader trends in 
intellectual culture. 
 
The disappearance of the ethical agent as the subject of interpretation of a cultural work 
such as a Greek tragedy will not necessarily make that interpretation automatically more 
objective. Such a strategy also has its place in a history of methodologies and views of the 
subject; it is not the culmination of a slow approach to truth, but itself entails a value 
judgement and may, like all things, be historicized, i.e. relativized. Explanation is not a priori 
more valid than interpretation48. The prestige of science is no more an absolute value 
embraced by all than is the romantic conception of the autonomous, self-determining and 
coherent individual. These were the kinds of things being argued, as I see it, by such 
scholars as Griffin, Friedrich and Scullion, who expressed reservations about the “neo-
ritualist” posture of scholars like Richard Seaford and, perhaps indirectly, of Burkert. As 
Scullion put it in an essay that deserves to be more influential, Tragedy has been largely 
“misconceived as ritual”49.  
 
                                                        
47 Seaford, 1981, 1987, 1994, 1996. Segal, 1997 [1982]. 
48 See Lawson & McCauley, 1990: esp. 12-31, on interpretation versus explanation in the interpretation of religion. 
49 Griffin, 1988; Friedrich, 1983, 2000; and Seaford’s responses to their criticisms, Seaford, 2000a, 2000b; Scullion, 2002. 
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We might usefully isolate four most influential and representative scholars, spread nearly 
evenly over time, who have explicitly handled the delicate questions of agency and person 
in Greek Tragedy in the last century: Bruno Snell, Arthur Adkins, Jean-Pierre Vernant and 
Christopher Gill. In between the milestone works of these individuals, there come the many 
other interpreters from whom scholarship on the subject has richly benefitted50. Bruno Snell’s 
earliest work focused on Greek terms for knowledge51. In 1928 he published Aischylos und das 
Handeln im Drama, treating questions of action and the psychology of volition in drama. 
While, as the title declares, his main subject is Aeschylus, in his opening chapters he offers a 
most Hegelian syllogistic and geistesgeschichtliche description of the biography of the Greek 
Ich, from the thesis of Homer, through the antithesis of Lyric to the synthesis of Drama. He 
combined the etymological or ‘lexical method’ with a view of history as unfolding Spirit. 
Thirty years later Adkins, a student of Dodds, would work on the basis of a somewhat 
similar, normative view of the nature of the subject and its agency; one that assumed a 
development to increasing sophistication or completeness over time. This residually 
romantic notion of the self gives its own shape to the Greek material studied. Such a 
normative view of development towards consummation, it should perhaps be said, is at 
least as old as Aristotle, who thought of Tragedy as itself arising out of the ad hoc and 
developing into its perfect form52. 
 
The locus classicus for modern discussions of agency in Greek Tragedy is Vernant’s essay 
‘Ébauches de la volonté dans la tragédie grecque’, 1972. Vernant’s objective there was to 
historicize the premises, often unspoken, which characterize many previous discussions of 
agency and the will in tragedy. He sought to show that much confusion derives from an 
anachronistic misreading of Aristotle on ethics and misapplication of the later idea of “free 
will” as philosophical problem. Vernant approvingly reads André Rivier’s 1968 essay, which 
argues against the modern, humanistic underappreciation of the objective realities that 
divine beings in fact represented for the Greeks53. Both look back critically to Snell’s 1928 
work on Aeschylus and together mark an important divergence from his path and the 
beginning of a re-assertion of the objective view that the Greeks themselves took on 
personhood – mortal and divine – and that modern interpreters ought similarly to take on 
ancient culture.  
 
                                                        
50 Notably, for example, Garton, 1957, Lesky, 1960, 1966; Dawe, 1963; Easterling, 1973; Gould, 1978. 
51 Snell, 1922: Die Ausdrücke Für den Begriff des Wissens in der Vorplatonischen Philosophie. One of his latest works took up this theme in 
the form of a response to Dodds’ The Greeks and the Irrational, see Snell, 1973: “Wie die Griechen lernten, was geistige Tätigkeit ist”. 
52 Aristotle described Tragedy itself as a development from something rudimentary, through stages, to a settled perfection in which it 
realized its true nature, phusis, from which there could be no further development, see Arist. Poet. 1449a 14-15: καὶ πολλὰς µεταβολὰς 
µεταβαλοῦσα ἡ τραγῳδία ἐπαύσατο, ἐπεὶ ἔσχε τὴν αὑτῆς φύσιν. 
53 Rivier, 1968, see also his treatment of the theme of the super-natural in Euripides, Rivier, 1960. 
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An essential difference between Snell on the one hand and Vernant on the other might be 
expressed in how they premise time and change. Snell’s work is explicitly shaped by a 
Hegelian historiography of spiritual development through thesis, antithesis and synthesis. 
Vernant’s approach is conditioned by the materialist historiography, which had previously 
shaped Durkheim’s sociological reading of ritual; by Braudel’s historiography of la longue 
durée; by Louis Gernet’s historical reading of Greek legal conceptions of imputability, agency 
and person; and by Ignace Meyerson’s project to describe a historical psychology54. On the 
one hand, time is a spiritual unfolding, on the other it is the dialectical transformation of 
objective, material conditions. 
 
The most important work of recent times on questions of personhood, the self, and the 
interpretation of the human subject, as conceived both in Greek culture and by modern 
scholars, is Christopher Gill’s Personality in Greek Epic, Tragedy, and Philosophy: The Self in 
Dialogue, 199655. This comprehensively covers much of the theoretical ground which forms 
the background to the problem of objective and subjective views of personhood. Like 
Vernant before him, Gill revisits Snell and Adkins and holds them up as examples of a 
philosophically undertheorized, normative view of human persons, one that has the outlines 
of a Kantian, Enlightenment conception of the individual as a unified being with certain 
defining potentialities. But Gill’s work is an in-depth study, as opposed to Vernant’s essay 
(rich and lengthy as that is), and therefore comparatively extensive. The ambition of 
Vernant, one may say, was a salutary historicizing of categories and a making explicit of the 
values expressed by the judgements taken on the question of the agent and the freedom of 
its will in Tragedy. Gill’s project is essentially philosophical but reposes on the same desire 
as Vernant’s, viz. to offer a corrective to any too unreflective conceptualization and 
privileging of the subject as object of analysis or as prize of civilizational development. 
 
Gill discusses some key passages in Homer that had been used by Snell and Adkins to 
illustrate their arguments on Homeric views of psychology, the identity of person and the 
qualified imputability to it of its acts56. He discusses personality in Plato and Aristotle at 
length. When it comes to tragedy, his focus is mostly on that complex dramatic creation of 
Euripides, Medea. He does not introduce Dionysus or Bacchae into his discussion. Bacchae 
rather complicates the rationalist, Aristotelian view of Gill, and yet it is essential to any 
discussion of self and personhood in tragedy, as I hope to demonstrate. Chiara Thumiger’s 
2007 Hidden Paths – Self & Characterization in Greek Tragedy: Euripides’ “Bacchae”, is a 
monograph devoted to related questions in Euripides’ play. Her valuable contribution to the 
                                                        
54 Durkheim, 1912; Braudel, 1998; Meyerson, 1948; Gernet, 1968. 
55 Anticipated in the 1986 article, “The Question of Character and Personality in Greek Tragedy”, Gill, 1986. 
56 I treat these passages in detail in my own forthcoming study, Agency in Greek Tragedy. 
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study of Bacchae is more concerned with rather more literary conceptions of character and 
self and their interpretation than is the case in the present study, which is focused on 
developing an anthropology of the tragic subject as a creature having value and concerns on 
one hand and on the other a peculiar and determining ontic character of personhood – or 
whatever we ought to call it, τὴν καρδίαν γὰρ ἢ ψυχὴν ἢ ὅτι δεῖ αὐτὸ ὀνο/άσαι57. 
 
Gill is interested in “the norms of personality and selfhood” expressed in Greek thought and 
their relationship to “equivalent modern norms”58. He sets out to combine “the exploration 
of Greek thinking about selfhood and personality with the re-examination of our own ideas 
on this subject”, to critically reappraise leading ideas of both ancient and modern thought 
and to encourage a new respect for Greek ideas, showing their relevance afresh59. He rejects 
the developmental, geistesgeschichtliches view of Snell and Adkins, his own work being a 
“reaction” against that, and he recognizes that he has this in common with structural 
anthropologists though does not discuss their methods60. He certainly shared this revisional 
or corrective reaction with Vernant, who was a most sophisticated and critical reader of the 
work of Lévi-Strauss, setting an example to a generation of scholars of how to exploit 
structuralism to gain new insights into ancient Greek culture61.  
 
Gill adduces contemporary philosophy of mind in the work of Wilkes, and of ethics in that 
of Macintyre and Williams to support his critical position. He submits to rigorous analysis 
and evaluation the usefulness of the Cartesian, post-Cartesian and Kantian models of the 
subject as coherent “I”; a unitary, full person; having a continuous identity; autonomy and 
agency. These had been the dominant, ultimately normative views of personhood 
throughout most of the modern period62. As he summarizes Wilkes’ critique of Cartesian 
orthodoxy63: 
 
. . . the Cartesian and post-Cartesian models of mind and personhood are overly 
subjective and subjectivist in two related ways. (1) They give a privileged status to the 
idea of the ‘subject’, the ‘I’ as seat of self-consciousness; and (2) they give a similarly 
privileged status to the subjective (especially first-personal) perspective in their 
accounts of our access to, and knowledge of, human psychology.  
 
                                                        
57 To borrow from Alcibiades in the Symposium Pl. Sym. 218a. 
58 Gill, 1996: 2. 
59 Gill, 1996: 4. 
60 Gill, 1996: 5. 
61 See Vernant, in Buxton 2000; and Vernant, 1974, esp. “Raisons du mythe”: 195-250  
62 Wilkes, 1988; MacIntyre, 1985; Williams, 1985. 
63 Gill, 1996: 6. 
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Wilkes and others argue that the notion of ‘the subject’ is unhelpful, the mind better 
understood as “for instance the interplay between psychological parts or functions”. A 
third-person mode of enquiry would be best suited for this undertaking. This is an 
argument for a scientific, “objectivist account of our knowledge of human psychology”.64 
Wilkes’ criticism of the first-person view of the individual as unitary consciousness, “I”, 
entails a critique not simply of the psychology of knowledge, but of the ontology of person 
as I see it.  
 
The picture we discover in a work like Bacchae is such that we should be wary of assuming 
that personhood is ever entirely subsumed in the mental life of a person, in its consciousness 
and unconsciousness, however that is conceptualized, whether unitary or interactive. It may 
be ambiguous and indefinite, occasionally contradicted, but it is strongly suggested in 
Bacchae that embodied identity – the simultaneous presence of both body and mind – alone 
provides the sufficient conditions of fullest personhood. Where Gill focuses on the nature of 
the conscious and its central role in self, I shall be more concerned with the ontic dimensions 
of mind and embodiment and the complicated way these are seen in Bacchae to constitute 
aspects of persons and beings in time, having both a virtual, mental character and a physical 
dimension. Bacchae, amongst other things, is a play that problematizes the self and its 
identity. Personhood here is “not easily located”: οὐ ῥάιδιον ζήτη/α, 1139. 
 
As Wilkes critiques Cartesian over-privileging of the subject and subjectivity, so analogously 
did MacIntyre and Williams challenge the validity of Kant’s notion of the moral agent and 
its capacity for “self-legislation” or for an idealized autonomy65: 
 
Both MacIntyre and Williams argue that moral (or rather ethical) life should be 
understood primarily in terms of the development of dispositions by full-hearted 
engagement in the value-bearing practices, roles, and modes of relationship of a 
specific society.  
 
Once again, the critical view taken by those philosophers and endorsed by Gill, is that the 
Kantian and post-Kantian views are too centred on the sovereign individual, (such an ideal 
of “man” is really a more mythical person than the life-like, time-bound and faulty persons 
of Greek myth and drama). They argue for a more realistic view of persons as caught up in 
“interpersonal and communal relationships”. Engagement or participation has a central role 
in ethical life and the formation of ethical ideals66. What Gill calls “engagement” and 
                                                        
64 Gill, 1996: 6-7. 
65 Gill, 1996: 7. 
66 Gill, 1996: 8-9. 
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“participation” in “communal relationships” finds expression in the current study of Bacchae 
as “intersubjectivity” – homilia – “forms of life”, “the polis” and the “public domain”. For a 
study of Greek Tragedy cannot really avoid the fact that persons are conceived there as they 
in fact always are: definitively social beings, creatures of relation and “talk”. Sociality is not 
one aspect of the life of individuals; it is constitutive of persons qua subjects.  
 
Bacchae represents a re-assessment of identities and of personhood, setting the isolated 
individual as a negative ideal against precisely ‘the development of dispositions by full-
hearted engagement in the value-bearing practices, roles, and modes of relationship of a 
specific society’. But this is not a world only of discourse and conceptions, of established 
nomoi and forms of life, but of their origin and establishment out of the opaque recesses of 
human life and its psychology in all its uncanniness. It is a world not only of reason but of 
such immeasurables as a sophia, which is perpetually other than what mortals have thought. 
The Dionysiac context is one of charis – human or savage or divine67 – and of the healthy 
mania of inspiration. It is a richly textured, dynamic cosmos not of stable idea and its 
discursive interpretation68, but of phainomena and phusis: sōma, body, chrōs, flesh, morhpai, 
shapes, sensation, charisma and a kind of profoundest esprit de corps and joyfulness, 
euphrosynē. These are not easily susceptible to reasonable accounting, arising in the animal 
co-presence of embodied beings. 
 
Gill’s proposal in view of the historical, interpretive problems he identified, consisted of a 
synthesis of those modern revisional insights into the psychological and ethical structure of 
person (of Wilkes, MacIntyre and Williams), viz. of the excessive subjectivism of traditional 
Cartesian philosophy of mind on one hand; and the excessive individualism of the Kantian, 
moral subject, on the other. These together are seen by him as “expressing a subjective-
individualist conception of personality”, which is the object of his analysis and refutation69. 
Wilkes on mind and MacIntyre and Williams on ethics sometimes present Greek thinking as 
“anticipating” their own work; this is Gill’s line too though with the qualification that he 
does not identify the Greek and modern as one line of thinking. Instead he argues that one 
important distinction is that Greek thinkers were even more “objectivist” in the framing of 
their ethical theories than these moderns prescribe70.  
 
                                                        
67Human, 236: ὄσσοις χάριτας Ἀφροδίτης ἔχων, 721: άριν τ' ἄνακτι θώµεθ'; Savage, 139: ὠµοφάγον χάριν. Divine, 535: Διονύσου χάριν. 
68 Pentheus wants to know what idea “form” the mysteries of Dionysus take; idea is unspeakable, unpinned down and concealed in this 
context 471: τὰ δ' ὄργι' ἐστὶ τίν' ἰδέαν ἔχοντά σοι; Dionysus’ world is not one of transcendent but shifting time-shaped morphai; the god like 
his reality takes arbitrary, changing forms “however he wants to”, 478: ὁποῖος ἤθελ'· 
69 Gill, 1996: 9. Williams replaced Kant’s terminology of “morality” with the more appropriately Aristotelian one of the “ethical” to obviate 
any confusion with his views. See Gill, 1996: 7 n. 23. 
70 Gill, 1996: 9 
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The fundamental aim of Gill’s work, then, is to “counteract” the “subjective, individualist 
and subjective-individualist strands of thought” pervasive in shaping modern notions of 
mind and ethics. In place, he offers an “objective-participant account” of these. By this he 
means to combine an ‘objective psychological framework’ with a ‘participant’ ethical 
framework71. Gill’s “objective-participant view” is, in itself, a salutary reaction against the 
excessive and indeed unhistorical subjectivism of an often inarticulately Kantian, moral 
individualism and normative, Cartesian structuring of the person that has coloured so much 
modern interpretation. Gill’s critical work also anticipates my own approaches, with 
important similarities and differences. It will thus be worthwhile to note in some further 
detail how he defined his main idea. 
 
Distinguished definitively from the “subjectivist-individualist conception”, Gill summarizes 
his “objective-participant conception” in five points. “To be a human being or (rational 
animal)” is: (1) to act on the basis of reasons fully conscious or not; (2) to participate in forms 
of life and in discourse concerning the nature and significance of those forms of life, the 
outcome of which participation will be knowledge concerning the good life and a 
corresponding character and way of life; (3) to be a person whose “psycho-ethical life” is 
typically conceived of as an internal ‘dialogue’, has the potential to become ‘reason-ruled’ by 
the discourse of social norms and ‘reflective debate about the proper goals of a human life’; 
(4) to have the potential to become ‘reason-ruled’ through admission into effective 
participation in ‘interactive and reflective discourse’ i.e. the forms of life of one’s cultural 
community; (5) to understand oneself as a human being, with “the fullest development of 
human rationality” involving reflection on the meaning of this humanness and its relation to 
‘participation in other kinds of being, such as being animal and divine’.72  
 
Gill’s point is that Greek thinking itself expresses what he defines as an objective-participant 
conception of person. This does certainly seem to be the case for Greek philosophers, and in 
important ways is true of Euripides. But the poet of Dionysus in Bacchae, as we shall see in 
the course of this study, suggests a less exclusively rationalist ethics, a less mental 
structuring of the human person. Lines are more blurred in the world of Bacchae. Qualities 
do not stand in the opposite relations that would make them more amenable to logical, 
rational scrutiny. Instead they move as if along spectrums of colour, turning into their 
opposites. The human mind must necessarily evaluate and assess by articulating values 
contrastively. Thought causes things to pause in order to be grasped and defined but the 
dynamism of Dionysus’ world causes thought’s “standing” and “pausing” to seem only 
                                                        
71 Gill, 1996: 85-6. See also a discussion and evaluation of Gill’s contribution, contextualized in the scholarly arguments over character in 
Tragedy in Thumiger’s study of Bacchae, Thumiger, 2007.  
72 Gill, 1996: 11-12. 
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momentarily or relatively valid. This is a world closer to the one in which humans, most of 
whom are not philosophers, actually live. It is a world marked by intercourse more than 
discourse, ignorance dappled with insight, rhythms, distortions and epiphanies, 
intensification and relaxation, the life of the body and the mind inextricably entangled as 
properties of a single, opaque being.   
 
The persons we encounter are pullulating with desires. They are schemers, gossips and 
wantons. The city of Thebes as a whole has this sickness, the symptoms of which are not 
knowing how to evaluate, how to identify divine persons or a worthwhile life. The only cure 
– akē – for this breakdown of persons and forms of life is a special kind of knowledge, sophia, 
which is not “rationality”. People are urged not to reflect but to dance. They are indeed 
shown as beings having the potential for reflective debate with themselves and not 
avalingavailing themselves of that potentiality. But something anterior is at stake. What will 
make humans wish rightly? What can constrain them to have the desire for healthy forms of 
“participation” in forms of life and reflection on those forms of life? What will make them 
want to cherish as a highest value in itself the rule of reason; interactive and reflective 
discourse; received, changing, disputed social norms; the ideal of the good life; their identity 
as rational humans, supposedly distinct from other kinds of being?  
 
There is a certain measure of arbitrariness in taking any position on value, including the 
position that one ought to take a position, be reflective, value rationality, participate fully in 
internal and interpersonal dialogue, etc. Most people are not philosophers and it seems they 
do not wish to feel that their values are arbitrary. The world of Bacchae is the world of 
imperfect community, of failing forms of life, of persons who fail in many ways but most 
strikingly both in talking with themselves too much and too little. There is rationality in 
Bacchae but it is of the wrong kind. There is participation, but in the wrong spirit. There is 
attempt to share rational discourse but it is frustrated. The problem in this world is one of 
desire and of the quality of desire. Relationships are not purely mental or discursive but 
more healthily characterized by certain qualities of feeling. Things phenomenal and not only 
conceptual constitute this world: bodies and their experience, mood and emotion. Presence 
of persons is not simply participation in verbal or symbolic intercourse, not only presence of 
mind, but something with an animal dimension, something very nearly erotically physical.  
 
Co-presence of persons, human common life, is co-presence of bodies. Yet, paradoxically, 
certain modes of the “animal” co-presence of bodies possess a quality usually associated 
with divine beings. Certain forms of community or the incorporation of individuals into a 
social group can seem to cause a transcending of individual selfhood, a powerful binding 
together of persons. Along with this there can take place the apparent transcending also of 
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discursive forms of life and talkative modalities of association and understanding. Such are 
the Dionysiac contexts, taking their character from music, dance, religious enthusiasm, ritual 
actions. They are situations of intense sociality, the binding together of persons in common 
mood, feeling single emotions as if a single person, bound together in a noose, brochos, of 
“light madness” elaphra lussa. This “madness” can take a healthy form, in the formation and 
re-affirmation of wholesomely exuberant community. It can also take exactly the opposite 
form, that of the hysterical mob, in which personhood will be ultimately entirely lost, both 
individual and communal. Such is what transpires at Thebes, in which individual, family 
and city break down.  
 
The ideal nature of person, the kind of human Aristotle thinks humans ought to be, is 
expressed by Gill in his care in describing the qualities of persons as potentialities73. “Rational 
animal” is also misleading, for it may be that humans are not simply animals distinguished 
for their potential for rationality. Humans are more defined by their quality of concern, i.e. for 
their feeling that things matter than for their rational potential. That is one way to say that 
they are marked by their intense relating to others, to themselves and to their world of 
experience. Caring about being good, having a meaningful life, being just and valuing 
reason are not values we arrive at, in Bacchae, by being rational or reflective. They are values 
that arise in some other way; they are transmitted values or they issue from an inspired 
insightfulness or leap of faith in the unity of the good, the beautiful and the divine. As the 
chorus of Dionysus’ followers sing: “Whatever it is that the divine [daimonion] is,/ (And) 
this, over the long durée, is upheld [nomimon]/will be and always has been.”74 Tragedy does 
not reveal human beings marked so much for their rationality as for their calculating nature 
and their failure to care.  
 
In Bacchae rationality, the power of the mind and serviceability of language and discourse, 
are made to seem relative. It is the manner of thinking and the quality of responsiveness which 
seems to be determining. The good life is evoked, and it is something that humans should 
wish for and aim at, but how it would be accessed will not be through terms amenable to 
objective-participative analysis, but through the participation by transformed subjects in a 
community of emotion – sympathy, joy, camaraderie, the suspension of competitiveness – 
with social others. Bacchae presents a different kind of vision, one in which there is neither 
participative solidarity nor the desire for solidarity in forms of interpersonal relating aimed 
at a good life. Some of the questions posed in Bacchae are: How will persons begin to want a 
                                                        
73 Gill has extensive chapters on Plato and Aristotle; see on Aristotle’s “psycho-ethics” the key “Being yourself and Meeting the Claims of 
Others” and “Being a Person and Being Human”, Gill, 1996: 321-469. 
74 894-6: ὅτι ποτ' ἄρα τὸ δαιµόνιον, / τό τ' ἐν χρόνωι µακρῶι νόµιµον / ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός. For these lines see also § 4.3 p. 252 n. 101, § 
5.5.3 p.341 n.158, § 7.3 p. 400-401. 
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good life? Is the good life what we thought? Are persons what they thought? Is thinking 
really what constitutes or transforms the nature of person? Do humans participate 
simultaneously in the human, animal and divine? The world of drama is simply a more 
diverse one than the philosophy of mind or ethics comprehends. Here persons are abrasive 
and difficult, striving with others and at odds with themselves, and what will be 
determining is not only whether they can learn to become reason-ruled but primarily what 
quality of bearing they have towards others, themselves and existence. With Dionysus, the 
god who arrives unforeseen, what counts is how persons are oriented towards him and 
towards the new and the strange; towards the onset of unfamiliar knowledge, mathos; new 
relationships, new identities and thanatos, death, the transformation that casts its light on all 
human doings and defines their lives as mortals, thanatoi. 
 
The “psycho-ethical” value judgements implicit in Gill’s language of potentiality can 
certainly also be ascribed to Aristotle on ethics. For Aristotle being ‘reason-ruled’ and 
rationally reflecting on how to live a good life, one marked by precisely such rule-by-reason 
and rational reflectiveness, is seen as the very means towards what is adjudged the highest 
end of life. In this study I conscript Aristotle on agency, challenging Vernant’s reading of 
Aristotle and arguing that the language of volition, desire, judgement and deliberation 
common to Euripides and Aristotle, demonstrates a similar attending to these as 
fundamental concerns of human life. Aristotle, however, is analytical and classificatory, 
whereas the dramatic poet presents a context of blurred definitions, transitions, dynamic 
shifts, ambiguity and multiple perspectives. Bacchae is the messy world of parole, of talk in 
time; it presents humans in interlocutive postures. Aristotle’s is a discursive context, an act 
of rational reflectiveness on the rules that do and ought to govern human action for the 
purpose of a good life, a context of langue or rules deduced.  
 
A problem here is the radical time-boundedness of a tragedy like Bacchae. Its protagonists 
are non-ideal participants in an inter-subjective order, conceived as responsible for their 
own desires and tragically reflecting too late on these. But Bacchae does not suggest that 
rational reflection would have been the truer way of life. Instead it relativizes the value of 
the mind and problematizes its nature and the nature of thought and reflection in 
themselves. Bacchae complicates things radically. What a person is and what knowledge is 
and how one ought to know and what the most worthy objects of knowledge could be, are 
presented as problems. The answers are suggested and they may not satisfy the objective 
standards of scientific methods that do not countenance the vague and ambiguous or 
emotions. For, it seems that it is in affect, in emotional bearing and qualities of feeling and 
attending, that the poet of Bacchae locates a special, Dionysiac kind of knowledgeability.  
 
 39 
It is from a philosophical work (also from 1985), Taylor’s “Agency and Language,” that I 
draw for my discussion of the ethical psychology of Bacchae. It is no longer necessary to 
argue for the value of a non-Cartesian model of the mind. I have turned to the anthropology 
of agency or personhood and its detection, in the work of Alfred Gell and others75. For there 
is another approach to person/agent, which, like Gill and Vernant, repudiates the notion of 
“historical development” and any over-privileging of subjectivity as an absolute, 
unscrutinized value, but at the same time finds that Greek poets are concerned with human 
experience, with the experience of feeling like an agent, like the subject of one’s own 
experience, and not only with the objective description of generalities and structures or the 
prescription of rational ethical attitudes. The social world of engagements and participation 
does not simply determine individual persons but is recursively reconstituted by them. 
There is a dynamic relationship between preceding norms and their successors.   
 
One recent discussion, Thumiger’s 2007 Hidden Paths, provides an excellent map of the 
routes taken by interpretation of Bacchae, from the point of view of the notion of the subject 
and character. Thumiger reads Bacchae through an informed knowledge of the formative 
philosophical paradigms that shape criticism. Through Gill’s contribution to the 
understanding of personality in Greek poetry and thought, she attempts a conciliation of 
diverse approaches to the problem of character, the subjective and the objective views. 
Rather than being occupied with character and characterization in Bacchae – questions of 
psychology, narrative and dramatic strategies for showing these and the debate entailed on 
the nature of the Greek conception of characterization and its differences from modern 
assumptions about depth and individuality – I examine the problem of agency and 
personhood.  
 
In Bacchae the audience does not simply witness a revenge drama. The play includes the 
most remarkable enactment of the gradual loss of self-control and later the depiction of a 
coming round, the slow regaining of the mind that had been catastrophically lost. What has 
precipitated these processes – elements of Dionysus’ plan of revenge – was an initial 
unwillingness to recognize the god and his mother and their connection with Zeus. Humans 
have been free to act, to go one way or another. The problem has been what they have 
desired and not desired, their failure to pause or feel confronted by doubt or dilemma, 
mermērizein. Agency is fundamental in Bacchae – it is just that the more primary agency has 
been at stake, not freedom to act in any given way, but freedom to want what healthy agents 
really want. Desiring and having the right desire, i.e. being able to identify what ought to be 
desired and for those to be one’s authentic desires, these are central in Bacchae. The play is a 
                                                        
75 On agency detection in contemporary cognitive psychology Baron-Cohen, 1997; Tomasello, 1999; and cognitive science of Greek 
religion, see Baron-Cohen, Larsson, 201: 66-126. 
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very sophisticated exploration of agency in the terms of desire, judgement, choice and their 
breakdown. 
 
The bibliography on Dionysus is immense and constantly expanding. In the last five years 
alone, very important collections on Dionysus and on Bacchae, fresh translations and papers, 
seem to mark a renewed impetus, since the highwater of the 1980s, which was something of 
a golden age for Dionysus scholarship in a century that itself will be looked backed on, since 
1872 and the publication of Die Geburt der Tragödie, as the aetas dionysia. While we must 
forego a review of that literature, which in itself would form a whole study, much of it will 
be referred to in the course of this study. 
 
Although Radke’s 2003 Tragik und Metatragik: Euripides’ “Bakchen” und die moderne 
Literaturwissenschaft returns to an Aristotelian reading of the play and discovers rather less 
value in postmodernist approaches, her Aristotelianism is one more predicated on the 
Aristotle of Poetics than of the ethical works. Of course, inherent in Poetics is Aristotle’s 
assumptions about ēthos, but her argument is more a salutary re-focusing on the play as a 
classic study in pity and fear than an exploration of desire and agency, the structure of the 
will and personhood of protagonists, as is the case in this study. It is certainly helpful to 
relativize the idea of Dionysus as paralogisches Symbol, which has made him so serviceable to 
all manner of anti- or non-humanist trends in modern thought. It must be clear, however, 
that a fundamental lesson of Bacchae is that any perspective is relative, that where authority 
lies, how we authenticate relations and how we verify truth, is problematic. Dionysus really 
does frustrate human reason and mind and this episode from his life does also work to 
induce not only sympathy and fear for persons, but reflection on the nature of sympathy 
and emotion. 
 
There is a prescriptive element implicit in Euripides’ work, just as there is in Socratic 
philosophy. It adjures mortals to know themselves better, to handle their desires differently 
and to evaluate their finite lives other than they may be doing. It is however not only reason 
or the discursive life of the community, through which one travels towards sophia, but 
through an anterior inspiration communicated from a divine origin. It is not the mind in 
dialogue but in full flight and in song that truly knows. In this study of Bacchae, I proceed by 
setting the drama against Aristotle’s work on ethics, the basic premise of which is that one 
ought to and can live a good life. His philosophy, like Greek drama, is concerned with the 
ends of life. Charles Taylor’s philosophy of agency is also ethical and prescriptive, taking as 
its given premise that one ought to want to live a deeper, better kind of life in which one’s 
values are more articulate and one is an ethical and self-reflexive agent. He shares that 
ethical axiom with ancient philosophers and with the Greek Tragic poets. I set his 
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investigations of personhood and agency against Bacchae in an attempt to illuminate its 
meanings. One ought to want to want the good life and thinking, reasoning persons stand a 
good chance of that. But reason, in itself, is not the primary motivation. Should I be good out 
of calculation, because I shall be happier than if I am not? Is it a strategy for peace and 
security? Or should I be good because social approval feels better than disapproval? But on 
what authority should anything be the case? What, really, can self-interest be, when “self” is 
so hard to define and comprehend? Reasonable people also use reason for wicked motives 
and it is not certain that the Socratic optimism that conflates evil with ignorance is quite 
right; certainly Aristotle did not think it was. Some kind of primary faith, some original 
motive for the good seems to be hinted at by Euripides in Bacchae. Some kind of uncodifiable 
ethical posture is described, something having to do with imagination rather than reason 
and a pre-rational sympathy rather than rationality. 
 
A psychological, ethical but also a cognitive anthropological reading of personhood is 
possible. Although there is not the space in this detailed engagement with Bacchae to 
describe all of the possibilities and ideas, it must be said that these are exciting times for the 
study of Greek Tragedy. It has long been studied with a normative conception of the 
historical human subject and of the fictional ‘person’ of poetry. Now, the normative character 
of interpretation is all the more apparent and Greek Tragedy becomes an opportunity to 
revise what we think the Greek view of persons and subjectivity was, how they re-
articulated that in poetry and philosophy. Perhaps this may in turn transform and certainly 
enrich also our own contemporary notions of person and agent, which are so clearly not 
données but nomima.  
 
Greek poetry is treated here through the optics of recent research in philosophy, 
anthropology, sociology, the history of religion and archaeology: Alfred Gell’s work on art 
and agency; Anthony Giddens’ theory of structuration, agent and institution in time; 
Michael Tomasello’s cognitive anthropology of humans as “ultra-social” agents, uniquely 
capable of “sharing attention”; the cognitive science of religion has been formative for my 
thinking; as has the implicit theory of culture developed through the prism of “symbolic 
archaeology” in the work of Ian Hodder. Maurice Bloch’s anthropology of ritual, with its 
notion of the dialectic of vitality and transcendence, casts its light on many of the arguments 
here, even if not always acknowledged or even consciously so, I suspect. All of these have in 
common a desire to get away from the limits of structuralist and functionalist views of 
culture. That frustration was already brilliantly expressed as early as 1973 with Geertz’ 
essays in The Interpretation of Culture76. These thinkers and writers are being mentioned out of 
                                                        
76 Geertz, 1973. 
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a sense of obligation to full disclosure. The ideas of Gell, Giddens, and Tomasello especially, 
have profoundly shaped this interpretation of Bacchae and the anthropological approach 
towards Tragedy that is being groped towards here. 
 
There may be a rhythm over time, a movement between the valorizing of the objective and 
of the subject and its experience. Now it is Es and later Ich. In Bacchae what is sure is that 
Dionysos soll werden. Elsewhere I discuss Time in Greek Tragedy, a question of much 
consequence for the understanding of and interpretive posture taken against Bacchae. 
Dionysus is the most ad hoc of gods, as human lives always are ad hoc and local. While 
scholars such as Gill, Vernant, Burkert and others may have been motivated to define and 
deploy an objective philology of a culture, Ancient Greece, that itself may have thought and 
valued “objectively” and not invested “subjectivity” with the prestige that romantic 
modernity has done, it is nevertheless the case that a drama like Bacchae shows something 
like a phenomenological view of persons. They are not rational animals or the agents that 
they ought to be, as in philosophy, or universals as in science, but particular, complex 
subjects of experience in time. Their subjective experience, their own lives, matter to them. 
They constitute a Lifeworld, which is always a twilight scene, somewhere perpetually 
halfway between knowledge and ignorance.  
  
This episode in the life of Dionysus, his celebrants and Thebes, is Euripides’ exploration of 
the nature, meaning and possibility of living a good, happy or blessed life, 426: εὐαίωνα 
διαζῆν. But what “it” is that lives a good life is not an object of secured knowledge; it 
remains an open question. The self in Dionysus’ vicinity becomes lost. What this property is 
that can be lost and re-acquired, these strange immaterial properties of person and agency, is 
a question opened up in Bacchae. It is a question, which in this tragic framing, through the 
phenomenal experience of theatre rather than the discourse of ideas, may be itself 
transformative, if we take the right bearing. 
 
 
1.4 The Organization of this Book 
 
The following study of Bacchae may be divided into two parts: part 1 on “agency” and part 2 
on “person”. This general introduction is followed by five chapters and a short conclusion. 
Chapters 2 and 3 form the first part – Bacchae in the light of two conceptions of agency, 
ancient and contemporary: that of Aristotle and that of Charles Taylor and his development 
of Harry Frankfurt’s ideas.  
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Chapter 4 provides something of a linking between the first part – more closely focused on 
agency as a certain kind of handling of desire – and the second, on the problem of 
identifying, locating and defining kinds of personhood in Bacchae. Chapters 5 and 6 attempt 
to show how person, being a virtual property of beings – mortal, immortal, fictional, dead – 
is one requiring special modes of apperception and detection. The complex relationship 
between presence and appearance is one explored in a sophisticated manner in Bacchae. 
What a person is is a question inseparable from the problem of knowing, recognizing or 
accessing persons. These questions are reflected on in part 2. 
 
Chapter 2 – “Hopoios ēthel’: The Agency of Desire and Choice in Bacchae” – discusses the 
vocabulary and dramatization of desire and volition as is found in both Bacchae and one of 
the most important formulations of agency in the Western tradition, Aristotle’s 
Nichomachaean Ethics. Chapter 3 – “Ah!: Tragedy’s Articulacy” – studies a recent 
philosophical perspective on agency and its bearing on Euripides’ drama. Chapter 4 – 
“Adēlotes – Belief and the Uncertainty of Persons” – explores the problems inherent in 
recognizing the identity of other persons. Chapter 5 – “Ou raidion zētēma: Abducting 
Dionysus & Detecting Agency” – explores the special modes of inference that Dionysus 
elicits. Chapter 6 – “Ōps ops77: A Voice in the Aithēr, a Face in the Clouds” – is a brief review 
of the much discussed question of the face and mask of Dionysus, in the light of everything 
said up to that point.  
 
An answer is hazarded to the riddle that Bacchae sets, the inverse of the sphinx’s riddle in 
Euripides’ Oedipus: the answer in Oedipus is a human person; in Bacchae that is the question, 
‘what is a human person?’ The solution to that riddle as offered by Bacchae is that a person is 
something having contents. The vessel of those contents is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for personhood. The contents of character – motives and speech – are nearly 
sufficient but not quite. A person is a being in time, not only a presence but an appearance: a 
present being, both a voice and a face. Such, it is argued, is the conclusion that Bacchae 
encourages us to draw. In conclusion, Chapter 7 seeks to bind together all that has been said 
up to that point. It has been a meristic reading of Bacchae striking a different path from the 
aspirations of objectivist philology or the orthodox telestic reading. In Bacchae, this episode 
from the composite biography of a god, there will have been traced a concern with desire 
and knowledge, the contents of persons, phrenes, the potential for the right kind of agency 
and a pre-occupation with the problem of identifying persons and motivations.  
 
                                                        
77 LSJ s.v. ὄψ: “voice, whether in speaking, shouting, lamenting . . . word (Cogn. with ἔπος, εἰπεῖν.). ὤψ: “eye, face, countenance . . . θεῇς 
εἰς ὦπα ἔοικεν in face she is like the goddesses, Il.3.158”. 
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2 
 
Hopoios ēthel1:  
 
The Agency of Desire and Choice in Bacchae 
 
Pe. ×–⏑– ×> ἃν δοκῆι βουλεύσο/αι.2 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The human social world is one of ongoing, mutual interpretation of minds and their 
encounters with one another in tragic or comic entanglement. Persons are deeply interested 
in one another and are, we can always assume, interested in themselves.3  This is not a 
simplistic fact, but one of great importance in considering Greek drama and its god, 
Dionysus. People are consistently and powerfully drawn to other people, to knowing about 
them, to having and expressing relations with them. Bacchae opens with a god whose 
legitimacy – his relationships – had been the subject of gossip. Dionysus breaks up the 
normal social relations of production (114-20), he breaks up the routinized experience of 
time and of relations, making the common unfamiliar and creatively estranging the self-
evident. Healthily and unhealthily, in a wholesome way and in an aggressive way, mortals 
are “ultra-social”; they bind themselves to one another. This becomes eminently clear in the 
drama of the manifesting god, the divinity who comes to reveal lines of relation, their 
binding and their undoing.  
 
A subject’s context constitutes an environment of attention for the life of their affects and 
passions, both within the mind and without the body. “Interest” – as the Latin root suggests 
– connotes inter-relation. Greek drama, as a communal and civic expression is a re-
instituting of interrelations. Social connections become articulated in the theatre. Through 
                                                        
1 “However he would wish”, 478. Note Roux’s comment on this line: “impertinence et familiarité; c’est un vers de comédie. Le poète 
rappelle discrtètement l’un des caractères spécifiques de la personnalité de Dionysos, dieu multiforme qui peut choisir ses apparences.”. Key 
here is not what the god can choose, but that he has open to him the infinite choice that distinguishes him from humans. His multiplicity and 
power of metamorphosis, like that of Zeus generally and, for example, Athena in Odyssey, is the expression of the peculiar volitional 
character of the divinity. 
2 “… I shall deliberate on what seems best.” 843. 
3 Gould, 1978: 43 “Plays, we say, are about people, about people doing and saying things. What they say and do gives us access to the kind 
of people they are – their personalities, their individuality, their ‘character’. And we find people interesting. Simply, crudely put, this is the 
basis of what we call our interest in dramatic character.” See also Tomasello, 2014b on “ultra-sociality”, and the peculiarly intense sociality 
belonging uniquely to humans, the ground condition of the defining, human form of agency – language, Tomasello, 1999, 2008. 
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the binding together of diverse, individual perspectives into one common perspective, the 
polis is reconstituted as a unified, body corporate. In the special circumstances of the theatre, 
in the physical co-presence of fellow citizens, the diversity of subjects becomes as one subject 
a polis person with a common mind.  
 
Tragedy expresses that congenital, human fascination with others and for a time satisfies it 
and turns it, through the experience of intensified joint-attention4, to a social use in the 
consolidation of the polis identity. It is not simply functional, however, even if it has this 
beneficial effect. Its meaning is not exhausted by its social or political usefulness. Tragedy 
describes persons not only as citizens but as humans. The Attic poet takes and encourages 
an anthropological perspective on his specific scenes. It is a mortal, human identity that is 
always being explored by these poets. It is a view at eye-level, not from an artificially 
privileged position above. 
 
20th C. thinkers, and interpreters of Greek poetry have sometimes sought to limit and qualify, 
or even deny the significance to Attic drama of the conventional philosophic conception of 
the Will and its freedom5. Discussions of the will have been framed by concepts (and their 
diverse valorizations) of freedom, self-realization, autonomy, responsibility and 
imputability derived above all from Enlightenment thinkers such as Descartes, Kant and 
Hegel and reactions against those thinkers, most notably in the 20th Century with its ever 
increasing appreciation of the place of the unconscious and the impersonal, material and 
historical forces that shape if not determine human life 6. The “agent” – both in its critical 
affirmation and critical denial – as that has been conceived in modernity since the 
Enlightenment, has been understood as the self-constituting originator of its acts. As 
Vernant summarized the normative view he wished to historicize, the autonomous agent is 
considered as such, “Dès lors qu’un individu s’engage par un choix, qu’il se décide, il se 
constitue lui-même, quel que soit le plan où se situe sa résolution, en agent, c’est-à-dire en 
sujet responsable et autonome se manifestant dans et par des actes qui lui sont imputables.”7.  
 
                                                        
4 For the notion of “joint-attention”, see Tomasello, 1999. 
5 Snell, 1928 and his reponse to the criticisms of Wolff, 1929, Snell, 1930; Lesky, 1966, 1972; Rivier, 1968; Vernant, 1972; Thumiger, 
2007; Morris, 2014. For a good discussion of this issue and of Snell and Adkins as “expressing leading features of post-Cartesian and post-
Kantian thinking about the self and personhood” see esp. Gill, 1996: 29-93, this quote p. 29. 
6 In the study of Ancient Greek culture, Dodds represents the most original adaptation of the study of Greek culture to the insights of 
psychology and the place of the unconscious in individual and social life, see Dodds, 1927, 1951, and of course the landmark commentary 
on Bacchae, 1960 [1944]. Note also Goldhill, 1997 on modern 20th Century approaches to Tragedy, with observations on Dodds and the 
case of Bacchae, and see Schlesier, 1994 and Humphreys, 2004 for historical perspectives on the interpretation and anthropology of Greek 
religion. 
7 Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 43-44. 
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In this chapter I begin with a consideration of Aristotle on ethics and explore what his 
differentiated discussion of the voluntary and involuntary, desire, judgement, deliberation 
and choice may have to offer a reading of Bacchae. Aristotle, like the modern philosophers 
juxtaposed with him in the following chapter, gives us a vocabulary, helpful in 
understanding the articulacy of Tragedy and some of its basic premises. Just as Aristotle’s 
project is to explore the nature and possibility of living a good life, so too is the ethical 
concern omnipresent, implicitly and explicitly, in Greek Tragedy. Even if this has not been 
the premise of most recent scholarship on Bacchae and its god, who looks so seductively 
jenseits morality, I hope to show that this is very much the case. 
 
The important difference between my approach and the traditional one, (as well as the 
typical refutation of the traditional view), is that I am concerned to discuss the figures of 
Greek drama neither as sovereign, individual subjects, nor as overdetermined objects, but 
primarily as definitively social entities. It is not that we ought not to consider persons as 
individuals in the modern, late-capitalist, post-Freudian sense, only that they are not as 
discrete as we may think. They are certainly not so hermetically sealed and autonomous as, 
in drama, they can think they are. Agency is, to borrow Gell’s term, “distributed”. Essential 
in my understanding of agency is a certain reflexivity built into the concept: it is 
indissociable from the recognition of agency and thus is “distributed”, as it were, between 
the agent of apprehension and the apprehended. Bacchae represents, of course, the very 
model of the porousness of persons amongst other persons and of the dispersed character of 
personhood, its being “hard to locate”8. Even in their isolation human figures are inter-
subjective. They are social members, as it were, of themselves, parts of a community that is 
always essentially virtual, being the quality defined by relation.  
 
I discuss one very important dimension of what I will provisionally call the ‘society of the 
self’9. This is the dimension of choice and desire in individuals as this is explored in Bacchae. 
Persons have parts. Not only are they members of intersubjective social groups, sharing 
homilia10, but they are formed of members – different voices make themselves heard and are 
‘heard’ by other aspects within a single person. A person is constituted as if on the model of 
the social community in which human life always takes place: a context of dynamic co-
presence (I mean in the healthiest scenarios, or the normative context of cognitive and social 
                                                        
8 Elusiveness: this hardness of location of the mind will become the realized literally, most vividly materialized in the descriptions of 
Pentheus shredded and rent body, described by the messenger as “not easily found”, 1139: οὐ ῥάιδιον ζήτηµα, and which Kadmos searched 
out with great difficulty, 1299: ἐγὼ µόλις νιν ἐξερευνήσας φέρω. 
9 Cf. Schwartz in Bernabé, 2013: esp. 313-7, where she writes of Pentheus as a wanderer ‘outside self and community’. Cf. Gill, 1996: on 
personhood and “the self in dialogue”. 
10 Homilia: sociality, fellowship, cf. LSJ s.v. “intercourse, company, society, intercourse, association, company”. Bacchae is replete with 
words for different kinds of community formation: thiasos, kōmos, oikos, dōma, polis.  
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competence of persons in the polis). This wholeness is dramatized a contrario through the 
scenes in Bacchae that are brought before the imagination, images of the body: irrefragable, 
once taken apart not to be made whole again, its members rent asunder, irrecuperable11. 
Parts of a human subject compete with others. Different potential selves, different desires 
and the possible identities (like the different paths one chooses) may be said to also compete 
for actualization. That at least is implicit in the presentation of figures, in Euripides, who 
desire or could desire different things. They are figures on whom persuasion is attempted. 
And in persuasion is implied alternative and possibility, even when persuasion ultimately 
does not avail. 
 
From the traditional terms of freedom, imputability and responsibility, the Scheideweg, 
which leads to overdetermination in one direction and underdetermination in another, I 
wish to strike out on a different path. In this and the following chapter, I begin from the 
work, principally, of Aristotle (in the Nicomachaean Ethics) and of Charles Taylor (as set out 
in the essays in Human Agency and Language – Philosophical Papers 1)12. Taylor, himself starting 
from a discussion of Frankfurt on persons, resets the discussion of agency and of free will. It 
is not Free Will – libre arbitre, the traditional object of Western philosophical reflection13 – in 
the usually received philosophical sense that is the subject of discussion here, but “free 
willing”, the freedom to desire, the freedom between desires, rather than actions alone. In 
their work Jean-Pierre Vernant and Louis Gernet sought to historicize what may distortingly 
look to modern eyes like an eternal philosophical category14. From the historical perspective 
of another important scholar, there may not have been questioning of what would become 
the ‘classic problem of free will’ amongst the Greeks of Euripides’ time, but nor was there 
any notion of an abolute determinism. Thought is no less ‘real’ than desire, one does not 
‘repose’ on the other but each is constantly, dialectically shaping the other. Thus Adkins, in 
his discussion of these issues in Aristotle’s ethics wrote: 
 
                                                        
11 See esp. 1216-21. 
12 Taylor, 1985, esp. “What is human agency?” 15-44; “Self-interpreting animals”, 45-76; “The concept of a person” 97-114. 
13 On the psychological determinism in Aristotle that “astonished” D.J. Allan (see “The Practical Syllogism” in Autour d’Aristote, 1955), 
Vernant remarks that the contrast between determination and non-determination, is simply inappropriate: “Or cette antinomie n’est pas 
pertinente du point du vue d’Aristote. Dans sa théorie de l’action morale, il n’entend ni démontrer ni réfuter l’existence d’une liberté 
psychologique dont il ne fait état à aucun moment. Pas plus chez lui que dans la langue de son temps on ne trouve de mot pour désigner ce 
que nous appelons libre arbitre; la notion d’un libre pouvoir de décision reste étrangère à sa pensée, elle n’a pas de place dans sa 
problématique de l’action responsable, qu’il s’agisse du choix délibéré comme de l’acte accompli de plein gré,” Vernant in Vernant & 
Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 52-3. 
14See Gernet, 1968: Droit et institutions en Grèce antique and also Gernet, 1968: Anthropologie de la Grèce antique. A notable influence on 
Gernet and Vernant was the work of Ignace Meyerson who sought to develop an historical psychology, see especially Meyerson, 1948 Les 
fonctions psychologiques et les œuvres. Especially relevant to the current study is 151-85, “La notion de personne”. 
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. . . the nature of the problems which Aristotle had to solve should be pointed out. 
Neither Gorgias nor any other Greek of the period before Aristotle believed in a 
universal determinism, psychological or other. Some acts, all agreed, were voluntary: 
the problem was to discover which, or rather to evolve a theory which should justify 
beliefs already held. Accordingly, Aristotle could not be expected to dicuss the (now) 
‘classic’ free will problem, since he knew of no theory of total determinism, at all events 
none which thus affected ethical thought. 15 
 
It is only since Epictetus in the 1st Century CE that the term “Free Will” has been used in its 
later canonical sense, and has had “droit de cité dans la philosophie grecque”. This term is to 
autexousion or hē autexousiotēs, which means literally “self-possession”, “self control”. It first 
appears in the 1st Century BCE, in Diodorus Siculus (19.105.4), “mais il n’a pas encore chez 
lui sa valeur technique”. In Aristotle’s time there was the concept of eleutheria, but this 
“designated not psychological freedom but the legal status of a free man as opposed to that 
of a slave”. Eleutheria, according to Vernant, takes on its psychological connotations at about 
the same time that to autexousion comes into use in the same category16. Yet we may well ask 
if the boundaries between legal and social status and psychological or volitional liberty are 
so clear and well definable. It is never easy to locate the threshold between metaphorical and 
literal. This is one of the lessons of Bacchae. Dionysus in Euripides, as in Aeschylus, for 
example, is strongly connected with an eleutheria17, a positively valorized liberty, which is 
irrefutably metaphorical, but also evoked in very literal scenes and language. Slavery, 
service and the freeman’s status are all inverted in Bacchae whereby the psychology of desire 
and choice, autonomy and community, mind and passion are all profoundly and richly 
explored.  
 
The argument I shall make here is that the operative problem in Bacchae, (and, I wish to 
suggest, in Tragedy generally), concerns not so much determinacy or non-determinacy of 
acts, nor the fact or illusion of the freedom of will as freedom of action, but “Freedom to 
Will”. What is important, what is redeeming ultimately for how we see them, is what and 
how characters desire. What they want to do is far more significant than what they are or are 
not constrained to do. Desire is anterior and primary; it is through their liberty to wish well, 
to desire differently, that mortals are free, however constrained by Necessity or 
Contingency. Humans may tragically or ridiculously suffer, caught up in chains of events 
                                                        
15 Cf. Adkins, 1960: 324, my italics. 
16 Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 52-3, n. 20. 
17 Eleutheros: the term occurs three times in Bacchae (253, 613, 775) and has the strong overtones of legal status to which Vernant refers, 
but on just such a material, concrete sense does the meaning of the play – a complex and extended exploitation of metaphor and metonymy 
for just this purpose – repose. The bacchants fantasize about freedom: Pentheus thinks he is free but is not, thinks his prisoner is captive but 
he is in fact free. Legal status is used here as an instrument against which to more sharply project a psychological state. 
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that are unfair and opaque, but their bearing, the quality of their relation to others, to gods 
and mortals, to events and to their own lives is what is decisive in how we see and evaluate 
them, throughout Euripides’ works. 
 
In Bacchae, there is much evaluating of will, choice and inclination. There is much 
differentiation between kinds of desire and kinds of bearing. This is an ethical world in 
which figures weigh up, calculate or enter into relations of affect, the “authenticity” of 
which is expressed, in one way, through their spontaneity. Here, persons are desirous and 
practical agents, who construe others as similarly evaluative and initiating of action. They 
detect agency and personhood in others. They fail to detect the right quality of agency – 
mortal or immortal, authentic or inauthentic, “strong or weak”18 – and wrongly determine 
the quality of bearing towards, and therefore relationships with, the persons in their midst. 
They plan around this and feel the rivalry of desires within themselves. They articulate the 
social world as a contest of wills in which they are enmeshed or entangled. Experience is an 
engagement of persons as purposive, desirous, willing and unwilling beings. Even when 
(perhaps especially when) they are not properly so, we as audience, the person to whom the 
poet addresses his work, are induced to be evaluative of the desires and impulses of the 
persons of the drama. In this context, questions of the ‘freedom’ and legal responsibility of 
action are less important than the quality of acts, or the quality of motivation, which 
determines choices and relations and what we call the identity or character of different 
persons.  
 
When is one ever ‘free’ in the sense of ‘independent of external forces’ – psychological, 
historical, social, circumstantial, divine – that one detects often only through their effects, in 
retrospect? The contemporary philosopher Charles Taylor argues that an essential 
component of freedom is articulacy. The very articulation to a person (by another, such as a 
chorus or concerned counterpart), or within a person, of alternatives, contrastively 
evaluated, is a necessary condition of personhood, and is definitive of agency as he argues it. 
Articulating, through deliberation, the relative value of different desires is constitutive of full 
agency. Tragic Drama is the art of the articulacy described by Taylor. It is Pentheus’ 
inarticulacy that is his Tragedy. He has not the evaluating depth, which Taylor defines in 
terms of the capacity for “strong evaluations”. Similarly, “shallowness” finds its absolute 
and counter-illuminating expression in the spectres of the depersonalized bacchants. In 
Kadmos and others we see ordinary superficiality, “weak evaluators”, utilitarians who must 
pay the price ultimately, of ransoming the self to Dionysus. He is a god in whose proximity 
                                                        
18 On Taylor’s notion of strong and weak evaluations see p. 180 § 3.3.5. 
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qualities of desire become evident, through the consequential “weakness of their 
evaluations”, through the enfeeblement of the agency they might otherwise express. 
 
 
2.2 Exōthen: Aristotle on volition, choice and deliberation 
 
Interpreters of Tragedy, when they have taken recourse to Aristotle, have naturally most 
often turned to his work on drama, the Poetics19. Gyburg Radke, to give one recent example, 
finds in Bacchae a “‘Schulbeispiel’ einer Mitleidtragödie”; she seems intent on rehabilitating 
Bacchae’s reputation with classicist, Aristotelian criteria drawn mostly from his Poetics and 
On Rhetoric20. As to the question of agency, however, Aristotle’s work on ethics also has 
much that is edifying. What Rivier and others have identified as a modern Kantian and 
Thomist conception of agency is, of course, traceable to the great Greek philosopher, on 
whose great work on ethics Aquinas did, after all, write an important commentary. Jean-
Pierre Vernant did discuss this work in relation to Tragedy. He represents however, a 
different outlook from Aristotle, even while arguing, as we shall see, that it is a misleadingly 
anachronizing to discern anything like a theory of freedom of will in Aristotle. Aristotle on 
ethics is bon à penser in reading Greek poetry, to which of course the Stagirite regularly 
referred for illustrative examples. Some of his essential points anticipate and correspond 
closely to the modern philosophers (Frankfurt and Taylor), whom I discuss in some detail in 
chapter 3. For these reasons, I next turn to some passages from Aristotle’s Nicomachaean 
Ethics (Eth. Nich.), exploring them alongside passages from Bacchae to test what that may 
reveal.21 
 
Dionysus is the god in whom, and in whose myths, the complex volitional contours that 
give human existence its peculiar shape, its character and face, become evident (“shown”, 
“manifest”). These are just the same contours delineated and explored by Aristotle in his 
work on ethics. Aristotle lays the priority on the act, the revelation of proairesis rather than 
on the a priori character. Drama is phenomenal, it shows acts not impalpable qualities. The 
telos of the art of Tragedy is for Aristotle “a certain activity, not a qualitative state . . . It is 
                                                        
19 Jones in his still influential Aristotle on Tragedy (Jones, 1968), for example, engages fulsomely with the Poetics and relatively sparely 
with the perhaps less obviously pertinent Nicomachaean and Eudemian Ethics. For an important point about the relation of Poetics to 
Nichomachaean Ethics concerning the question of the relation of self to action, choice and hexis, see Jones, 1968: 33-4. See also on 
Aristotle and Tragedy: House, 1956; Else, 1963; Halliwell, 1986, 2011. 
20 This is a response to decades of modernist and postmodernist interpretations, (Segal, 1997 [1982]; Bierl, 1991: esp. 177-226; Torrance, 
2013).  See Radke, 2007: esp. 260-70. See also Halliwell’s review, to whom Radke’s case is “undermined by an ultimately dogmatic 
account of what Dionysus ‘really’ stands for”, Halliwell, 2007: 484.  
21 For a discussion of many of the issues raised here and in Aristotle on agency – voluntariness, imputability, passion thumos and thought 
dianoia, the external or internal source of motivation – see Adkins, 1960: 316-31.  
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not, therefore, the function of the agents’ actions to allow the portrayal of their characters; it 
is, rather, for the sake of their actions that characterisation is included.” The art of Tragedy, 
which belongs to the god Dionysus, who comes to show himself forth, is for Aristotle the 
representation, “not of humans but of their acts and of life”22. In Tragedy the emotions of fear 
and pity turn on the hinge of the moment of reversal and recognition; these come about as 
Halliwell commented “in and through action, rather than consisting of wholly passive 
sufferings.” For Aristotle, Tragedy is concerned primarily with the most important ethical 
questions, viz. the living or failing to live a good life [εὐδαί/ονες ἢ τοὐναντίον], so 
Halliwell put it in his commentary: “Tragic drama offers us images of the actions on which 
depends the difference between happiness and unhappiness, terms which for Aristotle 
signify judgements on the success or failure of a life in the fullest ethical sense. Against such a 
background, ‘action’ is no loose or empty term for whatever may occur in a play, but a way 
of denoting tragedy’s encompassment of the significant goals of life.”23 
 
Consider the remarks of Aristotle concerning the elements of Tragic poetry. He describes 
ēthos, character, as that which “reveals choice, proairesis”, through showing dilemma: choice 
and aversion, in situations in which the right bearing towards the object of choice is unclear, 
ouk . . . dēlon; when no dilemma of choice is involved there is no character being manifested24: 
“Character is the element which reveals the nature of moral choice, in cases where it is not 
anyway clear what a person is choosing or avoiding (and so speeches in which the speaker 
chooses or avoids nothing at all do not possess character)”25. Does Aristotle mean, as 
Halliwell seems to read it, that character illuminates or motivates choice? To say that ēthos 
“makes visible” (“reveals”, “shows”, dēloi) choice, is the inverse of what interpreters usually 
say of actions and character, supposing that character is inherent, prior and motivates choices 
in the anterior relation in which causes stand to effects. I suspect that this is an expression of 
Aristotle’s sensitivity to the dialectical or recursive nature of ēthos and proairesis: they are 
properties of persons in time, continously shaping or modifying each other26. It is not that 
there are characters (like profiles on a page) and acts which belong, like objects or property 
to those characters. Actions – which over time are seen as habitual behaviour, hence ēthos – 
                                                        
22 Arist. Poet. 1450a 16-20: ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία µίµησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεων καὶ βίου [καὶ εὐδαιµονία καὶ κακοδαιµονία ἐν 
πράξει ἐστίν, καὶ τὸ τέλος πρᾶξίς τις ἐστίν, οὐ ποιότης· εἰσὶν δὲ κατὰ µὲν τὰ ἤθη ποιοί τινες, κατὰ δὲ τὰς πράξεις εὐδαίµονες ἢ τοὐναντίον]. 
Trans. Halliwell, 1987: 37. 
23 Halliwell, 1987: 95. 
24 Arist. Poet. 1450b 7-10: ἔστιν δὲ ἦθος µὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον ὃ δηλοῖ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ὁποία τις [ἐν οἷς οὐκ ἔστι δῆλον ἢ προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει] – 
διόπερ οὐκ ἔχουσιν ἦθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἷς µηδ' ὅλως ἔστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἢ φεύγει ὁ λέγων. 
25 Halliwell, 1987: 38. 
26 22, 47, 50. On the quintessential question of the dialectic of character and acts and this certain ‘equivocation’ in Aristotle see § 3.1 p. 137 
n. 9, § 5.2.4 p. 303 n. 31 and § 5.5.3 p. 337. Cf. also the discussion in C.C.W. Taylor, 2006 on Arist. Eth. Nich. 1113b. 
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constitute character and character in turn motivates further acts of certain qualities, 
continually while a mortal lives, in this dialectical way. 
 
At the “core” of Dionysus’s art of Tragedy – the spatial imagery of outside and inside, 
surface and depth is almost impossible to avoid27 – is a conception of mortals as constituted 
by acts, choices, desires that become manifest in action, thought and word (as is testified to 
in the kind of scholarly debates it has inspired). In the social world the basic activity that 
takes place between persons is communicative, ongoing interpretation: connecting facts 
with reasons, deeds with motivations, effects with causes. In this scenario the quality of acts 
– whether willed, reasoned, unreasoned, or compelled – are of determining significance. 
Principal here is the location and ownership of cause and the self’s causativity, or motivation: 
is this external or internal – exōthen or endothen; does it belong to the person as author or is it 
of derived authorship? We may say that Tragedy is interested in how acts are bound to 
persons, how we connect what is inside to what an agent does. It is interested in causes and 
phenomena and takes a complex, differentiating view on these.28 
 
 
2.2.1.1 Akousion, Hekousion 
 
Α. /ητέρα κατέκταν τὴν ἐ/ήν, βραχὺς λόγος. 
Φ. ἑκὼν ἑκοῦσαν ἢ <οὐ> θέλουσαν οὐχ ἑκών;29  
 
Al. He killed my mother. A story briefly told. 
Ph. Willingly and by her will or <not> by her wish, and not willingly?   
 
By chance, Aristotle opens the book most pertinent to this discussion – Eth. Nich. 3 – with a 
very “Dionysiac” example and then a reference also to that lost play of Euripides, which was 
performed between the Iphigenia at Aulis and the Bacchae, on a Spring day in Athens, 405 
BCE, the Alcmeon at Corinth30. Aristotle is defining the voluntary and the involuntary. The 
involuntary, to akousion, is that which takes place “by force or by reason of ignorance” βίᾳ ἢ 
δι' ἄγνοιαν. It is a question of location, repérage, (the spatial metaphor is persistent). Where 
                                                        
27 Cf. on this Metaphorik of space Taylor, 1985: 36 “The line here between metaphor and basic theory is hard to draw”, see § 3.3.7 n. 650. 
28 See Arist. Poet. 1450a 15-33 on the arrangement of actions, syntaxis. On the priority of this arrangement over character, as the proper 
objective of the dramatic poet see Arist. Poet. 1450b 8-15.  
29Nauck2 TGF Eur. fr. 68 attributed to the Alcmeon at Psophis see Arist. Eth. Nich. 1136 a 13, where Aristotle cites these lines opening a 
discussion of the hardness of pinning down justice and injustice, insofar as they are a matter of intention, the spirit or quality of disposition 
behind an act, not simply the act. 
30 The Alcmeon at Psophis was earlier: see Nauck2 TGF Eur. frr. 65-87. See Hall’s essay for a discussion conjecturing what may have been 
the effect or ‘impact’ of Bacchae in combination with these other two works, in Stuttard: 11-28. 
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the “moving principle” – archē – resides, within an agent or without, will be decisive. Being 
forced, biaion31, means, by definition, being compelled by a principle, a source of agency, 
“outside”, exōthen, of oneself.32  
 
δοκεῖ δὴ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν γινό/ενα· βίαιον δὲ οὗ ἡ ἀρχὴ 
ἔξωθεν, τοιαύτη οὖσα ἐν ᾗ /ηδὲν συ/βάλλεται ὁ Fράττων ἢ ὁ Fάσχων, οἷον εἰ 
Fνεῦ/α κο/ίσαι Fοι ἢ ἄνθρωFοι κύριοι ὄντες.33 
 
Those things, then, are thought involuntary (akousia), which take place by force or by 
reason of ignorance; and that is forced of which the moving principle (archē) is 
outside (exōthen), being a principle in which nothing is contributed by the person 
who acts – or, rather, is acted upon, e.g. if he were to be carried somewhere by a 
wind, or by men who had him in their power.34 
 
The voluntariness or involuntariness of mortal acts becomes an issue in the proximity of 
Dionysus. In the seventh Homeric Hymn, Dionysus35 is himself borne away, abducted, by 
some Tyrrhenian pirates, who fail to recognize his divinity. They are calculating, wily men, 
like so many rovers of the sea (Odysseus, Menelaus of Odyssey, to a lesser extent Vergil’s 
Aeneas36), concerned to make a profit of a very worldy kind. The moving principle that 
motivates their act is clearly within, and shared between, themselves37. They do not act under 
compulsion, biai. Do they seize their fateful windfall – κακὸς /όρος38 – out of ignorance δι' 
ἄγνοιαν γινό/ενα? The god seems like a king’s son to them, they sniff a handsome 
ransom39. He is a king’s son, of course, the son of Zeus. The helmsman realizes this; he has 
                                                        
31 Biastheis: see Rivier, 1968: 37, referring to Snell, 1928; and the reading of Soph. Electra, 575 Ἀνθ' ὧν, βιασθεὶς πολλὰ κἀντιβάς. 
32 Arist. Eth. Nich.  1109 b 35 – 10 a 4. See also Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 55 “Dans la langue et la mentalité anciennes, les 
notions de connaissance et d’action apparaissent étroitement solidaires. Là où un moderne s’attend à trouver une expression du vouloir, il 
rencontre un vocabulaire de savoir . . . Comme l’observe L. Gernet, ce n’est pas alors l’individu en tant que tel qui est le facteur du délit: 
« Le délit existe en dehors de lui, le délit est objectif » (Gernet, 1917 : 305) Dans le contexte de cette pensée religieuse où l’acte criminel se 
présente, dans l’univers, comme un égarement de l’esprit, c’est toute la catégorie de l’action qui apparaît autrement organisée que chez 
nous.”. 
33 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1110a. 1-4, cf. also 1110b 1-3; 1111a 21-4; ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν ἡµῖν 1112b 28; ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν εἰρηµένοις ἀµφισβητητέον, καὶ 
τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ γεννητὴν τῶν πράξεων ὥσπερ καὶ τέκνων. “man is moving principle or begetter of his actions, as 
of children”, 1113b 17-19. 
34 Translations of Aristotle’s Nicomachaean Ethics are based on Ross & Brown, 2009. 
35In Bacchae it isDionysus who causes mortals to be borne off on the gusts of power, which blow away the cognitive threads that bind them 
to a specific place and time in an identified social and existential web with one another as citizens, family relations, men or women. 
36 E.g. Hom. Od. 1.1. polutropos See also the shifty Phoenician at Hom. Od 14.288-9 δὴ τότε Φοῖνιξ ἦλθεν ἀνὴρ ἀπατήλια εἰδώς, τρώκτης, 
ὃς δὴ πολλὰ κάκ' ἀνθρώπους ἐεόργει·. 
37 Hymn. Hom.VII. 8-9: οἱ δὲ ἰδόντες/νεῦσαν ἐς ἀλλήλους. 
38 Hymn. Hom. VII. 8. 
39 Hymn. Hom. VII. 11. 
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recognized that this implausibly imperturbable figure – ὁ δὲ /ειδιάων ἐκάθητο/ ὄ//ασι 
κυανέοισι40 – is no ordinary mortal41. If they were ignorant they are now warned, but desire 
is stronger in them than this new knowledge about their situation. They insist on not 
recognizing Dionysus – for one can insist on ignorance and passivity – and because their 
prior desires are too strong, they want those to remain their “effective desires”42.  
 
In Dionysus’ presence humans become partially subject to the foreign and partially 
transparent as to the manner of their wishing. Ignorance, voluntariness, compulsion – in the 
Dionysiac scene these are articulated through just the very phenomena on which Aristotle 
will rely to tease out the ambiguities and complexities of volition, counsel and 
responsibility. Sleep, drunkenness, madness, the animal and infantile state, the origin of the 
motivating master impulse, whether inside or outside the agent – Aristotle uses all of these 
to exemplify his abstract points, and all of these form motifs, topics and themes of Bacchae.  
 
In this Homeric hymn to Dionysus, the pirates’ boat is clothed in vine and ivy and the 
pirates turned into dolphins. Before we leave them to splash on in the waves, we may note 
that their fate, or the quality of voluntariness which causes this metamorphosis, is not what 
Aristotle would call “mixed”, miktai43. Throwing goods overboard, because compelled to do 
so in a storm, is his example of the mixture of voluntary and involuntary. There, one has 
chosen to do something because forced to. Such actions are, however mixed, on balance 
more voluntary than involuntary, “for they are chosen at the time when they are done, and 
the end of an action is relative to the occasion [kata ton kairon].”44 The pirates are not 
constrained and they are given an opportunity to know: in the end, the gods throw men 
overboard. Being constrained is an important theme with Dionysus. He is often tied up in 
his myths. Human constraints are ineffective on him. He is the god of loosened ties and wills 
undone. Scheming seamen may try to bind the happy god in painful fetters, but these have 
no power to hold him, and they fall away from his hands and feet45.  
                                                        
40 Hymn. Hom. VII. 14-15. 
41 Hymn. Hom. VII. 17-24. 
42 Effective desires, see § 3.2.2 p. 103. Note that we are told that it is the captain in particular who resists understanding who they have to 
deal with, τὸν δ' ἀρχὸς στυγερῷ ἠνίπαπε µύθῳ· Hom. Hym. VII. 25. The situation has the same shape as Bacchae, and Aeschylus’ Lycurgeia 
in which the captains of the ship of state catastrophically resist the god. 
43 Arist. Eth. Nich.  1110a. 11. 
44 Arist. Eth. Nich.  1110a. 12-14: αἱρεταὶ γάρ εἰσι τότε ὅτε πράττονται, τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς πράξεως κατὰ τὸν καιρόν ἐστιν. 
45 Hymn. Hom. VII. 12-14 καὶ δεσµοῖς ἔθελον δεῖν ἀργαλέοισι/ τὸν δ' οὐκ ἴσχανε δεσµά, λύγοι δ' ἀπὸ τηλόσ' ἔπιπτον/ χειρῶν ἠδὲ ποδῶν·. 
Homer mentions the story of the king Lykourgos who chased the ‘raving god’ Aeschylus’ and his nurses into the sea with a whip, went 
blind and lived a short life, see Hom. Il. 6.132-7. Edonians the Pentheus-like King Lykourgos persecutes Dionysus and his followers. It is 
widely agreed that Aeschylus’ Dionysus plays were important models for Euripides’. We have only fragments of these works of Aeschylus, 
but it is assumed that Apollodorus tells the same story largely. In keeping with this consistent motif in myths of Dionysus, we are told by 
him of a sudden, prodigious emancipation, see Apollod. Bibl. 3.34.4 - 35.3 καὶ Διόνυσος µὲν εἰς θάλασσαν πρὸς Θέτιν τὴν Νηρέως 
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‘Binding’ and ‘unbinding’ form powerful elements in the visual language of Bacchae46; they 
dramatize and make visible those otherwise invisible, abstract qualities of voluntariness and 
involuntariness, which represent such an important dimension of the action. There are, in 
Bacchae, several figures (Teiresias, the Servant who brings in Dionysus captive, the 
messenger who reports the deeds of the bacchants, the bacchants themselves), who 
correspond to the kubernētēs of the Homeric Hymn. The glib and opportunistic “city-slicker” 
– planēs tis47 – on the other hand, is of a kind with the piratical profiteers, and Kadmos in his 
characterization is just as calculating: a man who wagers on Dionysus rather than believes, 
mit ganzem Herz. Kadmos’ daughters too, (a crew of cynical siblings who deny Semelē, like 
the pirates nodding to each other and knowing one another’s meaning), are mortals who 
judge poorly and suffer the loss, not of their human form but of their human contents, their 
minds. These figures have deduced causes, meaning and identity on the familiar pattern of 
inference48.  
 
Foils to the non-recognizing leader, the prudent characters in Bacchae recognize the divinity 
of Dionysus. The servant who brings in the Stranger explains that he had surrendered 
himself “not unwillingly”, ἀλλ' ἔδωκεν οὐκ ἄκων χέρας 437, (and as ever, what hands do 
in Bacchae is of great significance). He, in turn, had protested to the Stranger, that only under 
Pentheus’ orders did he arrest him ouk hekōn, “not willingly so”, 441-4249: 
 
 κἀγὼ δι' αἰδοῦς εἶFον· Ὦ ξέν', οὐχ ἑκὼν 
 ἄγω σε, Πενθέως δ' ὅς /' ἔFε/ψ' ἐFιστολαῖς. 
 
And I respectfully said, “Xenos, not willingly 
Do I take you in, but by order of Pentheus who sent me.” 
 
The themes of constraint and voluntariness are reflected in the recurrent use of akōn, hekōn, 
unwilling and willing, and in forms of anagkē, compulsion. This is a context then, in which 
                                                        
κατέφυγε, Βάκχαι δὲ ἐγένοντο αἰχµάλωτοι καὶ τὸ συνεπόµενον Σατύρων πλῆθος αὐτῷ. αὖθις δὲ αἱ Βάκχαι ἐλύθησαν ἐξαίφνης, Λυκούργῳ 
δὲ µανίαν ἐνεποίησε Διόνυσος. On Aeschylus’ Lykourgeia and Edonians see also n. 140 below. 
46 On this important point, (in this play about the god who is bound, desmios and also elsewhere called lysios, see Dodds on 433-8 and 498), 
to which I shall return, note also Thumiger, 2007: 100-6, e.g. “The motif of tying/freeing in Bacchae confirms our claims about Pentheus’ 
lack of awareness of his own mental state and his own position in the unfolding events. Imprisonment, binding and liberation are a 
characterizing mechanism in the play, and a central experience in the plot as Dionysus’ action in Thebes is in many ways an attempt to 
‘release’, and Pentheus’ resistance is an urge to restrain and control, both himself and others.”, 100. 
47 At 718-21, “city-slicker”, is Dodds’ phrase. 
48 On “Dionysiac inference” see Chp. 5. 
49 See Burnet, 1900, on οὐχ ἑκὼν at Arist. Eth. Nich. 1110b 23: “‘non-voluntary’ as opposed to ‘involuntary’. The contradictory is 
substituted for the contrary.” 
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actors imagine that not only acts matter, but even more significantly, the spirit in which 
actions are carried out. Bearing, the inner state and condition of the willing agent, is thus 
imagined to be a determining aspect of deeds, and of how deeds are to be understood and 
explained. The god cannot be contained or compelled by mortals, and he in turn does not 
wish to compel, but to be recognized and acknowledged unforced and sincerely; he desires 
from humans a certain bearing towards himself, a certain quality of relation. The quality of 
that relation, or that manner of knowing, will be determined by the bearing, the intentional 
character of mortals.   
 
Dionysus is a recursive not a coercive kind of god, he is recognized by those already 
euphronountes “in their right mind”50; those who nurture the wholesomeness and sanity 
which is also his gift to mortals. One must be disposed to know Dionysus and yet it is his 
knowledge which disposes one to have this orientation to him. His is the feedback-loop of 
an emotional or affective economy. He does not compel the knowledge by which he is 
recognized, it is voluntary; in a sense, it must be already in place. To detect this new god51, 
one must paradoxically already have a certain cognitive and volitional readiness, perhaps 
something like a timeless way of knowing, without which one cannot apprehend the strange 
and the new, except on the insufficient pattern of the already familiar. This manner of 
knowing is not forced on mortals, and it cannnot be faked by mortals. Teiresias the mantis 
explains to the prejudicious and unseeing king52, 314-15: 
 
οὐχ ὁ ∆ιόνυσος σωφρονεῖν ἀναγκάσει 
γυναῖκας ἐς τὴν ΚύFριν, ἀλλ' ἐν τῆι φύσει 
 
It is not Dionysus who compels women to be wholesome 
                                                        
50 Euphrōn: 196, 237, 480, 851. Euphrosynē: 377; Aphrosynē: 387, 1301. Kakon phronein: 483 Phronein/ ou phronein: 332, 853, 1123; 
phronein asaleuton 390-1; to mē thnēta phronein 396. Sōphrōn: 314, 316, 318, 329, 504, 641, 686, 940, 1002, 1150, 1341.  
51 Neos theos: 256, οὗτος δ' ὁ δαίµων ὁ νέος 272, bacchantic worship described pejoratively by Pentheus as neochma, 216 and in similar 
vein at 467. D’Angour, 2011: 157 “While the use of neos in this sentence straddles the meanings of ‘young’, ‘additional’ and ‘recently 
come’, the more colourful term neōsti (219) is both more pejorative and less ambiguous.”. Images of the very young and of the old, of 
Dionysus and Pentheus as “shoots”, “foetus”, “new-born” (88-104, 288-90; 1170, 1174, 1185-7; the bacchants are expressly depicted as 
young mothers, 699-703) are set off by a god whose power is to equalize, in his presence, the old and the young, 206-7. In a context where 
the “youth”, “newness”, “freshness” is subject to such consistent evocation and diverse valorization, Teiresias remark at 362-3 takes on an 
especially rich, ironic colouring, ὑπέρ τε πόλεως τὸν θεὸν µηδὲν νέον / δρᾶν. This entanglement of meanings, articulating at the level of the 
line and the phrase the fact of multiplicity of perspective, is typical of Euripidean Tragedy.  
52 Dionysus is himself designated as mantis, 298-9: µάντις δ' ὁ δαίµων ὅδε· τὸ γὰρ βακχεύσιµον / καὶ τὸ µανιῶδες µαντικὴν πολλὴν ἔχει· 
and by Aeschylus in Bassarids TrGF 3 Radt Aesch. fr. 23.2 + 341 [This suggested combination at Sommerstein, 2008: 20-1]: φθάσαντος δ' 
ἐπ' ἔργοις προπηδήσεταί νιν (?) / ὁ κισσεὺς Ἀπόλλων, ὁ βακχειόµαντις. The mantis speaks in a way uncontaminated by personal desires, 
with the objectivity of the involuntary. Teiresias has that power in states of inspiration. In Bacchae we meet him in discursive not mantic 
mode, he uses logic and talk to persuade, only alludes to his special power of speech, which belongs also to Dionysus, 368-9: µαντικῆι µὲν 
οὐ λέγω, / τοῖς πράγµασιν δέ· µῶρα γὰρ µῶρος λέγει. On the figure of Teiresias in Bacchae see Gallistl, 1979, Roth, 1984. 
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in matters of sex, but they are so by nature 
 
The readiness of these humans to acknowledge him53, to partake of his “wholesomeness” 
(sōphronein54), their uncompelled and unfeigned bearing or attitude55, is for Dionysus the 
decisive point that determines whether he will or will not ultimately be their undoing56. This 
is what Dionysus is explaining to Kadmos, after he has destroyed his household, revealed 
himself as the god and pronounced the punitive fate that awaits the founder of Thebes and 
his wife Harmonia (herself daughter of a mortal and the god Ares), “If you had known 
sound-mindedness – sōphronein – when you did not wish to – ὅτ' οὐκ ἠθέλετε – you would 
have obtained the child of Zeus for an ally, and would now be blessed”, 1340-357: 
  
ταῦτ' οὐχὶ θνητοῦ Fατρὸς ἐκγεγὼς λέγω 
∆ιόνυσος ἀλλὰ Ζηνός· εἰ δὲ σωφρονεῖν 
ἔγνωθ', ὅτ' οὐκ ἠθέλετε, τὸν ∆ιὸς γόνον 
ηὐδαι/ονεῖτ' ἂν σύ//αχον κεκτη/ένοι. 
 
I say this not as one born of a mortal father 
But as Dionysus son of Zeus; if you had known 
To be sensible, when you did not wish to,  
You would be happy now, with Zeus’ offspring for an ally. 
 
Dionysus’ very first words, lying in his xenos persona, express that smooth effortlessness, 
which will become increasingly recognizable as characteristic of the god – as the chorus of 
                                                        
53 Readiness, willingness: Kadmos is ready for Dionysus; in the first moments he comes on stage he declares, ἥκω δ' ἕτοιµος τήνδ' ἔχων 
σκευὴν θεοῦ·, 180; Teiresias exhorts Pentheus to willing receptiveness of the god, 312-13: τὸν θεὸν δ' ἐς γῆν δέχου/καὶ σπένδε καὶ βάκχευε 
καὶ στέφου κάρα (see § 2.6 p. 118). The knowledge and acquaintance of the common people, to whom Dionysus is so serviceable, χρῆταί, 
that is just what the chorus wishes to receive τόδ' ἂν δεχοίµαν, 433. 
54 Sōphronein: “wholesomeness of mind” or the “moderateness”, “prudence” that is the consequence and mark of mental integrity. 
55 On Kadmos’ too calculating comportment, see § 3.3.1. 
56 Cf. σκευήν τ' ἔχειν ἠνάγκασ' ὀργίων ἐµῶν. 34, he has forced ἠνάγκασ' the Theban women who have already spurned him and his divine 
identity. See also 939-40, where the bedazzled Pentheus is told that he will count Dionysus as a friend when he sees how moderate or self-
controlled the bacchants actually are: ἦ πού µε τῶν σῶν πρῶτον ἡγήσηι φίλων, / ὅταν παρὰ λόγον σώφρονας βάκχας ἴδηις. 
57 1340-3: Roux: “Ces vers rassemblent une dernière fois les grands thèmes orchestrés tout au long de la pièce.” But note Di Benedetto on 
the succeeding line 1345 (for translation see p. 81): ὄψ' ἐµάθεθ' ἡµᾶς, ὅτε δ' ἐχρῆν οὐκ ἤιδετε. “Dioniso non pone il problema a livello di 
intendimenti e di buono o cattivo volere, ma a livello di consocere e non conoscere, e conoscere vuol dire per Dioniso riconoscere che egli è 
un dio. Ma il consocere attuale, il fatto che ora essi . . . riconoscano la divinità di Dioniso, non modifica affatto la situazione. L’impianto 
etico-religioso di Eschilo viene contradetto radicalmente.”, [my emphasis], but from an Aristotelian point of view the question of 
knowledge and ignorance is intimately connected with will and it cannot be said that ignorance excludes culpability, for it is often the case 
that one has chosen the conditions of ignorance, cf. also the remarks (of Vernant and de Romilly, 1961) on the supposed “évolution qui 
d’Eschyle à Euripide tend à ‘psychologiser’ la tragédie, à souligner davantage les sentiments personnels des protagonistes.”, in Vernant in 
Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 62-3. 
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young women from the land of Kadmos, Phoenicia, sing at Thebes in Eur. Phoen. 689 
“eveything falls together well for gods”, Fάντα δ' εὐFετῆ θεοῖς. He has no hesitation at all 
in answering the interrogations of Pentheus, he can speak with parrhesia58, freely, 
spontaneously responding. With ease he explains his origins: οὐκ ὄκνος οὐδείς, ῥάιδιον δ' 
εἰFεῖν τόδε, 46159. What is the god like, Pentheus asks soon after, 477-78: 
 
Pe. ὁ θεός, ὁρᾶν γὰρ φὴις σαφῶς, Fοῖός τις ἦν; 
Di. ὁFοῖος ἤθελ'· οὐκ ἐγὼ 'τασσον τόδε. 
 
Pe. The god, since you claim to see him clearly, what kind of a person was he? 
Di. Whatever kind he wished; it wasn’t me who determined that.60 
 
Dionysus himself “brought me, caused me to come to Greece” /' εἰσέβησ' 46661, explains the 
Stranger. The god can only have “compelled” – ēnagkasen – assumes Pentheus: Fότερα δὲ 
                                                        
58 Παρρησία: frankness, outspokenness, license, is a telling motif of Greek poetry. In Bacchae the messenger wishes to speak παρρησίαι, 
freely, 668, but worries if he may to the intemperate young king. Dionysiac voices raised in spontaneous, animal calling and crying is the 
most extreme example of this “freedom of speech”, or more accurately freedom to speak. It is a term that occurs frequently in Euripides, see 
LSJ s.v. παρρησία: ἐλεύθεροι παρρησίᾳ θάλλοντες οἰκοῖεν πόλιν κλεινῶν Ἀθηνῶν Eur.Hipp. 422, cf. Ion 672; παρρησίᾳ φράζειν Ba.668 ; 
Phoen. 391. See also the bacchants delighting in speaking freely at 775-7: ταρβῶ µὲν εἰπεῖν τοὺς λόγους ἐλευθέρους/ πρὸς τὸν τύραννον, 
ἀλλ' ὅµως εἰρήσεται·/ Διόνυσος ἥσσων οὐδενὸς θεῶν ἔφυ. 
59 With which compare Pentheus in efficient mode, to no effect commanding “no delay” in the mustering of the army to see off the civic 
threat of Dionysus at 780-1: ἀλλ' οὐκ ὀκνεῖν δεῖ· στεῖχ' ἐπ' Ἠλέκτρας ἰὼν πύλας·. Oknos: This is Wakefield’s emendation, which is accepted 
by Diggle as by Dodds and most modern commentators (Seaford, Di Benedetto, Kopff, Grégoire & Meunier). The manuscripts read οὐ 
κόµπος “no boast”, on which ad loc. Dodds: οὐκ κόµπος οὐδείς: “… the implied antithesis to ῥάιδιον δ' εἰπεῖν is a false one; and the 
construction is not very clear…the true reading is Wakefield’s οὐκ ὄκνος Roux wants to retain κόµπος, ad loc.: “interrogé sur ses origines, 
un noble personnage répond habituellement qu’il “est fier”, qui’il “se vante” d’être issu d’une famille, d’une glorieuse cité . . . οὐ κόµπος 
οὐδείς est dit non sans quelque ironie. Il n’y a donc pas lieu de suspecter le texte, comme l’ont fait maints éditeurs depuis Musgrave.” 
Musgrave’s emendation (“revived by” Meurig-Davies CR 62, 1943, 69, Dodds) is proposed on the parallel offered by Heracles’ reply to a 
question about his identity and intentions in the Peirithous [von Arnim, Suppl. Eur. 41.5 which in Page’s Literary Papyri is i. 15.20], Roux: 
“Mais le contexte est différent”, Guidorizzi and Susanetti also retain the manuscripts’ οὐ κόµπος οὐδείς. 
60 478: Seaford: “alludes to Dionysus’ power of self-transformation”. Di Benedetto: “Lo Straniero con il v. 478 ha spostato il discorso, 
facendo riferimento alla volontà del dio. Lo Straniero vuol dire: il modo di manifestarsi del dio depende da lui, e quindi io non c’entro”, in 
Dionysus’ deflecting of the question Di Benedetto feels that Pentheus at 479 (τοῦτ' αὖ παρωχέτευσας, εὖ γ' οὐδὲν λέγων) does have a point 
and refers us to the slipperiness of Socrates at Pl. Prot. 350 c. But the point here is the doubleness of the Stranger’s utterances, not that “io 
non c’entro”, but almost the very reverse, for the Stranger is the God, a kind of doublet of personhood, to understand whose language and 
meaning the audience needs a kind of versatility, the ability to see two things as one, and a unit as multiple, to bring into focus a double 
vision – just what Pentheus in that uncanny hallucinatory sequence at 918-22 seems finally, but in an involuntary schizoid way to be doing, 
mainomenos.  
61 466: The commentators (Dodds, Roux, Seaford, want us to catch a latent meaning in εἰσέβησ’ [comparable with embateuein found in 
inscriptions for ‘initiate’ and eisbasis in papyrii, for “an initial magical operation”) of “initiate into mysteries” eis teletas (from in addition to 
“bring, cause to go” to Greece, eis Hellada. Seaford wants the meaning not to remain latent and translates, “Dionysus himself initiated me, 
the son of Zeus.” I prefer Di Benedetto’s reading of these lines, for whom it is not, as Dodds and the others took it, a question of manner or 
agent of ‘introduction’ or ‘initiation’, “come è successo che”, but quite plainly of space, “da dove”. The point is the tension inherent in this 
situation of a disguised god who speaks alternatingly, both of and as himself; both as a third person, autos, and emphatically in the first 
person cf. 614: αὐτὸς ἐξέσωσ' ἐµαυτὸν.  
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νύκτωρ σ' ἢ κατ' ὄ//' ἠνάγκασεν;62. Set against this common conception of compulsion and 
constraint are objects that “act”, are animate and move, evidently – ἄνευ θνητῆς χερός – 
“without mortal hand”, testimonies to or proofs of miraculous agency, 447-50: 
  
αὐτό/ατα δ' αὐταῖς δεσ/ὰ διελύθη Fοδῶν 
κλῆιδές τ' ἀνῆκαν θύρετρ' ἄνευ θνητῆς χερός. 
Fολλῶν δ' ὅδ' ἁνὴρ θαυ/άτων ἥκει Fλέως 
ἐς τάσδε Θήβας. σοὶ δὲ τἄλλα χρὴ /έλειν. 
 
Of their own will did the bindings come undone from his feet 
And the bolts sprang off the doors without any human hand. 
Full of many wonders is this man arrived 
here in Thebes. The rest must be your concern. 
 
When the captive Dionysus is marched off to Pentheus’ prison, the despairing chorus sings, 
calling on Dionysus, son of Zeus, 550-5263 : 
 
 ἐσορᾶις τάδ', ὦ ∆ιὸς Fαῖ 
 ∆ιόνυσε, σοὺς Fροφήτας 
 ἐν ἁ/ίλλαισιν ἀνάγκας; 
 
Are you looking upon this, son of Zeus 
Dionysus, your promoters64 
Struggling with constraint? 
 
                                                        
62 469: Dodds: “ἠνάγκασεν: “God’s will is a compulsion . . . But in Pentheus’ mouth the word is ironic”. It is a characteristically very loaded 
kind of irony, for the ironic expense is one whose costs he shall have so drastically to cover, when “uncompelled” he comes by night and 
face-to-face, under the eyes (Roux: “non pas ‘face à face’, mais ‘à ta vue’) of his unseeing and murderous mother. Seaford: although at 467 
Pentheus was being “sarcastic” according to Seaford: “It is not certain that (as claimed by Dodds and Roux) Pentheus is being ironic here. 
Rather, in this dialogue he shows a not entirely uninformed interest in the mysteries, which might indeed involve divine compulsions: 34, 
Livy 39.18.8 (necessarius of the Dionysiac mysteries), Ap. Met. 11.29 (Isis in a dream commands initiation).”, but even if Pentheus does 
show such a ‘not entirely uninformed interest in the mysteries’, that quality of objective or distanced, even supercilious regard rather than 
hospitable embrace, is just the problem. This manner of viewing is Pentheus’ mistake.  
63 ἐν ἁµίλλαισιν ἀνάγκας: Dodds: “at grips with oppression”; Seaford: “in struggles against constraint”; Roux, “luttant contre la menace 
d’emprisonnement de Penthée”, for her anagkē must be quite literally understood as imprisonment; she cites 643 in support of that reading; 
Kirk: “in the toils of violent compulsion”. Di Benedetto: “il nesso di ἀνάγκη con ἅµιλλα è dificile e intenso, con un implicito procedimento 
di personalizzazione dela ‘necessità’ che si oppone fattivamente alla resistenza da parte del soggetto;”. 
64 προφήτας: mouthpieces, promoters. Commentators agree that this should not be taken as ‘prophets’ or ‘interpreters’. Seaford: 
“proclaimers”; Dodds: “preachers”. Cf. 211 where Kadmos offers to act as prophētēs with words for Teiresias, who is blind. There too it 
does not mean “interpreter” or “prophet” at all, but very plainly, and in keeping with the themes of the larger work, one who will register 
what is simply there to perceive, a transposer – from sight into words – not an interpreter. 
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Willingness and unwillingness is central where this god is concerned, who in his accounts is 
so typically resisted. The volitional friction of mortals is set against the frictionless character 
and comportment of Dionysus, in whom not only is there the promise of rest and peace, but 
who is characterized by this pronounced, divine effortlessness. In the first episode, Teiresias, 
the local expert on the estranged god who is, in reality, a son of Thebes, explains this quality 
of Dionysus’ to Kadmos: “The god will lead us thence (to the mountain) with no toil”, ὁ 
θεὸς ἀ/οχθεὶ κεῖσε νῶιν ἡγήσεται, 19465. Dionysiac wish is Dionysiac command. Dionysus, 
speaking as the Stranger, tells the laborious king that “the daimōn himself will release me, 
whensoever I wish”, λύσει /' ὁ δαί/ων αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω, 498, and hints at his identity 
as Dionysos Lysios. 
 
The central episode, 576-861, with its opening sequence (the Palastwunderszene, the scene of 
the “palace miracles”, as Dodds called it66) is a tableau of the unity of divine desire and 
consummation, set against mortal ineffectualness – the sprezzatura of Dionysus 
emphasizing the ineffectiveness of the worried human’s will. Dionysus was bound, and now 
with the greatest of ease, with no effort at all, he is unbound, easily free, 612-17: 
 
Ch.  Fῶς γὰρ οὔ; τίς /οι φύλαξ ἦν, εἰ σὺ συ/φορᾶς τύχοις; 
         ἀλλὰ Fῶς ἠλευθερώθης, ἀνδρὸς ἀνοσίου τυχών; 
Di.    αὐτὸς ἐξέσωσ' ἐ/αυτὸν ῥαιδίως ἄνευ Fόνου.67 
Ch.  οὐδέ σου συνῆψε χεῖρας δεσ/ίοισιν ἐν βρόχοις68; 
Di.    ταῦτα καὶ καθύβρισ' αὐτόν, ὅτι /ε δεσ/εύειν δοκῶν 
         οὔτ' ἔθιγεν οὔθ' ἥψαθ' ἡ/ῶν, ἐλFίσιν δ' ἐβόσκετο. 
 
Ch. Of course! Who would be my guardian, if something befell you? 
But how did you get free, after you fell into the possession of an impure man? 
Di. I saved myself, easily, with no effort. 
Ch. Didn’t he tie up your hands in binding knots? 
Di. Even in this did I make a mockery of him, in that thinking he was binding me 
      He neither touched nor grasped us, no he was feeding on thoughts, elpides. 
 
                                                        
65 On Dionysus’ effortlessness generally see also Dodds on ἀµοχθεὶ 194: “the Dionysiac effortlessness of which we had a hint at 66; we 
shall meet again later. Cf. Ar. Frogs 402 where the mustai pray to Iacchos δεῖξον ὡς ἄνευ πόνου / πολλὴν ὁδὸν περαίνεις. This is something 
quite different from the commonplace that all things are easy to a god… it is a power communicated by this god to his worshippers.” 
66 Dodds: 147; on this scene and its interpretation, see Castellani, 1976; Gakopolou, 2011. 
67 Cf. Dionysus’ words at 498: λύσει µ' ὁ δαίµων αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω. 
68 With these brochoi “knots”, “noose”, which come to be another figuration of Pentheus’ ineffectiveness, and indeed of human technique in 
the face of Dionysus generally, compare Agauē’s ecstatic remarks that she has caught her prey “a … [wild animal? Cf. 1185-7] young son 
without brochoi”, 1174-6: ἔµαρψα τόνδ' ἄνευ βρόχων / <×–⏑–⏑⏑–> νέον ἶνιν, / ὡς ὁρᾶν πάρα.   
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The mortal had run about in a frenzy, feeding wildly on thoughts (“hopes”, “expectations”) 
and thus “illusions”: ἐλFίσιν δ' ἐβόσκετο69. A sweating, deranged and panting mess, he and 
the human context determined by his misjudged commands, are the very picture of futility 
(ἅFας δ' ἐν ἔργωι δοῦλος ἦν, /άτην Fονῶν 626, FέFονθα δεινά, 642). He is like his 
Aeschylean precedent, the maddened Lykourgos, who no longer sees what he sees and 
cannot wish to do what he does. For, in the grip of Dionysus’ avenging mania, Lykourgos, 
king of the Edonians, killed his son Dryas, thinking him a branch. Dionysus takes revenge 
on mortals by making them involuntary, the very instruments of their own undoing: tragic70.  
 
The god sits idly, thassōn, and calmly observes the scene, 618-2271: 
 
Fρὸς φάτναις δὲ ταῦρον εὑρών, οὗ καθεῖρξ' ἡ/ᾶς ἄγων, 
τῶιδε Fερὶ βρόχους ἔβαλλε γόνασι καὶ χηλαῖς Fοδῶν, 
θυ/ὸν ἐκFνέων, ἱδρῶτα σώ/ατος στάζων ἄFο, 
χείλεσιν διδοὺς ὀδόντας· Fλησίον δ' ἐγὼ Fαρὼν 
ἥσυχος θάσσων ἔλευσσον.72    
 
He found a bull at the mangers, where he had brought and shut us up, 
On this bull he tried throwing a noose, around its knees and hooves, 
Panting out his rage, he was dripping sweat from his body, 
Biting his lips; I was right nearby 
I watched, sitting there calmly. 
 
Pentheus, who when we meet him first, is a flighty, excitable man, goes on to show himself 
intolerant and touchy and impatient of seers – a typical king and tyrannos73. In the scenes that 
take place within the palace walls, described in detail to the audience by the magically 
emancipated Dionysus, he has descended into a state of very unroyal labour, into a fever of 
                                                        
69 On elpis, see § 2.5 n. 249, § 3.1 p.136, § 4.3.9 n. 183, and elpis contrasted with melein see § 3.3.3 n. 169. 
70 See Aesch. Fr. 57-60. Apollodorus. Note how Pentheus is referred to as branch, sprig, offspring in: ἕλικα νεότοµον 1170, τόδ' ἔρνος 1306, 
he is the shoot of Kadmos, the sower of humans who harvests a wretched crop (1313-15), who will end up an atrocious harvest, pulled off a 
branch where the god (himself of artificial insemination and ‘harvesting’ more than parturition, who was grafted on a mortal woman), has 
placed him, 1070-4. On the Lykourgeia of Aeschylus, see Ar. Av.276, Scholia; and Deichgräber, 1939, Jouan, 1992, Mureddu, 1994, 2000, 
West, 1990, Sommerstein, 2008; and see § 4.3.1 n. 106. 
71 Penthean ineffectualness, 625-28: ἦισσ' ἐκεῖσε κἆιτ' ἐκεῖσε, δµωσὶν Ἀχελῶιον φέρειν/ ἐννέπων, ἅπας δ' ἐν ἔργωι δοῦλος ἦν, µάτην πονῶν/ 
διαµεθεὶς δὲ τόνδε µόχθον, ὡς ἐµοῦ πεφευγότος/ ἵεται ξίφος κελαινὸν ἁρπάσας δόµων ἔσω. Note the telling echo of Dionysus’ 
imperturbable “sitting”, thassōn, here at 1076, 1111, where Pentheus’ privileged viewing seat will not remain undisturbed for very long. 
72 See Orestes’ episode of frenzy at Eur. Or. 253-65. 
73 Excitable: 212-14, 332, on ptoein “flit, flutter” see § 2.2.4  n. 153; Intolerant, impatient: 343-57; Discrediting of seers: 255-7; Reacting 
violently against a seer who does not say what he wishes to hear: 346-51; typical of the king or tyrannos: Agamemnon in Hom. Il. 26-32, 
105-8; Oedipus in Soph. OT 380-403; Kreon in Soph. Ant. 1023—63. See also Dodds on 214, with Murray against Norwood. 
 62 
humiliating hallucinations74. In a later part of this long episode, the penultimate one for 
Pentheus, 778-861, we find a king somewhat restored to himself volitionally, only to slip 
again, now gradually and somewhat mysteriously, like one hypnotized, under the spell of 
Dionysus’ will. Here in the central palace scenes, we have heard tell of a mortal already 
susceptible to delusion, learning and yet still not learning the truth about his own desires 
and the meaning of the Stranger’s easefulness, 640-43: 
 
Di. ῥαιδίως γὰρ αὐτὸν οἴσω, κἂν Fνέων ἔλθηι /έγα· 
      Fρὸς σοφοῦ γὰρ ἀνδρὸς ἀσκεῖν σώφρον' εὐοργησίαν. 
Pe. FέFονθα δεινά· διαFέφευγέ /' ὁ ξένος, 
      ὃς ἄρτι δεσ/οῖς ἦν κατηναγκασ/ένος. 
 
Di. Easily shall I bear him, though he come puffing all his might, 
For it belongs to a wise man to exercise healthy-minded sweetness of temper. 
Pe. I have suffered dreadful things, the xenos has escaped me, 
Who just before was tied up tightly in bonds. 
 
Dionysus gives ease to hands which choose to surrender their will, (or have been compelled 
because of an original sin of refusal or non-recognition). The doffing of one’s identity entails 
the abandonment of one’s own desires. It means losing one’s own will as personal property 
and, in Bacchae, accession to the god’s higher (or lower) mode of desiring. Humans calculate 
and strive, they work towards ends, they are “awesome” deinoi, for their unique capacity to 
have purpose, telos, and to plan for and pursue their telē75. The having and pursuing of telē 
requires the capacity to project time as sequence and the identification of oneself as person 
having a future. The ordinary character of willing, just as the ordinary telē that belong to 
mortals, are subverted and even inverted by the new god who brings a different kind of 
consummation, establishing amongst mortals, alongside their time-bound telē, his time-
transforming (initiatory) and transcending teletai76.  
 
                                                        
74 Ominously ironic on Pentheus’ kingly and solitary “labouring on behalf of the city” see 963-4: µόνος σὺ πόλεως τῆσδ' ὑπερκάµνεις, 
µόνος·/ τοιγάρ σ' ἀγῶνες ἀναµένουσιν οὓς ἐχρῆν. 
75 Deinos: humans awesome for their cognitive powers and their capacity for designing and anticipating, see Soph. Ant. 332-52; Aesch. PV. 
436-71. 
76 Teletai: Dionysus establishes or “institutes” these “in order to become revealed” 22, the mortal who “knows the teletai of the gods” is 
blessed 74. Pentheus sees that the mission of the stranger has as its objective the introduction of these teletai: a danger to the city’s young 
women at whom they are aimed 238, a worthless, innovation of the charlatan seer 260, teletas ponēras, a non-Greek arrival from abroad 
465, which is peopled by barbarians who are inferior in sense to Greeks, 483. Rijksbaron points to the same thought expressed in Hdt. 
1.60.3, but Herodotus seems to undergo the maturation and come to possess the versatility to take new perspectives, which Pentheus so 
tragically lacks, so Hdt. 3.38. On bacchic teletai in the post-Classical period see Burkert, 1993. 
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Eudaimōn (“blessed”, “happy”77) is the man who escapes the sea and finds a haven; blessed 
too is the mortal who escapes toil, sings Dionysus’ chorus of bacchants, 904-06: 
 
εὐδαί/ων δ' ὃς ὕFερθε /όχθων 
ἐγένεθ'· ἕτερα δ' ἕτερος ἕτερον   
ὄλβωι καὶ δυνά/ει Fαρῆλθεν. 
 
Blessed is he who has got beyond 
Labour, one man supercedes another 
Differently, in happiness and power. 
 
This chorus of bacchants, a thiasos, band of foreign, female worshippers of the god, had 
entered the stage after the prologue singing an entrance hymn indistinguishable from the 
hymns sung in the cult of the god78. They celebrate the sweet labour of Dionysus, which 
requires none of that effort of will, none of the labour to which mortals in their earth-bound 
existence are ordinarily compelled, and of which Hesiod and Aeschylus gave such account 
in their work79. The bacchants themselves are set apart for both the collapse of themselves as 
agents of their own personal will and for the wondrous effortlessness of their mode of 
being80. When we hear about them, we hear that their natural state, when not deranged by 
outsiders, is one of rest, good order or “happy labour”: thaleros hypnos, eukosmia, hēdus 
ponos81.  
 
Even their most gruesomely effortful act, ripping Pentheus’ joints apart, is not entirely of 
their volition – mikton, they do it both voluntarily and not voluntarily – just as it is not 
accomplished by ordinary physical effort82. The god lends ease, eumareia, for the 
                                                        
77 On the meanings of eudaimōn, olbos and makaros (the choral song continues further on, 910-11: τὸ δὲ κατ' ἦµαρ ὅτωι βίοτος/ εὐδαίµων, 
µακαρίζω), see Rijksbaron: “I refer to De Heer (1969) . . . ‘None of them (sc. the different types of ‘happiness’) ‘is thought to be enduring, 
but εὐδαίµων is connected most intimately with the sense-comportment of permanence; the condition of being ὄλβιος is an aspect, a 
manifestation, of being εὐδαίµων.’” See also Thumiger, 2007: 171-85 on time, though there more specifically, from the point of view of 
characterization and time.  
78 Dodds: 71-2, “Both in form and content the ode seems to be fairly closely modelled on actual cult hymn”, 71.  
79 66-8: Βροµίωι πόνον ἡδὺν / κάµατόν τ' / εὐκάµατον, Βάκ-/ χιον εὐαζοµένα. See also Ion 128-35 καλόν γε τὸν πόνον, ὦ /Φοῖβε, σοὶ πρὸ 
δόµων λατρεύ- / ω, τιµῶν µαντεῖον ἕδραν·/ κλεινὸς δ' ὁ πόνος µοι / θεοῖσιν δούλαν χέρ' ἔχειν, / οὐ θνατοῖς ἀλλ' ἀθανάτοις· / εὐφάµους δὲ 
πόνους / µοχθεῖν οὐκ ἀποκάµνω.  
80 For the maenads as producing all the rewards of normal agricultural labour without of any of the effort, see especially 699-711. A very 
example of that transcending of work evoked at 904-06. 
81 ηὗδον δὲ πᾶσαι σώµασιν παρειµέναι, 683, αἱ δ' ἀποβαλοῦσαι θαλερὸν ὀµµάτων ὕπνον, 692; θαῦµ' ἰδεῖν εὐκοσµίας, 693; ἔνθα 
µαινάδες/καθῆντ' ἔχουσαι χεῖρας ἐν τερπνοῖς πόνοις, 1052-53. Note that for Aristotle the involuntary is aligned with the unpleasant, the 
voluntary with pleasure, δοκεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ µὲν ἀκούσια λυπηρὰ εἶναι, τὰ δὲ κατ' ἐπιθυµίαν ἡδέα, 1111a 31-2. The ponos to which mortals are 
compelled becomes “pleasant”, hēdus, with Dionysus, 66: Βροµίωι πόνον ἡδὺν. On ponos see also § 3.3.10 n. 269. 
82 οὐχ ὑπὸ σθένους/ἀλλ' ὁ θεὸς εὐµάρειαν ἐπεδίδου χεροῖν. 1127-28. 
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accomplishment of his purposes, just as he endows mortality with the gift that releases them 
from pain83. His gift is this release from the burdensome laws of nature at the price of the 
dissolution of one’s own desires, or purposiveness. Freedom from care and effort is bought 
at the price of self-possession. Their minds are the ransom mortals must pay Dionysus for 
his cures.  
 
The maenads are “willing” (in the weak sense) murderers of Pentheus; Agauē very eagerly 
(again, this “eagerness” is unchosen, so it is of a weak, merely “voluntary” kind”) hunts 
down her son84, who himself had been so “zealous for what he ought not to have been 
zealous after” (σFεύδοντά τ' ἀσFούδαστα, 913)85. They are willing but not choosing 
murderers. In their deeds – the most grievous deeds imaginable, the savage, utterly bestial 
killing of blood-kin – we have a very case study in that which interests Aristotle on agency, 
one in which acts are committed in spite of oneself. This fissure opened up in human subjects, 
a space between acts and the intention or inadvertency of their commission, is a fine one. 
Out of it issues the conscious and the unconscious, all that is sweetest and all that is most 
dreadful86 and the very material of Tragic Drama. Dionysus’ mania is a hijacking or abduction 
of that quality which we call “self” – identity, personhood, agency. Hence in his art, Attic 
Drama, the recurrent problem is that of self-interest (whether only apparent or in fact also 
authentic) and its difficulty of location: since the self is itself so evanescent, so hard to pin 
down, inaccessible and hard “to know”; and that above all to its “owner”87.   
 
Compulsion, forms of control, service and even enslavement to the god are central questions 
of Dionysus’ world88. Fundamental questions of autonomy and agency, of compromised 
agency and the nature of authority over ones’s self and one’s own desires, one’s bearing to 
mortal and divine others – these all constantly underlie the action and motivations of this 
and other Attic tragedies. Surrender to Dionysus is the service he requires, and this is a god 
who renders to humans the very sweetest gifts: wine, joyful solidarity, peace, rest, 
                                                        
83 οἴνου τέρψιν ἄλυπον, 423; βροτείω τ' ἔχειν ἄλυπος βίος, 1004. 
841087-1114, where for example: ἀγµῶν τ' ἐπήδων θεοῦ πνοαῖσιν ἐµµανεῖς 1094., κρεῖσσον γὰρ ὕψος τῆς προθυµίας ἔχων 1101. 
85 And in his state of enfeebled volition he in turn thinks that he is hunting down the fluttering birds, that to his own fluttering mind, the 
bacchants are, 957-8: καὶ µὴν δοκῶ σφας ἐν λόχµαις ὄρνιθας ὣς/ λέκτρων ἔχεσθαι φιλτάτοις ἐν ἕρκεσιν. 
86 δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἠπιώτατος, 861. 
87 On the misidentification of self-interest compare for example the problems in Euripides’ Polyphontes in Cresphontes Eur. fr. 452; in 
Chrysippus Laius is incapable of governing his desire for the boy Chrysippus and laments the “evil godsend for humans, when one knows 
what is good and does not do it”, Eur. fr. 841. Mistaking money – misthos – as having a value that it does not in fact have, will typically also 
lead to having to pay the dreadful wages of a misconstrued self-interest: such is the venal reckoning Pentheus attributes to Teiresias, 255-7, 
but which only reflects his own overestimation of the value and power of lucre, so that he offers money to the god to bribe him illicitly to 
see the bacchants, 812: µάλιστα, µυρίον γε δοὺς χρυσοῦ σταθµόν. 
88 Therapeia: on service and mutual amenability with Dionysus see § 3.3.1 n. 132, § 3.3.2 n. 49, and Wildberg, 1999/2000. 
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refreshment89. He brings to humankind also dance, music and prophecy, thus completing 
and elaborating the suite of specifically human and civilized – politika – capacities, 
established by the philanthropic Prometheus90.  
 
All of Dionysus’ gifts entail a surrender of volitional agency, but in turn they give access to  
the magnified kind of agency which belongs to the god. They enable a binding together of 
discrete persons into one person, one ‘body corporate’ – a phrase betrayed by the very 
bodilessness of that which it usually describes – that transcends time and individual death. 
A Dionysiac life of calm and peace endures and “holds together houses”91: 
 
ὁ δὲ τᾶς ἡσυχίας 
βίοτος καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν        
ἀσάλευτόν τε /ένει καὶ   
ξυνέχει δώ/ατα· Fόρσω 
γὰρ ὅ/ως αἰθέρα ναίον- 
τες ὁρῶσιν τὰ βροτῶν οὐρανίδαι. 
 
But the life of peace 
And mindfulness 
Remains unshaken 
And holds together houses, far off 
In the skies though they dwell 
The heavenly ones see the doings of mortals. 
 
The unanimity of the chorus, the conjoining of many voices and faces into one, is itself the 
gift of Dionysus. It is a model of the healthy polis, the strange, uniquely human, nearly 
divine capacity to generate and regularly re-institute an identity, an objective person who is 
not one subject, but in which many subjects can conjointly partake. Here is the ‘spiritual’ 
                                                        
89 278-85. Wine is the highly recursive gift of Dionysus: he gifts it to mortals πῶµ' ηὗρε κἀσηνέγκατο / θνητοῖς 279-80; he is the wine and 
mortals pour him out for the gods, οὗτος θεοῖσι σπένδεται θεὸς γεγώς 284; and using it its own reward, ὥστε διὰ τοῦτον τἀγάθ' ἀνθρώπους 
ἔχειν 285. On Dionysus’ as benefactor see Henrichs, 1975; and Cabrera, 2013. 
90 As Prometheus established certain capabilities by his gift of fire, which is the mother of all gifts (cf. Aesch. PV 506 πᾶσαι τέχναι 
βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προµηθέως), symbol of mind, so does Dionysus “institute”, kathistanai (21-2) his gifts and practices. Invention of drums: the 
Korybantes “invented” the drums, a bacchic gift, 121-5; Wine: Dionysus bequeaths his wine which is also himself, his own intoxicating 
presence, 278-84. It is the only gift that relieves humans (οὐδ' ἔστ' ἄλλο φάρµακον πόνων, 284) from just those capacities for devising 
schemes and tools, the prosthetics of practical intention, which are the gifts of Prometheus, see Aesch. PV 436-71. 
91 In just the way that the House of Kadmos fails to be held together, but cf. 1308, where pathetically the destroyed Pentheus is said to have 
‘held together the house of Kadmos’ and to have been the ‘joy of the polis’, 1308-10: ὧι δῶµ' ἀνέβλεφ', ὃς συνεῖχες, ὦ τέκνον, /τοὐµὸν 
µέλαθρον, παιδὸς ἐξ ἐµῆς γεγώς, / πόλει τε τάρβος ἦσθα·. It has been a different kind of joy, a pride in a different relation that Dionysus has 
wanted Thebes to feel. 
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articulation of the Atheneians’ Thesean synoecism92. Thebes in Bacchae has not found this 
health. She is the nurse of Kadmeians, τροφοὶ Θῆ-/βαι 105-6, who like the mother that 
destroys its child, or the maenads who stream in frenzy out of their house and city-walls, 
has abandoned its present-time and thus its future. The House of Kadmos has come 
toppling down. This city has been a disastrous project in transgenerational personhood. 
Thebes has failed to sing and surrender and view itself in Dionysus’ way. The community 
that loves peace and knows itself and therefore what is really in its interests and what those 
ought to be, that community endures over generations.93  
 
Aristotle had been reading Euripides. He counters the Socratic notion of wickedness being a 
matter of ignorance, something ultimately always committed in spite of oneself94. He calls 
geloia, “ridiculous, laughable”, the kind of compulsions to outrage adduced in exculpation 
by protagonists in Tragedy, singling out as example the Alcmeon in Corinth, which was 
performed alongside Bacchae in 405 BCE95. There are dreadful things – ta deinotata – to which 
persons simply would not be compelled, according to Aristotle. One could only ever kill 
one’s mother, (and we may presume, one’s son) he implies, if one did not know she were 
such: d’après leurs conditions internes, les différentes modalités de l’action, as Vernant wrote96. 
Ignorance and dreadful things: this is the fundamental Problematik in Bacchae.  
 
It is a work in which internal conditions so manifestly determine the modality of action. 
Here knowledge, states of mind, bearing, intention, choices to recognize and not recognize, 
have primary place. The effacement of the faculties of deliberation, and thus of choice, in 
mania; the gradual enchantment or thelxis of the king, a process invested with great 
prominence as such in the drama97; his casting under what Euripides’ Dionysus calls a “light 
                                                        
92 See Parker, 1996: 10-28. 
93 See Seaford in Masks, 115-46 and Seaford, 1994. Also Bloch, 1992, on the politics of religious ritual, who argues that rituals functions to 
knit together the forces of vitality (youth) and transcendence (age), resolving tensions that form an existential threat and ensuring both the 
creative energy of a culture, its containment by institutions and its endurance over time. 
94 See for example Pl. Prt. 345d – e; Meno 77 – 8; Grg. 475e, 509e; Leg. 860c – 863e. Cf. for Aristotle’s rejection of the Platonic paradox 
that no one is wicked voluntarily Arist. Eth. Nich.  1113b 3-1114b 25, where “virtue and vice are in our power”, and not a question only of 
knowledge and ignorance. 
95 Arist. Eth. Nich.  1110a 26-9: ἔνια δ' ἴσως οὐκ ἔστιν ἀναγκασθῆναι, ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον ἀποθανετέον παθόντι τὰ δεινότατα· καὶ γὰρ τὸν 
Εὐριπίδου Ἀλκµαίωνα γελοῖα φαίνεται τὰ ἀναγκάσαντα µητροκτονῆσαι. On this lost play, and how it may have complemented Bacchae and 
Iphigenia at Aulis, see Hall’s essay in Stuttard: 11-28. For a formative discussion of the two plays, by a scholar who established the ritualist 
parameters for the interpretation of Bacchae in the century, see Murray, 1913: 163-95.   
96 “. . . Aristote élabore une doctrine de l’acte moral qui représente, dans la philosophie grecque classique, l’effort d’analyse le plus poussé 
pour distinguer, d’après leurs conditions internes, les différentes modalités de l’action.”, my italics, Vernant 48-9, in Vernant & Vidal-
Naquet, 1972. 
97 Esp. 810-61 and its spectacular consummation in 913-76. 
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madness” elaphran lussan, 85198; Pentheus’ inability to pierce the mist of entrancement that 
enwraps the mind of his mother and the maenads, 1115-21; and then the remarkable 
depiction of a slow, gradual return to consciousness of Agauē, who has by now killed her 
own son 1263-96: all this suggests a fascination with the absolute centrality of the mind and 
its states, a central preoccupation with the invisible threads, made momentarily manifest, 
that link subjects to their actions in more or less meaningful, moral agency. 
 
What the maenads do in the culmination of Bacchae looks completely involuntary in 
Aristotelian terms. The archē is Dionysus, it comes from outside of themselves. It is not 
entirely “in their power”99: ὁ θεὸς εὐ/άρειαν ἐFεδίδου χεροῖν, 1128. It is involuntary “in the 
abstract”, for while “no one would choose any such act in itself”100, to commit the atrocity the 
Theban women are said to do, they are figured always as the very portrait of happy 
willingness and desire after Dionysus. In their leaping, rushing – thoazein, skirtān101– character 
the bacchants are the model of that enhanced eagerness, the self-abnegated fundamentalism, 
which is religious zeal. Their only work is the unreflective commission of Dionysiac desire. 
 
 
  
                                                        
98 On this “light madness”, ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν, 851, Dodds: “a madness of inconstancy, ‘a dizzy fantasy’, rather than (Paley, Wilamowitz) ‘a 
light attack of madness’. So Phocylides fr. 9 fr. 9 speaks of people who appear saophrones but are really elaphronóoi.” Radke: 143-53, 
makes some good points on this “leichter Wahn”: “Dionysos wünscht nicht alle Rachegöttinen und Furien auf Pentheus herab, sonder 
gerade soviel an Verblendung, wie für den nächsten Schritt seines Planes erforderlich ist.”, but her argument that this ‘light frenzy’ is 
something proper to Pentheus, not coming from Dionysus but only intensified, as it were, for the god’s purposes is not entirely persuasive. 
πρῶτα δ' ἔκστησον φρενῶν, / ἐνεὶς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν, 850-1, is fairly definite: “Put him out of his mind and put in him a light frenzy”. 
Dionysus is putting something in him from outside and that also resembles the weakened volition that has always been the mark of 
Pentheus, in spite of himself. Leinieks: 81, 115, 257, parses it simply as ‘delusion’ (flattening out the difference between ‘frenzy’ and 
‘delusion’ – but frenzy is never a static state, delusion can be a purely internal or immobile condition: like the difference between laughing 
and smiling), “At 851 eu phronein is implicitly contrasted with delusion”, though it is not implicit. Nevertheless, dentifying things only 
contrastively, can drain them of their strong and nuanced colours, on Lussa “Frenzy”, personified in Aeschylus Xantriai, see § 4.2 n. For a 
useful discussion of Lussa in Bacchae and Tragedy, see Di Benedetto p. 442. I find elaphra, ‘light’ all important here. A ‘light frenzy’, is a 
mark of the god’s subtlety, his lightness of touch, the delicacy that is so powerfully offset by the atrocity of maenadic frenzy and the god’s 
vengefulness. This a context of blurred lines, gradual transitions, everywhere the prospect of ambiguity is raised as if human life were 
somehow lived in that state described by Diotima in Plato’s Symposium, somewhere between ignorance and knowledge, Pl. Sym. 202a. 
99 Arist. Eth. Nich.  1110a 16-17 ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστίν ·ὧν δ' ἐν αὐτῷ ἡ ἀρχή, ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ µή. 
100 Arist. Eth. Nich.  1110a 18-19 ἑκούσια δὴ τὰ τοιαῦτα, ἁπλῶς δ' ἴσως ἀκούσια· οὐδεὶς γὰρ ἂν ἕλοιτο καθ' αὑτὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὐδέν. 
101 Thoazein: 65, 219. Skirtān: 167-9, 445-6. Rushing, leaping, dionysiac joy is surrender to Dionysiac authority, a “surrender” which, in its 
healthy form, is not simply passive or by default, but active will. 
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2.2.1.2 Heterorrepēs 
 
For how could he not know himself?102 
 
By “particular cases”, must we adjudicate matters, on the spectrum of akousion – hekousion, 
Aristotle argues. And here in Bacchae is a complex, very particular case. It was a drama 
performed alongside the Alcmeon at Corinth and the Iphigenia at Aulis. In those other plays 
too, kin are made, apparently “willingly”, to do what most disgusts the will under normal 
circumstances: to kill their own. This trilogy, performed posthumously in 405 BCE, might 
well have been advertised “Dreadful things”: τὰ δεινότατα. Agamemnon is compelled by a 
seer’s interpretation, which he may choose to ignore, to sacrifice his loving child103. He 
wavers and we are given to see the process of wavering, of preponderance now this way, 
now that, exhibiting that quality of decision that belongs to mortals and which corresponds 
to the quality of alternate evaluation of their acts by Zeus heterorrepēs, as he is described by 
Aeschylus104.  
 
A savage divinity has made a humanly repellent demand. Humans negotiate the 
circumstances, revealing their characters through the values they claim to have and wish to 
have and the values, that through their actions, they in fact ultimately reveal. Choice and its 
deliberation, or the renunciation of choice and of deliberation (itself of course a choice, the 
choice of passivity), is most unfalsifiably evident in what mortals finally desire most, the 
wish that becomes effective. This is what Harry Frankfurt called effective values, viz. the ones 
that are actualized105. Character is defined by desire and intention. In situations of choice 
                                                        
102 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111a. 3-8: πῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε; 
103 Calchas’ prophesying Aesch. Ag. 121-38, Agamemnon does not blame the seer, Aesch. Ag. 186: µάντιν οὔτινα ψέγων; but is faced with a 
choice, however aporetic he feels, he recognizes the dreadful options Aesch. Ag. 205-17; vacillates between impure alternatives A. Ag. 219-
20: φρενὸς πνέων δυσσεβῆ τροπαίαν / ἄναγνον; and then resolves on how he shall proceed τόθεν / τὸ παντότολµον φρονεῖν µετέγνω Aesch. 
Ag. 220-1; he himself “puts on the yoke-strap of compulsion” ἀνάγκας ἔδυ λέπαδνον, Aesch. Ag. 218. In Eur. IA 87-114 it is even more 
pronounced: the sacrifice that the seer has said is required is not forced upon Agamemnon, the entire work revolves on the axis of 
deliberation, the dilemma whether to be unspeakably ruthless and save face or to be humane and go home, so e.g. see Agamemnon’s own 
explanation of his predicament, he is a man in profoundest conflict between alternatives, which it will be for him to ultimatley choose. On 
his willing choice of sacrifice, at least initially, the blamelessness of anyone but himself, see also Eur. IA 358-64, note esp. Agamemnon’s 
overjoyed reaction to the news that killing his daughter will make the Trojan expedition feasible again and his delighted devising of a 
pretext, prophasis, 359-62: ἡσθεὶς φρένας / ἄσµενος θύσειν ὑπέστης παῖδα· καὶ πέµπεις ἑκών, / οὐ βίαι – µὴ τοῦτο λέξηις – σῆι δάµαρτι 
παῖδα σὴν / δεῦρ' ἀποστέλλειν, Ἀχιλλεῖ πρόφασιν ὡς γαµουµένην. But contrast the exhausted and desperate derogation of prophets by the 
Atreides at Eur. IA 520-1. On seers see also § 2.2.1.1 p. 61 n. 73, § 4.3.7 n.166, § 5.2.2 n. 13. 
104 Aesch. Supp. 402-4: ἀµφοτέροις ὁµαίµων τάδ' ἐπισκοπεῖ / Ζεὺς ἑτερορρεπής, νέµων εἰκότως/ ἄδικα µὲν κακοῖς, ὅσια δ' ἐννόµοις., cf. 
also Hom. Od. 4. 236-7, where Helen, who has put her pharmakon in the wine she is giving her guests, this sometimes sweet sometimes 
fearsome gift of Dionysus, begins speaking mentioning Zeus “who sometimes gives out good, sometimes evil; he can do anything”: ἀτὰρ 
θεὸς ἄλλοτε ἄλλῳ / Ζεὺς ἀγαθόν τε κακόν τε διδοῖ· δύναται γὰρ ἅπαντα.  
105 For Frankfurt’s notion of “effective desires”, see § 3.2.2 p. 147. 
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between alternatives, our actual desire in fact (as opposed to what an individual thought or 
wished or pretended its desires were) is revealed. We may not always be able to act on our 
desires or realize them, but our acts very often declare what our desires have been, often in 
spite of ourselves. Tragedy is an imitation of actions. Desires are only ever visible as effects 
or inferrable from utterance. These require connecting to the intentional causes we must 
infer. Acts are eloquent, but what they express is not definite. Actors think their motivations 
more efficacious than they may be, or they lie or circumstances confuse the real causes of 
events. Drama is founded upon the indeterminate space between desires or intentions, 
which are many, and acts, which are singular. 
 
Abandoning the mission to Troy is possible, but it will mean losing face before the army of 
Greeks and before the Trojan abductors of the Greek woman. The sacrifice to Artemis is a 
pretext for that human drama. The idea of authoritative demands being pretexts, which 
undermine those authorities is strong in the drama106. Iphigenia at Aulis is a dramatization of 
deliberation and choice. This is a conclusion not easy to escape, considering the relative 
space given to the problem of mortal choosing and the elaborately developed social 
psychology of desire in the play, (the predicament of the Argives being envisaged as a moral 
problem of affect and loyalty, of human relations) and that space given to the exegesis of 
divine demands on humanity. To Clytemnestra it is certainly not clear that the gods exist at 
all, but she has no doubts that there are wicked and cruel acts and deceitful persons107. 
Agamemnon in Euripides is a man in conflict with himself, so is he presented from the 
outset, writing and tearing up again his letters, unresolved and tortured by deliberation 
before an abominable choice which is one that goes to the very nature of his identity: is he a 
father and husband or a heroic “face” that derives its values from the doxa, judgement, not of 
kin but of fellows?108  
 
Hamillaisin anagkas, “in the struggles of compulsion”: the old retainer seeks to draw 
Agamemnon one way in his wrestling with himself, while Menelaus attacks the old servant 
and wants to draw him the other way. Then Menelaus, himself, is changed in his view on 
things, for he sees his brother’s tears, the evidence of the inwardness of his human 
                                                        
106 Pretext: prophasis, see Eur. IA 362, 884, 1180, 1434. 
107 Eur. IA 1034-5: εἰ δ' εἰσὶ <συνετοὶ> θεοί, δίκαιος ὢν ἀνὴρ/ἐσθλῶν κυρήσεις· εἰ δὲ µή, τί δεῖ πονεῖν;    
108 On the fear of what the Greeks will say of him and the loss of reputation and fear of reprisal as ultimately determining motive, Eur. IA 
506-42. The fear is a combination of fear for reputation and fear for what Odysseus may incite the Greeks to do to him if he fails to sacrifice 
Iphigenia, 531-7. Agamemnon feels he has reached an impasse and that the gods have desired this (ὦ τάλας ἐγώ, / ὡς ἠπόρηµαι πρὸς θεῶν 
τὰ νῦν τάδε Eur. IA 536-7) but if impasse he has reached, it is through a projection of what Odysseus may hypothetically do based on a 
reading of Odysseus’ character, motivation and peculiar skills. Euripides leaves it open as to whether this interpretation of possible future 
scenarios is not itself a prophasis that Agamemnon, as is typical of Euripidean characters, is giving himself in order to permit himself the 
‘easier’, more selfish option. 
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‘subjectness’, and feels pity. Remembering himself as related to others by affective bonds, he 
ceases to scheme and deceive and speaks “from my heart”, not with ulterior, calculating 
motive. He is no longer deinos towards his brother but symmachos, an allied heart109: οὐκ ἐς σὲ 
δεινός, εἰ/ὶ δ' οὗFερ εἶ σὺ νῦν110. Agamemnon will again change his mind and cede to the 
baser motivation of regard for reputation. Odysseus, the supreme utilitarian, is in the 
background, haunting the play. He offers yet another face of the ruthless 
instrumentalization of others and relations111. Even the initially innocuous and admirable 
Achilles shows momentarily an Odyssean, readily instrumentalist face112. He reveals himself 
unattractively mindful, even in these extreme circumstances, of his own face113. The outrage 
of Clytemnestra and the touching willingness of Iphigenia herself to die in service: 
everything in Iphigenia at Aulis serves to illuminate the problem and to handle it as the 
fundamental one of the “deep desires”, τὸ χρῆζον, of mortals in their social predicaments. 
What they are, what they are thought to be and what deceptions and pretexts are used to 
dissemble them – this is the matter of Euripides’ drama. 
 
Tragedy is precisely the elaboration of such particular cases in which the nature and 
volitional character of various actions in a very great number of predicaments are presented 
for judgement.114 Pentheus’ murder is done by reason of ignorance and it does produce very 
great “pain and regret”115. These are the criteria, according to Aristotle, by which we adjudge 
an act involuntary. Dionysus and the Dionysiac inspired are beyond or without mochthos, 
toil. In Aristotle the mochtheros is the “wicked man”, wretched or base. Such a man is 
ignorant of what he ought to do and not do, how he ought to value: he has not the Dionysiac 
sophia and sōphrosynē through which the work of life is redefined. By this hamartia, error, he 
becomes unjust and bad116. What is decisive in judging an act involuntary is not ignorance of 
advantage, undiscerned self-interest, nor ignorance of ‘generals’, but “ignorance of 
particulars” ἡ ἄγνοια … ἡ καθ' ἕκαστα. “Pity and sympathy” depend on these, for it is 
ignorance of the nature of a particular situation that determines whether acts are 
involuntary117. 
                                                        
109 Eur. IA 473-503. 
110 Eur. IA 480. 
111 Eur. IA 522-31. 
112 Eur. IA 965-7. 
113 Eur. IA 1015-23. 
114 The particular details will differ, but what is common is ignorance of the precise nature of the “circumstances and end” of a given action, 
κυριώτατα δ' εἶναι δοκεῖ ἐν οἷς ἡ πρᾶξις καὶ οὗ ἕνεκα Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111a.18-19. 
115 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1110b 18-20, Bacchae 1296-1387. 
116Arist. Eth. Nich. 1110b 28-30 ἀγνοεῖ µὲν οὖν πᾶς ὁ µοχθηρὸς ἃ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ ὧν ἀφεκτέον. καὶ διὰ τὴν τοιαύτην ἁµαρτίαν ἄδικοι καὶ 
ὅλως κακοὶ γίνονται. Cf. Dionysus’ dark encouragement to the deranged Pentheus at Ba. 924: νῦν δ' ὁρᾶις ἃ χρή σ' ὁρᾶν, with which it 
stands in sharp contrast 358-9, 506. 
117 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111a.1-2 ἐν τούτοις γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ συγγνώµη· ὁ γὰρ τούτων τι ἀγνοῶν ἀκουσίως πράττει. 
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Aristotle distinguishes between acts committed out of ignorance and merely in ignorance, 
ignorantly. Drunkenness, passion, anger (/εθύων ἢ ὀργιζό/ενος) are instances in which a 
man may be said to act “not knowingly but in ignorance”, οὐκ εἰδὼς δὲ ἀλλ' ἀγνοῶν118. For 
Pentheus, one may say, the problem with the bacchic revels introduced into Thebes is their 
introduction of intolerable states of involuntariness, for which there will be account but no 
responsibility. For him the orgia of Dionysus are orgiastic in the modern, pejorative sense; 
they are the effects of a cause which is base human motivation. Drunkenness and passion 
are just what he thinks he detects.119 To Pentheus’ mind there is an irresponsibility about acts 
with no secured agents. That irresponsibility is culpable. He believes that he has penetrated 
mere human desirousness, under the pretext of a profound, pious motivation.  
 
Essential to a thoroughgoing intentionality is having a particular end in mind, as the object 
of prior thinking. We feel pity for the maenad or the mad, mainomenos, for the helplessness 
of their actions, the obvious diminution of their responsibility. We feel differently for the 
figure who puts wine to his or her lips and then becomes deranged, or for the hero who is in 
the grip of an intelligible passion or rage, mēnis, from which we think he may be dissuaded. 
Peithō, ‘persuasion’, and logos, ‘reason’, lose their purchase on minds, to various degrees. 
These are also degrees of voluntariness: akousion and hekousion. Only the compos mentis can 
be prevailed upon by reason or persuasion, to see others as subjects “like self”. Through self-
reflexivity alone persons begin to look differently upon their own instincts and desires and 
look sympathetically upon the condition of others. Deliberation may be seen as such an 
internal weighing up, persuading and prevailing upon the several parts of self120. The 
bacchants have been “zombies”, mere vehicles of a will not their own, incapable of 
recognizing others or self qua selves. Their actions have been those of vacuous beings, 
emptied of personhood, objects through which the delegated agency of the god has been 
distributed. Accordingly, individual personality and speech have been displaced in them by 
spontaneous song, war-cry, ululation, outcry and vocative summoning. 
 
Aristotle, as example, lists a range of particular instances of the possible “objects of 
ignorance”, giving a description resonant for the reader of Tragedy, and peculiarly in this 
instance, of Bacchae: 
 
                                                        
118 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1110b. 24 -7. 
119 215-25, 233-8, 353-4, 453-9, 487. 
120 See Gill, 1996 on the self in dialogue; and Snell, 1928, on deliberation and only apparent deliberation in Homer; also Wolff, 1929 in 
reply to Snell, 1928; and against modern notions of interiority and autonomy, Rivier, 1968; Vernant, 1972. 
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ἴσως οὖν οὐ χεῖρον διορίσαι αὐτά, τίνα καὶ Fόσα ἐστί, τίς τε δὴ καὶ τί καὶ *ερὶ τί 
ἢ ἐν τίνι *ράττει, ἐνίοτε δὲ καὶ τίνι, οἷον ὀργάνῳ, καὶ ἕνεκα τίνος, οἷον σωτηρίας, 
καὶ Fῶς, οἷον ἠρέ/α ἢ σφόδρα. ἅFαντα /ὲν οὖν ταῦτα οὐδεὶς ἂν ἀγνοήσειε 1ὴ 
1αινό1ενος, δῆλον δ' ὡς οὐδὲ τὸν Fράττοντα· *ῶς γὰρ ἑαυτόν γε; 
 
Perhaps it is just as well, therefore, to determine their nature and number (of 
circumstances and objects of action). A man may be ignorant, then, of who he is, what 
he is doing, what or whom he is acting on, and sometimes also what (e.g. what 
instrument) he is doing it with, and to what end (e.g. he may think his act will 
conduce with someone’s safety), and how he is doing it (e.g. whether gently or 
violently). Now of all of these no one could be ignorant unless he were mad, and 
evidently also he could not be ignorant of the agent; for how could he not know 
himself?121 
 
Dionysus declares, as we saw above, that the young king does not know what [kind of] life 
he is living, what he is doing – drān – nor who he is: οὐκ οἶσθ' †ὅτι ζῆς† οὐδ' ὃ δρᾶις οὐδ' 
ὅστις εἶ.122 One could scarcely be in such a state “unless he were mad”, says Aristotle and 
that indeed is the condition to which he is succumbing. It is not full-blown madness with 
Pentheus but “light”, elaphra: this is a context of process, gradation and spectrum rather than 
mutually precluding oppositions. As wine teaches what sobriety and lucidity mean, so we 
the audience learn, through the detailed picture of descent into and recovery from Dionysiac 
mania, what it means not to know oneself. Mortals act “in spite of themselves” and so we 
learn that self-interest is not self-evident. We begin to see in this blurring of voluntariness, 
                                                        
121 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111a. 3-8, my italics. 
122 506: οὐκ οἶσθ' †ὅτι ζῆς† οὐδ' ὃ δρᾶις οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ:  This line to which my argument so often returns is problematic as can be seen. The 
manuscripts’ [LP] ὅτι ζῆς is rejected by many. Dodds gives a fulsome review of the problem and its posited solutions, ad loc.: “‘You know 
not what your life is (?), nor the thing you do, nor what you are’. If ὅτι ζῆς is sound, the sense must, I think, be, as Prof. Fraenkel suggests to 
me, ‘You do not realize your status as mere mortal’. . . By ὅστις εἶ Dion. means ‘what your position is (in relation to me)’: the man mistakes 
himself for the god’s master . . . There remains considerable doubt about the first clause, which is unfortunately not preserved in the 
papyrus. . . the words are decidely obscure”. Dodds runs through the many corrections that have been proposed for †ὅτι ζῆς† and their 
relative unlikelihood or plausibility. Dodds initially thought “least bad” ὃ τείσεις (Schoene’s ὃ τίσεις): thus “what price you shall pay”. 
Ultimately (in the 2nd edition, 1960: 141 ft.1) he concurred with Campbell’s <ἔθ’> ὅτι τι φήις  (CQ xlix, 1956), i.e. “yet what you are 
saying”. Roux accepts Dodd’s accession to Campbell’s suggestion and prints it in her text instead of †ὅτι ζῆς† found in LP, accepting his 
argument for a copyist’s error (the dropping out of ΕΘ after the ΣΘ of οἶσθ'). Roux: “Penthée ne sait pas ce qu’il dit (une absurdité!) 
lorsqu’il se prétend κυριώτερος [505]; il ne sait pas ce qu’il fait (un sacrilège) quand il ordonne d’enchaîner l’étranger; et ses actes prouvent 
qu’il ne sait pas ce qu’il est (un simple mortel; cf. 199).” Despite his reservations, it must be said that Madvig’s ὅ τι χρῆις (and Wilamowitz’ 
supportive comparison with Hippocrates Ep. 17 οὔτε ὅ τι θέλει οἶδε οὔτε ὅ τι ἔρδει) to argue for a Pentheus who does not know “what you 
want” would be very consistent with the consistent thematization of his desire and his ignorance as primary problem. Murray and Kirk 
retained LP’s †ὅτι ζῆς†. I find Kirk’s solution not unacceptable, Kirk: “You do not know what your life is – neither what you are doing nor 
who you are”. 
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that the problem of intentionality recapitulates the profound problem of identity, that 
personal agency is deeply entangled with value. 123 
 
The theme of the parentage of Dionysus, which has gone unrecognized – for him the crucial 
point to be made is the historical fact of his conception and double birth, to Semelē and to his 
father Zeus124 – is set off by Agauē’s supposed killing of a wild animal, which is in fact her 
own, unrecognized child125. Agauē will not recognize her own progeny, neither his face nor 
his voice, when he calls out to her at the climax of the action, 1115-21. Zeus establishes the 
pattern of tragic scenarios when he sires the god of theatre, for in a voluntary act which he 
would never choose, he has blasted Semelē, his mortal lover, to death126. Hera, who witnesses 
the constant bastardizing of Zeus with fertile mortals uses her devices to take revenge. Ovid 
tells the story of Hera’s disguisement as the crone Beroe and her persuading of Semelē to 
wish for herself that which she ought never to desire, viz. to receive Zeus in a form 
unsuitable for mortal intercourse127. Hera is the mother of a kind of distributed agency; she 
uses mechanē, machination and deception, dolos, to induce or bring to birth her own will 
through the instrumentalization of the unknowing desirousness of others.  
 
τὸ δὲ λέγειν ὡς οὐδεὶς ἑκὼν Fονηρὸς οὐδ' ἄκων /ακάριος ἔοικε τὸ /ὲν ψευδεῖ τὸ 
δ' ἀληθεῖ· /ακάριος /ὲν γὰρ οὐδεὶς ἄκων, ἡ δὲ /οχθηρία ἑκούσιον. ἢ τοῖς γε νῦν 
εἰρη/ένοις ἀ/φισβητητέον, καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωFον οὐ φατέον ἀρχὴν εἶναι οὐδὲ 
γεννητὴν τῶν Fράξεων ὥσFερ καὶ τέκνων. 128  
 
The saying that ‘no one is voluntarily wicked nor involuntarily happy’ seems to be 
partly false and partly true; for no one is involuntarily happy, but wickedness is 
voluntary. Or else we shall have to dispute what has just been said, and deny that 
man is moving principle or begetter of his actions, as of children”.  
                                                        
123 His further examples are quite typically taken from Tragedy, the art of intentions, half-intentions, unconscious intentions. Referring to the 
charge – recorded by Heraclides Ponticus in the first book of his On Homer – against Aeschylus that he had revealed the mysteries in his 
plays (Toxotides, Hiereiai, Iphigenia, Oidipous) and also to the Merope of Euripides’ Cresphontes Aristotle wrote: οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι 
ἀπόρρητα ἦν, ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ µυστικά . . .οἰηθείη δ' ἄν τις καὶ τὸν υἱὸν πολέµιον εἶναι ὥσπερ ἡ Μερόπη . . . 1111a. 10 -13, cf. also 
Arist. Poet. 1454 a 4-9 κράτιστον δὲ τὸ τελευταῖον, λέγω δὲ οἷον ἐν τῷ Κρεσφόντῃ ἡ Μερόπη µέλλει τὸν υἱὸν ἀποκτείνειν, ἀποκτείνει δὲ 
οὔ, ἀλλ' ἀνεγνώρισε, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἰφιγενείᾳ ἡ ἀδελφὴ τὸν ἀδελφόν, καὶ ἐν τῇ Ἕλλῃ ὁ υἱὸς τὴν µητέρα ἐκδιδόναι µέλλων ἀνεγνώρισεν.  
124 1-9, 26-34, 41-2, 1340-1, 1349. 
125 Note how this configuration is the theme and variation of the trilogy: Alcmeon, and Iphigenia at Aulis and echoed in the plots of Orestes 
and Chresphontes, two youths who return disguised to their homes to take revenge on family. Chresphontes nearly suffers the fate of Dryas, 
when his mother, not recognizing him, nearly murders him with an axe, see Nauck2 TGF Eur. frr. 449-59. Also Hall in Stuttard: 11-28. 
126 6-9, 287-91. 
127 See Ov. Met. 3. 273-291 and [Apollod.] 3.4.3, see also below § 6.3.3 n. 86. A papyrus fragment, TrGF 3 [Radt] Aesch. frr. 168 contains 
verses spoken by Hera in the disguise of a mendicant priestess, which are ascribed to Aeschylus’ Semelē, see Sommerstein, 2008; 
Hadjicosti, 2006.  
128 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1113b 14-19. 
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Zeus is the involuntary author of Dionysus. His son in turn is a god who comes to testify to 
the truth of his own authorship and thus his authority. He does this by bastardizing human 
acts, so that their deeds become offspring unrecognizable to their own parents, of mixed 
intentional parentage. Actions are not like sensations, they are not passively experienced: 
case by case, we see that mortals are collaborative in their deeds, collaborative with 
themselves, and for all the mixture of knowledge and ignorance, of responsibility and 
irresponsibility, for all the complexities of imputation, we attribute agency to them. Thus 
men (as private individuals and as public legislators) “punish and take vengeance upon 
those who do wicked acts (unless they have acted under compulsion or as a result of 
ignorance for which they are not themselves responsible) while they honour those who do 
noble acts”129.  
 
For a competitive people, for whom excellence and conspicuousness for accomplishments 
and qualities is a value, so fundamental to their ethics, the attribution of honours as well as 
errors is of singular importance. It is because humans attribute merit that they also impute 
responsibility. Contradictions in supposing there to be an innate quality of hereditary 
excellence have become too obvious to ignore by the 5th Century. The well-born do not 
necessarily act well. This is not far from the recognition that a low-born may be made of 
noble stuff. The contingency of things will become ever more manifest. The problem of 
value becomes ever more pressing: what do humans deserve? We regale them with prizes 
and wreaths for their accomplishments, the consummation of their goals in contests with 
others. This must mean that they are open to blame, as responsible, as knowable for their 
misdeeds as for their deeds. So, perhaps, the ‘noble’ warrior of Homer is also the 
“irreproachable man”, amumōn130. 
 
For Aristotle on agency, as for Dionysus in Euripides, the springender Punkt is knowledge. 
You were ignorant, but could you have known otherwise? Before the absolutely essential 
point of justice and responsibility, of vengeance and deserved redress (that has exercised 
modern readers of Bacchae131), we are confronted first with the problem of the necessary 
conditions for imputability, that is, of knowledge, its nature and its accessibility. Ought the 
Thebans to have known better? In the stranger god the problem of knowledge is dramatized 
                                                        
129 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1113b 21-6: τούτοις δ' ἔοικε µαρτυρεῖσθαι καὶ ἰδίᾳ ὑφ' ἑκάστων καὶ ὑπ' αὐτῶν τῶν νοµοθετῶν· κολάζουσι γὰρ καὶ 
τιµωροῦνται τοὺς δρῶντας µοχθηρά, ὅσοι µὴ βίᾳ ἢ δι' ἄγνοιαν ἧς µὴ αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τοὺς δὲ τὰ καλὰ πράττοντας τιµῶσιν, ὡς τοὺς µὲν 
προτρέψοντες τοὺς δὲ κωλύσοντες. 
130 Blameless, unimpeachable, noble: Hom. Od. 1.232, 3.111; with poignant irony of Aegisthus 1.29. A term never used of gods, whose 
excellence is in no way connected to the non-imputability of negative characteristics, LSJ s.v. ἀµύµων. 
131 See e.g. The Riddle of the Bacchae: the last stage of Euripides’ Religious Views. Norwood, 1880; Le Problème des Bacchantes. Nihard, 
1912; Mason, 1979. 
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as the problem of ignorance of and encounters with the unfamiliar, the foreign. How ought 
we to know, to learn what we don’t already know, when the new object of knowledge may 
require new means of knowing? Bacchae sets this riddle and its answer is this complex, 
ambiguous god, this family who is unfamiliar, known only through new, strange modes of 
knowing.  
 
Dionysus does, of course, punish Thebes for its ignorance. As Aristotle says of the drunk 
man, whom we punish twice over, “he had the power of not getting drunk and his getting 
drunk was the cause of his ignorance”132. We may indeed say that like Pittacus of Mytilene133, 
the Thebans are punished twice by Dionysus: for the drunkenness which causes their crime 
(their “drunkenness” is their excessive scepticism, their attachment to normal cognitive 
habits) and for the crime itself, that of not recognizing him and receiving him with due 
honours and in the right spirit. For Dionysus, the culpability of the Thebans inheres in the 
flawed manner of their knowing: they are deductive reasoners, incapable of seeing and 
introducing in their midst the wondrous son of Zeus. They fail in integrating the anomalous – 
whether that be a divine conception or mystery rites that are deeper than merely a pretext 
for base licentiousness. They fail to accept the strange (which would in reality enrich and 
vitalize them), because it is unapparent to their habitual ways of seeing the patterning 
motivations.  
 
The sisters of Semelē deduce causes, knowing only what they think they know a priori about 
the nature of things. They reason that the fateful Theban princess is pregnant in the familiar 
way: “by some mortal man” νυ/φευθεῖσαν ἐκ θνητοῦ τινος134. Pentheus thinks he knows 
what the real intentions are behind the so-called mysteries; for him there is no mystery. 
Kadmos is cleverer, but perhaps not qualitatively different from them, perhaps at least he 
knows well enough not to think one ever completely knows all factors, so he bets on an 
option in which he foresees no great loss. Mortals suffer from a blindness for which they are 
answerable135. All are unseeing except Teiresias, the blind seer, the priest who reads 
intentions from natural signs. He traces divine agency and presence, using different means 
of detection, through mantic inspiration and a faith in specially transmitted knowledge136. 
                                                        
132 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1113b 30-3: καὶ γὰρ ἐπ' αὐτῷ τῷ ἀγνοεῖν κολάζουσιν, ἐὰν αἴτιος εἶναι δοκῇ τῆς ἀγνοίας, οἷον τοῖς µεθύουσι διπλᾶ τὰ 
ἐπιτίµια· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ· κύριος γὰρ τοῦ µὴ µεθυσθῆναι, τοῦτο δ' αἴτιον τῆς ἀγνοίας. 
133 Arist. Pol. 1274b.18-23: ἐγένετο δὲ καὶ Πιττακὸς νόµων δηµιουργὸς ἀλλ' οὐ πολιτείας· νόµος δ' ἴδιος αὐτοῦ τὸ τοὺς µεθύοντας, ἄν τι 
πταίσωσι, πλείω ζηµίαν ἀποτίνειν τῶν νηφόντων· διὰ γὰρ τὸ πλείους ὑβρίζειν µεθύοντας ἢ νήφοντας οὐ πρὸς τὴν συγγνώµην ἀπέβλεψεν, 
ὅτι δεῖ µεθύουσιν ἔχειν µᾶλλον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ συµφέρον. 
134 26-31. 
135 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1114a.25-29: ὁµοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ ἀσθένειαν καὶ πήρωσιν· οὐθεὶς γὰρ ἂν ὀνειδίσειε τυφλῷ φύσει ἢ ἐκ νόσου ἢ ἐκ πληγῆς, 
ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον ἐλεήσαι· τῷ δ' ἐξ οἰνοφλυγίας ἢ ἄλλης 
ἀκολασίας πᾶς ἂν ἐπιτιµήσαι. τῶν δὴ περὶ τὸ σῶµα κακιῶν αἱ ἐφ' ἡµῖν ἐπιτιµῶνται, αἱ δὲ µὴ ἐφ' ἡµῖν οὔ. 
136 200-3, 298-301, 368-9. 
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2.2.2 Theban error: anapherein tēn hamartian 
 
The errors committed, hamartēthenta, at the heart of the action of Bacchae are also ones 
committed both “upon calculation and . . . committed in anger”, τὰ κατὰ λογισ/ὸν ἢ θυ/ὸν 
ἁ/αρτηθέντα137. The daughters of Kadmos have made the disastrous mistake (out of envy, 
cynicism, culpable ignorance) of ascribing to their sister a mistake, in alleging that it is her 
own sexual error she has referred to Zeus: ἐς Ζῆν' ἀναφέρειν τὴν ἁ/αρτίαν λέχους, 29. 
The protagonists all realize their mistakes too late, opse138. Only in his last moments, does 
Pentheus first see his actions as mistakes139. It is too late and his efforts to be recognized – ὥς 
νιν γνωρίσασα, 1116 – will be in vain. These will be the dreadful consequences of original 
failures of feeling, mistakes that emanate from the deficiencies of calculation and the 
destructiveness of anger. 
 
In Bacchae, as in Tragedy more broadly, we learn a profound pity for humans (for persons 
like ourselves). Here we find so remarkably, as Aristotle would write in the 4th Century 
summing up the difference between hekousion and akousion, how “the irrational passions 
seem not less human than reason is”, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωFικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα Fάθη. 
Acts born of irrationality, of “anger or appetite” ἀFὸ θυ/οῦ καὶ ἐFιθυ/ίας, also “belong to 
the man”, καὶ αἱ Fράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώFου. It is absurd to treat them as involuntary, ἄτοFον 
δὴ τὸ τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα140. The orphaned acts of such mixed parentage, whether sent 
abroad, exposed (ektetheis) or abandoned, like Oedipus, Dionysus, Orestes or Cresphontes, 
are always seen to return eternally to trouble mortals and make them consider who they in 
fact are, as opposed to merely seem to be, what they mean and how they are living. For the 
Greeks – poets as much as philosophers – the evaluation of desires, motivations and actions 
is always seen as entangled in very complex ways with the knowledge or ignorance of 
circumstances, motivations and actions141.  
                                                        
137 Arist. Eth. Nich.  1111a 30 - 1111b. 3. Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 56-7.  
138 1345: ὄψ' ἐµάθεθ' ἡµᾶς, ὅτε δ' ἐχρῆν οὐκ ἤιδετε. See p. 57 n. 57 and p. 114 for translation. 
1391118-21: Ἐγώ τοι, µῆτερ, εἰµί, παῖς σέθεν/ Πενθεύς, ὃν ἔτεκες ἐν δόµοις Ἐχίονος·/ οἴκτιρε δ' ὦ µῆτέρ µε µηδὲ ταῖς ἐµαῖς/ ἁµαρτίαισι 
παῖδα σὸν κατακτάνηις. 
140 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111a 30 - 1111b. 3: ἔτι δὲ τί διαφέρει τῷ ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ κατὰ λογισµὸν ἢ θυµὸν ἁµαρτηθέντα; φευκτὰ µὲν γὰρ 
ἄµφω, δοκεῖ δὲ οὐχ ἧττον ἀνθρωπικὰ εἶναι τὰ ἄλογα πάθη, ὥστε καὶ αἱ πράξεις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου <αἱ> ἀπὸ θυµοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυµίας. ἄτοπον δὴ τὸ 
τιθέναι ἀκούσια ταῦτα. 
141 So, Jones in his On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy: “Consider hamartia. Nearly all professional Aristotelians have felt obliged, in the face 
of related passages in the Nicomachaean Ethics and the Rhetoric, to take this word to mean error of judgement, and to exclude any strong 
implication of moral fault or shortcoming. I believe that they are right, and that the strenuous efforts which were made during the nineteenth 
century, and occasionally since, to lend moral emphasis to hamartia [translated as peccatum in the late Mediaeval de Moerbeke, frailty by 
Twining, 1789] must be reckoned unavailing (although it is important to bear in mind that the Greeks did not distinguish wickedness and 
stupidity with anything like Christian definiteness.” Jones, 1968: 15. In this light, Vernant’s argument that, in Aristotle, desire in fact 
“reposes” ultimately on hexis, the constitution or disposition of the person, which undermines the full imputability or responsibility of 
actions to persons, seems reminiscent of Christian readings of “error” as sin. Yet, we might follow Augustine perhaps, in replying that 
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2.2.3 Kei mē thelei142 
 
In Aristotle, calculation and anger are set against one another like this, but also shown as 
commensurable, with respect to defining the quality of intentionality. These – τὰ κατὰ 
λογισ/ὸν ἢ θυ/ὸν ἁ/αρτηθέντα – figure very strongly and in particular ways in Bacchae. 
Zeus himself and Semelē are the victims of Hera’s calculativeness, dolion, mēchanai. Dionysus 
is spared by his father’s reckoning in advance, from that same jealous, strategizing 
intelligence of Hera143. The daughters of Kadmos (like the daughters of Proteus and those of 
Minyas144), are the victims of their own shallow calculation of things145. Kadmos is the victim 
of his own cleverness, “ingenious schemes”, “stratagems”, sophismata146, as is the “city-
slicker”147 who persuades the country folk to try ambushing and catching the bacchants. 
Teiresias himself raises the issue of strategizing when it comes to divine beings, repudiating 
it in his pious enthusiasm – ouden sophizomestha – but significantly he is speaking to the old 
Phoenician sailor, who is seen by his own family as a man of sophismata148. Kadmos’ 
calculating nature is made quite evident – calculation versus spontaneous authenticity is a 
clear thematic priority for the poet.  
 
Teiresias seeks to convert the tyrannos. He seems a uniquely discursive kind of true believer, 
correcting and explaining in a long, eclectically coloured discourse on Dionysus, his gifts, 
                                                        
Original Sin [a kind of typology for hexis, and of 20th C. ‘genes’], in its recognition and articulation, can in fact be the very access to a 
deeper notion of freedom, responsibilty and meaning. 
142 39-40: δεῖ γὰρ πόλιν τήνδ' ἐκµαθεῖν, κεἰ µὴ θέλει, / ἀτέλεστον οὖσαν τῶν ἐµῶν βακχευµάτων.  
143 290-1: Ἥρα νιν ἤθελ' ἐκβαλεῖν ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ, / Ζεὺς δ' ἀντεµηχανήσαθ' οἷα δὴ θεός· 
144 Proetides: Apollod. 2.26-28, where the language of service, thereapeia is particularly redolent of the Bacchae of this interpretation. 
Bacchylides Epinikoi 11.43-112. For the daughters of Minyas see Plut. Q. Gr. 38 = Moralia 299 E 5 – 300 A 4. On these sets of sisters and 
what they have in common with the daughters of Kadmos and their significance for Boeotian and Argive cult, see Otto, 1933: 109, also his 
Chp. 15, 155-64 “Dionysos und die Frauen”; and Dodds xxv-vi. 
145 32-4: τοιγάρ νιν αὐτὰς ἐκ δόµων ὤιστρησ' ἐγὼ/ µανίαις, ὄρος δ' οἰκοῦσι παράκοποι φρενῶν, / σκευήν τ' ἔχειν ἠνάγκασ' ὀργίων ἐµῶν. 
146 Κάδµου σοφίσµαθ', 30. Note that Pentheus later will want the Stranger to pay the penalty for his sophismata, 489: δίκην σε δοῦναι δεῖ 
σοφισµάτων κακῶν. Pentheus’ reading of the Stranger exactly matches the reading of Semelē and the reasons for her incendiary death made 
by her inferring sisters, 26-31. 
147 Sophismata: 30, and 489, where Pentheus says the Stranger must pay the penalty for his “abject, ingenious schemes”. τις πλάνης κατ' 
ἄστυ καὶ τρίβων λόγων, 717. Dodds on 717: “τρίβων, ‘rubbed’, i.e. ‘experienced’ . . . one of the colloquial words introduced into tragedy by 
Euripides . . . an irreverent ἀγοραῖος ἀνήρ with an eye to the main chance”, an unsympathetic type in Euripides the over-bold man, idle with 
an over-active tongue, cf. IA 275, Or. 902-3: κἀπὶ τῶιδ' ἀνίσταται/ ἀνήρ τις ἀθυρόγλωσσος, ἰσχύων θράσει·. Roux ad loc. finds that 
Euripides is making a political point against the too skilled public speakers at Athens who abuse their audience and lead it into reckless 
undertakings: “Il censure l’éloquence acquise, cynique et dangereuse du démagogue du Ve siècle, auquel il s’est attaqué volontiers à la fin 
de sa vie”. For the over bold man of the city in Bacchae see Teiresias’ remarks at 270-1: θράσει δὲ δυνατὸς καὶ λέγειν οἷός τ' ἀνὴρ/κακὸς 
πολίτης γίγνεται νοῦν οὐκ ἔχων. 
148 199-200: Ka. οὐ καταφρονῶ 'γὼ τῶν θεῶν θνητὸς γεγώς. / Te. οὐδὲν σοφιζόµεσθα τοῖσι δαίµοσιν. 
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history and its meaning and interpretation149. Yet he also suggests the limitation of 
explanation, 201-3, and a sense of the weakness and futility of persuasion, ἀλλ' ὅ/ως 
χορευτέον, / κοὐ θεο/αχήσω σῶν λόγων Fειςθεὶς ὕFο, 324-5. Persuasion, on the other 
hand, is just what the thoroughgoing city-man, Pentheus, had accused the seer of using on 
Kadmos: σὺ ταῦτ' ἔFειςας, Τειρεσία·, 255. There are many awesome things in the world, 
polla ta deina, but nothing is more deinon than human beings and the human mind, in 
Sophocles’ famous hymn150. Yet in Dionysus’ proximity, the calculating mind is shown either 
to be very feeble or to become enfeebled by the god. Thus, Pentheus thinks himself capable 
of much, but it is the god who is truly deinos, and the king has not reckoned with this151.  
 
 
2.2.4 First Episode: 170-369 
 
Nevertheless, it is not calculativeness for which we shall remember Pentheus, but the quality 
with which Aristotle contrasts it: thumos and epithumia152. In our first glimpse of him, 
focalized through Kadmos’ perspective, he is already being characterized as full of haste, 
exertion or eagerness, spoudē. How he “flutters”, eptoētai153, says the old king of the new, 
                                                        
149 266-327, on the famous Teiresiasszene see Deichgräber, 1935; Gallistl, 1979; Roth, 1984. See the memorable remarks of Dodds at 
Dodds, 91: “What Teiresias does perhaps represent is the ecclesiastical politics of Delphi . . . the type of mind which would harness to the 
cause of doctrinal conservatism the spontaneous emotional forces generated by a religious revival . . . ‘A regulated ecstacy has lost its germ 
of danger’ (Nilsson, History of Greek Religion, 208). Tyrrell was not, I think, far from the mark when he compared Teiresias to a Broad 
Church dean.” 
150 Soph. Ant. 332-83. 
151 492, 856, 861, 971. 
152 On Pentheus and the “unity of his characterization”, and that from an ‘Aristotelian’ point of view, see Radke: 203-55; see also 
Seidensticker, 1972 and Sale, 1972. 
153 214 ὡς ἐπτόηται:  Dodds: “a hint to the producer”. Consider the winged words of Homeric exchanges with their clear targets and in 
contrast the directionlessness of the agitated, flutterers of Tragedy, unmeasured and therefore weightless. See also 304, where we see how 
fluttering is associated with panic in battle, and νῦν γὰρ πέτηι τε καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς, 332. This is Plato’s word for “arousal” of 
desires, which is set against the logizesthai the ‘calculation’ of the rational faculty. See e.g. Pl. R. 439.d. 4-8. τὸ δὲ ᾧ ἐρᾷ τε καὶ πεινῇ καὶ 
διψῇ καὶ περὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἐπιθυµίας ἐπτόηται ἀλόγιστόν τε καὶ ἐπιθυµητικόν, 6-8. Seaf sees this in terms of the “mystic fluttering of the 
initiand”, see his comments on 214: “on his first appearance P. is characterized by the first of many experiences reflecting initiation into the 
Dionysiac mysteries.” For such fluttering as the nervous excitement “characteristic of mystic initiands” Seaford points us to various sources 
– Classical, Imperial (Plutarch) and late Antique (Aristides Quintilianus). Consider the earlier sources – Ar. Nub. 319 and Plato Phd. 108 b 1 
– in Clouds, Strepsiades is “excited in his soul”, psuchē, (a notion of ‘mind’ that is a priori ‘fluttery’) for reasons above all to do with the 
comedy of intellectual misapprehending and the prospect of mastering the art of argument. In Phaedo, just as in Republic “flutteriness” is 
associated pejoratively with the soul that desires basely. This negative sense of ptoein is I think the operative one in Bacchae.  The problem 
lies in how we judge terminology (technical, metaphorical, a loosely permissive deployment of several connotations for effect), and of 
course our judgement will be determined by a prior choice or judgement, which is what we are here trying as well as possibly to make 
articulate. We may question also the notion of the Tragic poem as “reflecting” mystery rites. Seaford’s midrashic reading wants us to detect 
hidden meanings, and purposes, but there is an evident, peshat, sense of the flutteriness of Pentheus which is incontrovertible: he is an easily 
aroused and agitated man. Of course, there could be present at once several different connotations of a given term, and that would be 
characteristic of Euripides. If there is a telestic subtext, it is very much subordinated to the theme of resistance, of the mortal’s willfulness, 
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younger one. We are set in a state of tension, in expectation of what “very strange” or “very 
new” thing, neōteron, a man in such a state has to say, 212-14: 
 
Πενθεὺς Fρὸς οἴκους ὅδε διὰ σFουδῆς Fερᾶι, 
Ἐχίονος Fαῖς, ὧι κράτος δίδω/ι γῆς. 
ὡς ἐFτόηται· τί Fοτ' ἐρεῖ νεώτερον; 
 
Here comes Pentheus hustling home in a hurry 
Echion’s son, to whom I have given the control of the land. 
How he flutters, what fresh business will he speak? 
 
Before he has come into the presence of Dionysus, a charismatic and disruptive presence, we 
find in Pentheus a man of both sceptical, warily sarcastic and emotional disposition, hexis. 
He divines calculation in others, but is not similarly wary or interpretive of his own 
motivations and meanings. In this way to Pentheus the bacchic rites are specious, so has he 
inferred (Fλασταῖσι βακχείαισιν, 217). Dionysus is a new daimōn of unestablished identity 
(τὸν νεωστὶ δαί/ονα/ ∆ιόνυσον, ὅστις ἔστι 219-20);154 his rites are pretext, prophasin 224. 
Behind the religious claims155, a common human motivation can be deduced: hedonistic 
drunkenness and sexual license156. But Pentheus will answer these allegedly hidden 
motivations, which he believes he has truly discerned, not with a careful or similarly 
calculating strategy, but with the angry man’s violence, 226-32. He hears there is a foreigner 
that has arrived in Thebes; he must be a charlatan, ξένος, / γόης ἐFωιδὸς Λυδίας ἀFὸ 
                                                        
an unwillingness that is turned against itself like bait in a trap, dolos. The manifest meaning theme is the clarity, saphes, that characters in 
drama are perpetually trying to secure.  
154 A peculiarly resonant charge. Socrates was, of course accused of introducing new gods and corrupting the young, (Pl. Ap. 24 b 8 – 24 c 1 
ἔχει δέ πως ὧδε· Σωκράτη φησὶν ἀδικεῖν τούς τε νέους διαφθείροντα καὶ θεοὺς οὓς ἡ πόλις νοµίζει οὐ νοµίζοντα, ἕτερα δὲ δαιµόνια καινά.). 
So very similarly does Dionysus threaten to ruin the polis, “corrupt young women”, (ὃς ἡµέρας τε κεὐφρόνας συγγίγνεται/τελετὰς 
προτείνων εὐίους νεάνισιν, 237-8); and the Stranger is himself a corrupted youth, 453-9 [cf. in Plato, the body of the beloved cherished by 
the one who values pleasure over the good, is remarkably like the Stranger’s body, in the eyes of Pentheus at 453-9, cf. Pl. Phdr. 239d.]; and 
Dionysus is kainos daimōn, which sophistic Teiresias and the Socratically slippery Stranger wish to introduce, eisagein [see e.g. Di 
Benedetto’s discerning a Socratic elusiveness in the Stranger’s replies at 479 similar to that at Pl. Prot. 350 c]. On the essential question of 
new and foreign gods and their introduction at Athens see esp. Parker, 1996: 152-198. On the threat represented for the Ancient Athenians 
by the new and by change, note especially the case of Nicomachus, which we learn about in a speech of the orator Lysias, Lys. 30 Kata 
Nikomachou. Nicomachus was prosecuted by the Athenians dissatified with his re-organization of the sacrificial calendar, the undesirable 
‘introduction’ of innovations, which as Parker shows is rather more a case of his calendar reflecting practical, real changes rather than 
activating them. On new gods and political life at Athens extensively see Garland: 1992. On the rejuvenation of Dionysus after about 430 
BCE – the Dionysus of Euripides, 405 BCE, is really a “Neo-Dionysus” – see especially Carpenter in Masks: 185-206 and Carpenter, 1986: 
124-6. See D’Angour, 2011: 157-161, on Dionysus the god the ‘neos’ god –  young, fresh, new – whose birth is so much evoked in 
Bacchae. 
155 Hiding behind the mask of darkness and of spiritual legitimacy ἄλλην δ' ἄλλοσ' εἰς ἐρηµίαν/πτώσσουσαν 222-3…ὡς δὴ µαινάδας 
θυοσκόους. They serve common lust εὐναῖς ἀρσένων ὑπηρετεῖν 223, not divinity.  
156 221-5, 260-2. 
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χθονός, 233-4. We may deduce what is in the foreigner, what are his real motives, simply by 
looking at him; he is attractive and must therefore be someone who exploits attractiveness. 
So runs the implicit logic of a man vigilant about the desires and motives of others157. Such a 
one has a king’s wrathful violence coming to him, he will cut his head from his body158.  
 
Pentheus is truly a child of his skeptical house. He “knows” that Semelē was struck down by 
Zeus for lying about her relations with him: epseusato159. The foreigner is claiming that 
Dionysus is a god, once stitched into Zeus’ thigh. Pentheus is not so credulous as to accept 
such empty claims. Such “terrible things”, deina, such outrages, whoever the foreigner is, 
surely deserve only violent death (strangling)160. The now all too manifest wariness and 
“realism” of Pentheus is further highlighted by the enthusiasm of Kadmos in the company 
of Teiresias, whom Pentheus then spots. Kadmos is ridiculous, 250; Pentheus chides him for 
his senselessness, 251-2. He must be ignorant to voluntarily deck himself out as a bacchant. 
He easily deduces the reason behind what he is seeing: Teiresias has base motivations, he 
wants to introduce the new god and receive fees for taking auguries from the flights of birds 
and from reading burnt sacrifices, 255-7: 
 
σὺ ταῦτ' ἔFεισας, Τειρεσία· τόνδ' αὖ θέλεις 
τὸν δαί/ον' ἀνθρώFοισιν ἐσφέρων νέον 
σκοFεῖν Fτερωτὰ κἀ/Fύρων /ισθοὺς φέρειν. 
 
You, Teiresias, you persuaded him of this, this new 
Daimōn do you want to bring to people 
So you can watch birds and make money off burnt-offerings. 
 
Pentheus’ divination of motives supposedly penetrates the truth behind Teiresias’ 
divinations: misthos, money, the wages of deception. Kadmos has been the victim of 
persuasion, to which Pentheus himself would never fall prey, he may imagine. Kadmos’ 
will, the mind within him, has been won over by the external will of Teiresias; he fails to see 
what is in his self-interest. Only out of regard for his old-age does Pentheus not lock up 
Teiresias. He would otherwise be bound up, desmios, captive with the bacchants, for 
introducing “wicked consummations”, “abject rites”: τελετὰς Fονηρὰς εἰσάγων, 260161. 
                                                        
157 235-8 and 455-59. 
158 239-41. 
159 245. 
160 246-7: ταῦτ' οὐχὶ δεινὰ κἀγχόνης ἔστ' ἄξια,/ ὕβρεις ὑβρίζειν, ὅστις ἔστιν ὁ ξένος; 
161 Bacchic acts are a priori artificial – bearing the traces of ordinary intelligible intentions – πλασταῖσι βακχείαισιν, 218 and a priori 
“wicked, worthless, base” ponēra. 
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There is nothing healthy left in orgia, when wine flows in women’s feasts, 260-2 162. Women, 
foreigners, seers – Pentheus can see through them, he knows what they are like. He detects 
the actual quality of agency behind acts, and there is ever strategy. Pentheus alone 
understands the real import of their situation.  
 
Pentheus is himself, so he shows, unsusceptible to the persuasion by which his grandfather 
has become so undignified and docile, 266-342. He is an angry man becoming violently 
outraged. He will not himself bear touching, since others represent a danger of infection, a 
threat to his self-mastery, such as has evidently been the effect on Kadmos, 343-44. He will 
teach a lesson for this mindlessness, 345. He will have the seer’s seat of prophecy violently 
destroyed, turned upside down by the men who are the agents of the king’s will, 346-51. His 
language escalates again, finding a new pitch of violence. The foreigner must be tracked 
down, sniffed out163, he who brings a “new disease” and “outrages” the beds of women, 353-
4. The disease of the new is always a threat to the community, the very raison d’être for 
which is self-preservation. That imperative to endure is expressed in the conservatism of 
enduring societies and explains why a figure like Dionysus is so fascinating and so 
dangerous164. If the god is taken he must be tied up and brought in as one fit to die by 
stoning, 355-7.  
 
 
2.2.5 Second Episode: 435-518 
 
In the second episode, 435-518, Penetheus and Dionysus come face-to-face. A servant brings 
in the god, the apprehended Stranger. This is where Dionysus has been described, as we 
have seen, as “not unwilling”, and “amenable”, eutrepes 440165, and where the servant records 
                                                        
162 We translate orgia as rites, or mysteries, but note opportunity it presents to the poet for playing with etymologies and complementary 
meanings, and Euripides is a poet who plays in such a way continually. ὀργάω denotes ripening, swelling, bursting; sexual arousal; but most 
generally, to be in an emotional state that we are coming to recognize as the natural condition of Pentheus himself, so LSJ gives: “to be 
eager or ready, to be excited . . . the influence of passion, . . . of a thing, to be urgent.” Further on orgia and paronomasia with orgadas cf. 
Chantraine s.v. and Rijksbaron oon ἐν ὀργάσιν, 340. There is a similar interplay of thumos & thuein, e.g. 794. 
163 Track down, ichneuein: Typically, the same idea is used by one figure in one sense and then in a reversed sense by another later so 
Pentheus at 352, but Dionysus warns him at 817: ἀλλ' ἐξιχνεύσουσίν σε, κἂν ἔλθηις λάθραι. Mortals like Oedipus and Pentheus, track down 
the truth, hunt it out, following its spoor, they follow the successive steps of a logic of which they think themselves masters. They are the 
doctors who face the symptoms of an epidemic and set about to cure it, 352-4: οἱ δ' ἀνὰ πόλιν στείχοντες ἐξιχνεύσατε/ τὸν θηλύµορφον 
ξένον, ὃς ἐσφέρει νόσον/ καινὴν γυναιξὶ καὶ λέχη λυµαίνεται. Cf. Soph. OT 220-1, 475-6. 
164 On culture and its rites as functioning for the perpetual integration of the young and old, successors and predecessors, “Vitality and 
Transcendence”, see Bloch, 1992. 
165 εὐτρεπὲς 440: Note that the manuscripts here as at 860, read eupre- rather than eutrepes. Most modern interpreters follow Elmsley’s 
acceptance of Canter’s eutrepes, (“Ita noster Iph. T. 244, Herc. . . .  eutrepes poiēsomai. Nostri, I will make ready.” Elmsley ad loc.) at both 
440 and 844. Diggle, Dodds, Roux, Guidorizzi, Di Benedetto all accept this emendation. Yet there are those who wish to retain the 
manuscript reading, Kopff keeps euprepes at 440 but adopts eutrepes at 844. Rijksbaron, for whom it all turns on a misreading of the middle 
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his own explanation to the Stranger of his unwillingness, in taking him captive166. From the 
independent and autoptic point of view of the servant, Dionysus is described as an animal, 
the prey that has been hunted down167, like a creature, that is, of diminished intentionality, 
ordinarily the passive object of human intent and purpose. Yet unlike the wild and pure 
animal that is hunted down by men who penetrate the unworked fields and forests, this 
captive does not react as expected, and there is more to it than the willingness or 
unwillingness of the beast. He is after all an apparently human prey, he can be addressed, 
appealed to and can respond. He has been a gentle beast thēr praos: ὁ θὴρ δ' ὅδ' ἡ/ῖν Fρᾶος, 
436. He is remarkable for his equanimity (and later, his equivocation much of a human and 
of a god). This is not an object: he is a subject, his face expresses a state of mind, a response 
anticipated168. He is even easily commanding in letting himself be commanded, 438-40: 
 
οὐκ ὠχρός, οὐδ' ἤλλαξεν οἰνωFὸν γένυν, 
γελῶν δὲ καὶ δεῖν κἀFάγειν ἐφίετο 
ἔ/ενέ τε, τοὐ/ὸν εὐτρεFὲς Fοιού/ενος. 
 
He did not pale, nor did his wine-blushing cheek change, 
But he was laughing and he told us to tie him up and lead him away 
And he waited, making himself amenable. 
 
Dionysus is taken, but by some mysterious transaction, his captive devotees elsewhere are 
simultaneously set free, 443-48. An invisible hand is at work, an extraordinary agency, not to 
be explained by the normal laws that govern mortal life169, “this man here is full of wonders” 
449-50. 
 
                                                        
form, ποιούµενος, wants us to retain euprepes on the basis of Tyrell’s gloss “ ‘turning for himself my task to seemliness’ i.e. the Stranger 
acted in his own interest by making my task a dignified (or: easy) one’”. “Readiness”, “amenability” is far more in keeping with the 
Dionysus of the Bacchae whose ‘seemliness’ or ‘decency’, is not something necessarily immediately apparent. He wants ‘readiness’ and re-
orientation towards himself in the right manner of hospitability and complicates what mortals thought was “seemly”, euprepes. See on 
amenability and the theme of service, therapeia on service to the god and “amenability” eutrepes, see see § 3.2.2 p. 145 n. 40; Wildberg, 
1999/2000. 
166  ὁ θὴρ δ' ὅδ' ἡµῖν πρᾶος οὐδ' ὑπέσπασεν/φυγῆι πόδ', ἀλλ' ἔδωκεν οὐκ ἄκων χέρας 436-7, τοὐµὸν εὐτρεπὲς ποιούµενος 440, κἀγὼ δι' 
αἰδοῦς εἶπον· Ὦ ξέν', οὐχ ἑκὼν/ ἄγω σε, Πενθέως δ' ὅς µ' ἔπεµψ' ἐπιστολαῖς. 441-2. 
167 τήνδ' ἄγραν ἠγρευκότες 434, ὁ θὴρ δ' ὅδ' 436. 
168 Face: we refer to Dionysus’ face, as we can to social others always. We infer abstract, emotional and constitutional knowledge about him 
from his visage. This is the mark of the human social agent, a constant interpreter of its own sensations and perceptions and of the states and 
likely intentions of others. See Gell on abduction § 5.2.4; on Foley and the interpretation of masks and dramatic inwardness § 6.3.2; and 
Vernant on facialité § 6.4. 
169 αὐτόµατα δ' αὐταῖς δεσµὰ διελύθη ποδῶν/ κλῆιδές τ' ἀνῆκαν θύρετρ' ἄνευ θνητῆς χερός. 447-8. 
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The normal order of human intention and effect submits to the impenetrable purposes and 
powers of a non-human order, which reveals itself in prodigies, thaumata170. Intentions, 
expectations (elpides, thoughts, anticipations), objectives and their means are not operative in 
the accustomed way here: this is an extraordinary situation. The servant closes his report 
with a haunting and very significant comment, σοὶ δὲ τἄλλα χρὴ /έλειν, “the rest must be 
your concern, melein”, 450. We are leaving the context of actions with aims, telē, intentions; 
and we shall learn the meaning of attention: attending to the quality of our means or modes: 
melein171.  
 
Pentheus acts like a self-possessed man. True bearing or comportment is not, however, the 
same thing as acting or role-playing, not at least in Dionysus’ Thebes. Pentheus plays the 
role of the master of the situation, the master of others and of himself, but by now we expect 
of him the intemperateness of the man who is not entirely self-mastering. We have seen a 
young man, like others in Euripides, not distinguished for his emotional continence172. He is a 
king of easy anger, thumos, and when we discover later that he is also one of overpowering 
appetite, epithumia, we shall not be surprised. It is his self-confident autonomy here that is 
more “put on”, like a public face. His diplomatic and condescending mastery is really what 
is specious, as he has called the wild, exuberant akrasia, “unmastery”, of the bacchants. 
 
Dionysus can be released; he is in Pentheus’ power now. There is no danger, the king 
assures all, 451-2. The Stranger is the object of the king’s patronizing inspection. It is an 
admixture of mockery at the inferred sexual designs of Dionysus and the possible arousal of 
the king’s own erotic interest, of which he must be unconscious, 453-9173. If he has such 
feelings they are ‘involuntary’ and unrecognized. He is a man who does not choose what 
arouses him any more than a magnet chooses the attraction it “feels”. Unlike electro-
magnetism, however, humans can become aware of their feelings and define them rather 
than be defined by them. In the presence of Dionysus’ magnetic person, Pentheus will seem 
                                                        
170 There are abundant prodigies and general recognition of the miraculousness, the more-than-human agency evidently behind them, so also 
e.g. the servant who brings in the god captive recognizes the super-natural is at work ἄνευ θνητῆς χερός 447-8; and the messenger who 
reports the events of the dreadful climax describes “doings not mortal” ἔργµατ' οὐχὶ θνητὰ δρῶν 1069.  
171 Similarly ominous is the chorus’ singing in the second stasimon that Dionysus “will be a matter of concern to you” in the future, 534-6: 
ἔτι ναὶ τὰν βοτρυώδη/Διονύσου χάριν οἴνας/ ἔτι σοι τοῦ Βροµίου µελήσει.    
172 Other than Pentheus, young men in Euripides are seen in psychological beakdown: Orestes is a being penetrated by the external forces of 
madness, longing only to become sealed up in a dreamless sleep; Actaeon is an injudicious boaster, physically broken into pieces; also 
Jason, of whom it can be said that he had not the capacity to contain his ambition and his desires. By contrast, Hippolytus, Ion and the 
Hippolytus of Hippolutos Kaluptomenos are marked by their excessive continence, the others are too much hunters, these too much fleeing, 
see for example of Hippolytus Nauck2 TGF Eur. fr. 428 οἱ γὰρ Κύπριν φεύγοντες ἀνθρώπων ἄγαν/ νοσοῦσ' ὁµοίως τοῖς ἄγαν θηρωµένοις. 
See “Hippolytus and the Bacchae” Bellinger 1939. 
173 The interest in Dionysus/ the Stranger’s visage is sustained throughout these remarks. For a description in Plato of the body of the 
beloved cherished by the one who values pleasure over the good, which sounds remarkably like Pentheus’ remarks concerning the 
Stranger’s looks at 453-9, cf. Pl. Phdr. 239d. 
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a man stunted in his capacity to reflect, see himself anew and thereby become a changed, a 
matured and different person, one responsive and note merely reactive. He is not a man 
who can perceive what is wondrous, strange or new. There is no wonder here. To him 
Dionysus is “full of desire”, Fόθου Fλέως 456, not of the “miracles” which the servant has 
seen, 449. 
 
In their first interaction we may fruitfully focus on the slipperiness of words and meanings. 
There is a disengagement or slippage between referents here, which presents another facet 
of the disjuncture between idea and reality, between human purpose and outcomes. A 
divergence between “meaning” as intention or object of will (“to mean to do”), and 
“meaning” as signification (“No means no!”), is patent here and further illuminates the 
thematic status of intentionality and unwillingness in the play. Is language something that 
happens – paschein – in or through a person, (like laughter, something that is shaped by 
cultural peculiarities that over time becomes a reflex)? Or is it something a person controls 
and does, a figuring of their effective intent – drān? Is it, as voluntary and involuntary so 
often are, “mixed” miktai? The subject’s relation to language is corollary of its relation “to 
self” and to volition. This relation is determining for the constitution and shape of identity174. 
 
Pentheus has made up his mind about the impassive Stranger before that attractive figure 
has been allowed a word. When finally he does address him directly, it is to establish his 
identity in the customary way: “Tell me firstly, who are you [in terms of] what is your 
family [kind]?” Although he goes on as if in a regular conversation between two men, it 
seems significant that Dionysus’ first words (and this is the case whether we read oknos or 
kompos175) should be about words and the manner of their utterance. Pentheus asks 
investigatively about the Stranger’s origins and then about the origins of the teletai – rites, 
consummations or initiations – he brings, 465-86. Pentheus hears only what he is already 
equipped to hear; he asks Dionysus if there is “some Zeus who gives birth to new gods176” 
and ignores Dionysus’ reply, which effectively declares Dionysus a local Theban, whether 
god or man177.  
 
Pentheus is inquiring after the form of Dionysus’ orgia, but these are outside of the ordinary 
systems of meaning, beyond normal language, and beyond the untransformed, uninitiated 
                                                        
174 On language and agency see Chp. 3’s Taylorian reading of Bacchae, and Taylor, 1985, 2016. 
175 πρῶτον µὲν οὖν µοι λέξον ὅστις εἶ γένος; 460. See Dodds on 461: Oknos: The answer to this question, in the manuscripts is ou kompos 
oudeis: “There is no boasting” and others emend this to ouk oknos oudeis: “[There is i.e. I have] no hesitation”. See the extensive note above 
at § 2.2.1.1 n. 59. Cf. also 506-7, where Pentheus, the boasting cousin of the luckless boaster Actaeon, is too unhesitating, in identifying 
himself, nothing gives him pause. 
176 Like the “some mortal” 28, who purportedly got Semelē pregnant, or the daimōn Dionysus, “whoever he is”220 and 233, 247. 
177 467-8: Pe. Ζεὺς δ' ἔστ' ἐκεῖ τις ὃς νέους τίκτει θεούς; / Di. οὔκ, ἀλλ' ὁ Σεµέλην ἐνθάδε ζεύξας γάµοις. 
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intentions of normal day-to-day interactions178:  ἄρρητ' ἀβακχεύτοισιν εἰδέναι βροτῶν, 472. 
These orgia are beyond the kind of face-to-face modes of communication and communing – 
ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα, καὶ δίδωσιν ὄργια, 470 – which Pentheus, the city man, presupposes he is 
now engaged in179. That would be the transactional mode in which actors can plausibly 
presume to know each others’ intentions, the mode in which actors exchange information in 
working towards mutually intelligible, even if undisclosed, goals. There, actions have ends, 
they are done with comprehensible objectives; “what is the use or profit”, onēsis, of those 
ineffable orgia to the “sacrificers”, Pentheus wants to know180.  Here inscrutable and 
indescribable teletai and orgia are displacing the telē and erga of the durée of ordinary life and 
its interactions. Language becomes ever more slippery, a frustrator of human will and 
intention, rather than merely its vehicle or instrument. The desire for knowledge becomes a 
lure, dolos181, which is to say the simulacrum of a desirable object, which is really the vehicle 
for the perilous intentions of an agency outside of and foreign to the victim’s own, 474-5:  
 
Di. οὐ θέ/ις ἀκοῦσαί σ', ἔστι δ' ἄξι' εἰδέναι. 
Pe. εὖ τοῦτ' ἐκιβδήλευσας, ἵν' ἀκοῦσαι θέλω. 
 
Di. It is not permitted for you to hear, though worth knowing. 
Pe. You trick that out well, so that I should wish to hear. 
 
Pentheus thinks Dionysus’ design is simply to make him want what is not worth wanting. 
Here he is again hitting on a truth about his situation, for desire, being ambushed by one’s 
own appetites and own ignorance, is just what will happen. In spite of this recognition, the 
king will gradually continue to lose what little force of will may be said to be his. He will be 
drawn on and made to desire impossible things182. 
 
                                                        
178 Nightly rites are (with different readings for the reason why, according to the different perspective of the speaker) set against the world of 
day, so 485-8. The dark is sacred for Dionysus 486, it is dangerous where women are concerned to Pentheus 487, but day or night, it makes 
no difference to those intent on base objectives, retorts the undercover deity, 488. 
179 Orgia as ‘things’: on 470 Seaford mentions the Hellenistic inscription at Miletos that includes details about Theban maenads that will 
bring their Dionysiac expertise to the Milesians “Both there and here ὄργια might mean mystic objects, as in a Hellenistic epitaph from 
Miletos . . ., apparently at Theocr. 26.13, and conceivably at Aesch. fr. 57. But more likely it means the rituals, as it does generally in 
Bacchae.”, Seaford ad loc. and see also Henrichs, 1969, 1978; Porres Caballero in Bernabé: 159-84. 
180473: ἔχει δ' ὄνησιν τοῖσι θύουσιν τίνα;  
181 On dolos, “bait, lure, trick”, a very model of the dissemblance of motive, see § 4.2.2 
182 997-1007, where the chorus sings of that which cannot be won by force, that which is pursued by the insane. That is contrasted with the 
great, plain, (obvious, manifest [phanera]) things that are worth pursuing; those alone lead to a long and happy existence. And see the 
echoing words of frenzied Agauē to the bacchant chorus, where she is holding the only too phenron head of her son, which she cannot 
discern as such, 1197-9: γέγηθα, / µεγάλα µεγάλα καὶ φανερὰ τᾶιδ' ἄγραι/ κατειργασµένα. 
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The rituals are specious, they are pretexts for base motives covered up. The Stranger’s 
replies are “counterfeited”, ekibdēleusas183. They are designed for effect and conceal the 
motivating desire, which is to lure the king with the promise of a depth or mystery that 
Pentheus believes is simply non-existent. The unspeakable, unspeaking orgia have the 
agency, or at least the emotional reaction, of a person, responds Dionysus, “The orgia of the 
gods hate the man who practises asebeia184”: ἀσέβειαν ἀσκοῦντ' ὄργι' ἐχθαίρει θεοῦ, 476. 
 
What is the god like? It is a matter of whatever he wishes, 477-8. Pentheus wants the clear 
information of first-hand knowledge – ὁρᾶν γὰρ φὴις σαφῶς – but Dionysus’ replies 
frustrate this appetite for clarity and offer only unreadable references to Dionysus’ opaque 
will. Obscurity and miscommunication – here talk is a problem, “You fend again this 
question, quite well saying nothing (or talking nonsense)”: τοῦτ' αὖ Fαρωχέτευσας, εὖ γ' 
οὐδὲν λέγων, 479. “Leading in” or “introducing” new gods and practices, becomes mixed 
up with deliberate misleading, or ‘leading on’, of interlocutors. The failure to understand 
talk quickly becomes transposed onto the problem of understanding and intelligence per se, 
480-81185: 
  
Di. δόξει τις ἀ/αθεῖ σοφὰ λέγων οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν. 
Pe. ἦλθες δὲ Fρῶτα δεῦρ' ἄγων τὸν δαί/ονα;  
 
                                                        
183 Ekibdēleusas: kibdēleuein “adulterate”, “falsify” as kibdēlos “adulterated”, “fraudulent”, especially of gold, so “counterfeit”, as at Eur. 
Med. 516. Metaphors of money are particularly important in Tragedy, for money is a symbolic system and therefore systematization of 
relations and values, and values and relations are what Tragedy is above all concerned with, especially the dangers inherent in their 
falsifiability or breakdown. Cf. Basanos, “touchstone”, in Sophocles and basanizein “test the worth by rubbing on a touchstone”, prominent 
in Aristophanes. Nothos, (though this term does not appear in Bacchae the conflation of bastardy with counterfeiture certainly does, both 
from Pentheus’ point of view, and it should be said, in fact, for Dionysus who is saved from Hera’s ‘undying hybris’ by a counterfeit version 
of himself after he is born, 284-97, that at any rate is what mortals say, 295-7) is what Dionysus is: “bastard”, ‘half citizen half alien’, a 
cross-breed, this word also denotes what Pentheus takes him for: “spurious”, “counterfeit”, cf. Hipp. 309, 962, 1083; Andromache 224, 636, 
928; and, a work with many similarities to Bacchae, Ion 545, 1105, 1473. Onēsis: “benefit” – the archē or primary motivator for actions, 
from Pentheus’ perspective. Dionysus’ incapacitates and disables functions, he makes technology, the prosthetics of human purposiveness, 
invalid. This is closely related to the theme of value, the underlying confrontation of effect and affect in the play. Pentheus reads others as 
venal 257, he over-estimates money, misthos, as a motivation and in so doing reveals his own volitional psychology, the structure of his 
willing. So does he think he can buy his way into knowledge of the bacchants: µάλιστα, µυρίον γε δοὺς χρυσοῦ σταθµόν. 812.  
184 Asebeia: “impiety”, “godlessness”, one who feels no sebas the “due sense of awe” before that which is sacred or solemn, to semnon, see 
on sebein § 3.1 p. 137 n. 10. And on asebeia § 2.2.5 p. 86 n. 184. 
185 Cf. Eur. Med. 298-301. Dodds on 480: “The stranger ἀµαθεῖ σοφὰ λέγων in saying that Dion. appeared hopoios ēthele: it was a hint of 
the god’s penchant for disguise, whose significance Pentheus missed.”. Roux presupposes Dionysiac knowledge to be, in a very restrected 
sense, knolwedge of rites and Pentheus’ ignorance here just the ignorance of the uninitiated, ad loc.: “ἀµαθής ‘celui qui n’est pas instruit des 
rites sacrés’, ‘le non-initié’ (cf. 472 ἀβακχεύτοισιν). C’est dans ce vers le mot important: ‘Tu es profane, tu ne peux donc comprendre que le 
dieu prend la forme qu’il veut’.”, Seaford’s reading of a telestic pattern is more subtle than this, cf. his remarks on Pentheus’ apparent 
familiarity with certain ritual knowledge, see Seaford on 469.  
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Di. To an ignorant man, one will seem to speak no good sense when 
speaking wisely. 
Pe. Is this the first place you have come with the daimōn? 
 
The foreignness of Dionysus’ knowledge is evidenced in its being possessed by that 
predictably shallow class of persons called foreigners, 481-4186. Foreigners are unusually 
opaque persons, not entirely intelligible. They seem either empty or shallow or dangerously 
dark, like the night concealing powers and meanings not easily predicted. For Pentheus, the 
meaning of darkness lies in its function to conceal; for Dionysus, through his rites, it lies in 
its power to reveal in a special way187, 485-8. Daylight and language – these are self-evident to 
Pentheus. Perhaps, they are not as self-evident as he imagines: the daylit world is shot with 
shadows and language is adumbrated by ambiguity. It is not only darkness that can form 
the scene for shameful deeds, says Dionysus, 486. Now he is beginninng to vex the king with 
his too clever answers, sophismatōn kakōn, 489. Pentheus’ frustration is underscored by his 
switch from second-person address to a third-person utterance which carries more meaning 
than he himself understands: “How bold is the bacchos and not unskilled [agumnastos, i.e. 
‘trained in the gymnasium’] in speaking” ὡς θρασὺς ὁ βάκχος κοὐκ ἀγύ/ναστος λόγων, 
491. For this is not simply the representative, a symbol or vicar of the god, going 
metonymously as bacchos, but also the very authentic, original Bacchos, autos. In this way, 
Pentheus will become more and more like the man in Aristotle who says things in spite of 
himself. Here he spurts out – ekpesein – truth not knowing what he is saying188.  
 
And yet, Pentheus still understands himself to be the agent of an unchallenged authority 
and Dionysus goes along with this, feigning the submission of his own agency to that of the 
violent king 493-7, who is willful but gradually deprived of meaningful willingness: “Say 
what I must suffer, what dreadful thing are you going to do to me?”, εἴφ' ὅτι Fαθεῖν δεῖ· τί 
/ε τὸ δεινὸν ἐργάσηι; 492, the god asks in calm self-assurance189. We should find it of no 
small significance that the first thing that Pentheus threatens is to cut off the Stranger’s 
                                                        
186 483-4: Pe. φρονοῦσι γὰρ κάκιον Ἑλλήνων πολύ./ Di. τάδ' εὖ γε µᾶλλον· οἱ νόµοι δὲ διάφοροι. Pentheus, who thinks he has the measure 
of existence and of other men, simply assumes that Greeks are superior. Dionysus’ reply, οἱ νόµοι δὲ διάφοροι, is an example of a beauty of 
Greek poetry, present since Homer (and in history writing), which went unperceived to a scholar like Edward Saïd, see § 4.4 n. 192. Even if 
one did accept the older readings of the play (Norwood, 1908; Verrall, 1895, Winnington-Ingram, 1948, see § 3.2.2 n. 67) that sometimes 
saw in Pentheus a sympathetic victim and in Dionysus a vicious, “Asiatic”, un-Greek god, such a statement as 484 of the sense of the 
relativity of perspectives and usages can scarcely be meant like an indictment of the speaker. See § 2.2.2.1 n. 76 on Hdt. 1.60.3; 3.38. 
187 Fire and light: the drama of night by fire, the strong association of fire with Dionysus, see § 5.3. 
188 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111a. 8-11 ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον †λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, 
ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ µυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόµενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. 
189 Note how this τί µε τὸ δεινὸν ἐργάσηι; 492, gains and adds a more deeply sarcastic colouring from 856 and 861; this is made as obvious 
as can be in some of the final lines to Pentheus, before he is led off to his death, 971-2: δεινὸς σὺ δεινὸς κἀπὶ δείν' ἔρχηι πάθη, / ὥστ' 
οὐρανῶι στηρίζον εὑρήσεις κλέος. 
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hair190. Hair is invested with meaning in Greek poetry. Its simultaneously liquid, flowing 
quality and textile, vegetable character lend it a special, vital potency in the vicinity of 
Dionysus, a god strongly associated with the tossed heads of torches and the sap in plants, 
who is called by Plutarch dendritēs191. Here the Stranger says that he “grows it for the god”, 
493-4: 
 
Pe. Fρῶτον /ὲν ἁβρὸν βόστρυχον τε/ῶ σέθεν. 
Di. ἱερὸς ὁ Fλόκα/ος· τῶι θεῶι δ' αὐτὸν τρέφω. 
 
Pe. First I am going to cut off those pretty curls of yours. 
Di. To god belongs the hair, I keep it for the god. 
 
“Grow” is really “cause to grow, let grow”192. Hair, like the fruits of agriculture, cannot be 
made to grow, only “let” grow, “fostered”, in a certain way. Like the daimōn of Socrates, 
which never induced but only checked actions193, the deliberating mind, will recognize the 
impulses, see and articulate them as alternatives and hold back, kolazein, and accordingly 
edit itself, lazesthai. Those impulses are like hair, arising sua sponte, as if by physis, by nature’s 
“springing out”. From this perspective, the management or arrangement, organōn, of the 
person is a grooming, a cutting back of the spontaneously arising desires, a styling, as it 
were, of inclinations. In the same way Aristotle and Theophrastus associate the unchecked 
exuberance, hypertrophy or superabundance of vegetable life (which has such a rich place in 
the imagery of Bacchae) with hybris194. 
                                                        
190 See § 5.4. 
191 Dendritēs: epithet of Dionysus at Plut. 2.675. On Dionysus’ “Feuchte” see Otto, 1933: 145-55. 
192 Trephein has a concrete sense “thicken, congeal, increase”, then “rear, keep, maintain, breed, foster” and in poetry “have within oneself, 
contain, keep, cherish”. It is not distant from that of orgān “to swell, ripen”, from which “be eager, be excited”, orgainein “be angry”. 
Euripides plays on the difference between things that happen, implicit in orgān and things that are done in orgia, which is derived from 
erdein, rezein, erga. On many levels he articulates the difference between dran, the intentional and purposive, and pathein, the occurring, 
that which is not strongly intended, cf. e.g. ὃς οὔτε πάσχων οὔτε δρῶν σιγήσεται 801. Cf. on hair as natural growth, § 5.4. For a genealogy 
of different modes of Greek action – prattein, poiein, drān – that can purportedly be connected to the epic, lyric and dramatic modes, see 
Snell, 1928. 
193 Pl. Ap. 31 c-d. See also Pl. Resp. IV, esp. 439c – 442a, on the faculties of reason, appetite and emotion – logistikon, epithumētikon, 
thumos [thumoeides, 456a cf. orgilos, 411c] – the curbing [to kōluon, the checking of the urge or command of impulse, to keleuon 439c] 
effect of reason and their necessary harmonization, 442a. Knowledge has particular objects, as passions or appetites are similarly 
intentional: having certain objects. 438c-d. The object of to logistikon, the rational faculty, can be itself and the other parts that make up the 
whole of the person, it has a unique capacity of reflexivity. 
194 Arist. De Gen. Anim. 725b 35 and Theophrastus Historia plantarum 2.7.6 and De causis plantarum 2.16.8, 3.1.5, 3.6.8, 3.15.4. See 
Michelini, 1978: 38-9: “Plutarch (Moral. 280 F) uses the word (ὕβρις) in a discussion of animal misbehavior: ἦ διὰ κόρον καὶ πλησµονὴν 
ἐξυβρίζουσι καὶ βόες καὶ ἵπποι καὶ ὄνοι καὶ ἄνθρωποι; . . . Thus ἐξυβρίζειν in animals, humans and plants stems from superabundance of 
nurture. It may be termed either misbehaviour or disease, or ‘madness’, that is, misbehaviour as disease . . . The ὑβρίζων organism- whether 
human, animal, or vegetable- puts self-aggrandizement before the social role assigned to it. Further on hair, see § 5.4 below. On the 
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Odysseus, the model of a self-possessed man, knows how to “trim”, lazesthai, his words and 
check himself: Fάλιν δ' ὅ γε λάζετο /ῦθον 195. Pentheus is the model of a man whose feelings 
simply happen196. They are as if external to himself, sprouting like hair or the unchecked words 
of children and drunks. He knows only how to “seize”, lazesthai, others: “Seize him, he looks 
down on me and on Thebes, this man”, he commands in frustration197. Pentheus is a man for 
seizing, tying up, chopping off. Hair can be styled or given form, subjected, that is, to 
intentional action but it cannot be made to grow or stop growing. It is perfectly coherent that 
this strange plant-like substance that springs, phuein (whence physis), from human flesh, 
should “belong to the god”. In his theatre human hybris, the failure to check what arises or 
springs up inside persons in the shape of impulse and desire, becomes manifest and the 
unbound hair of masked citizens flies upward into the aithēr198. 
 
The god himself will release the Stranger he says, 498. Pentheus thinks he knows what this 
means: it is that the god “feels” present during the rites in which he is conjured, 499199. For 
Pentheus, the motivations of others are a matter of the “feel” of situations; he consistently 
parses others as being how in fact he is, a man of terminal, unarticulated desirousness. 
Dionysus’ presence is not just a matter of the hysteria of crowds, or the rhetoric of rituals, it 
is a “thick” presence, even now the god is at hand, 500-02: 
 
                                                        
cognitive hypertrophy by which we see humans compulsively playing and engaging in symbolic activity, even in their sleep, see the remarks 
at Lawson & McCauley, 1990: 184. 
195 Hom. Od. 4.357, 13.254. And indeed Odysseus is Plato’s example for the man so distinct from animals and infants, (like Socrates 
himself, although Socrates in Symposium is also, unlike other historical men, incomparable ref.), whose parts are in discursive contact with 
one another, the man inside whom there is a dialogue, his self a model of the community of social others, which is the banquet and the polis, 
so at Pl. R. 441b. 2-c.2, we read Socrates quoting Homer Od.20.17 [for the second time, see also Pl. R. 3.390d5]: Ναὶ µὰ Δί', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, 
καλῶς γε εἶπες. ἔτι δὲ ἐν τοῖς θηρίοις ἄν τις ἴδοι ὃ λέγεις, ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὃ ἄνω που [ἐκεῖ] εἴποµεν, τὸ τοῦ Ὁµήρου 
µαρτυρήσει, τὸ –  στῆθος δὲ πλήξας κραδίην ἠνίπαπε µύθῳ· –  
ἐνταῦθα γὰρ δὴ σαφῶς ὡς ἕτερον ἑτέρῳ ἐπιπλῆττον πεποίηκεν Ὅµηρος τὸ ἀναλογισάµενον περὶ τοῦ βελτίονός τε καὶ χείρονος τῷ 
ἀλογίστως θυµουµένῳ. On the Odysseus of the internal dialogue, the soliloquy, see also Snell, 1928: 23-4 and cf. Gould, 1978: esp. 44-8, on 
soliloquies in Shakespeare and the framing of dramatic personality. The “neo-Odysseus” of the classical period, to match the “neo 
Dionysus” of Euripides’ late 5th C. version of the resistance of Pentheus, would be, like the Ithacan, that other master of self-containment, of 
the editing of self and of one’s talk, Socrates. 
196 See the distinction between actions and happenings, see § 4.3.2. 
197 Hom. Od. 4.357, 13.254. Bacchae 503: λάζυσθε· καταφρονεῖ µε καὶ Θήβας ὅδε. 
198 149-50: ἀναπάλλων / τρυφερόν <τε> πλόκαµον εἰς αἰθέρα ῥίπτων. With regard to being “unchecked”, we might then wish to read a 
certain double-meaning, a layer of irony within the designation by Teiresias of Pentheus as schetlios, 358-9: ὦ σχέτλι', ὡς οὐκ οἶσθα ποῦ 
ποτ' εἶ λόγων·/ µέµηνας ἤδη, καὶ πρὶν ἐξεστὼς φρενῶν. He is “unflinching” in his ignorance, it makes him ruthless. Ruthlessness becomes 
unrestraint. Ascheton, ‘uncontainable’, ‘unchecked’ and ‘not to be checked’. It is interesting to note that ascheton a corollary of epieikton 
‘unyielding’ occurs in Iliad as an attribute of Hera’s ‘unbending’ power menos, Il. 5. 892 but on the two other occasions of its use of the 
Trojans’ sorrow, penthos, 16. 548-9: Τρῶας δὲ κατὰ κρῆθεν λάβε πένθος/ ἄσχετον, οὐκ ἐπιεικτόν and 24. 708: πάντας γὰρ ἀάσχετον ἵκετο 
πένθος. Penthos, the condition is like Pentheus the man – unchecked. 
199 499: Pe. ὅταν γε καλέσηις αὐτὸν ἐν βάκχαις σταθείς.  
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Di. καὶ νῦν ἃ Fάσχω Fλησίον Fαρὼν ὁρᾶι. 
Pe. καὶ Fοῦ 'στιν; οὐ γὰρ φανερὸς ὄ//ασίν γ' ἐ/οῖς. 
Di. Fαρ' ἐ/οί· σὺ δ' ἀσεβὴς αὐτὸς ὢν οὐκ εἰσορᾶις. 
 
Di. Even now, he is present close by seeing what I am suffering. 
Pe. Where is he then? For in my eyes he is not visible. 
Di. Here by me, since you yourself are impious, you don’t behold.200 
 
Yet again we see the underscoring of Pentheus’ ignorance and this thematization of 
personhood and its location, through the dramatization of its very dissimulation. We 
become sensitive to the evanescent character of person, through the dialectic of presence and 
absence. Inadvertently, again, Pentheus hits on the dramatic-ironic truth of his situation: 
Dionysus is not evident to his eyes. Legitimacy, for Dionysus, reposes on a certain quality of 
knowing, of recognition. For Pentheus the possession of power is its own authority and 
justification, and this is what he counter-offers against the suggestion of his ignorance, 504-5: 
 
Di. αὐδῶ /ε /ὴ δεῖν, σωφρονῶν οὐ σώφροσιν. 
Pe. ἐγὼ δὲ δεῖν γε, κυριώτερος σέθεν. 
 
Di. Don’t dare bind me, I am a sane man, you insane. 
Pe. I will bind you, I am more powerful than you.  
 
Indisposed to feel the emotion of awe, σὺ δ' ἀσεβὴς αὐτὸς ὢν, a kind of healthy aporia, 
Pentheus cannot understand, οὐκ εἰσορᾶις, 502. There is a quality of knowing, which is also 
a quality of bearing and relating, which requires a special wholesomeness or ‘integrity of 
mind’ sōphronōn. Lacking this emotional and epistemic capacity, which here means choosing 
not to learn to value this capacity, is Pentheus’ error, hamartia. He is unequipped, he has not 
                                                        
200 παρ' ἐµοί 502: Dodds wants us to translate, with Murray, “Where I am”. “The irony vanishes if we translate ‘Beside me’”. I do not 
entirely concur. The theme of presence and absence is intersected by the diagonal axis of the theme, unity and multiplicity of self. Dionysus 
is both identical with the Stranger and also a kind of projection of the Stranger; we see them alternately as two and as one, they are as if both 
inside and external to one another in a complicated dance of perspective, which amongst other things becomes a dynamic model revealing 
the complex (infoliate) nature of personhood, a quality both virtual and objective. Dodds further: “Vision demands not only an objective 
condition – the god’s presence – but a subjective one – the percipient must himself be in a state of grace.” Up to ‘state of grace” I fully 
agree, I think that is a step too far in the direction of an inappropriately Christian construction put on things here. It is not a state of ‘grace’ 
that seeing Dionysus requires, or at least anterior to the grace charis which he does indeed endow, there is a not spiritual or metaphysical 
hospitability, a readiness for relation of a certain quality. Registering sights, ‘percipience’ does begin to take on an ethical depth here, as it 
becomes ever plainer how much sight, knowledge and truth are enmeshed. Whose fault would it be if Pentheus had not the believer’s grace, 
by which to see? It is however his negligent error not to be able to see others other than by his own familiar, deductive ascriptions of motive. 
His failing is one of defective social emotion. Di Benedetto in his first note on 502 (a): Certo, παρ' ἐµοί è necessariamente ambigua ed è 
condizionata dalla sitazione particolare della vicenda tragica . . . [he compares Diomedes play on proximity and distance eggus anēr at Il. 
XIV 110] . . . Con il modulo aveva già giocato Sofocle in O.R. 451.” 
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the right skeuē for this integral knowledgeability, which is both the gift of and the demand 
made by Dionysus. This failure in their mode of knowing is the mistake for which he is held 
so dreadfully accountable by the god, as is the whole House of Kadmos201. 
 
The scene opened with the messenger’s report, the words of an eye-witness. Pentheus has 
had another opportunity to revise his habitual way of seeing and evaluating. He has shown 
himself unresponsive to prudent counsel. He seems not to register the counsel of the servant 
although he himself is committed to a theory of knowledge premised upon autopsy, “seeing 
things in person”. His first words to the Stranger were a question about his identity, 460. His 
is the everyday, unreflective concept of identity. When we come to the close of this 
interview, the question is turned back upon him. He answers in the way he expects to be 
answered, 506-8: 
 
Di. οὐκ οἶσθ' †ὅτι ζῆς† οὐδ' ὃ δρᾶις οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ.202 
Pe. Πενθεύς, Ἀγαυῆς Fαῖς, Fατρὸς δ' Ἐχίονος. 
Di. ἐνδυστυχῆσαι τοὔνο/' ἐFιτήδειος εἶ. 
 
Di. You don’t know what life you are living, what you are doing or 
even who you are.  
Pe. Pentheus, Agauē’s child, by Echion as father. 
Di. You are suited by your name to end up unfortunate. 
 
Pentheus uses and understands his name only as an instrument (a device simply for 
connecting him to predecessors and distinguishing him from contemporaries). He fails to 
understand its contents. Inscribed into his existence, in his life as in his name, is the truth 
about him that will be realized in this drama: he is a man of sorrows, penthos. Meaning rises 
and breaches the surface of language – the contingent (pun) is revealed to be commensurate 
with the deliberate, but goes unrecognized until it is too late. There is an ill-fated purpose, 
an end which is not his own, but for which he is meant, epitēdeios203.  
 
                                                        
201 See § 3.3. 
202 On this problematic line, see above § 2.2.1.2 n. 122. 
203 Epitēdeios: “made for an end or purpose, fit or adapted for it, suitable, convenient”, cf. IA 475-6, where Menelaus is swearing to 
Agamemnon that he has had a genuine change of heart, is speaking clearly, (not adēlotes) and from the heart, ‘not to any specific end’ 
epitēdes: ἦ µὴν ἐρεῖν σοι τἀπὸ καρδίας σαφῶς/ καὶ µὴ 'πίτηδες µηδέν, ἀλλ' ὅσον φρονῶ. “Pentheus” has a meaning and a telos which is not 
one intended by himself, but by some other agency – external and unknown to him – than his own. Karl Meuli argued that Pentheus was a 
misreading for “Tentheus”. He was impatient of paronomasia, wishing to discern a language and meaning far deeper than any derived from 
the new arrangements and innovations of the individual poet Euripides, it is an example of Romantic philology, concerned with the Kern der 
Sage, it treats nomoi as having the timeless, ‘authentic’, independent qualities physis, see Meuli, 1946: 1020-1. Cf. Dodds on 367: 
“Examples of such tragic ‘punning’ (etumologein) are many,”. 
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Pentheus’ temper is a fire that has been stoked. The initially sovereign and patronizing tone 
has gradually given way to the violent reactiveness of an incontinent emotionalism. He will 
not countenance the insolence of the Stranger and his responses, which so frustrate normal 
expectation. As the scene draws to a close, he recovers himself and with the aggressiveness 
of a heavy sarcasm, dispatches the captive to prison, 509-14. The stables where Dionysus is 
to be held are a container that will not hold its contents. Human vessels have not the 
capacity to retain the too easily flowing, transient person of the god. The stable is made for 
tamed horses: this is an undomesticated god very much like a wild creature, even if one 
with a gentle side (ὁ θὴρ δ' ὅδ' ἡ/ῖν Fρᾶος, 436; δεινότατος, ἀνθρώFοισι δ' ἠFιώτατος, 
861).  
 
Not knowing what is of true value, Pentheus consistently acts against his own interests. This 
manm who reads and predicts human action in terms purely of self-interest, is ignorant of 
self and of what ought really to be his interest. While Pentheus opens the interview, 
Dionysus has the last word. He is unflustered and confident: “for what must not be does not 
have to be suffered” ὅτι γὰρ /ὴ χρεὼν οὔτοι χρεὼν/Fαθεῖν, 515-6. What is done and what 
is borne are indissociable from knowledge, the awareness of what one is doing and what 
one thinks one is doing, but in reality only suffering. Pentheus’ fate, it is suggested by some 
interpreters, must be “ordained”204. Dionysus himself intimates as much in his closing 
speech, (Fάλαι τάδε Ζεὺς οὑ/ὸς ἐFένευσεν Fατήρ. 1349), although even there he is not 
necessarily saying that the fate of Thebes had been foreclosed, only that Zeus had consented 
to a severe punishment for the Kadmeians. He continues to the end to express the failing of 
the Kadmeians in terms of knowledge and will to knowledge. Pentheus’ error is his 
ignorance. He is a man drunk on himself. Pentheus will have to pay the ransom for his 
offences, τῶνδ' ἄFοιν' ὑβρισ/άτων, 516: the wages of a too facilely abducted will and quality 
of intention205.  
 
What the Stranger is undergoing “now”, the god who is present sees206. The god is at hand, 
Fαρ' ἐ/οί, 502. A person is more than one. Agency inheres in this potential for perspective 
on self, for a multiplicity of self expressed through reflexivity. The too unified Pentheus, the 
unbastardized son of Agauē and of Echion, has not the depth or dimension to look upon 
himself, and thus cannot know his acts. He does not see his desires coming, as mortals do 
                                                        
204 Cf. Seaford’s rendering of 515-6: “For I will not have to suffer what is not ordained for me to suffer”. Roux: “Soit! En route! Ce qui n’est 
pas arrêté par le destin, le destin ne saurait l’infliger.” Di Benedetto is reliably exact: “Vado. Ciò che non bisogna patire, non bisogna che io 
lo patisca.” Dodds: “’I am ready to go: for what is not to be I have not to suffer’ – the negative counterpart of HF 311 ὃ χρὴ γὰρ οὐδεὶς µὴ 
χρεὼν θήσει ποτέ.” 
205 On the manner of inference defined as “abduction”, see § 5.2. 
206 καὶ νῦν ἃ πάσχω πλησίον παρὼν ὁρᾶι. 500, cf. 800-1, where Pentheus, aporetic, declares: ἀπόρωι γε τῶιδε συµπεπλέγµεθα ξένωι, / ὃς 
οὔτε πάσχων οὔτε δρῶν σιγήσεται, see 89 below. 
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not see Dionysus coming. Suddenly, he is there, dreadful, vengeful and sweet. He has 
different faces207. He is complex and multiple. His parts know one another, as Pentheus’ do 
not. Thus in the last words of the episode he speaks with this double subjectivity, which 
makes for such a sharp contrast with the one-sidedness of Pentheus. The visible and unseen 
Dionysus, the person within and beside the Stranger, has been denied, but “he is we”, 516-
18: 
 
ἀτάρ τοι τῶνδ' ἄFοιν' ὑβρισ/άτων 
/έτεισι ∆ιόνυσός σ', ὃν οὐκ εἶναι λέγεις· 
ἡ/ᾶς γὰρ ἀδικῶν κεῖνον ἐς δεσ/οὺς ἄγεις. 
 
But ransom for these offences suffered, 
Dionysus, whom you say is not, will pursue you with vengeance, 
For you are doing us wrong when you take him in bonds. 
 
 
2.2.6 Third Episode: 576-861 
 
We have already seen how by the third dramatic sequence, the episode of Palace Miracles 
and Pentheus’ gradual bewitchment, Pentheus’ involuntariness becomes articulated through 
his delusional state and futile effortfulness208. This has been all the more sharply marked 
through the underscored effortlessness of the manner in which Dionysus’ will is realized. In 
the third episode, furthermore, the problem of the insoluble entanglement of emotions, 
involuntariness, desire, choice, thought, decision and indecision, becomes increasingly 
explicit. A terminology of thumos, boulē, bouleusis comes expressly into play. The falling 
away of decisional faculties in Pentheus, of choice, the capacity for what Aristotle calls 
proairesis, is shown as a gradual, differentiated process. We return to Aristotle on ethics once 
again then, and thread his theory of agency into a reading of Bacchae and the fate of its ever 
more ratlos king209.  
                                                        
207 861. 
208 See on ponos “toil” contrasted with the otium and hēsuchē of Dionysus § 2.2.1.1 n. 81 and § 3.3.10 n. 269. 
209 Ratlos: another helpful German expression, here to qualify Pentheus’ aporia. It has the ordinary sense of “helpless”, as in “Ich bin völlig 
ratlos”: ‘I’m completely at a loss’. The literal meaning is revealing, “without counsel, advice” [Rat: derived from the same root as the verb 
for “talk” reden, cf. Old English “rede”: ‘counsel, advice, account’, from which also originally English “to read”]. Decision is “talk in 
advance with oneself and others”, Odysseus is polymētis, never ratlos for very long. Where talk breaks down, identity will follow. In 
Bacchae the ratlos mortal is set against a laughing, schadenfroh god. Cf. also “overweening”, a common translation of hybristes, the 
obsolete “ween”, meant “to think, suppose” or “hope, expect, intend”. There is something inherently dangerous in the “awesome”, deinos, 
the cognitive capacity of mortals, the multifold agentfulness of persons, something about intending and prospectiveness, that can make 
persons too easily forget themselves, forget the present and the lessons of the past, in their intention upon the future, forget to attend to the 
present, ta paronta (cf. 395-9). 
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2.3 Proairesis: Authentic Choice 
 
For Aristotle, as we saw, the irrational passions no less than calculation “belong to man”. 
The origin of actions, in anger or appetite, does not qualify them as inculpable. Acts which 
one might not want to have committed, which one may regret, are not necessarily wholly 
involuntary. A further differentiation of the categories of volition is introduced with the 
notion of proairesis, a refinement of the idea of the voluntary – to hekousion – of which we 
may say it is a subset. 
 
ἡ Fροαίρεσις δὴ ἑκούσιον /ὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐFὶ Fλέον τὸ 
ἑκούσιον· τοῦ /ὲν γὰρ ἑκουσίου καὶ Fαῖδες καὶ τἆλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, 
Fροαιρέσεως δ' οὔ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἑκούσια 1ὲν λέγο1εν, κατὰ *ροαίρεσιν δ' 
οὔ.210  
 
Choice, then, seems to be voluntary, but not the same thing as the voluntary; the 
latter extends more widely. For both children and the lower animals share in 
voluntary action, but not in choice, and acts done on the spur of the moment we 
describe as voluntary but not chosen. 
 
The French term gré, ordinarily translated into English as “will”, concerns the “voluntary” 
or “involuntary” character of acts, but does not exactly correspond, as Greek hekōn and akōn 
do not, Vernant argues, to the more loaded English “will” (la volonté). Thus Vernant:  
 
L’animal agît hekōn, comme les hommes, quand il suit son inclination propre sans 
être contraint par une puissance extérieure. Si donc toute décision (proairesis) est un 
acte exécuté de plain gré (hekōn), par contre « ce qu’on fait de plein gré n’est pas 
toujours l’objet d’une décision ».211 
 
This is fundamental. Doing something de plain gré, “willingly” as it were, need not entail 
having “willed” it. Decision always entails will, but a willing act does not necessarily entail 
decision. The maenad is like the animal, acting willingly but not through her own choosing. 
In the state of innocence and meaninglessness (not sharing meanings with oneself or with 
others) of the animal, the child and the bacchant, there is no or almost no decisional process. 
                                                        
210Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111b 6-10. On proairesis see especially Nancy Sherman, 1991. 
211 Vernant 49, in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972. 
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Only fully competent human intention, which, by definition, has a projected object, telos212, 
can have and therefore will attribute to others the full imputability of choice taken.  
 
Time and its construal, the construal of oneself as a being in time, with the projection of a 
‘before’, prin and ‘next’, epeita – this is the necessary condition for the projection of a present, 
nun, and the presence of a self. A sense of self is a sense of time: a past that, by retrospection, 
we come to ‘find’ was necessity, anagkē; a present, the sensation of experience as a flow, a 
stream of events and phenomena, having no apparent agent behind them; the opaque future 
of anticipated and unanticipated possibilities, elpides. This is the structure or syntax that 
must be consciously in place first, to qualify acts as decided or deliberated. Maenads, animals, 
children have not been initiated into (or have been released from) this syntaxis of events and 
phenomena. They are willing or unwilling but cannot wholly will, in the more precise sense 
of choose, for they cannot take thought in advance and therefore cannot “take up in 
advance”, i.e. “choose”, proairein.  
 
Human intention traces intentionality everywhere and even displaces its own intentionality, 
and therefore moral responsibility, onto non-human others; thus the Unschuldskomödie, a 
“comedy of innocence” that Meuli and Burkert discerned in sacrificial killing213, which they 
privileged as the central action of Greek religion214. Consider Burkert’s account of the 
“normative Greek sacrifice” in which the imputability of the act and the voluntariness of the 
victim plays such an impressive role in the act of killing and its construction: “Auch das Tier 
wird mit Wasser besprengt; ‚schüttle dich’, ruft Trygaios bei Aristophanes [Pax 960 and 
Scholiast ad loc. . . . Porph. Abst. 2,9;]. Man redet sich ein, die Bewegung des Tieres bedeutet 
ein‚ freiwilliges Nicken’, ein Ja zur Opferhandlung. Der Stier wird noch einmal getränkt – so 
                                                        
212 On intentionality and “aboutness”, see Dennett, 1987: 117-212 and below, § 3.3.12 n. 315. 
213 Meuli, 1946: 274-8. Burkert, 1966, 1997 [1972], GR. See also Bremmer, 1994: 38-54, with good bibliography. On Ritual and Tragedy, 
seee the landmark essay Burkert, 1966, which in many ways prefigures the later work, Burkert 1997 [1972], and Burkert GR. Against the 
privileging of Opferritual, see Ando in Faraone & Naiden [edd.], 2012: 195-200. Our interest here, whatever we decide the status of 
sacrificial killing in Greek religious life to be, is the clear import with which acts are invested, the characterizing emotions which the ritual 
may even be said to function to transform, certainly to alleviate: guilt and innocence. These would suggest a great deal about the sense of 
self-conscious human agency that these actors would feel. This is evident in the need they feel to exonerate themselves by the explanation 
that they are killing under divine commisssion or that it is not they who are responsible. An essential advantage of the ritual is to 
depersonalize acts: an individual is not guilty through sacrifice, only through neglecting to sacrifice. Ritual here is something like a system 
of techniques for distributing responsibility, intention and desire away from individuals. See also J. Z. Smith’s contribution in Hamerton-
Kelly [ed.], 1987 for a strong view not quite in agreement with Burkert’s. The bibliography is very extensive, for which see the updated 
English edition of Homo Necans, 1983: 2 n. 2, Burkert GR 2011 [1977].  
214 Burkert, 1997 [1972]: 8 “Gerade in der Mitte der Religion droht faszinierend blutige Gewalt.” 
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beugt er sein Haupt.“215 Much effort, then, is taken to secure the victim’s ‘consent’ in the 
reconstructed model of the normal Greek animal sacrifice216.  
 
Agency is such a fearful and dangerous problem; it cautiously dissimulates itself: “Unter 
den Körnern im Korb aber war das Messer verborgen, das jetzt aufgedeckt ist [Aristoph. Pax 
948, Eur. El. 810 IA 1565]. Mit ihm tritt der, dem die Führungsrolle zufällt im nun 
beginnenden Drama, der ὶερεύς, auf das Opfertier zu, das Messer noch versteckend, damit 
das Tier es nicht erblickt.”217 This knife or axe of the sacrificial killing will become itself 
invested with the personhood of an agent and is not a mere instrument218. With this displaced 
imputation of the ownership of the desire for the killing, the re-attribution or distribution of 
intention, this drama is from one point of view an elaborate Einreden, a ‘talking-into’ of 
actors in which the voluntary and the involuntary – the identity of the real agent – are the 
opposite of what they would otherwise seem.  
 
The sacrifice is a drama of acts that have psychological content; the ritual represents a 
problem of agency and motivation219. Acts are invested with ethical character and this quality 
of acts is determined by the construal and location of agency: who wanted the act, who 
initiated it, whose motive did it serve, how are those qualities articulated through the acts? 
In the drama of an intense situation, how are they disguised and displaced or neutralized 
and transformed? The Unschuldskomödie is a kind of reversed detective story, written by the 
                                                        
215 Burkert, 1997 [1972]: 11. 
216 This sacred identity farce continues (identity farce because the identity of the will and therefore of agency is shifted around in the manner 
that identity is confused in farce). Bacchae does of course have such a farcical aspect with its exchange of identities and non-recognitions. 
On the costume or transvestite scene 4 Dodds, 192 wrote: “Such a situation could easily be exploited as pure farce . . . But here the effect of 
farcical by-play is to intensify the underlying horror which peeps out in lines like 922 and 934.” Tragedy reveals the Schuld and its moral 
emotions, which the Unschuldskomödie takes such ingenious psychological and dramatical measures to cover up and neutralize. 
217 Burkert, 1997 [1972]: 12. 
218Cf. Porph. Abst. 2.28-30. Describing an ancient Athenian rite of the killing of the ox at the altar of Zeus Polieus, Pausanias shows vividly 
how much ritual killing is a problem that is solved by various acts and roles; responsibility and imputability is a central problem. The ox is 
made to initiate proceedings by eating barley left on an altar left unguarded, and thereby incurring guilt, Paus. 1.24.4.4- 1.24.4.12: τοῦ Διὸς 
τοῦ Πολιέως κριθὰς καταθέντες ἐπὶ τὸν βωµὸν µεµιγµένας πυροῖς οὐδεµίαν ἔχουσι φυλακήν·. . . One of the priests is called the “ox killer”, 
in an elaborate and contrived play which reveals so starkly the centrality of problem of agency: his role is to kill, toss the murder weapon 
and flee. The remaining humans as though not knowing the cuplrit, put the axe on trial: καλοῦσι δέ τινα τῶν ἱερέων βουφόνον, <ὃς κτείνας 
τὸν βοῦν> καὶ ταύτῃ τὸν πέλεκυν ῥίψας – οὕτω γάρ ἐστίν οἱ νόµος –  οἴχεται φεύγων· οἱ δὲ ἅτε τὸν ἄνδρα ὃς ἔδρασε τὸ ἔργον οὐκ εἰδότες, 
ἐς δίκην ὑπάγουσι τὸν πέλεκυν. On the different courts for different qualities of crime, clearly determining qualities of voluntariness and 
involuntariness, Paus. 1.28 is informative.  Particularly significant here is the Court of the Prytaneum (Paus. 1.28. 10. 6- 11.10.), where 
inanimate things, ta apsycha, are put on trial, (Cf. also in the comic setting, the trial of the dog Labes at Ar. Vesp. 885 ff.). Pausanias tells of 
the supposed origin, in the time of the Ur-Athenian kingkind Erectheus, of the trial of the axe and its imputation with guilt for the first ox 
killing.  
219 “Das Anstößige an diesem Ritus, das schon früh empfunden wurde, liegt darin, daß das ganze so eindeutig und unmittelbar den 
Menschen zugute kommt.” Burkert, 1997 [1972]: 14. 
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actual agents of the act, in which the anticipated act gives rise to “evidence” of displaced 
motivation and culpability.  
 
If Pentheus is a kind of sacrificial animal, as the poetry can suggest, what can that mean? Is 
the sacrificial Metaphorik an end in itself, or is it not simply one of the means to explore the 
primary subject, which is the import of situations. This is content, which is indissociable from 
the import given them by the actors. Does the Menschenähnlichkeit of the creature become 
most clear in the dying of the animal, as Burkert suggests220? In what would this 
Menschenähnlichkeit, ‘likeness to humans’, and Austauschbarkeit, ‘fungibility’ consist, if not in 
the recognition of the creature as having a perspective, a human-like point of view and 
therefore being capable of at least a rudimentary sociality or inter-subjectivity. The animal is 
necessarily construed as a being with something like an inner self, which alone could seem 
to “desire”, “fear”, “resist”, “acquiesce”, “be deceived”, “break taboo”. This is only more 
irrefutably the case when it is seen as also possible to invest inanimate objects with a kind of 
agency and responsibility, as was done in the Prytaneum and the old-fashioned Dipolieia 
festival with its buphonia, ox-killing221. 
 
The theory of restitution of the animal and the consecration of violence is one built on a 
sense of the sensitivity of humans to the import of their actions and their actions as 
presenting themselves as problematic. So did Meuli and Deubner discern in ritual killing, 
such as that of the the Buphonia, the Scheu ‘timidity’222 of the agriculturalist in the face of the 
slaughter and consumption of his “Ackergenossen”223. The counterpart of this humane and 
humanizing Scheu is the Zustimmung224, acquiescence, of the victim, which must be secured. It 
is expressed in the need felt for Versöhnung and Sühnerite, rites of atonement and 
reconciliation, that must be ultimately established. This is what we may take here from 
Burkert’s influential interpretation of the Opferritual: in sacrificial ritual as in Tragedy, the 
pressure of desires or motives and the evaluation of their quality, meaning and 
consequence, are of absolutely essential significance for participants.  
 
 
                                                        
220 Burkert, 1997 [1972]: 29: “Im Sterben wurde die Menschenählichkeit des Tieres vielleicht am deutlichsten erfaßt. So wird das Beutetier 
zum Opfer. Vom Gefühl fast brüderlicher Verbundenheit, das der Jäger zum Tier empfindet, wissen viele Beobachter zu berichten; von der 
Austauchbarkeit von Mensch und Tier im Opfer sprechen die Mythen nicht nur bei den Griechen immer wieder.” 
221 Evidence of the Buphonia ritual formed an important source for Burkert’s outline of a “normal sacrifice”, Burkert, 1997 [1972]: 153-61. 
222 And this Scheu is powerfully expressive of self-consciousness, the very opposite of hybristic self-assertiveness. Nevertheless, it is set off 
by the self-assertiveness of the ‘prayer’ in the ritual, which Burkert likens in function to the euchos in Homer as that is interpreted by 
Adkins, 1969 an act of speech by which the hero is seen “‘asserting his existence, his value and his claims’ diese für den Homerischen 
Sprachgebrauch gegebene Charakteristik paßt gerade für den Platz des Gebets im Opferritual,” Burkert, 1997 [1972]: 11. 
223 Meuli, 1946:228-33 “Abwälzen der Schuld am Töten”; “Sühnung, Versöhnung”, 247-5. 
224 Meuli, 1946: 266-8. 
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2.4 Passion: thumon ekpneōn 
 
θύοι/' ἂν αὐτῶι /ᾶλλον ἢ θυ/ού/ενος225 
 
Men sacrifice voluntarily, but they are commanded to or expected to by gods. They have 
displaced any question of moral responsibilty for the act, upon the inducement – to keleuon – 
of those external agents, the deathless persons who live and look down from a remote, 
vertical abroad. Yet, when Agamemnon is induced by a pitiless god to sacrifice his own 
daughter, Euripides presents this as the matter for the deliberation of a person. A person has 
the all-important potential for a moral and personal depth, which is in fact greater than that 
of the gods. The sacrifice of Iphigenia is not necessary, in the strong, fated sense. Its 
necessariness must be chosen, acquiesced to and embraced.  
 
What danger will Agamemnon choose to risk: the most abominable outrage of the killing of 
his own daughter or the disrepute among and possible persecution by the Greek army?226 It is 
an unwilling act, certainly, but also one that is subject to prior evaluation; it is in the hands 
of the actors, not forced upon them. If they are forced, it is only through their own values 
(their effective values rather than those they may wish were their effective, i.e. finally acted 
upon, values), that they are “compelled”. In other words, if the protagonists are compelled, 
it is by a compulsion they had it in their power to deny, as Menelaus’ reversal 
demonstrates227. As Aristotle puts it, “not every hekousion, willing act, is proaireton, 
deliberate”, which is to say, subject to prior evaluative decision-making. In what does 
proairesis consist, he asks. Choice is not appetite, “still less is it anger”, thumos, for “acts due 
to anger are thought less than any others, to be objects of choice.”228. Irrational creatures – 
animals, children – share in voluntary action but not in choice229.  
 
When Dionysus emerges from the palace, magically emancipated, to the relief of his anxious 
followers, he thinks they have fallen into athumia, “disspiritedness” or “despondency”, 610-
11: 
 
 εἰς ἀθυ/ίαν ἀφίκεσθ', ἡνίκ' εἰσεFε/Fό/ην, 
 Πενθέως ὡς ἐς σκοτεινὰς ὁρκανὰς Fεσού/ενος; 
 
                                                        
225 “I would burn offerings to him rather than get enraged”, 794. 
226 Eur. IA 506-42. 
227 Eur. IA 471-503. 
228 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111b 18-19: θυµὸς δ' ἔτι ἧττον· ἥκιστα γὰρ τὰ διὰ θυµὸν κατὰ προαίρεσιν εἶναι δοκεῖ. 
229 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111 b 11-19. For Platonic definitions and exploration of thumos, as one component of the tripartite self see Plato’s 
Republic IV, esp. Pl. R. 435b. 1– 441c. 8. 
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Did you come into despondency, when I was sent in, 
That I would fall into the dark fences of Pentheus? 
 
He wants to breathe fresh cheer into them, and explains that he has come away all too easily; 
he has saved himself with no effort at all, 614. The brochoi, knots or meshes, of Pentheus have 
had no power to bind and contain him. The bacchants would be at a loss if anything ever 
happened to him, but he is reassuringly masterful, 612-15. He describes the contrast (already 
identified above in the palace scenes230) of the striving, futile man and the self-possessed 
Stranger, who throughout is distinguished for his hēsuchia, calm (636). Pentheus is not just 
deluded, misapprehending and misjudging the apparent for the real, 616-19, but a man 
“panting out thumos” –  puffing spirit, life, passion, heart or mind – θυ/ὸν ἐκFνέων 620. 
The picture of Pentheus drawn by Dionysus here, 616-41, is of a leaky man, a man of 
uncontained rage, thumos and orgē, who has set himself against the consummately sealed-up 
and impenetrable figure, which is a god231. The mortal exhausts himself to no avail, stabbing 
at phantoms. However much he manifests a swelling up of emotions, however much thumos 
he expels, the god will only show a serene contempt232. A wise man is contained, he 
moderates his orgē233, the god explains, 640-1. 
 
His panting, like his threats, his calculations like his anger, avail Pentheus nothing. This 
“leakiness”, which by the end will become the “drippingness” of his physical matter234, is 
exemplified in ἔα ἔα, 644235, his utterance when he emerges and detects the liberated 
Stranger. It is an emission that Dodds found to be “a gasp of astonishment, perhaps 
representing the sound of a sharp intake of breath”236. An objective of the poet, as well as his 
technique, is to make the invisible manifest, to make the impalpable concrete. The nature of 
Pentheus, in which anger and desire – thumos and epithumia – are so preponderant, is 
“brought out” very materially in scenes such as this, when, drawn out from inside the 
                                                        
230 § 2.2.6. 
231634-7: κόπου δ' ὕπο/ διαµεθεὶς ξίφος παρεῖται· πρὸς θεὸν γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ/ ἐς µάχην ἐλθεῖν ἐτόλµησ'. ἥσυχος δ' ἐκβὰς ἐγὼ/ δωµάτων ἥκω 
πρὸς ὑµᾶς, Πενθέως οὐ φροντίσας.  
232 Just so again later: however terribly he breathes threats Dionysus knows him for what he is as he does not know himself ἐκ τῶν ἀπειλῶν 
τῶν πρὶν αἷσι δεινὸς ἦν, 856 . . . ὡς πέφυκεν ἐν µέρει θεὸς/ δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἠπιώτατος, 860 -1. 
233 Orgē is the variant used for thumos in Homer. 
234 Dripping: 711, 742, 1129-39, 1163-4:  καλὸς ἀγὼν †ἐν αἵµατι στάζουσαν/ χέρα περιβαλεῖν τέκνου†, 1216-21, 1299-1300. The bacchants 
themselves are “leaky”, drippers and heavy-breathers, 711, and the night is a broken vessel, sathros [cracked, corrupt], which cannot contain 
them, in which they are given to overflow, τοῦτ' ἐς γυναῖκας δόλιόν ἐστι καὶ σαθρόν, 487. Voice itself, either checked, edited or 
spontaneously flowing, typically overflowing the vessel of person in Tragedy, is always a clear index of self and its control or loss. After the 
great effort of sparagmos the maenads do not articulate but expel feeling or emotional energy, panting, groaning and crying out, 1131-3: ἦν 
δὲ πᾶσ' ὁµοῦ βοή, / ὁ µὲν στενάζων ὅσον ἐτύγχαν' ἐµπνέων, / αἱ δ' ὠλόλυζον. 
235 On 810 see § 3.1 n. 1 and cf. also ll. 586, 596. 
236Dodds ad loc. He continues. “being a noise, not a word, it is often doubled and placed extra versum, as here, and is naturally confined to 
excited dialogue or monologues; Eur. uses it very freely (cf. 1280)”. 
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palace, we see his incontinence. We learn, again and again in Tragedy, the wastefulness and 
futility of incontinence itself. Tragedy dramatizes the dangers of koros and hybris, the excess 
of desire, appetite and self-regard for which mortals must pay their tragic ransom, apoina. 
 
Once introduced, the thumos of Pentheus becomes an idea that is developed over the rest of 
the play. The messenger who comes into the city and reports the doings of the bacchants, 
wondrous and appalling, 677-774, has a cautiousness regarding the temper of kings237. He 
asks in advance if he may speak freely to Pentheus or if he must check his words238. This 
reflexive sensitivity, in a servant, to the effect of one’s own words, heightens the deficient 
capacity of Pentheus, who lacks precisely this sensitivity. The messenger knows only too 
well what, very judiciously, he calls “the speed and too king-like sharpness-of-thumos” of 
the sovereign’s mind, 670-1: 
 
τὸ γὰρ τάχος σου τῶν φρενῶν δέδοικ', ἄναξ,   
καὶ τοὐξύθυ/ον καὶ τὸ βασιλικὸν λίαν. 
 
I fear your mind’s speed, my lord, 
and its keen-spiritedness and very kingliness. 
 
An interpolated line follows, attributed to Pentheus, in which he takes up the idea of anger. 
He has assured the messenger that he speaks with immunity, athōios 672, and he says that 
“with the just one must not be angry, (become upset)” [τοῖς γὰρ δικαίοις οὐχὶ θυ/οῦσθαι 
χρεών.] 673239. The importance of thumos is underscored further when Dionysus, in the 
exchange leading up to the strange transformation of Pentheus’ cognitive faculties that 
                                                        
237 This is not misplaced, considering such famous, intemperate reactions as those of, for example, Agamemnon in Iliad I, or Sophocles’ 
Oedipus in Oedipus Tyrannos and Kreon in Antigone. 
238668-9: θέλω δ' ἀκοῦσαι πότερά σοι παρρησίαι/ φράσω τὰ κεῖθεν ἢ λόγον στειλώµεθα· 
239Nauck deleted this line, most modern editions retain it [Diggle, Grégoire & Meunier, Kopff]. Seaford on 673: “this line is suspect because 
similar to fr. 287.1 τοῖς πράγµασιν γὰρ οὐχὶ θυµοῦσθαι χρεών· [Bellerophon], and because an inept and flat sentiment in the context.” but 
Dodds ad loc.: “The partial coincidence with fr. 287.1 τοῖς πράγµασιν γὰρ οὐχὶ θυµοῦσθαι χρεών·, is not a reason for rejecting this line, 
since Eur. often echoes his earlier phrases; the antithesis τοῖς δικαίοις ∼ τὸν ὑποθέντα is a reason for retaining it.” For Roux ad loc. “rien 
n’est plus grec que de motiver sa conduite dans un cas particulier en la rattachant à une maxime générale.” It is really not an inept or flat 
touch of irony, it serves to enhance the picture of Pentheus’ self-ignorance. It anticipates also the problem of Dionysus’ handling of the 
Kadmeians, the difficulties with his version of justice. It is not clear how far we can say Dionysus is “just”. What is clear is that 
thumousthai, to be enraged, which is what the god is from the start, for all he wears a laughing face, is an emotion or condition which serves 
the mortal poorly. The notion of justice or being “in the right” is not particularly helpful in this situation. In his dramatic situations Euripides 
habitually draws attention through puns and paronomasia to the terms of greatest significance, such as in τοὐξύθυµον . . . θυµοῦσθαι.  
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begins at least from 810240, warns him that it were better to thuein, “burn sacrifices”, “smoke”, 
“cause to seethe” than thumousthai, “rage”, “be made to seethe”241, at 794-5: 
 
θύοι/' ἂν αὐτῶι /ᾶλλον ἢ θυ/ού/ενος 
Fρὸς κέντρα λακτίζοι/ι θνητὸς ὢν θεῶι. 
 
I would burn offerings to him rather than get enraged 
Kicking against the pricks, a mortal against a god. 
 
Thuein denotes both “rage, seethe”, “desire eagerly” and “offer up by burning, sacrifice”, 
(send up sweet smells, “sublimate”). It is also connected by the poets with the bacchants 
who elsewhere are called thuiades, inspired or mad women, by Aeschylus242. Smoke is also 
very often not only a trace of the gods’ presence, for the means of communicating human 
reverence to the gods, but very specifically a trace of the presence of Dionysus, who is not 
only usually there where humans share a certain quality of festive community (burning 
meat, drinking wine, singing songs), but, more than any other god, is felt to be accompanied 
by fire243. 
 
There is a kind of escalation, over the course of the work, from thumos, through oxythumia, 
and [thumousthai] to prothumia, which terminates in the metamorphosis of this man of 
figured thumos into the literal thuma, sacrificial victim, the flesh for burning, a savage 
(ōmestēs, which means also “raw”, unprocessed, not yet burnt for consumption) offering 
struck down for Thebes to feast the gods. Pentheus is prothumos, eager, to spy upon the 
maenads, whose motives he is sure are base. This prothumia, zeal, will gradually displace his 
sense of shame, aidōs, that reflexive, socially indispensable emotion, 828-30: 
 
                                                        
240 On the transformation that begins from the point at 810 “Ah!”, see March, 1989: 41; Burnett, 1970; Rosenmeyer, 1983: 387; Kalke, 
1985; on 810 see § 3.1 n. 1 and cf. also ll. 586, 596. 
241 These words are indeed etymologically linked, as smoke and breath are connected: LSJ sees thumos as rightly derived from thuein “rage, 
seethe, pant” by Plato in the Cratylus 419e: “θυµὸς” δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς <θύσεως> καὶ ζέσεως τῆς ψυχῆς ἔχοι ἂν τοῦτο τὸ ὄνοµα. See also Burkert 
GR: 102 “Bei Homer gerade erst im Ansatz zu fassen ist die Bedeutungsverschieben, die das alte Wort für ‘räuchern’, thyein, zum normalen 
Wort für ‘opfern’ schlechthin werden ließ.”, (Cf. Latin fumus). [Note the zesis, ‘bubbling, fermentation’, of matter that seems to live, like 
wine that ‘matures’ and has a life-span]. 
242 Aesch. Sept. 496-8: αὐτὸς δ' ἐπηλάλαξεν, ἔνθεος δ' Ἄρει /βακχᾷ πρὸς ἀλκὴν θυιὰς ὥς, φόβον βλέπων. As a “blood-dripping” frenzying 
bacchant at Aesch. Sept. 836: θυιὰς αἱµατοσταγεῖς; A. Supp. 562-4: µαινοµένα πόνοις ἀτί- /µοις ὀδύναις τε κεντροδα-/λήτισι θυιὰς Ἥρας. 
And earlier still, in Alcman fr. 63 Ναΐδες τε Λαµπάδες τε Θυιάδες τε, [Poetae melici Graeci, ed. Page, D.L. 1962]. Pentheus in the first 
episode had wanted to tear down and turn upside down the seat of augury of Teiresias, threatened that he would have his priestly insignia, 
his fillets “tossed to the winds and storms, thuellaisin”, 349-50: ἄνω κάτω τὰ πάντα συγχέας ὁµοῦ, / καὶ στέµµατ' ἀνέµοις καὶ θυέλλαισιν 
µέθες·. The idea of breath that gathers and becomes the destructive storm of returning fury is developed in this imagery. The thumos of the 
mortal is sound and fury, that in the environs of the unrecognized divinity, becomes manifest as indeed signifying nothing. 
243 See § 5.3 on Dionysus and fire. 
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Pe. τίνα στολήν; ἦ θῆλυν244; ἀλλ' αἰδώς /' ἔχει. 
Di. οὐκέτι θεατὴς /αινάδων Fρόθυ/ος εἶ; 
Pe. στολὴν δὲ τίνα φὴις ἀ/φὶ χρῶτ' ἐ/ὸν βαλεῖν; 
 
Pe. A dress? A woman’s? But shame will take hold of me. 
D. Are you no longer very eager to be a spectator of the maenads? 
Pe. What dress then do you mean I should cast on my flesh? 
 
Dionysus is disassembling the structure of Pentheus’ will, which has always been too 
shakily constructed an edifice, one that is not earthquake-proof, too easily toppled by the 
seismic movements of the Dionysiac body245. Over the course of these hundred-odd lines, 
Pentheus will undergo the inward change that will be made very dramatically manifest 
through his transvestiture, his outward transformation into an ineffectively, ridiculously 
disguised female bacchant. That make-over will take place offstage, within the palace. A 
choral ode, which can function both to generate a sense of the extended passage of time or as 
a kind of effacement of time, is sung, 862-911. Dionysus returns to stage first and calls 
Pentheus to come out, 912-3: 
 
σὲ τὸν Fρόθυ/ον ὄνθ' ἃ /ὴ χρεὼν ὁρᾶν 
σFεύδοντά τ' ἀσFούδαστα, Πενθέα λέγω, 
 
You, the man who is over-eager [prothumon] to see what he must not 
Striver after the unstriveable, I mean Pentheus, 
 
At these high moments, Pentheus is characterized through the quality of his desiring. For 
Dionysus, working out the telos of revenge, this is what is definite about Pentheus: he is a 
panting, wrathful man who, in ignorance of what he himself is doing, fights with divinity. 
As the action approaches the climax of Pentheus’ life, the incommensurateness of 
circumstance and desire is again given another very powerful figuration by the poet. The 
maenads have spied out the spy. They are trying to hit him in any manner they can, with 
stones, spears, their thursoi, 1095-1100. Yet at this stage, their attempts to topple the 
conspicuous man, (which is what a king is), are as ineffective as the king’s earlier threats 
                                                        
244 Thēlun: “female”, on the subject of play with significant words, I have always suspected that Euripides does cause in Bacchae the 
feminine and female to be linked, in a nexus made up of threads of lexical connection, with the “abundant or swelling” thēlein, poetic 
thalleien [cf. 1185-7: νέος ὁ µόσχος ἄρ-/ τι γένυν ὑπὸ κόρυθ' ἁπαλότριχα / κατάκοµον θάλλει., where it is used by a still non-compos mentis 
Agauē of her dead son, whom she takes for a bullock that she thinks she has hunted down, which nevertheless she describes in terms that 
could be used of a pubescent boy, just “sprouting” its first growth of hair]; and with the central problem of desire and willingness, thelein. 
245 576-603, on which see Seaford’s detailed remarks at Seaford, 1966 pp. 195-8. For the physical house as bacchic body, a confusion 
apparently quite deliberate and consistent, around Dionysus Cf. TrGF 3 Radt Aesch. Edonians fr. 58 ἐνθουσιᾷ δὴ δῶµα, βακχεύει στέγη. 
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against Dionysus, (who the Stranger is): οὐκ ἤνυτον, 1100. Euripides’ narrating messenger 
says of the situation, 1101-2: 
 
κρεῖσσον γὰρ ὕψος τῆς Fροθυ/ίας ἔχων 
καθῆσθ' ὁ τλή/ων, ἀFορίαι λελη//ένος. 
 
For the wretched man was seated, seized in aporia, 
At a height, higher than prothumia, [the bacchants’ zeal or high 
eagerness]. 
 
Without realizing it, Pentheus has been like the bacchants all along, the zealots who can 
realize or know nothing about themselves. All have been broken down or crippled as to 
their faculty for counsel with self or other. All in common have had destroyed or fatally 
enfeebled the capacity to evaluate, to judge and choose in advance. All have been passive 
victims of emotional states, and this has been marked by their subjection to thumos, a 
susceptibility to athumia and an injudicious and unrealistic prothumia. In this light, thumos is 
truly a phase or category of mania, another kind of elaphra lussa, “light madness”246. Its 
consequence is like that of mania; the body loses the agency of self. It becomes like that of an 
an animal, flesh and breath and involuntary emissions of sound, without that hard-to-define 
and impossible-to-locate quality, which is mind, spirit or identity: the person.  
 
Pentheus is reduced utterly, as Thebes will be. He becomes the dripping and scattered 
remnants of raw flesh (οὗ σῶ/α /οχθῶν /υρίοις ζητή/ασιν, 1220)247. Utterly abject, 
unprocessed, unsublimateable in the consoling rites of death, untransformed by human 
intention and therefore belonging to that chaotic dimension from which knowledge and 
relation are precluded. It is in bitter irony that Kadmos identifies the massacred Pentheus, 
once a breathing, fuming, wrathful and desirous human being – a creature of thumos – with 
a sacrifice to send up to the gods, the object thuma, 1246-7: 
 
καλὸν τὸ θῦ/α καταβαλοῦσα δαί/οσιν 
ἐFὶ δαῖτα Θήβας τάσδε κἀ/ὲ Fαρακαλεῖς. 
                                                        
246 On elaphra lussa see § 2.2.1 n. 81. On erān epithumia mania in see Dover’s discussion in Greek Homosexuality, with good notes on 
Plato’s handling of these terms, 1989 [1978]: 43 “Prodikos in the late fifth century defined eros as 'desire doubled', using for 'desire' the very 
general word epithūmia (of which the verb is epithūmein) and adding that 'eros doubled is insanity' (B7). So too Xen. Mem. iii 9.7 . . . one 
calls substantial distortion of a person's thinking 'insanity'. Frequently eros and erān are treated as synonymous with epithūmia and 
epithūmein;”. 
247 1216-20. For the nocturnal rites of raw-flesh-eating of Dionysus Zeagreus, see the fragment from Euripides’ Cretans TGF Nauck2 Eur. fr. 
472. 11-12 καὶ νυκτιπόλου Ζαγρέως βροντὰς/ τοὺς ὠµοφάγους δαίτας τελέσας. For this savage face of dionysus see also Detienne, 1977; 
Detienne & Vernant, 1979. 
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A fine thuma [sacrifice] cast down for the daimōns, [gods] 
The feast you summon Thebes and me to. 
 
 
2.5 Desire: ei bouloio 
 
Choice is not wish or desire, boulēsis, Aristotle argued.248 Boulēsis is “near”, suneggus, to 
proairesis but different, insofar as one can wish for the impossible, but no serious person can 
be said to choose, ‘seize by prior decision’, proairein, impossible things: ta adunata. One may 
wish to live forever, even though it is impossible, but one does not deliberate on how to do 
so: βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ <καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. This example proffered of the 
impossible wish – that for eternal life – is one of peculiar suggestiveness in the vicinity of 
this god, whose mysteries were founded upon the promise of deliverance and life after 
death.  
 
The limit set upon human life, the bourne from which no traveller returns, is a strange, 
immaterial barrier that perplexes the mind out of thought. From its earliest origins 
apparently, mortality was the border at which Tragedy encamped. It struck its skēnē, tent, on 
the bank of the river border separating mortal life and immortal, transforming into an 
existential threshold, with all its power to deepen events, the beach at Aulis or Troy, along 
which it so often set up its actions, or the city between two rivers, Thebes where Dionysus, 
the hybrid of mortal and immortal has arrived: Fάρει/ι ∆ίρκης νά/αθ' Ἱσ/ηνοῦ θ' ὕδωρ, 
5249. Mortality, ignorance and that surplus, the excess of vitality and appetite, which is the 
mark of human beings, this is the stuff the Tragic poets use to shape, poiein, their works.  
 
Bacchae (like Iphigenia at Aulis) is the story of the accomplishment, telein, of the god’s desire 
and the frustration of human desires. Dionysus desires from mortals. He desires their 
recognition and he desires revenge when he is not recognized250. He wishes to be wished for 
by mortals, “even if they do not wish” to wish that, 39-42: 
                                                        
248 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111 b 20-30. Boulēsis comes from the verb boulomai, defined as follows in Chantraine: 189 s.v. boulomai “sens : 
«désirer, vouloir» . Le sens et l’emploi de βούλοµαι se trouvent déterminés par ses rapports avec θέλω, ἐθέλω, lesquels ont varié et se 
présentent en gros de la façon suivante: chez Homère βούλοµαι est beaucoup moins fréquent que ἐθέλω qui est le verbe usuel signifiant 
«vouloir», tandis que βούλοµαι signifie proprement «désirer, préférer», . . . Le dérive le plus important est βουλή «volonté, décision, plan, 
conseil», d’ù le sens d’ «assemblée des ancien, Conseil», etc.” See Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 58-9. 
249 Ignorance of the day of death in Aeschylus, Prometheus took away the knowledge of the fated death and the antidote, pharmakon, he 
compensated it with was elpis, ‘hopefulness’, ‘expectation’, which the chorus of Ocean’s daughters finds a great benefit, meg’ ōphelēma, 
Aesch. PV 248-51. On elpis see also see § 3.1, § 4.3.9 n. 183, and elpis contrasted with melein see § 3.3.3 p. 176 n. 170. 
250 Recognition: τἀκεῖ χορεύσας καὶ καταστήσας ἐµὰς/ τελετάς, ἵν' εἴην ἐµφανὴς δαίµων βροτοῖς. 21-2; φανέντα θνητοῖς δαίµον' ὃν τίκτει 
Διί 42; 45-50. Revenge: 516-8; 1330-52. 
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δεῖ γὰρ Fόλιν τήνδ' ἐκ/αθεῖν, κεἰ /ὴ θέλει, 
ἀτέλεστον οὖσαν τῶν ἐ/ῶν βακχευ/άτων, 
Σε/έλης τε /ητρὸς ἀFολογήσασθαί /' ὕFερ 
φανέντα θνητοῖς δαί/ον' ὃν τίκτει ∆ιί. 
 
For this city must learn it well, even should it not wish to, 
What it means to remain uninitiated into my bacchic acts, 
And I must defend the honour of Semelē, my mother 
Appearing to mortals as the daimōn whom she bears to Zeus. 
 
Dionysus, according to the always helpfully exegetical Teiresias, wishes to be revered and 
honoured by all alike. He wants no mortal person – thnētos – wishing for the same, that is, to 
be distinguished and magnified as he wishes to be, 208-9: 
 
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁFάντων βούλεται τι/ὰς ἔχειν 
κοινάς, διαριθ/ῶν δ' οὐδέν' αὔξεσθαι θέλει. 
 
But from all alike he wants to have honours,  
He wants to be magnified while distinguishing no-one. 
 
He desires to lift mortals out of the practical mode of the agora, in which humans must 
work, through labour and negotiation, towards the realization of their desires. He causes 
talking, exchanging, transacting mortals – city-dwelling, inter-active humans251 – to dance 
and to sing: τἀκεῖ χορεύσας καὶ καταστήσας ἐ/ὰς/τελετάς, 21-2, 55-63. The needs of the 
body are experienced as pains and desires. Pleasure, relief and release from the burdensome 
and ongoing (otherwise uninterrupted) effort of the satisfaction of needs and desires is what 
Dionysus offers. He displaces the project of accomplishing practical telos, through 
introducing a different quality of objective and a different mode of satisfaction and pleasure. 
The realization he brings is the consummation or completeness that is achieved through his 
teletai. He wants these to be authentically desired by mortals.  
 
We may wish for things outside of our own control, such as that “a particular actor or 
athlete should win in a competition”252, but there is no proairesis when it concerns things that 
cannot be brought about by one’s own efforts, di’ hautou prachthenta:  
 
                                                        
251 13-20, 48-50.  
252 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111 b 24. 
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Fροαίρεσις /ὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τῶν ἀδυνάτων, καὶ εἴ τις φαίη Fροαιρεῖσθαι, δοκοίη 
ἂν ἠλίθιος εἶναι· βούλησις δ' ἐστὶ <καὶ> τῶν ἀδυνάτων, οἷον ἀθανασίας. καὶ ἡ 
/ὲν βούλησίς ἐστι καὶ Fερὶ τὰ /ηδα/ῶς δι' αὑτοῦ Fραχθέντα ἄν, οἷον ὑFοκριτήν 
τινα νικᾶν ἢ ἀθλητήν· Fροαιρεῖται δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα οὐδείς, ἀλλ' ὅσα οἴεται 
γενέσθαι ἂν δι' αὑτοῦ.253  
 
For choice cannot relate to impossibles, and if anyone said he chose them he would 
be thought silly; but there may be a wish even for impossibles, e.g. for immortality. 
And wish may relate to things that could in no way be brought about by one’s own 
efforts, e.g. that a particular actor or athlete should win in a competition; but no one 
chooses such things, but only the things that he thinks could be brought about by his 
own efforts.  
 
Wish relates more to ends, choice to means, for Aristotle254. He seems to suggest that wishes 
are more given, while the choice between them – which to activate – is more open and 
variable. In Bacchae the impossible is expressed as that which is not proper to mortals to 
“have in mind” or “intend”, to mē thnata phronein. Acting as if not mortal, not limited, not 
inter-subjective, but solipsistically, alone, a subject surveying a world of objects and persons 
as objects among other objects – this is hybris. It means to think and act in a manner 
unbecoming to an ephemeral, fleshly human with a single, time-bound perspective amongst 
countless others. The wish to live forever finds its parallel in the model of the man who 
forgets his mortality, forgets himself and lives as one who does not die. The chorus 
elaborates this theme in song, which is otherwise expressed so strongly in the action of the 
play, Pentheus’ character, desires and fate. In the first stasimon, 370-433, they sing about the 
effects on life of hankering after the impossible, of not realizing what one’s true interests are. 
Pursuing unrealistic things is a sure way to lose what is in fact possible; it is the way of the 
mad and the ill-advised, kakobouloi, 395-401:  
 
τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία, 
τό τε /ὴ θνατὰ φρονεῖν 
βραχὺς αἰών· ἐFὶ τούτωι 
δὲ τίς ἂν /εγάλα διώκων 
τὰ Fαρόντ' οὐχὶ φέροι; /αι- 
νο/ένων οἵδε τρόFοι καὶ 
κακοβούλων Fαρ' ἔ/οιγε φωτῶν. 
 
                                                        
253 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111 b 20-26. 
254 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111 b 26-7: ἔτι δ' ἡ µὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ µᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος. 
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Science is not wisdom, 
Thinking not mortal thoughts 
A short life, in this light 
Who would pursue great things 
And not attain what is there? Of the 
Maddened are these the ways and 
Of those of bad counsel, to my mind. 
 
“Science is not wisdom”, may mean here, at least in one sense, that the objects of desire 
require revising. Mortals need to look again at what they consider to be the better objects of 
their wishing and working towards.  
 
In the fourth stasimon, 977-1032, there are further impressive passages where these themes 
of desire, time, mortality and sense are drawn together. The bacchants sing of he who is 
unjust in his judgement, abnormal in his orgē “temper, emotions”: he is “mad in his guts 
about the bacchic orgia and [his] mother”, 998-9. Pentheus is frantic, they say, distraught in 
his lēma, “will, desire, purpose”, 1000255. He thinks he can overcome the indomitable by force, 
1001. Again, as at 398, ta megala is other than what has been recognized256. It is plainer, more 
visible, its meaning is unconcealed. It is this form of “greatness”, not unavailable to mortals, 
which belongs to Dionysus and leads not only to a longer life, (implicit at 397: βραχὺς αἰών) 
but to a life closer in kind to that of the blessed, makaroi, and the immortal, athanatoi.  
 
The Dionysiac bearing and mode of evaluating leads mortals to that which is beautiful and 
noble, ta kala. The bacchants are celebrating their desire and expressing it simultaneously. It 
is not a desire for impossible, unrealizable things, ta adunata; this is a healthy form of 
wishing whose fulfillment is in Dionysus, the god who brings the gift of this desire and the 
recognition of the nature of this desire. The recognition and consciousness of the gift is 
inseparable from its value, the double merit which is the corollary of the double guilt of the 
man who commits a crime in ignorance, drunkenly, and must pay twice257, 997-1010258: 
 
                                                        
255 Lēma: Derived from λάω, “see” [LSJ s.v. λάω 1] or “seize, grasp, hold”. A candidate for a Greek term for “Will”? See Snell, 1928 and 
Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972, who make much of the point that the Greeks supposedly had no word for ‘will’.  
256 Somewhat like the Megala Dionysia itself, this festival of drama, not only the largest festival, but which is perhaps also deeper, 
containing more than one may have appreciated. 
257 See § 2.2.2 n. 132 on Arist. Eth. Nich. 1113b 30-3. 
258 Dodds ad loc.: “This passage is the hardest in the play and full of textual uncertainties.” Dodds’ discussion of the text and its problems 
and the “best” suggestions is extensive. Rijksbaron ad loc. is also detailed in his comment and includes a discussion of interpretations and 
their merits subsequent to Dodd’s publication (so since 1944). He settles on an interpretation that combines that of Dodds and of Kirk. I 
have offered here what I think is a defensible and faithful adherence to the corrupt text, which I make no effort to repair. I wish to retain 
what I regard as an appropriate awkwardness in my translation from Ancient Greek to contemporary English.  
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ὃς ἀδίκωι γνώ/αι Fαρανό/ωι τ' ὀργᾶι 
†Fερὶ βάκχι' ὄργια /ατρός τε σᾶς† 
/ανείσαι FραFίδι 
FαρακόFωι τε λή/ατι στέλλεται,                1000 
τἀνίκατον ὡς κρατήσων βίαι. 
†γνώ/αν σώφρονα θάνατος ἀFροφάσιστος 
εἰς τὰ θεῶν ἔφυ 
βροτείω τ' ἔχειν ἄλυFος βίος. 
τὸ σοφὸν οὐ φθόνω χαίρω θηρεύου-          1005 
  σα τὰ δ' ἕτερα /εγάλα φανερὰ τῶν ἀεὶ 
ἐFὶ τὰ καλὰ βίον,†   
ἦ/αρ ἐς νύκτα τ' εὐ- 
αγοῦντ' εὐσεβεῖν, τὰ δ' ἔξω νό/ι/α 
δίκας ἐκβαλόντα τι/ᾶν θεούς.                     1010 
 
He who with unjust mind and lawless mood [orgē] 
†Concerning bacchic orgia and your mother’s† 
With raving heart 
And frantic will is getting ready,                                          1000 
As if by violence he will master the indomitable.    
Death, which suffers no pretexts, plants a healthy mind 
In regard of divine matters 
And a life befitting mortals is painless. 
I don’t begrudge them their art but I delight in pursu-     1005 
ing other, great things plain to see  
That belong to those who pursue always beauty, life  
And day into night comporting themselves  
Finely in reverence, casting out what is out- 
side of law and honouring gods.                                           1010 
 
In Bacchae we witness the spectacle of “pursuits”, “hunting down” (diōkein, thēreueien), of 
that “light frenzy”, which is desire for the impossible set in contrast with the joyful 
expression of desire for the appropriately desirable. We hear report of the hunting down of 
immortals by mortals and of a mortal by an immortal – the spectre is consistently of 
contrasted qualities of wishing. The reflected upon, the planned and consummated is 
contrasted with the unreflected. Pure desires are contrasted with impure259. The desire of 
                                                        
259 θηρῶσιν τὸν ἄσεπτον· 890. 
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humans, when it is unhealthy, when it reflects on the accomplishment of its goals, but is 
unreflexive as to the meaning of those goals, is never finally consummated. The healthy 
desire for Dionysus, and of Dionysus, illuminates the dangerous and destructive character 
of human libidinal life, when that is either excessively spontaneous or too excessively 
calculating. The unlimitedness of human desires, the hybris of unchecked, unmodified or 
unarticulated and unevaluated wishing, always ends in calamity. 
 
It is impossible, or should be impossible, for Pentheus to observe the rites of the maenads 
and remain, one way or another, uninitiated. Dionysus warns him that it is “unlawful” for 
him to see or hear them: “It is not sanctioned for you to hear, although it is worth 
knowing”260. At that point, Pentheus thinks he is only being baited “to want” to see and hear 
all the more. He does not recognize limitation or impossibility, only temptation, a further 
incitement to desire: “You trick it out cleverly, so that I should wish to hear”261. Pentheus’ 
destiny will be to come to wish for what he ought never to have wished for, and to 
misapprize the object of his wishing. Dionysus brings about his plan by operating upon 
Pentheus’ faculties of desire. When he begins to bring Pentheus most evidently under his 
control, in order to accomplish his stated objective of revenge, it is to ignite this desire to see, 
that Dionysus again returns, 809-11: 
 
 
Pe. ἐκφέρετέ /οι δεῦρ' ὅFλα, σὺ δὲ Fαῦσαι λέγων. 
Di. ἆ· 
      βούληι σφ' ἐν ὄρεσι συγκαθη/ένας ἰδεῖν; 
 
Pe. Bring me my armour here, and you, stop talking. 
Di. Ah. 
      Do you wish to see them sitting together in the mountains? 
 
Dionysus will soon after explain quite explicitly what he will do to Pentheus. He has 
scrambled his volitional faculties, disjointed the structure of his will as later he will enable 
mother and aunts in the disjointing of the young king’s body262. At the conclusion of the long 
third episode, in its “Temptation Scene”, as Dodds designated it, Dionysus leaves us in no 
doubt that desire and consciousness, the union or schism between the recognized and 
unrecognized objectives, is of very great import here. The Stranger tells Dionysus, his own 
                                                        
260 οὐ θέµις ἀκοῦσαί σ', ἔστι δ' ἄξι' εἰδέναι. 474. 
261 εὖ τοῦτ' ἐκιβδήλευσας, ἵν' ἀκοῦσαι θέλω. 475. 
262 1125-8: λαβοῦσα δ' ὠλέναισ' ἀριστερὰν χέρα, / πλευροῖσιν ἀντιβᾶσα τοῦ δυσδαίµονος / ἀπεσπάραξεν ὦµον, οὐχ ὑπὸ σθένους / ἀλλ' ὁ 
θεὸς εὐµάρειαν ἐπεδίδου χεροῖν. 
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self, to infiltrate Pentheus cognitively, in order to make him wish for that which he would 
not otherwise, that which the god wishes him to desire, 850-3: 
 
                     Fρῶτα δ' ἔκστησον φρενῶν, 
 ἐνεὶς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν· ὡς φρονῶν /ὲν εὖ 
 οὐ /ὴ θελήσηι θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι στολήν, 
 ἔξω δ' ἐλαύνων τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐνδύσεται. 
 
                   Firstly, stand him out of his mind, 
Putting in him a light frenzy; since in his right mind 
He would not wish to put on a woman’s dress, 
But when you drive him out of his wits, he’ll put it on. 
 
And thus we see the Stranger, Dionysus, bringing to consummation his own will263, by the 
penetration of the casements of this king’s too willful mind. This is the activation of parts of 
Pentheus over which he has no control, because he has not first himself recognized, has not 
made himself an object of thought, to do which is the effect of the intending mind. The god’s 
own disguise has in no way been penetrated by the obdurately unfortunate (schetlios, 
dustuches, athlios, tlēmōn264) and unseeing king. This kin, a cousin of the god, who, like his 
aunts before, ought least of all to commit such an error265, disastrously traces no family 
resemblance to Zeus in his interlocutor. Dionysus – who discourses with himself, talks to 
himself as if to another, always recognizing at the same time that the audience of his 
thoughts and counsels is himself – is the foil to Pentheus, who does not recognize others and 
will not himself be recognized. He is a man who has not first recognized what and that he 
is266. 
 
When Pentheus exits at 846, despite the intermittent gasps of volitional resistance267 (which 
express how poorly he understands his situation, since they brilliantly capture the absence 
of reflexiveness in him), he has fallen into the hands of the living god. To control a mortal’s 
mind is to control the person entirely. Dionysus wants mortal bodies in certain states, in 
dynamic modes, in dancing postures, but that is not enough for him: the sufficient condition 
for him is to have also the minds of mortals in authentic desire, having the same desires as 
the god. Mortals must become commensurate with Dionysus’ wishes.  
                                                        
263 Dionysus’ plan: 47-54. 
264 Schetlios: 358; dustuches: 508; athlios: 1139, 1216; tlēmōn: 1058, 1102. 
265 26-7: ἐπεί µ' ἀδελφαὶ µητρός, ἃς ἥκιστ' ἐχρῆν, / Διόνυσον οὐκ ἔφασκον ἐκφῦναι Διός. 
266 506, on which see § 2.2.1.2 n. 122. 
267 828, 836. 
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The scene immediately preceding the final exit of Pentheus alive, 912-76, before the fourth 
stasimon and the subsequent fifth scene with the messenger’s narration of Pentheus’ 
sparagmos, is one in which for the first time we might begin to feel pity for Pentheus. He is in 
the grip of that condition so very humanly recognizable, child-like and calamitously 
suggestible, one from which few mortals are completelyinvulnerable. The cruelty of the god 
and his exploitation of higher powers to accomplish his ends and turn human desire upon 
itself, is becoming pitifully clear. It is a most ironic passage full of pathos. We see the 
degeneration of a person whom we know to have had the potential for a certain agency. This 
is a king reduced to the most thoroughgoing servitude268.  
 
One may wish for the impossible, according to Aristotle, but it were silly, ēlithios, to 
deliberate on unrealizable ends, ta adunata269. To deliberate upon the impossible belongs to 
the “fool or madman”, τις ἠλίθιος ἢ /αινό/ενος. The realistic object of consideration is 
alone a proper object of deliberation and choice, proairesis, (not immutable things, not the 
eternal, ta aidia; not the natural cosmos; not self-evident facts such as mathematical axioms). 
Deliberation belongs only to the man who is in possession of mind, nóos, ὁ νοῦν ἔχων 270. That 
is not what Pentheus is, by this stage. He weighs up impossible desires, as if they were 
realistic alternatives. His mind is dissipating and Dionysus approves, 943-8: 
 
Di. ἐν δεξιᾶι χρὴ χἄ/α δεξιῶι Fοδὶ 
      αἴρειν νιν· αἰνῶ δ' ὅτι /εθέστηκας φρενῶν. 
Pe. ἆρ' ἂν δυναί/ην τὰς Κιθαιρῶνος Fτυχὰς   945 
      αὐταῖσι βάκχαις τοῖς ἐ/οῖς ὤ/οις φέρειν; 
Di. δύναι' ἄν, εἰ βούλοιο· τὰς δὲ Fρὶν φρένας   947 
      οὐκ εἶχες ὑγιεῖς, νῦν δ' ἔχεις οἵας σε δεῖ. 
 
Di. You must hold it in your right hand and at the same time 
       hold up your right foot; I do praise you for changing your mind. 
Pe. Could I bear on my shoulders the clefts of Cithaeron 
      with the bacchants themselves? 
Di You could do it, if you wished; you had a mind before 
       that was not healthy, now you have the kind you ought to. 
                                                        
268 He failed to take the opportunity of a healthy service to the god’s will, such as he is enjoined to by Teiresias at, 366: τῶι Βακχίωι γὰρ τῶι 
Διὸς δουλευτέον. See also §3.3.3, § 3.3.5, § 4.3.8. 
269 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111b 23, 1112a 20. 
270 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1112a 18-21: Βουλεύονται δὲ πότερον περὶ πάντων, καὶ πᾶν βουλευτόν ἐστιν, ἢ περὶ ἐνίων οὐκ ἔστι βουλή; λεκτέον δ' 
ἴσως βουλευτὸν οὐχ ὑπὲρ οὗ βουλεύσαιτ' ἄν τις ἠλίθιος ἢ µαινόµενος, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ ὧν ὁ νοῦν ἔχων. περὶ δὴ τῶν ἀιδίων οὐδεὶς βουλεύεται, 
οἷον περὶ τοῦ κόσµου ἢ τῆς διαµέτρου καὶ τῆς πλευρᾶς, ὅτι ἀσύµµετροι. 
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The consequences of Pentheus’ volitional collapse are several. In every sense is he taken 
apart, driven out of himself, calamitously “externalized”. In the rending and evisceration of 
his body and the driving of his mind out of “itself” we may see the same phenomenon, 
expressed in two aspects: the concrete and the abstract. The fragmentation of the mind and 
the decomposition of the structure of the will, is given the most vivid and literal figuration 
in Pentheus’ fate at his mother’s hands. He will leave the lives of others different, 
reconstituted as to what is and is not permissible to desire. The House of Kadmos will learn 
what it is to truly desire Dionysus, the consequences of not wishing for him or 
inauthentically wishing for him – carrying the thyrsus, being a narthēkophoros, but not 
becoming a true bacchant271. Pentheus had held together the house and had held in check the 
hybristic desires of others in the polis, for whom he was an object of fear, tarbos. While alive 
they would not have insulted the old Kadmos, precisely because of that awe of authority 
and terror of deserved punishment, which it has been Dionysus’ desire to reclaim. Kadmos 
explains this in an apostrophe to the dead and broken king of very great pathos, 1308-12272: 
 
ὧι δῶ/' ἀνέβλεφ', ὃς συνεῖχες, ὦ τέκνον, 
τοὐ/ὸν /έλαθρον, Fαιδὸς ἐξ ἐ/ῆς γεγώς, 
Fόλει τε τάρβος ἦσθα· τὸν γέροντα δὲ 
οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζειν ἤθελ' εἰσορῶν τὸ σὸν 
κάρα· δίκην γὰρ ἀξίαν ἐλά/βανες. 
 
Through whom the house has seen again, my child, you who held together,  
My house, born of my own daughter, 
You were the terror of the city, no one would be ready  
To insult the old man seeing your head, because you would have exacted due 
punishment. 
 
Not wishing so to be, mortals become obstacles to the realization of divine desire, fighters 
against the gods. They have been, even if inadvertently, fighters against divinity, 
theomachontes273. In the court of the god’s arbitration, ignorance is no exculpation, since 
                                                        
271 So ran the proverbial wisdom cited by Plato in the Phaedo, those who have truly loved sophia are no different from those true initiates, 
Pl. Phd. 69c 8 – d 2 [ὥς] φασιν οἱ περὶ τὰς τελετάς, “ναρθηκοφόροι µὲν πολλοί, βάκχοι δέ τε παῦροι·” οὗτοι δ' εἰσὶν κατὰ τὴν ἐµὴν δόξαν 
οὐκ ἄλλοι ἢ οἱ πεφιλοσοφηκότες ὀρθῶς. 
272 On apostrophe in Bacchae see § 6.1.2. 
273 Τheomachein: from Dionysus’ point of view 45, Teiresias’ 325, the Stranger’s 635-6, Agauē 1255, against which is contrasted the good 
fortune of possessing Dionysus as ally, symmachos 1343, spoken by Dionysus as his final revealed self. See also Kamerbeek, 1948 “On the 
conception of theomachos and in relation with Greek Tragedy”. Note that the substantive theomachos is never used in Bacchae. While 
persons may commit acts of theomachein, it is not a simple matter of therefore being able to identify them as theomachos. Perhaps their acts 
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knowledge is just what he has offered. Ignorance is no mitigation. If they had desired 
otherwise, the opposite outcome would have prevailed; they would have a god for an ally, 
symmachos. In the end, as at the beginning, it has been a question of what and how figures 
desire. Knowing and wishing are terminally entangled with each another, 1340-1343274. 
 
Dionysus’ desire itself has the one-dimensionality, the unreflectedness, which it has been 
implied, is so perilous for humans. He has had, from the outset and long before the action of 
the play and its encounters, an objective, telos, one long ago assented to by Zeus, who like 
those Tyrrhenian pirates of Hymn. Hom. 7 had only to nod to be understood. Schemers, 
theirs is the mutuality of readily intelligible ends275. This is not a god or a religion of mercy. 
The god of Christianity, a brother and friend who brings his believers to their “father”, with 
whom the believer will over the course of history develop an individual relationship, will not 
arrive for another 400 years even if, in the thematization of personhood inherent in 
Dionysus as I argue, we may suppose that we discern a kind of typology276. It is never too late 
to implore mercy, to seek compassion, to want union or redemption from the Christian god 
and his gentle intermediating son. To truly want it is already the beginning of, and certainly 
the necessary condition for, absolution. Desire the right relation in authenticity and sincerity 
and one is thereby free. As St. Augustine famously put it Dilige et quod vis fac277, “Only love, 
then do whatsoever you want”. He could say as much because “love” like timē before it, 
means a right or desirable relation, the bearing to self and other of healthy willing. Deeply 
implicit in it is the recognition of value or what Christians will come to call truth. A crucial 
difference between Jesus of Nazareth and Dionysus of Thebes is that while Christ is the Son 
of God who promises redemption of what has already been lost, Greek Tragedy reveals the 
transformation of knowledge and desires as something that occurs too late. Christ suffers for 
human sinners, Dionysus refuses to suffer human folly. It is too late by the end, for Kadmos 
to ask Dionysus for mercy278. It is too late that Pentheus realizes how near he has been to 
falsehood and evil – κακοῦ γὰρ ἐγγὺς ὢν ἐ/άνθανεν, 1113 – and too late to make his 
enchanted mother recognize her own son – ὥς νιν γνωρίσασα /ὴ κτάνοι, 1116.  
                                                        
have been theomachontes but it is unclear if one can be designated unambiguously as such when everything has been so inadvertent. This 
problem of acts and their relation to ēthos is unresolved in Aristotle and will become increasingly important in our consideration of person 
and agency in Bacchae. 
274 See § 2.2.1.1 p. 57 for text and translation. 
275 πάλαι τάδε Ζεὺς οὑµὸς ἐπένευσεν πατήρ. 1349. 
276 There is a long history, of course, of such typology. We may see the Christus Patiens as a kind of Midrash on Dionysus/Christ. A scholar 
like Girard wanted to trace a scape-goat pattern by which godhood tself could be accounted for and which he applied to Dionysus. Henrichs’ 
essay is one of the best treatments on the modern reception, one that still bears many of the lineaments of Christian doctrine and emotion, 
Henrichs, 1984 “Loss of Self, Suffering, Violence: The Modern View of Dionysus from Nietzsche to Girard”, but see also his chapter in 
Masks: 13-43. 
277 August. In Evang. Iohann. VII, on 1 John IV. 4-12. 
278 1344-5, see p. 114 for translation. 
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As far as Dionysus is concerned the opportunity for the assessment of their predicament has 
passed. Mortals ought to have nurtured within themselves, in their minds, phrenes, the 
proper affect. Out of the healthy emotion would have issued, without any need for 
reflection, the due bearing or orientation. It is too late for Thebes. Kadmos understands now; 
he confesses that “we have done wrong”, ēdikēkamen, 1344. Yet he did not know; they “did 
not understand, when you ought to have known”. Even that fact – for this is a play not 
simply about knowledge but about the knowledge of knowledge, as it is not simply about 
choices but about the situation of choice – that they did not comprehend or recognize when 
they ought to have, they now understand, egnōkamen taut’, 1346. Yet excess now lies with the 
god’s reaction, 1344-8: 
 
Ka. ∆ιόνυσε, λισσό/εσθά σ', ἠδικήκα/εν. 
Di. ὄψ' ἐ/άθεθ' ἡ/ᾶς, ὅτε δ' ἐχρῆν οὐκ ἤιδετε. 
Ka. ἐγνώκα/εν ταῦτ'· ἀλλ' ἐFεξέρχηι λίαν. 
Di. καὶ γὰρ Fρὸς ὑ/ῶν θεὸς γεγὼς ὑβριζό/ην. 
Ka. ὀργὰς FρέFει θεοὺς οὐχ ὁ/οιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς. 
 
Ka. Dionysus, we beseech you, we have done wrong. 
Di. You have learnt us late, but when you ought you did not know. 
Ka. We have realized this, but you excessively prosecute us. 
Di. Yes, because I, a god, have been insulted by you. 
Ka. It is not suitable for gods to be like mortals in anger. 
 
This sensitivity to his identity and status is the idée fixe of Dionysus. He is autistically 
immoveable on this point279. As Pentheus before had found so unbearable the idea of his 
being insulted, violated as to his identity, so too has Dionysus, from beginning to end280. 
Dionysus “prosecutes” epexerchēi (“proceeds against”, “goes against”, “accomplishes his 
goal”) excessively, lian. He is not subject to that command to mortals of his half-brother, 
                                                        
279 On this technical sense in which I use autistic, see Tomasello, 1999: 76-7 and Baron-Cohen, 1997. The competent social actor reflexively 
apprehends social others as subjects like himself, having a like mind, outlook and intelligible responses to events and situations. 
280Hubrizein: Pentheus: 246-7: ταῦτ' οὐχὶ δεινὰ κἀγχόνης ἔστ' ἄξια, / ὕβρεις ὑβρίζειν, ὅστις ἔστιν ὁ ξένος; 778-9,  
Dionysus, has even come to Thebes first, of all Greek cities, because of an original hubris that precedes the beginning of Bacchae: 9: 
ἀθάνατον Ἥρας µητέρ' εἰς ἐµὴν ὕβριν. 516-18: ἀτάρ τοι τῶνδ' ἄποιν' ὑβρισµάτων/ µέτεισι Διόνυσός σ', ὃν οὐκ εἶναι λέγεις·/ ἡµᾶς γὰρ 
ἀδικῶν κεῖνον ἐς δεσµοὺς ἄγεις. And he in turn “grievously outrages” Pentheus 616: ταῦτα καὶ καθύβρισ' αὐτόν. Kadmos comes to 
understand the calamity through the frame of hybris: ὕβριν <γ'> ὑβρισθείς· θεὸν γὰρ οὐχ ἡγεῖσθέ νιν. 1297, and implies a certain fear of 
suffering it himself in future, with no male offspring to guard his honour, as we saw above 1308-12. Hybris is on the “mind” of the chorus 
too, who at 113 uses the term in a surprising way: ἀµφὶ δὲ νάρθηκας ὑβριστὰς, see also 375, 55. 
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Apollo, to do nothing in excess, ouden lian281. The gods have a very human anxiety concerning 
the hubris of mortals, but unlike humans they do not tend to feel the need to take the 
measure of things. They are not concerned with the import of situations other than from the 
perspective of the realization of their prior desires and objectives282.  
 
It belongs to gods to accomplish their objectives, to feel wrath and translate anger effectively 
into strategies for revenge. Strategizing is not equivalent to evaluative counsel-taking. The 
gods do not generally deliberate on the moral value or ethics of their decisions, but only, if 
at all, on their practical realization. It is for mortals to ponder over meaning and value, 
enthumeisthai and to deliberate, bouleuein, out of a sense of the import of their different 
choices. This is both a liability of humans, a feature of their existential situation – mortal, 
limited in their knowledge and access to a wider perspective, living on a plain amongst 
troublesome, vexingly attractive or repulsive fellows – and ultimately what distinguishes 
them positively with regard to the gods. Mortals have the invaluable potential to consider 
and change themselves ethically. They lay to heart, they reconsider, revise, look again at 
their situation and themselves. They can learn and change and come to a deeper kind of 
existence and a deeper sense of the depth and nature of the subjectivity of others. They can 
learn compassion, which Dionysus, in his moral shallowness, cannot, for all his other 
mysterious and attractive qualities.  
 
Mathos, “learning”, is something we are made to associate with mortals283. It is what they 
actively do with pathos, experience. It is a kind of agency of the mind and heart, by which 
they come to know or understand that this itself – judgement, comprehension, 
interpretation, evaluation – is their unique and complex “agentfulness”. When Kadmos 
                                                        
281 See also Kadmos’ remarks on the excessiveness of Dionysus’ punishment at 1248-50: οἴµοι κακῶν µὲν πρῶτα σῶν, ἔπειτ' ἐµῶν·/ ὡς ὁ 
θεὸς ἡµᾶς ἐνδίκως µὲν ἀλλ' ἄγαν/ Βρόµιος ἄναξ ἀπώλεσ' οἰκεῖος γεγώς. By the end, the bacchants feel Pentheus and Kadmos have got what 
they deserve, 1327-8: τὸ µὲν σὸν ἀλγῶ, Κάδµε· σὸς δ' ἔχει δίκην/ παῖς παιδὸς ἀξίαν µέν, ἀλγεινὴν δὲ σοί. Seaford sees Kadmos as an 
innocent bystander in these events, made to suffer for Pentheus’ error, Seaford on 1327-8: “Kadmos’ is a private grief. He is the innocent 
victim of contempt for the deity, like Phaidra in Hipp.”, as I am trying to show, it is ethically more complicated than that.  
282 Tellingly, the opposite of epexerchesthai, “prosecute a plan or action”, “punish”, “take revenge”, “attack”, “accomplish an aim” or most 
concretely “come upon”, (all of which Dionysus, der kommende Gott of Hölderlin and Otto, does in Bacchae) is considered at the end of the 
5th Century to be expressed by enthumeisthai, “to lay to heart”, “to ponder”, “to think deeply”, “to feel profound concern”. And this in 
Thucydides a writer himself much concerned with men as agents who wrong and feel wronged, who are motivated and seek to affect the 
motivations of others, who deliberate on their objectives and act on deliberation, who recognize danger and impute agency. On the laying of 
plans, the confidence in or excitement in their consideration, and the difference of “having in one’s heart” and “execution”, see for example 
Thuc. 1.20. 5.4-6: ἐνθυµεῖται γὰρ οὐδεὶς ὁµοῖα τῇ πίστει καὶ ἔργῳ ἐπεξέρχεται, ἀλλὰ µετ' ἀσφαλείας µὲν δοξάζοµεν, µετὰ δέους δὲ ἐν τῷ 
ἔργῳ ἐλλείποµεν. 
283 Mathos: δεῖ γὰρ πόλιν τήνδ' ἐκµαθεῖν, κεἰ µὴ θέλει 39, δόξει τις ἀµαθεῖ σοφὰ λέγων οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν.  480, σὲ δ' ἀµαθίας γε κἀσεβοῦντ' ἐς 
τὸν θεόν. 490. Figures are exhorted “learn!”, µάθε, by others, 657, 1281. When a subject is discussing its own lesson learnt, it is too late 
already: κακοῦ γὰρ ἐγγὺς ὢν ἐµάνθανεν. 1113, Διόνυσος ἡµᾶς ὤλεσ', ἄρτι µανθάνω. 1296. In Aeschylus first we find the opposition pathos-
mathos suggested, Aesch. Ag. 176-8: τὸν φρονεῖν βροτοὺς ὁδώ- /σαντα, τὸν <πάθει µάθος>/θέντα κυρίως ἔχειν. 
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admonishes Dionysus that it is unfitting for gods to resemble mortals in regard to their orgai, 
their thumoi, he is expressing this essential point. Dionysus, who has come resembling a 
mortal man so closely that he has taken on not only the outward form of a mortal human, 
but even “a man’s nature”284, does indeed “show” himself also inadvertently285 He shows us 
spectating mortals what the nature of gods is and what sufficient condition of humanity or 
personhood may be missing in gods when they come resembling humans too closely. By 
this dramatic articulation, in the spectre of the moral insufficiency of an allzumenschliche 
divine power and his thumos, in the orgē of the god who imports his orgia286, the audience will 
be induced to revise or deepen its understanding of what constitutes or could ideally 
constitute a human person287.  
 
[οἵαν οἵαν ὀργὰν]: “What seething, what fuming”, or “What rage, what rage”, as Dodds put 
it, sings the chorus of Pentheus288. Yet, “temper”, “mood”, “emotional constitution”, 
“propensity”, as well as more specifically “wrath”, could be said of what he “manifests”, 
anaphainei 538289. The god, born of Zeus the Sky-God’s lightning strike, reveals himself and 
his orgia, teaches what it means to be unprepared, ateleston, “uninitiated”, into his “bacchic 
acts”, baccheumata, 39. The “earth-born”, “inhuman”, “reptilian” Pentheus (χθόνιον 
                                                        
284 µορφὴν δ' ἀµείψας ἐκ θεοῦ βροτησίαν 4, ὧν οὕνεκ' εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω/µορφήν τ' ἐµὴν µετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν. 53-4. 
285 ἵν' εἴην ἐµφανὴς δαίµων βροτοῖς 22, φανέντα θνητοῖς 42, ἐνδείξοµαι 46, δεικνὺς ἐµαυτόν 50. Compare also the repeated and positive 
valorization of the visible, that which is manifest ta phanera: 992, 1006, 1011, 1199, which of course, as we have seen, Dionysus, who 
stands face-to-face with him, is not to Pentheus οὐ γὰρ φανερὸς ὄµµασίν γ' ἐµοῖς 501. 
286 And whose followers gambol and course through the meadows, orgadas (340, 455). Orgia: 34, 51, 79, 262, 416, 470, 471, 476, 482, 998, 
1080. The orgia are the “works” of Dionysus and his followers, amongst the ends, telē, of which are his teletai, “consummations”, the 
affective, psychological, spiritual or religious sublimated purposes. Orgia is a different mode of “accomplishment”, a kind of “work” set 
aside and sacred, outside of the banausic and banal economy of exchange and labour which is an insufficient, if necessary, organization of 
human social relations. The term orgia is itself a fusion, an example of the integration and transformative power and effect that belongs to 
Dionysus. On the, I certainly think, deliberate interplay of orgia and orgadas, see also Chantraine on ὄργια and Rijk. on ἐν ὀργάσιν 340, 
where we hear of that luckless Actaeon, cousin of Pentheus, the bad judge of his mortal situation, who had boasted that he was greater in the 
hunt than Artemis “in the meadows”: “Probably an ominous term, for it may be meant to evoke an association with ὄργια. Compare 
Chantraine s.v. ὄργια, fin.: ‘ . . . il faut indiquer que par étymologie populaire, lorsqu’il s’agissait notamment de Dionysos, ces mots (viz. 
ὄργια etc. – AR) ont pu être associé à οργή’. Ὀργή, in turn, is at the base of ὀργάς, ‘terre grasse, humide et fertile’. Just as Actaeon was 
punished for his misbehaviour ἐν ὀργάσιν, so Pentheus will be punished for his misbehaviour ἐν ὀργίοις.” 
Erg- (work, intentional and object-pursuing action) is contrasted with org- (natural or spontaneous actions that do not require and often 
hinder purpose) in this thematic interplay in the work of affect and effect. Erg-: σκοτίαισι κρυπτὸν εἱρκταῖς 549, σκοτεινὰς ὁρκανὰς 611, 
καὶ λογχοποιῶν ὄργανα κτᾶσθαι µάτην; 1208. Org- 537, 641, 647, 758, 997. 
287 Greek gods are not always and absolutely merciless. See, for example, the ‘pity and regret’ they feel seeing the corpse of Hector outraged 
by Achilles at Hom. Il.24.23-4. 
288537 [οἵαν οἵαν ὀργὰν]: deleted by Bothe and Hermann, citing a notation in L “perisson“ i.e., ‘superfluous’ , though as he also points out 
the verse “a nullo critico in suspicionem adductum”, Hermann ad loc. Almost all commentators do retain this line, [Diggle, Kopff, Grégoire 
& Meunier], Grégoire & Meunier note the lacuna in the manuscript in the corresponding position at the beginning of the preceding strophe, 
i.e. before 519: ante hunc u. lacunam susp. Canter. 
289 Anaphainei cf. ἀναφαίνω σε τόδ', ὦ Βάκ-/χιε, Θήβαις ὀνοµάζειν. 528-9, †ὦναξ Βρόµιε, θεὸς φαίνηι µέγας., 1031. Pentheus wonders, in a 
language that we must see as typically loaded, how Dionysus “appears in front my house, having got out” πῶς προνώπιος/ φαίνηι πρὸς 
οἴκοις τοῖς ἐµοῖς, ἔξω βεβώς; 645-6. 
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 γένος ἐκφύς γε δράκοντός . . . χθόνιος, / ἀγριωFὸν τέρας, οὐ φῶτα βρότειον, 538-42) 
reveals only his orgē, his natural impulse; and in so doing, like Dionysus, is also revealing 
what he is and what he is not, what he has to excess and in what he is deficient. A certain 
desirousness is in mortality. It is inside mortals and always coming out as breath itself. In 
detecting breath, anima, (since it is the necessary condition and therefore index of life) we 
say that beings are animate. Mortals are things that swell and dwindle, like plants. Their 
expansion and contraction, their budding and fading is out of their control, a process in 
which they are at best only participants. It is impossible to be always awake, always sober, 
(Socrates comes nearest that) or always aroused like the satyr, whose ithyphallia is the mark 
of an interminable tumescence of will and appetite denied to normal, time-bound mortals 
with their rhythmic bodily existences and cyclic fortunes.  
 
Mortal life is distinguished for its temporal character, its rhythmic shape290, its termination in 
unforeseeable and ineluctable death291 (its being insusceptible to becoming “bent” to human 
intentions, agnamptos292). Euripides turns the famous encounter between Dionysus and the 
resisting man into a remarkably rich and wide-ranging experiment in articulating the 
quality and import to human beings – these breathing, dying, thinking and unthinking, 
raging and sleeping, purposive and inadvertent beings – of their desires, choices and the 
ends of their lives. 
 
 
2.6 Judgement: sun mainomenai doxai293 
 
For reasons similar to those given for the non-identity of proairesis and boulēsis, choice cannot 
be said to be the same thing as opinion, doxa294. Doxa can be of anything at all, including the 
“eternal, the impossible, and things in our power”, Fερὶ τὰ ἀίδια καὶ τὰ ἀδύνατα ἢ τὰ ἐφ' 
ἡ/ῖν. The criteria by which we evaluate proairesis are ethical, good or bad, while we 
distinguish doxa as “true or false”295. The relationship of doxa to proairesis is complicated. 
Aristotle does not deal with the point with anything like the sophistication of the Tragic 
poets. In the interests of his analytical, classificatory objectives, Aristotle divides opinion 
                                                        
290 Hoios rusmos: Archilochus fr. 128. 6-7: ἀλλὰ χαρτοῖσίν τε χαῖρε καὶ κακοῖσιν ἀσχάλα/ µὴ λίην, γίνωσκε δ' οἷος ῥυσµὸς ἀνθρώπους ἔχει. 
“In your rejoicing let your joy, in hardship your despairs/ be tempered: understand the pattern [rusmos] shaping men’s affairs.”, [trans. 
West, 1993]. 
291 Ephemerality of life’s fortunes: Eur. Her. 866, Phoen. 558, Pind. Pyth. 8.95. Unforeseeable death: Aesch. PV 248-50. 
292 See Snell’s comments on Tragic ‘flexibility’ and inflexibility, epignamptein, Snell, 1928: 20-1, in his influential discussion of agency in 
Aeschylus, also § 3.2.2 p. 106 n. 68. 
293 887. 
294 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111 b 31 – 1112 a 13. 
295 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111 b 33-5. 
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neatly from choice. It is not his mandate to establish whether “opinion precedes or 
accompanies choice”. They are, critically for him, simply “not identical”296. To the reader of 
Tragedy, however, the recursive or dialectical relationship between what one thinks is the 
case on the one hand, and how and what one chooses on the other, must be manifest. In the 
abstract, knowledge is separable from values, perhaps, but in the particular cases which 
Tragedy dramatizes, it is not so. Certainly in Bacchae, there is an entanglement of the 
epistemic and the ethical, of knowledge and values, which illuminate, or adumbrate each 
other, in a very complex manner. 
 
Doxa, “judgement” or “opinion” is infected from the beginning in Bacchae or so at least the 
expert on the gods and on signs, Teiresias alleges297. Discerning reality and evaluating 
circumstances is the central problem here. The tragic consequences of the situation will issue 
from the faculties of mortals, impaired to perceive and therefore also to judge, 309-13:  
 
                                     ἀλλ' ἐ/οί, Πενθεῦ, Fιθοῦ· 
 /ὴ τὸ κράτος αὔχει δύνα/ιν ἀνθρώFοις ἔχειν, 
 /ηδ', ἢν δοκῆις /έν, ἡ δὲ δόξα σου νοσῆι, 
 φρονεῖν δόκει τι· τὸν θεὸν δ' ἐς γῆν δέχου 
 καὶ σFένδε καὶ βάκχευε καὶ στέφου κάρα.298 
 
                                                       But believe me, Pentheus, 
Do not boast that it is their agency which has the power amongst humans, 
Nor, even if you deem so, for your deeming is ill, 
Deem that you are actually thinking anything. Receive the god into the country 
And pour offering and become a bacchant and dress your head. 
 
This same idea is picked up again in near identical words by Dionysus: persons fail to judge 
their own impairments, when that impairment is precisely the all-important capacity for 
judgement itself: “To an ignorant man, one will seem to speak no good sense when speaking 
wisely” 480299. Pentheus is a man who cannot discern appearance and reality300; he is as 
Teiresias has diagnosed him, diseased in his judgements, thinking that he thinks when he 
                                                        
296 Arist. Eth. Nich.  1112a 11-13: εἰ δὲ προγίνεται δόξα τῆς προαιρέσεως ἢ παρακολουθεῖ, οὐδὲν διαφέρει· οὐ τοῦτο γὰρ σκοποῦµεν, ἀλλ' εἰ 
ταὐτόνἐστι δόξῃ τινί.  
297 326-7, see also § 3.3.6 p. 188. 
298 Pentheus has his chance to be “cured”, not having taken it will have been his culpability, cf. Arist. Eth. Nich.  1114a.14-19: οὐδὲ γὰρ ὁ 
νοσῶν ὑγιής. καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἔτυχεν, ἑκὼν νοσεῖ, ἀκρατῶς βιοτεύων καὶ ἀπειθῶν τοῖς ἰατροῖς. τότε µὲν οὖν ἐξῆν αὐτῷ µὴ νοσεῖν, προεµένῳ δ' 
οὐκέτι, ὥσπερ οὐδ' ἀφέντι λίθον ἔτ' αὐτὸν δυνατὸν ἀναλαβεῖν· ἀλλ' ὅµως ἐπ' αὐτῷ τὸ βαλεῖν [καὶ ῥῖψαι]· ἡ γὰρ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ. 
299See 24 above. 
300 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1114 a 31- b 15. 
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does not. Thus in that palace scene recounted by the Stranger, Pentheus seems to himself, 
judges himself, to be doing things he is not; he grasps at the immaterial, he is fed on 
imagined things, “hopes”, “expectations”, elpides 616-7. 
 
The flame on Semelē’s tomb flares up301. Pentheus has been a man of prejudices302, now 
whatever judgement he was capable of, at least momentarily he has lost. He thinks the 
surely divine, certainly prodigious sign a practical problem that must be solved, ὁ δ' ὡς 
ἐσεῖδε, δώ/ατ' αἴθεσθαι δοκῶν, 624. The inefficacy of Pentheus is explained by the 
brokenness of his faculty of adjudication, doxa. In a small detail, we feel a masterful 
emphasis through irony, on the thematic priority of judgement and seeming: Pentheus has 
failed to see the personhood inside of persons, and failed to see Dionysus, but he sees 
phasmata, shining hallucinations, which he takes for a person, mistaking it for Stranger303. The 
illusion was Dionysus, says the Stranger, “or so it seems to me, I say my opinion, doxa”, 628-
9304. 
 
Dokein is a common verb in Greek; it means, “suppose”, “think”, “expect”, “imagine”, “be of 
an opinion”, “to think right, to think a good idea”. It is the verbal form then, of the 
substantive doxa “opinion”, “judgement”. It is derived from the verb dechesthai “receive”, 
“take” – apprehension precedes comprehension. It takes the form also of dokeuein “observe”, 
“watch”, “regard closely”, one of the many threads in a complex and persistent connection 
in Greek of sight and perception with the internal “digestion” or processing of objects of 
perception and sight, that is cognition, comprehension and judgement305. The doctrines that 
mortals have and hold, that they have received from their parents and ancestors, these are 
the patrioi paradochai, which Pentheus is vainly adjured to receive by the seer306. Pentheus 
                                                        
301 The tomb is memorial trace, mnēma, an index of presence, of past and present agency. Index: on the interpretation of this “still living 
flame” 8, token of “undying hybris”9, see § 5.3.3. On rememberance and forgetting in Bacchae, see Mazzaro, 1993. 
302 He “interprets”, judges or sees Dionysus when he first meets him, exactly as he had before he had ever set eyes on him, cf. 233-8 and 
453-9. 
303 624-30. 
304 629-30: κἆιθ' ὁ Βρόµιος, ὡς ἔµοιγε φαίνεται, δόξαν λέγω,/ φάσµ' ἐποίησεν κατ' αὐλήν· 
305 At 977-91 the bacchant chorus anticipate the events of Pentheus’ detection and destruction. The raving maenads are not humans but 
“rushing dogs of Lyssa [fury]”, they are beings of pure impulse and instigation, the very picture of the falling away of the capacity for 
judgement. They detect the spy kataskopon, who himself is really “mad”, lussōdē. The matēr, mother 982, “will see”, 983, the mastēr, 
seeker or searcher, 985. He is looking upon the maenads, dokeuonta 984. The peeping, injudicious son of an injudicious, to prejudicious 
son, will be judged not a human person; the mother will ask who bore it, this creature not of human blood. Like Semelē who was adjudged 
to have slept with “some man” or the foreign god “some Zeus who gives birth to new gods” or Dionysus, taken simply for “some foreigner”, 
Pentheus is thing “born of some lion or Libyan Gorgons” 987-991: τίς ἄρα νιν ἔτεκεν;/ οὐ γὰρ ἐξ αἵµατος/ γυναικῶν ἔφυ, λεαίνας δέ τινος/ 
ὅδ' ἢ Γοργόνων Λιβυσσᾶν γένος. 
306 πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ' ὁµήλικας χρόνωι/κεκτήµεθ', 201-2. Apprehend, receive: τὸν θεὸν δ' ἐς γῆν δέχου 312, τὸν δαίµον' οὖν τόνδ', 
ὅστις ἔστ', ὦ δέσποτα, δέχου πόλει τῆιδ' 770-1. The chorus are those who take in and affirm their receptiveness: τὸ πλῆθος ὅτι τὸ 
φαυλότερον ἐνόµισε χρῆ-/ταί τε, τόδ' ἂν δεχοίµαν. 430-1, Πενθέως Ἀγαυὴν µητέρ'… δέχεσθ' ἐς κῶµον εὐίου θεοῦ. 1166-7. 
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wants to apprehend the bacchants and he wants to see things for himself, to not have them 
passed on by messengers, priests, tradition or the wisdom of the “common folk”, 430-1.  
 
Doxa is in a sense that which one chooses, for it is that which one has judged right to accept 
as corresponding to reality. What is ajudged sound by the various figures in Bacchae is at 
odds, and often when the idea of dokein surfaces, it is a signal of the unsoundness of human 
judgement. Thus at 311-2, the point is made with a triple repetition of the root, that Pentheus 
is not capable of judgement. That “citified, glib talker”307, who convinces the shepherds to try 
to catch Agauē and collect a reward from the king308, misidentifies the nature of what he spies 
and his avarice nearly gets them savagely killed309. He is a character on the model of the 
Etruscan pirates and all those who take too utilitarian a reading of things in Dionysus’ 
proximity. His uncomprehending reading of the situation is a misjudgement, which is 
accepted by his fellows310, with nearly calamitous consequences311. The logic of the opportunist 
and the determining character of judgements, taken and received, play out here in the 
second episode in a kind of rehearsal of the play’s climax. Motivation, inference and the 
nature and quality of judgements are given the fundamental and determining place they 
indeed have in the existence of persons. 
 
In a famous and much discussed passage of the fourth episode, Pentheus is seen vanquished 
in his capacity to control his desire, to apprehend reality and therefore to judge what he 
apprehends. This is a wavering consciousness, seeing aspects of reality but incapable of 
discrimination, hitting on the truth of appearances only involuntarily, 918-22312: 
 
 
καὶ /ὴν ὁρᾶν /οι δύο /ὲν ἡλίους δοκῶ, 
δισσὰς δὲ Θήβας καὶ Fόλισ/' ἑFτάστο/ον· 
καὶ ταῦρος ἡ/ῖν Fρόσθεν ἡγεῖσθαι δοκεῖς 
καὶ σῶι κέρατα κρατὶ FροσFεφυκέναι. 
                                                        
307 καί τις πλάνης κατ' ἄστυ καὶ τρίβων λόγων 717. 
308 718-21. 
309 ἡµεῖς µὲν οὖν φεύγοντες ἐξηλύξαµεν/ βακχῶν σπαραγµόν 734-5. 
310 εὖ δ' ἡµῖν λέγειν/ ἔδοξε, θάµνων δ' ἐλλοχίζοµεν φόβαις/ κρύψαντες αὑτούς. 721-3. 
311 The rending, sparagmos, which instead of the shepherds the cattle suffer, serves to prepare for the calamitous fate of Pentheus, 731-47. 
312 Seaford’s comments on these lines are extensive, see also Seaford, 1987. His conjecture that a mirror, implement of initatory rites, 
although not mentioned in the text was plausibly being used on stage in this scene is intriguing. Dionysus’ invisible mirrors is another study 
to itself. Thumiger, 2007: 114 n. 53 “Di Benedetto (2004) 138 notes how in the short passage at 918-58 Pentheus uses the verb δοκέω with 
reference to himself with striking frequency [5 times]: this does not underline self-reflexivity, but a naïve predisposition to accept any new 
perception without scrutiny. See also δοκεύω (‘to look at closely’, therefore ‘to spy’) applied by the chorus to Pentheus at 984.” Thumiger is 
quite right about the lack of scrutiny here which is the dissipation of judgement, but that weakness of judgement is the consequence of his 
fatal lack of self-reflexivity. 
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ἀλλ' ἦ Fοτ' ἦσθα θήρ; τεταύρωσαι γὰρ οὖν. 
 
And yet, it seems to me I see two suns, 
Two Thebes, two seven-gated towns; 
And you seem to us a bull leading me forward 
And to have sprouted horns on your head. 
But were you perhaps a wild beast all along? For you are become bull. 
 
Mortals seem to see what they are disposed to see. They see what they wish to. Now 
Pentheus has lost power over his own desires, he is registering things differently, entirely in 
line with the desires of the god. 
 
In Bacchae we witness the extinction and deceiving of perception and conception and the 
invalidation of judgement. In a remarkable scene in the final episode, we also are shown the 
recovery of judgement. This will entail a recovery of sight, of self-awareness and 
simultaneously therefore of the capacity for inter-subjective awareness. Dismal Agauē and 
her fellow maenads have not known what kind of things they have done, hoi’ edrasate, 1259. 
The plural may also helpfully hint at the schismatic being that stands before Kadmos: it is 
both Agauē, his daughter, and in some essential way, not her. She is still in the maenadic 
trance, unreflexive and ecstatic. If she stayed in this condition “to the end”, dia telous, in 
which she is now “fixed”, “established”, she would judge herself neither lucky nor unlucky, 
οὐκ εὐτυχοῦσαι δόξετ' οὐχὶ δυστυχεῖν 1262. Maenadic self-ignorance is an extreme version 
of the universal human failure of self-understanding. Pentheus had earlier been told by 
Dionysus that his very name was the sign of his fate, but it is a sign and a hint that Pentheus 
does not know to interpret313. The maenadic state is a state of indiscrimination. Agauē cannot 
see for herself what is “not good” or “grievous”314. That she even asks the question is the sign 
of the onset of her gradual return to self, 1259-62: 
 
Ka. φεῦ φεῦ· φρονήσασαι /ὲν οἷ' ἐδράσατε 
       ἀλγήσετ' ἄλγος δεινόν· εἰ δὲ διὰ τέλους             
       ἐν τῶιδ' ἀεὶ /ενεῖτ' ἐν ὧι καθέστατε, 
       οὐκ εὐτυχοῦσαι δόξετ' οὐχὶ δυστυχεῖν315. 
                                                        
313 ἐνδυστυχῆσαι τοὔνοµ' ἐπιτήδειος εἶ. 508, see p. 13.  
314 τί δ' οὐ καλῶς τῶνδ' ἢ τί λυπηρῶς ἔχει; 1263. 
315 1262: Dodds: “‘Fortunate’ I will not call you; but in your dream you will escape misfortune.’ δόξετ', because eutuchia is an objective 
condition (‘good fortune’), not a state of mind (‘happiness’). For the thought cf. fr. 205, and Soph. Aj. 552 ff.”. Dodds too easily glances 
over the complex relationship between ‘objective condition’ and ‘state of mind’, which is the flowing, dialectical charge, with which the 
play crackles. Di Benedetto on 1259-62: “Cadmo non si riferisce alla conoscenza in quanto percezione e organizzazione di dati; si tratta 
invece della consapevolezza della propria situatzione.” Yet in Bacchae there is a continuous alignment of or demonstration of the 
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Ka. Ach, ach! When you know what you have done 
       A terrible pain will pain you, but if to the end 
       You remain forever in this condition in which you stand, 
       You will judge yourself neither lucky nor unlucky. 
        
Dionysus, as ever, provides a heightening contrast with mortals. His clarity, inferences and 
judgements of situations and of signs, his gnosis and diagnosis, are privileged and 
validated. His focalizations have not the unreliability of human others’316. This is a necessary 
characteristic in a superhuman person whose mission has been to come in order that the 
human adversary, voluntarily or not, “will know” him: γνώσεται δὲ τὸν ∆ιὸς/∆ιόνυσον, 
859-60. Thus, we accept – judge his judgement – as true when he says, for example, that 
Pentheus stabbed at an apparition, phasma, 630, thinking it to be “me”, δόξαν λέγω, “as I 
judge it” (i.e. to be what Pentheus was thinking or judging to be the case), 629317. And when 
he “thinks” that he hears the scrape of Pentheus’ shoe approaching from inside, his 
expectation is verified when Pentheus in fact emerges, 638-9. His doxa, his inference, finds its 
verification in events. 
 
Aristotle pursues the problem of the nature of proairesis, which is such a fundamental 
condition for the attribution of fullest personhood, as we shall argue in the following 
chapter. ‘Is not proairesis deliberation, bouleusis?’, he asks318: 
 
                                                        
indissociability of perception with consciousness, the data of a situation necessary for a judicious assessment of self and others; hence 
regaining consciousness of her situation necessarily entails, as a primary condition, regaining perceptual and organizational faculties; up to 
now she has been a figure of rolling and even spinning eyes [διαστρόφους/κόρας ἑλίσσουσ' 1122-3, ἐν διαστρόφοις/ ὄσσοις 1166-7].  
Kadmos must reset her focus on external objects in order for her to come into clear focus as a subject to herself (λαµπρότερος ἢ πρὶν καὶ 
διειπετέστερος 1267); she has been, like her offspring, a fluttering, purposeless, randomly moving mind, (τὸ δὲ πτοηθὲν τόδ' ἔτι σῆι ψυχῆι, 
1268, cf. on eptoēsis above § 2.2.4 n. 132), 1264-70. Benedetto continues, pointing out an analogous passage at E. Or. 396-8, but there is a 
more direct connection for him with Soph. Ai. 257-9 and 272: “Ma il dato pìu specifico dell’enunciazione di Cadmo è la distinzione 
(contrappositiva) tra consapevolezza in quanto promotrice di sofferenza e inconsapevolezza in quanto illusoria sensazione di assenza di 
infelicità.”. I take the important point to be not so much the contradistinction of consciousness and unconsciousness, the states they promote. 
What is being expressed is the impossibilty of any kind of evaluation of situations, when one is in the depersonalized, automatic state in 
which Agauē is. She does not know herself at all. Seaford points to Oedipus before his self-discovery and Ar. Ran. 1182-6. 
316 Yet not everything he threatens comes to pass, exactly as Dionysus predicts in the prologue, see Thumiger, 2007: 182-3 fft. 76 & 77. 
317 Doxa: “judgement” or “opinion”, contrasted with epistēmē, see Dodds on 629; cf. Eur IT 1164; and see on epistēmē Snell, 1928: 2 ff. and 
Snell, 1922. 
318 Thought is intentional, by its very nature as an operation of the discernment or construal of things, which are not identical with itself. The 
objects of desire and of forethought are necessarily ahead of the subject or in the subject’s future.  
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ἑκούσιον /ὲν δὴ φαίνεται, τὸ δ' ἑκούσιον οὐ Fᾶν Fροαιρετόν. ἀλλ' ἆρά γε τὸ 
Fροβεβουλευ/ένον; ἡ γὰρ Fροαίρεσις /ετὰ λόγου καὶ διανοίας. ὑFοση/αίνειν δ' 
ἔοικε καὶ τοὔνο/α ὡς ὂν Fρὸ ἑτέρων αἱρετόν.319 
 
It seems to be voluntary, but not all that is voluntary to be an object of choice. Is it, 
then, what has been decided by earlier deliberation? At any rate choice involves 
reason and thought. Even the name seems to suggest that it is what is chosen before 
other things. 
 
Divine power does not rush into things, 882-4. We may suppose, as regular theatre-goers, 
and we find confirmed in Bacchae, that humans in their weakness are precipitate beings. It is 
hard for them to know what they should know and how to learn it. Divine strength, like 
divine perspective, is reliable, piston 883. Mortals, by their actions, effectively “honour 
ignorance” and accumulate the wrong kinds of gifts, instead of “increasing that which 
comes from the gods”. Such mortals cannot judge aright; they are “raving in their 
judgement”, mainomenai doxai. It is the strength of the gods, their force not their persuasion 
or teaching, that “sets aright mortals”, apeuthunei, 882-7.   
 
The god whose followers are “maenads”, is the god who brings mania, this god of 
ambiguous bestowals, both so terrible and so gentle, 861. In his vicinity we learn about the 
different kinds of mania that Plato would famously differentiate as the unhealthy and that 
empowering kind, which brings a “power”, “might”, menos, issuing from the gods320. This is 
also the god who punishes mortals, precisely for their sickened minds, their broken 
judgements. Mortals are twice culpable with Dionysus: both for their acts and for the 
drunkenness, sickness or raving of their minds, which have been the cause or insufficient 
inhibitor of those acts. 
 
 
  
                                                        
319 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1112a 14-7. 
320 Pl. Phdr. 265.a.5-b.5. Μανίας δέ γε εἴδη δύο, τὴν µὲν ὑπὸ νοσηµάτων ἀνθρωπίνων, τὴν δὲ ὑπὸ θείας ἐξαλλαγῆς τῶν εἰωθότων νοµίµων 
γιγνοµένην . . . Τῆς δὲ θείας τεττάρων θεῶν τέτταρα µέρη διελόµενοι, µαντικὴν µὲν ἐπίπνοιαν Ἀπόλλωνος θέντες, Διονύσου δὲ τελεστικήν, 
Μουσῶν δ' αὖ ποιητικήν, τετάρτην δὲ Ἀφροδίτης καὶ Ἔρωτος, ἐρωτικὴν µανίαν ἐφήσαµέν τε ἀρίστην εἶναι. See also Casadesús Bordoy, 
2013 on “Dionysian Enthusiasm in Plato”. See also § 4.2.3 p. 230 n. 49. 
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2.7 Bouleusis: Deliberation 
 
 
τί βούλο/αι γάρ;321 
  
 
Fάντας δ' ἐFαίνη/ι καὶ φιλέω, 
ἑκὼν ὅστις ἔρδηι 
/ηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκαι 
δ' οὐδὲ θεοὶ /άχονται. 
 
So long as he does nothing shameful willingly, hekōn, 
I give my praise and love to any man. 
Not even the gods can fight necessity.322 
 
 
ζητῶν Fῶς Fράξει, “inquiring how he is to act”323, Bruno Snell’s ‘Ti drasō’324, is the stuff of 
dramatic situations. That is one way of framing the more profound inquiry ‘what do I 
wish?’. Since desire is primary, since desire is ambiguous and only partially manifest in acts, 
‘what do I wish?’ is the stronger line of questioning, if a subject is concerned not only with 
realizing goals but with the quality and import of different goals. It is the mark of humane 
reflexivity, a question the gods do not ever pose themselves. In the Dionysiac scenario, 
where figures do not ask themselves that question well enough, the question is rather, 
“Where shall I go, how shall I dance?” and “how shall I dissemble myself?”325 In Bacchae the 
searching out how to act, the dislocation and unlocatedness of the archē, the primary 
motivation, is expressed powerfully through the character and deeds of Pentheus. It leads to 
the literal searching for the fragmented self which is no full person but shattered into a 
thousand scraps, muriois zētēmasin, 1218, “a thing not easy to locate”, οὐ ῥάιδιον ζήτη/α, 
                                                        
321 “What do I wish?”, Eur. IA 485. 
322 Simonides 542. [=37.1.27-30 in Poetae Melici Graeci, Page {ed.}, 1962], for translation and discussion of this pertinent and variously 
interpreted poem see Beresford, 2008 (whose translation I borrow). 
323 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1113 a. 
324 See Snell, 1928 and Rivier, 1968 on the divergently interpreted significance of the question posed by the tragic protagonist, “What shall I 
do?” Ti drasō?. For the present author, Menelaus’ τί βούλοµαι γάρ; “What do I want?”, is the more poignantly tragic question. “What shall I 
do?” is often the recognition that there is not much to be done. “What do I want”, is an agent’s question, the voice of a person surveying 
itself and not just circumstances that have fallen together, see also below § 3.3.8 n. 252. 
325 So Kadmos asks Teiresias the expert (sophos) in the first episode, after the high religious emotion of the bacchant dancers’ parodos 
(where the only question was “who is there?” 69-70), 184-6: ποῖ δεῖ χορεύειν, ποῖ καθιστάναι πόδα/ καὶ κρᾶτα σεῖσαι πολιόν; ἐξηγοῦ σύ 
µοι/ γέρων γέροντι, Τειρεσία· σὺ γὰρ σοφός. Pentheus, when once he has lost the capacity he failed to use to ask himself deeper questions, 
what he should do, also asks only how he should dance, 941-2: πότερα δὲ θύρσον δεξιᾶι λαβὼν χερὶ/ ἢ τῆιδε βάκχηι µᾶλλον εἰκασθήσοµαι; 
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1139326. Pentheus is given many opportunities to revise himself, to look again at his situation, 
which would be to re-envisage his life and identity and that of the god. Before the laying on 
him of the light madness, 810-46, there is a final offer. Dionysus says that it is not too late to 
set things right. But Pentheus cannot learn, he cannot know in a manner different to the way 
he already knows and only assumes machination, a trick being devised against him, 800-5: 
 
Pe. ἀFόρωι γε τῶιδε συ/FεFλέγ/εθα ξένωι, 
 ὃς οὔτε Fάσχων οὔτε δρῶν σιγήσεται. 
Di. ὦ τᾶν, ἔτ' ἔστιν εὖ καταστῆσαι τάδε. 
Pe. τί δρῶντα; δουλεύοντα δουλείαις ἐ/αῖς; 
Di. ἐγὼ γυναῖκας δεῦρ' ὅFλων ἄξω δίχα. 
Pe. οἴ/οι· τόδ' ἤδη δόλιον ἐς ἐ/ὲ /ηχανᾶι. 
 
Pe. We are entangled with this impossible stranger, 
Who will not be still, neither acted upon nor acting. 
Di. Good man, it is still well possible to arrange things. 
Pe. Doing what? Becoming a slave to my own slaves? 
Di. I shall bring the women here with no weapons. 
Pe. Oho, now this is a trick you are devising against me. 
 
How a man is to act, “this is what is chosen”, τοῦτο γὰρ τὸ Fροαιρού/ενον, says Aristotle, 
and choice is defined through deliberation, bouleusis. 
 
                                                        
326 See § 5.1 and cf. Goldhill, 1986: 285-6 “For as Pentheus’ body, dismembered by the Dionysiac chorus, [Goldhill means the thiasos of 
‘maenadized’ Theban women of all ages, not the chorus of foreign women who have accompanied the Stranger, which is distinct and thus 
must be told the news of the sparagmos, see 1029-35], which can only be collected in fragments, but never reconstituted to wholeness, so 
each person’s attempts to comprehend the corpus of tragic texts – through the violence of reading, the selectvity of analysis – can never 
hope to attain the synthesis which can totally efface the signs of sparagmos, the sparagmos of signs.”. This reads very much as belonging to 
the particular intellectual concerns of that time, perhaps not all would still accede to the notion of reading as ‘violence’. Goldhill was more 
inclined to accent the ‘play-within-a play’ dimension of Bacchae than I, (see also Segal, 1997 [1982], Bierl, 1991). His chapter “Genre and 
Transgression”, 244-64, is especially rich, see e.g. the remarks on Bacchae at Goldhill, 1986: 264, which anticipate many of my themes, 
“The interest in the relations between inward and outward signs and attitudes of behaviour, and how to read those signs; the awareness and 
questioning of the place of paradigms in behaviour and moral choice; the role of the past in the determination of the present; the role of 
representation and of self-image in culture; are all implicated in Euripides’ self-reflexive drama.” What is the meaning of the text in Goldhill 
is the mind, intentionality and agency of persons for me. Texts, in any case are interacted with like persons, meaning things, having depths 
and even an unconscious. The semiotic inclination of the time, by which Drama avails itself as a system of signs, something we ‘read’ 
(Reading Greek Tragedy), lays insufficient weight on the moral content of the work, cf. also Wiles, 1987 “Reading Greek Performance”, in 
response to Goldhill’s work. We should engage with a drama like Bacchae as we do with persons, whom we not only read, but whom we 
monitor constantly, expecting complex motivations within them that can even elude themselves. We have such organic, time-shaped 
relationships with works as we do with persons, who are not shaped by the binary relations of a semiotic grammar, but constituted through 
the recursive relationships they have with themselves and with us. So complete is our entanglement with person-like things and those object-
like others we think of automatically as persons. See on non-semiotic strategies of interpretation, § 5.2 below. 
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βουλευτὸν δὲ καὶ Fροαιρετὸν τὸ αὐτό, Fλὴν ἀφωρισ/ένον ἤδη τὸ Fροαιρετόν· τὸ 
γὰρ ἐκ τῆς βουλῆς κριθὲν Fροαιρετόν ἐστιν. Fαύεται γὰρ ἕκαστος ζητῶν Fῶς 
Fράξει, ὅταν εἰς αὑτὸν ἀναγάγῃ τὴν ἀρχήν, καὶ αὑτοῦ εἰς τὸ ἡγού/ενον· τοῦτο 
γὰρ τὸ Fροαιρού/ενον. δῆλον δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἐκ τῶν ἀρχαίων Fολιτειῶν, ἃς 
Ὅ/ηρος ἐ/ι/εῖτο· οἱ γὰρ βασιλεῖς ἃ Fροείλοντο ἀνήγγελλον τῷ δή/ῳ. ὄντος δὲ 
τοῦ Fροαιρετοῦ βουλευτοῦ ὀρεκτοῦ τῶν ἐφ' ἡ/ῖν, καὶ ἡ Fροαίρεσις ἂν εἴη 
βουλευτικὴ ὄρεξις τῶν ἐφ' ἡ/ῖν· ἐκ τοῦ βουλεύσασθαι γὰρ κρίναντες ὀρεγό/εθα 
κατὰ τὴν βούλευσιν.327 
 
The same thing is deliberated upon and chosen, except that the object of choice is 
already determinate, since it is that which has been decided upon as a result of 
deliberation that is the object of choice. For everyone ceases to inquire how he is to 
act when he has brought the moving principle back to himself and to the ruling part 
of himself; for this is what he chooses. This is plain from the ancient constitutions, 
which Homer represented, for the kings announced their choices to the people. The 
object of choice being one of the things in our own power, which is desired after 
deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things within our own power; for when we 
have reached a judgement as a result of deliberation, we desire in accordance with our 
deliberation.  
 
The effacement of choice in Bacchae, though not of responsibility (aitia and timē have been 
only the more potently asserted and reaffirmed in their reality by the closing lines of the 
drama), will have been necessarily also the extinction of the power of deliberation. The 
maenadic Theban women, Pentheus’ transformation: these present, a contrario, in extreme 
forms, what agency is. One of those necessary things is the asking of questions and the 
asking of the right questions. Elenchus entails a kind of forward motion, but mania in its 
negative instances as well as in the positive form of “inspiration”, entails a cognitive 
breakdown. A more or less “light madness”, it produces a whirling motion, a turning of the 
self without a pre-established (proaireton) telos towards which to move. Deliberating, 
bouleusis, is asking oneself about one’s wishes, boulēseis. It is not simply perceiving or 
registering what one “is” and desires, but entails judgement, an active and agentful 
determination of what one is through the determination of what one has evaluated shall be 
one’s moving principle, archē. Thebes has been wanton in its acceptance (Kadmos’ strategic 
welcoming of the god) as in its rejection (Semelē’s sisters and Pentheus’ shallow and 
thoughtless refusal to accept, receive or believe)328. Too unreflectively and passively voluntary, 
Thebes has failed to wish for Dionysus or has done so with insufficient authenticity.  
                                                        
327 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1113 a 2-12. 
328 On the “wanton” see § 3.2.2.  
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The presence and quality of desire for the god and the relations he brings have been the 
central problem. The Thebans have determined wrongly or failed to determine; they have 
failed to choose and failed every opportunity to deliberate rightly. Their punishment has 
been the loss of deliberative power and loss of choice. They have learnt too late what choice 
is, how healthy it is to suspend deliberation in order to learn what deliberation and choice 
would have been and how thereby they might have “brought back to themselves” the ruling 
part. That is to say that they have not learnt how to become the self-constituted agents of 
their own desires and choice. 
 
The surrender of Pentheus’ will to that of the foreign Stranger, (Dionysus’ undetectedness 
illuminates, ‘shows forth’, anaphainei, the lack of discernment of human subjects), is 
somehow both uncanny and psychologically realistic. It is a process of only gradually 
subdued resistances to the suggestion and influence of another, superbly realized by the 
poet. It begins, one may argue, even before the attractive Stranger has ever said a word, “as 
a mortal”329. Even just before entering his palace to be transformed, Pentheus is on the 
threshold between the ‘indoors’ of his own will and the ‘outdoors’ of the Stranger’s330.  Strong 
emotion is like a possession. Baccheuein is regularly used to designate a being lost to those 
intense passions that undo a subject’s ties to itself, to others – and to time, as a feeling of 
forward motion towards an open-ended future that can be construed as telos.  
 
Pentheus thinks still that he has the capacity for preference, when under the effects of the 
“light madness”, whose power lies precisely in its effacement of that reflexivity, which 
would enable him to recognize and evaluate what it is that he thinks he recognizes and 
evaluates. The two modalities of Dionysus seem like an open set of alternatives to him – of 
pathos, being the object, and of praxis, drān, being the subject331; of kingly action or servile 
submission to the bouleumata, “purposes, intentions, the express will”. He does not know 
that he is lost to himself, that he has been penetrated by the will of another. All that has been 
required for that is the disguisement of will, the confusion of desire’s origin, ownership and 
identity, 843b-46: 
 
Pe. ×–⏑– ×> ἃν δοκῆι βουλεύσο/αι.                            
Di. ἔξεστι· Fάντηι τό γ’ ἐ/ὸν εὐτρεFὲς Fάρα.          
                                                        
329 From 434-60 Dionysus is onstage without speaking, although he is being closely examined already from 453. In the prologue, 1-63 he 
speaks as a god in human form, and again in his final apearance from 1330 onwards (there is text missing before this) he makes quite clear 
that he is speaking again in the mode of a god, “as himself”, 1340-1. 
330 Earlier he had been warned not to stand “outdoors” of the nomoi, οἴκει µεθ' ἡµῶν, µὴ θύραζε τῶν νόµων 331. 
331 On their confrontation in human drān, the matter of dramata see Snell’s influential essay opening Snell, 1928: 1-33. 
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Pe. στείχοι/’ ἄν· ἢ γὰρ ὅFλ’ ἔχων Fορεύσο/αι 
      ἢ τοῖσι σοῖσι Fείσο/αι βουλεύ/ασιν. 
 
Pe. ×–⏑– ×> I shall take counsel what judgement seems better332. 
Di. That is possible. In every way am I here and disposed. 
Pe. I think I will go in, either I am going to march out in arms 
Or I shall obey your counsels.333 
 
Anything is possible, exesti, and in every way does the god stand at the mortal’s disposal. 
Dionysus’ readiness, his amenability, τό γ’ ἐ/ὸν εὐτρεFὲς334, is a sinister reminder of the 
almost universal unreadiness that has marked mortals. His own amenability heightens the 
picture of human “unserviceableness”. We find here what others have found in Agamemnon: 
man being led by Necessity, anagkē, to a terrible deed, which he comes not only to accept but 
even to desire and passionately undertake335. Soon Pentheus will lay himself completely at 
the Stranger’s disposal: σοὶ γὰρ ἀνακεί/εσθα δή, 934336. 
 
Inclinations, tendencies, passionate desires, lusts and appetites – epithumia, thumos, orexis, 
boulēsis337 – these can remain unprocessed by language and the mind – phrenes, nóos338 – and its 
contrastive, evaluative articulations339. These are qualitatively distinct from proairesis, which is 
anterior, reasoning and conscious and, essentially, binds agents to their acts. In proairesis acts 
are bound to actors by this cognitive thread, which is “decision” or “counsel”. Inextricable 
from choice is, per definitionem, that pre-meditative, that fundamentally linguistic and mental 
activity, which the Greeks called bouleusis. Bouleusis is a linguistic and mental activity that 
can be either or both public and private (having a cognitive and political dimension), and it 
is everywhere in Greek poetry, for taking counsel with oneself and others is everywhere in 
human life.  
                                                        
332 843: The manuscript is lacunose here. Grégoire & Meunier combine 843a and b [ἐλθόντ' ἐς οἴκους <–⏑– ×–⏑–. / ×–⏑– ×> ἃν δοκῆι 
βουλεύσοµαι.] and give both 842 and their 843 to Pentheus, translating “Tout, plutôt que prêter à rire à ces bacchantes! – Entrons donc au 
palais, et là, j’aviserai . . .”. Seaford: “Unless this anakolouthon ‘reflects P.’s wavering state of mind’ (Dodds) we must emend”. Seaford 
adopts Jackson’s emendation, see Diggle’s apparatus. Cf also Rijksbaron on ἃν δοκῆι 843 extensivley on the various grammatical issues and 
assorted proposed solutions offered by translators and commentators, the translation I offer here is much in line with that of Kirk and 
approved by Rijksbaron. 
333 845-6: Dodds: “P. pretends to himself that his decision is postponed. But the Stranger knows that virtually it is already taken.” 
334 Cf. 440. 
335 Lesky, 1966: 84. 
336 934 Anakeimetha: Seaford ad loc. “depend: ἀνακεῖσθαι can also mean to be dedicated to a deity. P. here seems to assent unwittingly to be 
sacrificed (it was important that the sacrificial victim go willingly)”. On sacrificial aspects of Bacchae see also Seidensticker, 1979. 
337 See also Arist. de An. 414b 2, 433a 13. 
338 See Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 51 “la partie désirante de l’âme (tò óretikón); de l’autre côté, l’intellect, le noûs, dans sa 
fonction pratique” Arist. Eth. Nich. 1139 a 17-20.  
339 On contrastiveness see § 3.3.6.  
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It is worthwhile underlining the anterior, that is to say temporally determined character, of 
Aristotelian proairesis. There is something like a syntax in agency. Cognition has a 
fundamentally syntactic character, a temporal and causative syntax, which by its construal 
of itself and the objects of perception, it lends to everything it touches. This will prove a 
profoundly important feature for Tragic subjectivity and the somewhat cognitive theory of 
personhood being presented here. As we shall see, the obvious and often overlooked, 
minimal conditions of the typical conceptions of agency are: a consciousness of self as a 
being in time, having a past, anticipating a future and being in a present typically occupied 
with reflection and consideration of that anterior and posterior projection of the self. This is 
a fundamental element of agency that I wish to conceptualize here: human agency inheres in 
the human construal of the self (and others identically). That construal is temporal in nature 
and given to continuous reinstitution, kathēsis; arrangement, kosmein; and organization, 
epitassein. Thought is a perpetual rebinding of the self to its previous estate and its future 
“re-incarnation”. Without this cognitive and temporal identity, this constituting by the mind 
of itself as a subject “stretched” over time, humans would indeed act merely hekōn and akōn, 
de plein gré or malgré soi, and never “choosingly” or deliberately.  
 
Deliberation requires a consciousness of present self in relation to past self and future self 
(and the construal of a reality that also has a past, present and future). We may suspect that 
consciousness is not, as the term may imply, just the registering of the “fact” of self, but 
rather the constituting of self. This is because it is the constituting of self qua object, the object 
of consciousness. The self is, necessarily, the conception of the self. It becomes an object of 
attention, because it is constituted in the mind. Yet, it has not objectivity. It is quite unlike 
physical, concrete objects, which have persistence over time; those possess that quality, 
which Piaget called “object constancy”, or what Strawson calls “object permanence”340. The 
human self is marked by what we might call “person impermanence”. It has the virtual 
character of community, being constituted like a thiasos or polis or oikos of different voices, of 
relations and perspectives that necessarily shift in time. These are subject to rhythms of 
unity and disunity, unanimity and discord. The political level recapitulates the cognitive 
and pyschological. The self like the city needs to groom itself, gather its threads together. 
This binding action is its articulacy, a continuous, conscious and unconscious reconstituting 
and re-instituting of self as identical over time.  
 
Without consciousness and deliberation, actors would experience events, even events that 
they would seem to have initiated, only weakly willingly and unwillingly. They would be 
                                                        
340See § 4.1 n. 20 on constancy and permanence in Piaget, 1937 and Strawson, 2009. 
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indistinguishable in a fundamental way from other animals. Their emotions would only 
happen to them, their passions seize them, as if from outside, for there would be no “inside”. 
Existence would unfold as uninterrupted externality without the perspective which creates 
an apparent division between within and without. In the Opferritual humans do not discover 
some prior Menschenähnlichkeit in their animal victims but attribute to animals the defining 
human character, and that is agency. This is the product of consciousness and everything 
that consciousness does to desire: the manner in which it elevates it to choice. The 
deliberative faculty is a faculty of temporal constitution. 
 
 
2.8 The Horizon of Articulacy 
 
Once a new horizon of determination has been identified and articulated – Divine Will, 
Necessity, Mind, Disposition, Class, Race, Gender, History, Outer Space, Quantum Reality, 
Genes – it is soon perforated; ways are found to make it plastic and manipulable, the object 
of operative intentions. Mortals are transgressive. We might call this continually receding 
border ‘the horizon of articulation’. Humans, and most paradigmatically, those Athenians so 
artfully described in counterpoint to the “stay-at-home” Spartans in Thucydides’ I341, are 
restless explorers. To them the constrainment of horizons represents a challenge that incites 
their curiosity. They feel an intolerance of anything like servitude or indenture to 
circumstances not in “their control”, as Aristotle puts it. Whether in some final way they are 
or are not constrained, humans historically insist on acting like agents. 
 
Although such themes as agency, volition, choice, judgement and deliberation are not 
typically what are discussed when Bacchae is studied, I have tried to show, through the optic 
of Aristotle on ethics, that these have an important place in the drama. Since Nietzschean 
modernism took hold of the moral imagination of scholars, it has been taken for granted that 
Dionysus and Euripides’ play are beyond morality – jenseits von Gut und Böse – and ought 
not to be studied in terms of ethics. The premise I wish to defend is not that Dionysus is or is 
not good or wicked or that he does or does not move beyond good or evil. It is rather, quite 
simply, that to human persons, things do matter. They matter to the poet, they matter to his 
audience and they do to the protagonists in the play. The manner of their mattering is what 
is open and that acts should ultimately be most meaningful and lead to the most meaningful 
or valuable outcomes is what is at stake.  
 
                                                        
341 Thuc. 1. 70-1. 
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We are induced neither to see Pentheus wholly one way nor Dionysus wholly another. We 
are led, I think indisputably, to the renewed knowledge or recognition of actors as agents, as 
persons who have desires and aversions and can act upon those in any number of ways. 
Persons are marked by constant talk, not least in drama. Talk is the perpetual re-articulation 
of predicament. Yet the nature of one’s predicament and the nature of other persons and 
their outlooks and intentions is always at least partially concealed from individuals. Bacchae 
manifests a profound sensitivity to the determining character of judgement and counsel, the 
manner of articulating desires or simply being articulated by them. When mortals, like 
Pentheus or the later Theban king, Oedipus, in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannos, think they are 
most “agentful”, most rely on their own dunamis, they are tragically most passive, most 
acted upon by forces that have escaped their notice. 
 
Bacchae has presented a very differentiated, dynamic portrait of the will in different 
conditions of strength and weakness, articulacy and inarticulacy. The absence of self-
awareness, which is the mark of the frolicking maenad, mania in its non-bacchant, non-
divine form – ateleston, abaccheutos – is parallel with the tragic lack of self-reflexivity in 
Pentheus and the Kadmeians. Dionysus addresses humans as beings marked by epistemic, 
volitional and affective dimensions of experience and action. These are all entangled in the 
vicinity of the god. These are the contents of persons, the shape their motivations, 
determining their acts. It is this substance, this entanglement of knowledge, desire and 
emotion which is the subject of Bacchae. The rites – teletai, orgai, baccheumata, narthēkophoria342 – 
are insufficient if they are not filled with or animated, as it were, by the right quality of 
agency.  
 
 
2.9 Summary 
 
This long chapter has been an exploration of Bacchae on its terms of will, desire, 
voluntariness, involuntariness, judgement, deliberation and choice. These are seen to 
become blurred in the vicinity of this god. This ‘blurring’ induces us to consider them as 
problematic. Perhaps, we may come to inquire, they are inherently “blurry” or “fuzzy” 
properties of persons and acts. We have seen that the same language of volition in Euripides 
finds a formal and systematic theorization in the ethical philosophy of agency in Aristotle. 
The problem of agency, choice, desire and the ownership of impulses and passions is a 
fundamental one. In Greek Tragedy it is not identical to the formulation of agency in terms 
of individual freedom that is a distinct topos of Western thought since the Enlightenment. 
                                                        
342 See on narthēkophoria § 2.5 n. 271 on Pl. Phd. 69c 8 – d 2. 
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The poet presents a highly differentiated, dynamic picture of human agency. The 
philosopher is likewise sophisticated and delicate in nuancing and qualifying the 
classification of human agency and the relationship of subjects to their acts. He studies the 
complex thread-work of intention and imputability, the extent to which persons are or are 
not agents, to which they can be said to be the effective causes of their acts. 
 
Euripides’ ‘Dionysus at Thebes’ is not simply the account of a missionary god bringing his 
worship, being denied and asserting his authority. It is about the contents, so to speak, of 
resistance to him, the manner of his transforming that resistance and the meaning or contents 
of his worship. When this god is refused by a mortal, what part of the mortal does he attack 
and subdue – physical force is ineffective against gods, they ‘easily get over human city-
walls’343 – what becomes the object of Dionysus’ divine intentions in this play and other 
accounts of the god, if not human desiring and the cognitive powers to shape and select 
desires. The story of Pentheus’ attitude and that of the Kadmeians provides a kind of 
shadow thrown by the light of Dionysus’ fiery gifts. These are not doctrinal, no formulae or 
rituals that can be perfunctorily carried out in shows of obedience to his divine authority. 
They have emotional contents corresponding to the person of Dionysus, whose living 
identity inside his given morphē is or is not apprehended, with commensurate consequences. 
The principal point for him is that he does have in the recesses of himself, an identity, a 
deeper meaning and that very intelligible quality of a being having emotions which matter 
deeply to it, and caring for its worth.  
 
The entire play takes as its theme the representation not simply of the actions of actors but 
also of the quality of the motivations, which actions and thoughts to express. Happiness, 
eudaimonia, is the telos of human life, in Aristotle. It is a question of actions not of states – 
hexis344. If it were a question of states, the sleeping man in the vegetable state, whom we 
might accurately associate with the maenads of Bacchae, might be called “happy”, which he 
should not, to the philosopher’s mind345. Yet Bacchae reveals the complex and dynamic 
relationship between inaction and actions, states, desires and choices. Dionysiac eudaimonia 
is a kind of condition, but one predicated on a chosen, proaireton, bearing. A desire that has 
been desired because it is the right desire with the right and nobler – kallion, sophōteron – 
“object”. That object is really an objective: a quality of relation with Dionysus, with one’s 
social others and towards one’s own self, a mortal person amongst others. The ethical 
contents of Euripides’ vision in Bacchae, focused upon agency and its limits, on qualities of 
                                                        
343 654: οὐχ ὑπερβαίνουσι καὶ τείχη θεοί; 
344 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1176 b. 
345 But as Kadmos says to Agauē, he can call her neither “happy nor unhappy” in her state of sleeping mind, 1260-2: εἰ δὲ διὰ τέλους/ ἐν 
τῶιδ' ἀεὶ µενεῖτ' ἐν ὧι καθέστατε, / οὐκ εὐτυχοῦσαι δόξετ' οὐχὶ δυστυχεῖν. 
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desire and their relation to a carefully shaded spectrum between knowledge and ignorance, 
is irrefutable. 
 
Euripides has explored the complex living mechanism of human will, setting it against the 
projected will of a god. In its efforts at resistance, its vulnerability to the agency of others 
and in its dissipation, we find that the strange, dynamic qualities of “mind” and “heart” – 
phrenes, prapis, nóos – the inextricably cognitive and affective contents of persons and their 
more or less “agentful” handling of those, form the living matter of Bacchae. In the following 
chapter we further explore the problem of agency in Bacchae, in respect of evaluation, the 
question of the “right quality” of choice and desire and the articulation into different orders 
of desire. As has been done in this chapter with an ancient philosopher, so in the following 
shall we regard Bacchae in the light of a modern philosophy of agency.  
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3 
 
Ah.1 
Tragedy’s Articulacy 
 
 
Before the action of Bacchae begins there has been an “original error” – but whose fault it 
was, as is common in human history, is impossible to disentangle: Zeus desired Semelē, 
Semelē desired Zeus; Hera desired revenge; she caused Semelē to desire inadvertently 
something from Zeus that would destroy herself; her sisters did not wish to recognize her 
relationship, they wished to believe her father was conniving to save her repute; Dionysus 
wishes for revenge, he cannot be made to wish otherwise; Zeus does not want to get in his 
way and has long since given his consent to the apparently disproportionate response. 
Desire has been disastrous. It has entangled actors up with one another in ways they could 
never foresee. Everyone seems to have been the victim of themselves. Initial weak – 
unreflective – desiring has led to conditions of involuntariness. 
 
 
3.1 Dionysus’ Desire 
 
In the previous chapter we saw the great extent to which different qualities of desiring are 
dramatized in Bacchae. Submitting the play to a discussion of agency around the terms 
found in Aristotle’s work on ethics and volition – hekousion, akousion, thumos, epithumia, 
                                                        
1 ἆ· 810: A prime example of Dionysiac language – not designative but the trace of something present, it is almost physically efficacious, a 
sound not a word pointing to a referent, it is the ambiguous utterance that begins the process of reconstitutingreconstitution Pentheus’ will. 
Dodds: “Stop!” concurring with Tyrrell and Verrall. Dodds continuescontinued on 810-12, Pentheus’ response to this vocalic ejaculation 
and the question that follows, tempting Pentheus to wish to see the maenads, “It is the answer, if not of a maniac, at least of a man whose 
reactions are ceasing to be normal: the question has touched a hidden spring in Pentheus’ mind, and his self-mastery vanishes.” But it does 
not vanish instanter, it will be a gradual process, with moments of resistance, a slow succumbing of the will. ‘Touching a spring in his mind’ 
paints a picture of a mechanical Pentheus, in which there is some truth, for Pentheus’ problem is that he has been to ‘mechanical’ and 
insufficiently organic, flexible, growing in time, this will ultimately leave him amēchanos, helpless. Cf. Adkins, 1960: 323, in his discussion 
of the Eudemian Ethics and Eth. Nich. and Aristotle’s handling of the problem (with my italics) “left for him by Gorgias and Plato”, the 
problem of involuntariness introduced by the force, bia, of passions: “. . . we are dealing with whole personalities not with springs of action 
in isolation; and human beings have both thoughts and desires. Accordingly, an act which is an expression of either is our act and hence 
voluntary; which entails that all actions are voluntary save those that are done under external compulsion very strictly interpreted, and those 
which are done ‘not in accordance with dianoia’, however this phrase is to be understood. The problem of Gorgias is thus solved, and the 
dangers of Platonic language eliminated.” Seaford’s retaining of “Ah!” is more faithful to the text and its events than ‘stop!’, “Halt” 
(Buschor, 1977) and even Roux’s “Ah? Bien! (Un silence) . . .” Seaford ad loc: “Ah! is uttered outside the metre, and this gives it a special 
emphasis appropriate to its marking the turning point in the play . . . the difficulty of determing its precise tone (much depends on its 
delivery)”. Di Benedetto: “Ah!”, SegalGibbons, 2001 and Carson, 2015 “Ahh!”; but Stuttard in Stuttard: “No, wait!”. Cf. Eur. Hel. 445, HF 
1051, Or. 1598, Soph. Phil. 1300 (urgent protest), Eur. Rhes. 799 (pain), Ba. 586, 596 (astonishment, aporia). See on Dodds on “ea, ea!” 
644 at § 2.4 p. 99. 
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boulēsis, bouleusis, proairesis – terms that recur in the poetry of Euripides itself, we saw that 
self-interest (both real and apparent), wishing (reflective and unreflective, sincere and 
insincere), deliberation and calculation, are of principal interest in the play.  
 
Dionysus wants to be wanted and he wants to be wanted sincerely. Many interpreters have 
discussed the very clear thematization of knowledge in Bacchae2. Here the aim is to establish 
the meaning of Dionysiac knowledge, which is so elusive. Not knowing or recognizing who 
and what the god is and what he means causes humans to resist him – in a circular fashion, 
to resist his knowledge. Euripides presents a god in whom we find revealed something 
about the nature of desire, its articulation in deliberation and through choice; and about our 
knowledge of desire. In this chapter we take further our study of the evaluation of desires 
and attempt to establish, this time reading Bacchae through a modern perspective of the 
philosophy of agency, what the important criteria for agency and personhood may be. 
 
Does Necessity also govern deliberation – is one fated to deliberate in certain ways? This is an 
important question. Vernant, in the classic modern discussion of Greek views on agency, 
argued that even deliberation is deliberation over desires, which repose upon an unchosen 
personal constitution, hexis, and are therefore determined3. Tragedy represents or imitates 
not acts, not murders or rapes or the exposing of infants, but persuadings, deliberations, 
decisions, decisional processes and the absence or ineffectiveness of these. To put this more 
precisely: the action – dramata – presented on the Attic stage is the action of communication, 
deliberation and the expression of states. Before and after deeds stands talk: persuasion, 
choices and their interpretation, the discovery of their implications. This is the very matter 
of Tragedy: human subjects qua subject, but also ironically, subjects qua objects: objects of the 
apprehension of others and of the viewing audience. They are objects whose subjectivity we 
learn to know and recognize.  
 
Tragic protagonists then, address each other and address themselves, as subjects. They feel 
that their actions have import or are related to “important” agents in significant ways. They 
live and act as though persuasion were possible, as though deliberation and decision were 
important. They discover not the tightness of things, the sovereignty of an absolute anangkē, 
but a looseness in the constitution of things. This looseness is the feeling of indeterminacy 
and contingency in the flow of events experienced as the present. Perspective, we shall 
                                                        
2 E.g. Conacher, 1967: 73-7, Segal: passim, esp. 272-347, Leinieks, 257-75, Radke, 154-203; Reynolds-Warnhoff, 1997. 
3 “Le caractère, ēthos, propre à chaque genre d’homme repose sur une somme de dispositions (héxeis) qui se développent par la pratique et 
se fixent en habitudes [here he refers the reader to EN 1103 a 5, 1139 a 34-5].] Une fois le caractère formé, le sujet agit conformément à ces 
dispositions et ne saurait autrement… Mais à aucun moment Aristote ne cherche à fonder sur une analyse psychologique la capacité que 
posséderait le sujet, tant que ses dispositions ne sont pas fixées, de se décider d’une façon ou d’une autre et d’assumer ainsi la responsabilité 
de ce qu’il fera plus tard.” Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 60.  
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discover, is what is determining. Looking back, even looking back from a projected future, 
can have something like an overpowering necessity-effect4. Humans are typically (uniquely 
and therefore definingly) prospective, planning against a future of alternative outcomes and 
apparent options. They are creatures of elpis, anticipation. Tuchē, the underdetermined 
present and elpis, the undetermined future, are perpetually absorbed by the mind and its 
perspective-taking, into the pattern – Archilocus’ rusmos5 – of an apparently overdetermined 
past governed by Necessity. This is the rhythm which we feel we discern in the course of 
events and phenomena. 
 
It is a striking feature of the myths of Dionysus that the act he requires from humans is a 
cognitive transformation, a modification of what and how they know. He does not return to 
punish humans who fail to sacrifice animals to him. It is not a deed that he punishes, such as 
Odysseus’ crew’s eating of the cattle of Hyperion6. It is not an act such as that which inspired 
Artemis’ pity for the wild animals that had been the victims of Zeus’ sacrifice7. We do not 
find, with Dionysus, the unaccounted-for desire of a goddess, conveyed by the despised 
interpreter of divine will, the seer Calchas, such as we find in Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis8. 
Instead we see a lapse in, or inadequacy of, awareness.  
 
Of course, one may say that when sailors are so remiss or when one has not paid the gods 
their due, that is also problematic because of ignorance and, whether out of ignorance or 
not, the gods are angry because they have not been recognized. Yet, in Bacchae it is ignorance 
and recognition themselves that are articulated as problematic, and not only the practical 
consequences of these. Recognition and ‘practical consequences’ can never, to be sure, be 
cleanly separated. A deed of reverence is the token of recognition; recognition motivates the 
expression of recognition. With Dionysus things are more evidently dialectical and it is the 
                                                        
4 Rivier, who argued that anagkē in Tragedy is not to be understood as issuing from the human mind but as having an objective character, 
also described it as something named as “ἀνάγκη perceived as an element inscribed in the dramatic situation”: “En résumé, la décision est 
partout présente. Elle n’est pas toujours accompagnée d’une délibération. Et le moment du choix est regulièrement omis. En lieu et place, ce 
que nous trouvons, c’est l’effet d’une contrainte, souvent (mais pas toujours) nommée par le personnage ou ses témoins, – d’une ἀνάγκη 
perçue comme un élément de possession inscrit dans la situation dramatique.” Rivier, 1968: 36.  
5 See Archilocus fr. 128. 6-7: ἀλλὰ χαρτοῖσίν τε χαῖρε καὶ κακοῖσιν ἀσχάλα / µὴ λίην, γίνωσκε δ' οἷος ῥυσµὸς ἀνθρώπους ἔχει, “In your 
rejoicing let your joy, in hardship your despairs/ be tempered: understand the pattern of things [hoios rysmos] shaping human affairs.” 
(trans. West, 1993: 11) and above, § 2.6 n. 360. Such a sense of the rhythmic shape or patterning of events and “lives” is of course also 
famously articulated in Herodotus, a man so struck by both the wondrous strange and normal patterning that gives the world its complex 
character. 
6 Hom. Od. 12. 260-390. Odysseus’ men have been warned, and that by the seer Teiresias and by Circe through their importunate captain. 
They act nevertheless and when they are punished it is not for their motives, or the quality of their desires and acts, but simply for those acts. 
7 There the creatures (the unborn young of the hare that became a meal for Zeus’ eagle) were made into sign objects, instruments rather than 
the living subjects they were in her eyes, see Aesch. Ag. 134-7. 
8 Calchas’ interpretation: Eur. IA 89-93. Despised seer: Eur. IA 520-1, see also on seers § 2.2.1.1 p. 61 n. 73§ 2.2.1.2 n. 103, § 3.3.11, § 4.3.7 
n.166, § 5.2.2 n. 13. 
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recursive movement between ēthos and praxeis, character and acts, or acts and meaning, 
object and significance, and vice versa – this perpetual constitution of each by the other, that 
takes primary place. With Dionysus alone of the gods does knowledge, an sich, its nature, 
acquisition and loss, become such an important topic. With him it is not only the act of 
recognition that counts but the quality and authentic character of recognizing, i.e. of 
motivation. Dionysus in Bacchae is truly a figure in whom the subjective character of things, 
their emotional, psychological, cognitive contents, have primacy. Hence authenticity is 
always such a problem in his vicinity. Deeds can be counterfeited, emotions can be acted 
out, but the right bearing, the true feeling and the quality of care is something that matters 
to him and that he wants tested against the basanos, touchstone, of his presence9. 
 
With Dionysus in Euripides, ignorance and the willingness and unwillingness that has 
motivated it, is expressly the problem. In Bacchae it is an inner state that is wanting or 
incomplete. It is not what the sisters of Semelē did or did not do, which has been a problem 
for Dionysus, but the very knowledge and recognition itself, which is disastrously omitted. 
What Dionysus has wanted is not something that can be falsified or fulfilled through a 
belated act. It is an internal condition, it is knowledge as affect, that matters with him. It will 
be insufficient to simply carry the narthex, as Kadmos does. Dionysus wants an authentic, 
unfalsified and, we learn, unfalsifiable recognition. That will be the expression of the 
emotional and cognitive relation he craves. The spirit of actions and, related to that, the 
problem of the falsifiability of acts and intentions, is of paramount importance in the 
proximity of Dionysus. 
 
This god requires of mortals a certain orientation towards himself, a cognitive adjustment 
and the suitable, concomitant emotional bearing: eusebein, “reverence”, “healthy terror”, an 
entering into the atmosphere and the spirit of things, which he brings10. Apollo in Iliad brings 
a pestilence upon the Achaeans because his priest has been dishonoured. There the 
dishonouring is similar to the insult in Bacchae. The standing of the god has been offended 
                                                        
9 The recursiveness between acts and states, as between emotions and choices, is one that causes things to appear ambiguous. There is a 
constant dialectical and dynamic relation between these. This dialectical and animate character of the relation between properties of being 
and doing is something one tries from many different angles to get at. I suspect this being-in-motion of things, this dialectic between hexis 
and praxis, ēthos and proairesis, is what accounts for the equivocation we sometimes discern in Aristotle: what looks to some like the 
“unsoundness” or “looseness” of his arguments. See Taylor, C.C.W. 2006: 164-5 on Arist. Eth. Nich. 1113b 11-14 and esp. his n. 14 on the 
scholarly disputes on these important apparent inconsistencies. 
10 Sebein “reverent awe”, “Ehrfurcht” is an important state to be in in Bacchae: τῆς δυςσεβείας, 263; {Δι.} ἀσέβειαν ἀσκοῦντ' ὄργι' ἐχθαίρει 
θεοῦ., 476; παρ' ἐµοί· σὺ δ' ἀσεβὴς αὐτὸς ὢν οὐκ εἰσορᾶις., 502; σέβεταί σ' Εὔιος, 566; ὁ Διόνυσος ἀνὰ µέλαθρα·/σέβετέ νιν. 589-90; ἦµαρ 
ἐς νύκτα τ' εὐ-/αγοῦντ' εὐσεβεῖν, 1008-9; τὸ σωφρονεῖν δὲ καὶ σέβειν τὰ τῶν θεῶν/κάλλιστον· 1150-1; ὑµῖν ἐγένεθ' ὅµοιος, οὐ σέβων θεόν., 
1302. See also 3.3.6 on the contrast of piety and impiety in Bacchae; and note the connection with that other important and disputed value, 
semnos, “holy”, “solemn” attribute of mountains 411, 718; the darkness of night 486; and the fire epiphany of Dionysus 1083. On Greek 
piety, see Musurillo, 1966; Nilsson, 1969; Mikalson,1991. On asebeia see § 2.2.5 p. 86 n. 184. 
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because, as the seer Kalchas explains to the Greeks, the pleas of his priest, Chryses, through 
whom the god’s agency is delegated or distributed, have been disregarded by Agamemnon, 
(οὕνεκα τὸν Χρύσην ἠτί/ασεν ἀρητῆρα, Hom. Od. 1.11)11. In Homer, however, there is still 
a specific act of offence, the taking of Chryseis and the refusal to yield her to her father. The 
accent in Bacchae is much more strongly on the contents or meaning of acts and omissions.  
 
With Dionysus in Bacchae it is a pure failure of apprehension, a neglected or absent act that is 
the mortal lapse: simply taking Dionysus for less than he is. Apollo, “the most Greek of all 
the Greek gods” according to some, is remote, “works from afar” (ἑκηβόλου ἈFόλλωνος, 
Od. 1.1412) and that is an important difference with his step-brother, Dionysus13. With Apollo 
there is not this pronounced rhythm of near and far, distance and sudden provocative 
presence. Dionysus is suddenly at hand, amongst humans, nearer than they realize: the most 
present of gods, his peculiarity is this parousia, his being nearby. He is at hand14. The foreign 
‘priest’ of Dionysus, insulted by the Theban king, is in fact the very god himself. Dionysus 
wishes to be recognized for what he is, not a mortal, but the son of Zeus. The sin of omission 
in Dionysiac myths is not only an act omitted: an attitude that motivated the act has not 
been learned, it is not present. An inner condition has failed to be there and manifest itself, a 
desire which is the mother of a new kind of knowledge. Here is the expression of a subtle, 
cognitively and inter-subjectively complex world of relations between mortals and gods. 
 
For these reasons questions of desire and will, and the readiness and willingness of subjects, 
arise throughout Bacchae. The women of Thebes did not wish to accept the divinity of 
Semelē’s son; Pentheus does not want to recognize the nature of Dionysus and the 
meaningfulness of his rites and those of his thiasos, the entourage of female co-celebrants. 
Kadmos declares in his first words in the play, that he is prepared, hetoimos: “I am come, 
ready, with the god’s effects” ἥκω δ’ ἕτοι/ος τήνδ’ ἔχων σκευὴν θεοῦ·, 180. A certain 
readiness, an orientation – neither purely passive nor thoroughly active – is what Dionysus 
                                                        
11 Hom. Il. 8-100. 
12 Most Greek: see Burkert GR: 223 “Man hat Apollon oft den ‚griechischsten der Götter’ genannt, nicht ohne Grund“. Hekatos ‘Working 
from afar’, ‘far-ranging’: Hymn. Hom. Eis Apollōna passim, e.g. Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκάτοιο 1, Ἀπόλλωνος ἑκαέργου 56, 63, 177 and Hom. Il. 
7.83, 20. 295 and Burkert GR: 227 “als ‘Ferntreffer’ hat man Apollons Beinamen hekatebolos, hekebolos, hekatos verstanden”, where note 
also Anm. 232: “Das Rätsel liegt darin, dass die Namen hekatebóloss und hékatos vom Namen der Göttin Hekate nicht zu trennen sind: 
Chantraine 1968, 328”. 
13 They do not stand in simple opposition, rather in something like a rhythmically defined inter-relation. Apollo is designated in Iliad 
similarly to how Dionysus repeatedly is in Bacchae. So at Hom. Il. 1.9 the god who avenges his arētēr, “prayer”, “imprecator” (as Dionysus 
avenges the treatment of his “vicar”, himself) is called Λητοῦς καὶ Διὸς υἱός . Nietzsche’s very influential opposition of these gods, for all 
its stimulating brilliance as a poetic exercise itself, is not one that illuminates Bacchae very helpfully. See Wood, 2011 and Suárez de la 
Torre in Bernabé [ed.], 2013: 58-81. 
14 On “Presence and Absence in the Parousia of Dionysos”, in a discussion of aspects of the “xenos attributes in Euripides’ Bacchae”, see 
Schwartz in Bernabé [ed.], 2013: 301-28, esp. 307-12. Also Henrichs in Masks, 31-6 and Detienne, 1986.  
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requires of mortals. This is what is dramatized in all the myths of resistance to him15. 
“Willingly receive the god, pour a drink offering, dress your head”: have and manifest a 
willingness, that is all it takes. Thus, Teiresias exhorts the obdurate young king, 312-1316.  
 
What is the source of knowledge, where does authority in matters of the truth of the gods 
lie? The chorus celebrates the gift of Dionysus, which belongs equally to the rich and the 
common man alike, 421-2. “That would I accept” τόδ’ ἂν δεχοί/αν 433, that which the 
common people consider right or valuable and hence “make use of”, “practise”, chrētai, 
sings the chorus, 430, 43317. This verb dechesthai, “receiving”, expresses an openness, an 
important readiness, hetoimotēs. That is what Dionysus wants from mortals, and he wants it, 
crucially, uncompelled. Thus, at the climax of the work, it is as a failure of desiring on the 
part of the Thebans that Dionysus explains the destruction he has brought upon them: this 
catastrophe would not have transpired if they had known to be of healthy mind, “when they 
did not wish to” ὅτ’ οὐκ ἠθέλετε, 134218. They have brought it, he says, on themselves. The 
knowledge of Dionysus is indissociable from a desire for that knowledge; the Kadmeians 
have “learnt us late, when you ought to have you did not recognize (us)” ὄψ' ἐ/άθεθ' ἡ/ᾶς, 
ὅτε δ' ἐχρῆν οὐκ ἤιδετε, 1345. 
 
Bacchae, as typically tragic drama does, presents a contest of wills. What humans want and 
what they fail to want is an important theme of staged drama, as it is in the drama of 
historical life. Dionysus is seen here to desire – thelein – and have what he desires, in 
thematic contrast with those too desirous, too ineffectual and ephemeral creatures, mortal 
humans. Too kingly Pentheus – τὸ βασιλικὸν λίαν, 671 – admonishes the Stranger, 
threatening that “We shall guard your body within our prison”, and as often the retort is 
simply that the wishes of the Stranger, that is to say of the god himself, as he in fact hints 
with αὐτός, must prevail: “the god himself will release me, whenever I wish – thelō”, 497-8: 
 
Pe. εἱρκταῖσί τ’ ἔνδον σῶ/α σὸν φυλάξο/εν. 
Di. λύσει /’ ὁ δαί/ων αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω. 
 
                                                        
15 See also Aesch. Lykourgeia Fr. 57-60; Ar. Av.276, Scholia. See also Deichgräber, 1939, Jouan, 1992, Mureddu, 1994, West, 1990. 
16 See § 2.6 p. 118 for text and translation. 
17See 161 below, Cf. Med. 118-30. At Eur. IA 17-20, Agamemnon has an exchange with his servant in which he expresses a yearning for the 
life of the socially low. It is not exactly a position on the value of the simple people, but certainly represents a sense of the value, and better 
quality of their lives, vis à vis the powerful. That this has a status that links it to the important themes of the work seems attested to in the 
recurrence of the question of the value of lives in Menelaus’ treatment of the servant (and instrumental view of the life and person of his 
niece) at Eur. IA 303-16. 
18 Ethelein: “wish”, “want”, “to be willing” but in Homer “with neg., almost, = dunamai ‘be able to’” LSJ s.v.; see also Chantraine on 
boulomai and ethelein at § 2.5 n. 248. 
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Pe. Inside locked up quarters we shall guard your body. 
Di. Me himself the daimōn will release [lusei], whenever I want. 
 
This prophecy19 and assertion of the absolute, sovereign superiority of Dionysiac will, is soon 
demonstrated and fulfilled. The Stranger escapes his bonds and imprisonment (614-41) and 
Pentheus, that pathetic picture of mortal ineffectualness setting itself against divine will, 
comes to embody the futility of mortal reckoning and its hybristic desire to contain the 
Dionysiac body.  
 
Pentheus fails to contain the Stranger, to bind him in chains. He is astonished to come 
outside and find this leader of bacchants emancipated, 642-6. Yet it has been “the one who 
causes the clustering vine to grow for mortals that has released the stranger”20. Still, Pentheus 
does not recognize what he is dealing with and orders “locked up all the towers in a circle”, 
653. The city, which itself has been leaking its emotionally incontinent population, must be 
the vessel to bind and contain the Dionysiac menace. “What, do not gods get over even city-
walls?” asks Dionysus, τί δ’; οὐχ ὑFερβαίνουσι καὶ τείχη θεοί; 65521. Immortals are distinct 
from mortals by the closeness of their wishes to their consummations. There is a dangerous, 
uncertain space between what mortals desire and what they receive. For mortals the 
question of the import of desires always arises, and it does so most manifestly in the kind of 
reflective and evaluative moments that Tragedy seems designed to show forth. That is not 
the case with gods. For the gods only realizing desires matter, much less so what those 
desires and their consequences mean. 
 
 
  
                                                        
19 After the fact, the Stranger asks ironically, “Didn’t I tell you, or were you not listening, that I said a certain person would release 
me?”me’: οὐκ εἶπον, ἢ οὐκ ἤκουσας, ὅτι λύσει µέ τις; 649. 
20 ὃς τὴν πολύβοτρυν ἄµπελον φύει βροτοῖς. 651 
21 It is suggestive to read this, and indeed Bacchae generally, recalling Solon, another fundamental ‘civic poet’. See Sol. 4.27-8 where the 
‘yard doors and high walls’ do not want to keep out the ‘public ill’ δηµόσιον κακὸν: αὔλειοι δ' ἔτ' ἔχειν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι θύραι, / ὑψηλὸν δ' 
ὑπὲρ ἕρκος ὑπέρθορεν. The challenge that faces humans in the social world of the polis lies not in negotiating the boundaries between ‘the 
inside of culture and the outside of nature’, but in recognizing, learning and handling the contents of themselves. 
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3.2.1 Agents and Failing Agency 
 
In the Bacchae it is not the case that mortals are “Coupée[s] de l’ordre général du monde 
gouverné par les dieux”22. This is a world governed and penetrated by gods, by Zeus and his 
son Dionysus who moves – we see him – amongst mortals. The events of the play are 
bracketed by oracular predictions that precede the action represented and prophesy beyond 
its conclusion23. Seats of augury and oracular sanctity also threaten to be destroyed by 
human and sub-human violence24. In the Bacchae, much happens to the protagonists, which 
cannot reasonably be attributed to their own intentions. Crucially, however, these are the 
consequences of an initial desire, a prior error of will, which was theirs. What we find is not 
that humans are either free or not free in their choosing, but that certain kinds of choosing 
can lead to the diminishment or even the complete dissipation of any faculty for choice. 
There is a complex and richly graduated spectrum between, what in the historical world are, 
the equally rare extremes of full or complete absence of, volitional autonomy.  
 
Human will does not always entirely belong to humans, but is often the consequence of an 
original error, which is imputable to an act committed or omitted on account of a poor 
judgement or a ruinous desire. This is the case in the context of Bacchae. The daughters of 
Kadmos did not want to believe that their sister was loved by Zeus; they misread her 
motivations. The old king of Thebes chose in advance to adopt too realistic, too politick an 
attitude to Dionysus. His will, the purity of his desire for Dionysus and the relation that 
Dionysus has come to reclaim, this was always compromised by Kadmos’ too clever 
calculations, his sophismata25.  
 
Pentheus’ refutations of the accounts about Dionysus26, his rejection of bacchic celebrations – 
this is motivated rejection, a chosen stand taken by the young tyrannos. He makes clear that 
he regards Dionysus and his worship as spurious, the mere pretext for concealing base 
desires and not anything that can reflect (certainly not realize) new, healthier forms of 
desire27. The mortal protagonists of Attic Drama, like all mortals, do not choose their 
                                                        
22 Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 74. 
23 The life after Thebes of Kadmos has been predicted by an oracle of Zeus: χρησµὸς ὡς λέγει Διός, 1333. The events of Bacchae had been 
assented to long in advance by the father of Dionysus: πάλαι τάδε Ζεὺς οὑµὸς ἐπένευσεν πατήρ. 1349. 
24 Not entirely human: Kadmos and Harmonia, turned into snakes, will lead a motley army, destroying cities until they destroy an oracle of 
Apollo, 1330-3. Oracles: ὅταν δὲ Λοξίου χρηστήριον/ διαρπάσωσι 1336-7. Pentheus, who himself is called a non-human, earth-born snake 
man or spawn of Gorgons, 987-96, had threatened to turn upside down the seat of the seer, Teiresias, 456-51. 
25 Sophismata: “ingenious stratagems”, “clever schemes”, see § 3.3.1 “Theban Stratagems”. 
26 219-20; τὸν νεωστὶ δαίµονα/Διόνυσον, ὅστις ἔστι, 242-7. 
27 Pentheus has been abroad, ekdēmos, and Dionysus has penetrated the city, hēkō, but we are never given a hint that Pentheus is anything 
other than his own man, self-conscious and conscious of others, reproving (ἀναίνοµαι, πάτερ, 251), monitoring (νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον, 252) finding 
ridiculous (πολὺν γέλων 250) and diagnosing (οὐχ ὑγιὲς οὐδὲν ἔτι λέγω τῶν ὀργίων, 262) - as those in the grip of mania or divine control do 
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inclinations, but, like all mortals, they do have the faculty to reflect upon their desires and 
motives and to select which inclinations they activate. Pentheus, over the course of Bacchae, 
is given many opportunities to pause, and to wish differently. The Kadmeians’ have made 
choices, which have engendered this calamitous circumstance of frenzy: the condition, 
precisely, of loss of choice.  
 
Pentheus, like his aunts, sees the world of persons and events in practical, disenchanted 
terms. He prejudges the bacchic rites as specious, plastaisi bachkaisi, mere pretext, prophasis, 
for the pursuit of selfish pleasure28. Darkness and invisibility are cloaks for concealing 
desires whose nature is revealed through their very secretiveness. It is the same cloak of 
obscurity he will think he can exploit to go unobserved, unembarrassed through the streets 
of the city29. Pentheus lives in a transactional world: he will be greedy to see the nocturnal 
rites, offering money for the illegitimate privilege30. This is how we necessarily understand 
his motivations. We understand Pentheus by the motives he reflexively ascribes to others: 
self-interest is the cause by which he construes the motives for behaviour. Not knowing the 
nature of his self, he will never understand what authentic self-interest is. 
 
In Bacchae, we witness processes in time, sharply delineated against values defined as 
timeless31. Decisional faculties yield to exterior influence and the connection between prior 
and subsequent self is (a precious bond, but, always tenuous), undone by this god called 
elsewhere Lysios, “releaser” and Eleuthereus, “liberator”, the god whom human bonds cannot 
hold32. In these terms, for example, may we read the spectacle of Pentheus’ strange 
transformation. What we are given to see is the dissolution of a man’s capacity for proairesis; 
the slipping away, gradual not instantaneous, of bouleusis, deliberation, the capacity to take 
counsel with self. Pentheus becomes a figure of gré. Willingly he follows Dionysus, willingly 
he cedes decision to the vengeful god. But we cannot say that it is his will that motivates 
him, that he wills it. When they are abducted, mortals discover how they are held ransom to 
                                                        
not. Later we see, as a differentiated process, his cognitive collapse; here when we meet him first he is presented as a figure of only 
“normal” violence, when for example he threatens to bring the bacchic worship to an end and cut off the Stranger’s head from his body: 
239-41: εἰ δ' αὐτὸν εἴσω τῆσδε λήψοµαι χθονός, / παύσω κτυποῦντα θύρσον ἀνασείοντά τε/ κόµας, τράχηλον σώµατος χωρὶς τεµών.   
28 “New” is identified with the dangerous and specious: κλύω δὲ νεοχµὰ τήνδ' ἀνὰ πτόλιν κακά 219. Plastaisi: “moulded”, “shaped” means 
given its form by a specific intentional agent: γυναῖκας ἡµῖν δώµατ' ἐκλελοιπέναι/ πλασταῖσι βακχείαισιν, ἐν δὲ δασκίοις/ ὄρεσι θοάζειν 
220-2. Prophasis: πρόφασινπρόφαςιν µὲν ὡς δὴ µαινάδας θυοσκόους, 224. Hidden motives of others: 221-5, 255-7; women’s latent motives 
become released 260-2, 453-9 and 486-7. Prophasis, we may say, is implicitly set against prophēteia, prophētēs, the similarity and 
difference of words (forms) are used by Euripides to articulate their disputed meanings (contents). For prophētēs see 9 n. 42, 61, 83.  
29 Pentheus reads others as motivated to hide their motives and thinks he can hide himself: 816, 838, but ultimately he will be more seen 
than seeing: ὤφθη δὲ µᾶλλον ἢ κατεῖδε µαινάδας· 1075. 
30 Money for night spying: µάλιστα, µυρίον γε δοὺς χρυσοῦ σταθµόν. 812. 
31 On time in Bacchae see Thumiger, 2007: 171-85.  
32 Lysios: Paus. 2.2.6, 2.67.6, 9.16.6; Οrph. Hy. 50 (Λυσἰου Ληναἰου). 2, 8. Eleuthereus: Paus. 1.20.3, 1.29.2; Plut. Quaest. Conv. 716b, οἱ 
παλαιοὶ τὸν θεὸν Ἐλευθερέα καὶ Λύσιον ἐκάλουν.  
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their own desires. Dionysus, captured by mortals, in turn captivates them, usurping or 
neutralizing that which above all things had distinguished them from other animals: the 
fundamentally temporally construing faculty, and the capacity for evaluative decision-making.  
 
Reflection, counsel, thought - the cognitive articulation through language, an evaluative and 
internal process – these, for Aristotle, are the decisive ingredients, the set of capacities that, 
by its absence or presence, determines the modalité d’action. This too, in various formulations, 
is the recurrent theme of Bacchae, as indeed it is the matter of Tragedy generally. Aphrōn, 
Aphroditē, thelxiphrones Erōtes33; overflowing cups; the magnetism of personal beauty; forms 
of persuasion and seduction and their escalation to enchantment; that extreme form of 
mental and volitional depletion which is the Dionysiac eviction of the mind from itself in 
mania (typically a feminized Pendant to atē): these forms of willingness, expressed through 
and distinguishing modalities of action, constitute the very material of Bacchae.  
 
The play dramatizes the exhaustion of deliberative possibilities and the succumbing of the 
subject as decisive agent – “apprehending its own self, in its rapports with others and with 
nature, as a centre of decision”34 –  to enchantment, that is: to external agency. Bacchae also 
dramatizes the return to decision, precisely in fact as Vernant here puts it, through the 
recovery of self-apprehension and the recuperation of the mind. And here the mind is seen 
as the apprehender of rapports with others and with nature, it is the constituter of relations. 
This all, we see most evidently in the so called “psychotherapy scene”, 1200-130035. A moving 
scale of degrees of willingness is a subtext of the action of Bacchae. Hence the constant matter of 
the work is consciousness; irresponsibility and responsibility; the weakening hold on 
language and of the purchase of language on reality; and the constitution of the self and its 
agency. 
 
                                                        
33 Bacchants emit wild cries and “foam”, aphron, ἡ δ' ἀφρὸν ἐξιεῖσα, 1122. This is a pun on “mindless” as in related aphrosunē at 387, 
1301, see chp. 6 on phrōn and phrenes. Aphrodite is used metonymously for that “mindless” sexual appetance which Pentheus attributes to 
all women, but not to himself, the man who will become mindless and thus first amenable to being dressed as a female bacchant: 225, 236, 
459. Thelxiphrones: the demons of erotic passion are “mind enchanting” οἱ θελξίφρονες νέµον- /ται θνατοῖσιν Ἔρωτες 404-5. It is worth 
mentioning that its amongst the bacchants that Aphrodite and the Erōtes, as well as the Charites and Pothos, Desire, are positivelypoitively 
valorized, see 401-16. 
34 Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 61. 
35 Pscychotherapy Scene: Devereux, 1970, who makes a “purely psychiatric analysis” of the scene of Agauē’s recovery; also Parsons, 1988. 
For psychoanalyses of Pentheus see Seidensticker, 1972 and Sale 1972. On psychotherapy and Tragedy see Arthur, 1977; Segal, 1978; Gill, 
1985; Padel, 1992, 1995; and on Padel: Gill, 1996. For a list of psychoanalytic readings of Bacchae see Thumiger, 2007: 60 n. 2, her own 
chp. 2 on verbal instantiations of character representation, “The private self”, in Bacchae, is a very subtle and fruitful cognitive-
pyschological handling of the question. See Jeanmaire, 1951 on “La ‘mania’ divine’” “Le Ménadisme”, also Dodds, 1951. Pigeaud, in her 
edition of Grégoire & Meunier (2011), treats the play as a study in psychological breakwdownbreakdown. 
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Value, the verifiability of truth and the danger of counterfeitures and impostors form 
recurrent problems in Greek Drama. Authenticity is the precipitating problem of Bacchae: 
authenticity of relations and the authenticity of identity. How to live an authentic life, what 
properly to value, what to desire in order to live in accordance with true reality: this is what 
the chorus sings of, what Teiresias the seer adjures, and what Dionysus has come to attest. 
He has come to punish false desire and motive, the shallowness of pragmatic will; mere 
willingness, where what has been demanded of mortals is an elected affinity, 
Wahlverwandschaft. He requires this paradoxical choice from mortals to surrender precisely 
their selective and discriminating mind to the god’s desires, to surrender to the god’s 
spontaneous mode. Dionysus brings to Thebes, “even if she does not want it”, the very 
mode of transcended (in its negative form, abandoned) decision. 
 
 
3.2.2 Tragic Agency, Tragic Person 
 
Harry Frankfurt’s essay “Freedom of Will and the Concept of a Person”36 has been 
influential, and that, not least, through its having been taken up so prominently by Charles 
Taylor. For Frankfurt, the common philosophical analysis of the concept of a person – an 
entity predicated with states of consciousness and corporeal characteristics – “is not really 
analysis of that concept at all”, as he sets out correctively or polemically, to show37. In 
philosophy as in philology, we are reminded, scholars cannot settle on definitions of the 
most basic categories38. Those categories however will absolutely determine our 
interpretations of such works and phenomena as Bacchae, Dionysus and his Theatre. 
Traditionally, much energy has been devoted to defining personhood through 
distinguishing humans from non-humans.  
 
Our object of study is very specifically Tragedy and a single tragedy, not “culture” or 
“religion”, even though we must see Tragedy as an expression of (constituted of and 
recursively re-constituting) ancient religion and culture. In Tragedy, personhood and agency 
(ethically, philosophically, psychologically, physically articulated in contrast with animal 
and with god) is a problem, and that most intensely in Bacchae. Frankfurt argues that in 
                                                        
36 Frankfurt, 1971. 
37 Frankfurt, 1971: 5. 
38 The mind-body problem, which underpins the Cartesianism criticised by Vernant and which it may be said receives a kind of dramatic 
treatment in Bacchae (with its wild human bodies, bestializations and now embodied, now disembodied god see § 6.1.1), is also detected in 
the mainstream philosophical discussion by Frankfurt. See Strawson Individuals 1959 and Ayer The Concept of a Person 1963, as 
representative of the general view: “What concerns Ayer and Strawson is the problem of understanding the relation between mind and body, 
rather than the quite different problem of understanding what it is to be a creature that not only has a mind and a body but is also a person.”, 
Frankfurt, 1971:5 n. 1. 
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delineating personhood it does not matter if what it is is species-specific, whether animals 
do or do not share personhood with humans. The criteria of personhood, rather than mere 
segregation of species “. . . are designed to capture those attributes which are the subject of 
our most humane concern with ourselves and the source of what we regard as most 
important and most problematical in our lives.”39 Similarly, in Bacchae there is a tolerance of 
the contiguousness of species and a privileging, rather, of the questions which are ‘most 
important and most problematical in our lives’40. 
 
For Frankfurt the essential difference between persons and non-persons “is to be found in 
the structure of a person’s will”. All manner of creatures have desires and motives, but only 
humans form what Frankfurt, and Taylor following him, will call “second-order desires”. 
Humans alone not only want, choose, and are moved to act in certain ways, but also “may 
want to have (or not have) certain desires and motives. They are capable of wanting to be 
different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are”. Desiring certain desires, 
wanting to want this and to not want that, this is a product of certain unique cognitive 
                                                        
39 Frankfurt, 1971: 6. 
40 What matters in Dionysus’ ‘neighbourhood’ is not asserting or preserving a radical difference between humans and animals. The 
closeness of the human and animal is manifest; they are interleading estates. The bacchants dress themselves in the skins of wild animals, 
the nebros (111, 137, 696), and are likened above all to wild animals: 135-9, 164-6, 699-703, 866-76, 977, 1056-7. From the very moment 
of his birth, and ever after, Dionysus is associated with wild animals, as much as with “spiritual” purity, hosia [70, ἐν ὄρεσσι βακχεύ-/ων 
ὁσίοις καθαρµοῖσιν 76-7, 114, his bacchants evoke Purity as goddess at 370-1, Pentheus utters “impure hybris against Dionysus” 374, and is 
an “impure man” who has incarcerated the Stranger, 613]: 101-4, 918-24 436-37, 1017-19: φάνηθι ταῦρος ἢ πολύκρανος ἰδεῖν/ δράκων ἢ 
πυριφλέγων/ ὁρᾶσθαι λέων. The division wild/tame is of great significance here. The domesticated becomes wild and the wild can be tame 
or gentle, the savage god makes others wild but is himself only ever seen as amenable (eutrepes 440, 844), tame, meek, prāos: ὁ θὴρ δ' ὅδ' 
ἡµῖν πρᾶος οὐδ' ὑπέσπασεν/φυγῆι πόδ', 436-7. Pentheus and the Thebans are ever snake people: 537-44, 1025-6, 1155, 1330-2, 1357-62. 
Actaeon, Pentheus’ cousin suffered the fate of becoming a wild animal torn savagely apart by his domestic beasts, 338-39: ὃν ὠµόσιτοι 
σκύλακες ἃς ἐθρέψατο/ διεσπάσαντο and 1291. Pentheus wants to incarcerate Dionysus with the horses of the House of Kadmos, by their 
mangers, 509-10. He will vainly chase after Dionysus at the bulls’ stalls, 618-9. The house and city, a domestic and political container, 
cannot contain the familiar forces that had been suborned to human intentions. The yoke of necessity in Aeschylus is here the broken bridle 
and the unbolted stable, herktai, 497, 549. Cf. Animal and Human analogies underpinning arguments in Republic, eg. Pl. Resp. 459-60, 
male and female as ‘one hunting pack’ Pl. Resp. 451d, 466 c-d inter al.; likeness with animals and difference from animals rests on the 
mediation of their sociality through language in Aristotle, Arist. Pol. 1253). See also Burkert GR: 104-107 “Tier und Gott”, where we read 
about the exceptionalness of Dionysus in this regard too, 105: “Und doch vermeiden es die Griechen, auch nur metaphorisch Zeus und Hera 
‘Stier’ oder ‘Kuh’ zu nennen, was doch etwa Ägypter und Ugariter gegenüber ihren Göttern ohne Scheu getan haben . . . Eine Ausnahme 
macht Dionysos. Er wird im Kultlied aus Elis als ‘Stier’ angerufen, zu kommen, ‘mit dem Rindsfuß tobend’, als ‘würdiger Stier’; er wird 
nicht selten mit Stierhörnern dargestellt; er hat in Kyzikos ein stiergestaltiges Kultbild; von ihm erzählt auch ein Mythos, wie er als 
Stierkalb geschlachtet und von den frevelhaften Vorzeitwesen, den Titanen, gegessen wurde. Dieser Mythos allerdings ist in der klassischen 
Zeit verdrängt, geheimgehalten, da er mit dem öffentlichen Bild des Göttlichen nicht vereinbar ist.” For recent work on the essential 
difference – one often not recognized by primary order, scientific methodologies – between humans and animals see Suddendorf, 2013; 
Tomasello, 2001, 2014; Taylor, 2016. Further on animal and human in Bacchae see Segal: 1982, 27-54, Thumiger, 2006, 2007: 122-37. 
Those denizens of the Dionysiac neighbourhood, which are satyrs, of course, embody the fusion or ‘contiguousness’ of human and animal; 
see on the satyr, for example, Lissarague in Masks: 207-20 and in Winkler, J. & Zeitlin, F. [edd.], 1990: 228-36. On animals and plants and 
the porousness of these natural divisions, (corollary of the transgressiveness, which has formed the basis for so many readings of Dionysus 
and of myth. 
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capacities, the critical faculties specific apparently to humans: “No other animals have the 
capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order 
desires.”41 
 
What we find in Frankfurt then (and, as we shall see, in Euripides), is a model of 
personhood defined by levels. These strata, significantly for our reading of Bacchae, can be 
concealed, covered from view, not evident but, owing to their imbricated character, 
becoming so in certain contexts. A person is marked not only by consciousness or the mere 
perception or registering of events and sensations, but by consciousness of their 
consciousness. A self, properly speaking, is a self that knows itself as such. Personhood is a 
recessive, a deferred kind of property, having hierarchized orders and levels within it, 
forming a kind of interior horizon that recedes and expands as one pursues it. A person is 
rather like a house in the way we speak of it as having levels, spaces within space and 
façades.  
 
Frankfurt employs a special, differentiated notion of will. Will is not simply inclination to 
act in this way or another; it is not “co-extensive with the notion of first-order desires”. First-
order desires, which we may share with all other creatures, are unevaluated, unprocessed by 
critical faculties. We might think of the first as the order of Gré. These desires arise and 
subside, they are or are not acted upon. When Pentheus, falling under the Dionysiac 
charisma, says at 820 “lead me away as quickly as possible, I grudge you any delay”, what 
we are being made to see is a man succumbing to the dissipation of the faculties for second-
order desiring, a man in whom orexis, appetite, and boulē, conscious desire, expand and 
bouleumata contracts42.  
 
For Frankfurt, it is important that the “will” is not this kind of desire or boulē. Desiring or 
inclining is insufficient for “will”,” which he takes as “effective desire”, “one that moves (or 
would move) a person all the way to action.”43 Desire is more manifold than will; one can 
have many desires, but does not act on all of them. What one actually does is what one really 
wills at any given time or, through failure of will or some other incapacitation, what one has 
insufficiently willed not to do. Much of what persons spend their time doing is making their 
desires commensurate with what they wish their desires to be, or making their will the 
desires that will become activated, i.e. those desires on which they act: “Someone has a 
                                                        
41 Frankfurt, 1971: 7. 
42 ἄγ' ὡς τάχιστα· τοῦ χρόνου δέ σοι φθονῶ. 820. 
43 Frankfurt, 1971: 8. 
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desire of the second order either when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he 
wants a certain desire to be his will.”44 
 
Wanting to have certain “effective desires”, a certain “will” in Frankfurt’s sense, is what he 
regards as “essential to being a person”,” and this he terms the having of “second-order 
volitions”. An agent without second-order volitions, even one that has second-order desires, 
is not a ‘full person’. Such entities Frankfurt calls ‘wantons’. We may ask ourselves, with 
reference to a play like Bacchae, what the nature of willing and desiring is, at what level or 
order these take place. The maenads are not only ‘wantons’, they are desirers of the animal 
order, of pure want and spontaneous reaction45. Kadmos, it seems, wants to want to believe 
in Dionysus, but we are left with doubts concerning the nature of his motivations. He wills it 
and his will is effective enough to make him take up the bacchants’ paraphernalia, even at 
risk to his social standing46. Kadmos wants the desire for Dionysus to be his desire, but we 
are left wondering if after all he is not a ‘wanton’ as, one may argue, he is finally charged by 
the god to have been47. Kadmos in turn implies that the god himself is guilty of a similar, too 
human, weakness in the face of his own emotions48. Kadmos seems to want to want Dionysus, 
but in his effective acts has he become a true bacchant, or merely a narthēkophoros, a bearer of 
the thyrsus, a wearer of the costume, a player of the role? His authenticity is in doubt. 
Would an “effective bacchant”, one who is sufficiently believing, exhort in the realpolitische 
terms Kadmos does, we are left to wonder49.  
 
                                                        
44 Frankfurt, 1971: 10. 
45 There are abundant images and expressions of the abandonment of individual, autonomous will and the surrender of the maenads and 
bacchants to a common volition that belongs to none of them, by which they belong to the owner of that will, Dionysus. They are in a state 
of animal thoughtlessness, which has two faces: one of purest innocence, the other of the most absolute and inhuman savagery. See the 
songs and the outburstsoutburst of emotion, which they are subject to, rather than subjects of: 73-86, 105-19, esp. 135-66, 378-85, 402-31, 
526, 576-603, 680-768. In the climactic scene of Pentheus’ sparagmos, their obedience to the command of the disembodied voice is the 
voluntary, not strongly willed, obedience of the dog, (the reverse of Aktaiōn’s hounds, which could not heed the lost voice of their master; 
the master of the maenads has vanished, καὶ τὸν ξένον µὲν οὐκέτ' εἰσορᾶν παρῆν 1077, but his enigmatic voice is present, speaks from the 
air, ἐκ δ' αἰθέρος φωνή τις, ὡς µὲν εἰκάσαι/ Διόνυσος, ἀνεβόησεν· 1078-9). The maenads are hunting dogs (ἡ δ' ἀνεβόησεν· Ὦ δροµάδες 
ἐµαὶ κύνες, 731, ἴτε θοαὶ Λύσσας κύνες, ἴτ' εἰς ὄρος 977) with pricked ears, absolutely still, they must be commanded once more by their 
pack-leader, kunēgetēs (871), 1086-8: αἱ δ' ὠσὶν ἠχὴν οὐ σαφῶς δεδεγµέναι/ ἔστησαν ὀρθαὶ καὶ διήνεγκαν κόρας./ ὁ δ' αὖθις ἐπεκέλευσεν). 
46 180, 205-4. 
47 1341-7.  
48 1348-9. 
49 330-42. His reasoning for why Pentheus should accept Dionysus is highly utilitarian: even if this is no god, he should say so in spite of 
himself, “lie nicely” παρὰ σοὶ λεγέσθω· καὶ καταψεύδου καλῶς, and thereby win honour for the family in any case, 333-6. Pentheus should 
accept Dionysus and avoid any chance of suffering his cousin, Aktaiōn’s, wretched fate. He had boasted that he was better at hunting in the 
mountains than Artemis, 337-40, (cf. Teiresias’ admonishment to Pentheus not to “boast” that it is human agency, dynamis, that holds the 
power, 309-10). There is more to gain from the wager on Dionysus than there is to lose, according to Kadmos. But connected to this 
question of risk and belief as wager, cf. also the chorus’ “it is light expense to believe that this has power”, κούφα γὰρ δαπάνα νοµί-/ ζειν 
ἰσχὺν τόδ' ἔχειν, 893-4 and further on this question § 4.3.4. On narthēkophoria see § 2.5 n. 271 in Pl. Phd. 69c 8 – d 2. 
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Teiresias and perhaps even the foreign thiasos are much stronger candidates as persons in 
this scenario, for they show secondary volition. They want Dionysus and they want to want 
Dionysus; their wills and desires are perfectly aligned. It is the difference between service 
and servitude: Teiresias is proud in the serving of Dionysus, τῶι Βακχίωι γὰρ τῶι ∆ιὸς 
δουλευτέον 366, the bacchants are joyous conscripts in the service of the god50. For Pentheus, 
on the contrary, this is not service but the degeneracy of willing servility, and the answering 
of, or waiting upon, hupēretein, a base bidding51. There is nothing more unbearable than the 
enslavement, which Dionysus represents to him52; he is a man in the fashion of an heroic age, 
for whom the greatest virtue is strength and respect, to hold the sword over his enemy’s 
neck53. For the bacchants and for Teiresias, the worship of Dionysus does not mean 
submission to slavery, becoming simply a fungible object in the ownership of “some 
foreigner”54. It means entering the service of a god who distributes his power and wisdom 
through those who desire him and desire to serve him by using his gifts55. He fills up those 
who serve him and empties out those who were servants or slaves only of their own 
unmastered desires. 
 
Unlike Kadmos, Pentheus undergoes a change, involuntarily, in the structure of his will. He 
is not a wanton when we meet him, though he is a man full of express desires. He certainly 
does not want to want Dionysus, though this is what those around him all encourage him to 
do – to desire otherwise. Yet his desires belie themselves; he seems to find the Stranger 
desirable and comes to desire that which will give him pain, 814-5: 
 
Pe. λυFρῶς νιν εἰσίδοι/' ἂν ἐξωινω/ένας56. 
                                                        
50 ὦ µάκαρ, ὅστις εὐδαί- / µων τελετὰς θεῶν . . . Διόνυσον θεραπεύει 73-4 . . . 82. Dionysus’ therapeia “service”, see 932-3. On service to 
gods cf. Eur. Cyc. 708-9 and on which Seaford, 1984: 225, Seaford on 206-9; and Wildberg, 1999/ 2000.  
51 πλήρεις δὲ θιάσοις ἐν µέσοισιν ἱστάναι/ κρατῆρας, ἄλλην δ' ἄλλοσ' εἰς ἐρηµίαν/ πτώσσουσαν εὐναῖς ἀρσένων ὑπηρετεῖν, 221-3. 
52τί δρῶντα; δουλεύοντα δουλείαις ἐµαῖς; 803. That is precisely what he had already been in the palace scene of his derangement, a futile 
striving slave, so Dionysus had narrated: ἅπας δ' ἐν ἔργωι δοῦλος ἦν, µάτην πονῶν 626. 
53877-80: †τί τὸ σοφόν, ἢ τί τὸ κάλλιον† / παρὰ θεῶν γέρας ἐν βροτοῖς / ἢ χεῖρ' ὑπὲρ κορυφᾶς / τῶν ἐχθρῶν κρείσσω κατέχειν; 
54 ὅστις ἔστι 220, τις εἰσελήλυθε ξένος 233, ὅστις ἔστιν ὁ ξένος 247.  
55 Unlike any other god, Dionysus is said to enter the body and invest it with his beneficent powers, so mortals “fill” themselves – ὅταν 
πλησθῶσιν ἀµπέλου ῥοῆς 281 – with the juice of the wine, which he brought and bequeathed to them, and they receive the rest and the 
unconsciousness of the ills of daily life – ὕπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ' ἡµέραν κακῶν 282 – which belongs to this “festival delighting” god 278-
83; the seer goes on to explain also that whenever he fills the human body “abundantly”, polus, ὅταν γὰρ ὁ θεὸς ἐς τὸ σῶµ' ἔλθηι πολύς 300, 
he gives his own mantic power of saying “what is to be”, τὸ µέλλον, to the “in-furiated” or “inspired”, τοὺς µεµηνότας 300.  
56 The manuscripts read νιν ‘her’, the complement of which is the plural ἐξωινωµένας, Bruhn emended to µεν, and Dodds favoured this 
emendation. Most commentators retain νιν unproblematically. It is tempting, but perhaps tendentious, to see this in terms of the thematic 
confusion of one and many, a context in which “blessed is he who makes his soul a part of the bacchic thiasos, group, in holy purifications 
in the mountains”, θιασεύεται ψυ-/χὰν ἐν ὄρεσσι βακχεύ-/ων ὁσίοις καθαρµοῖσιν, 75-7.  
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Di. ὅ/ως δ' ἴδοις ἂν ἡδέως ἅ σοι Fικρά;57 
 
Pe. It would pain me to see them drunk. 
Di. Would you nevertheless like to see what you won’t like? 
  
As we saw above, discrimination begins to dissolve in him58. He moves in an arc from 
repugnance and clearly articulated reasoning of that repugnance, to the baring or 
undressing and re-dressing of his desires. From an optative man for whom there are 
different possibilities and potentials, he is reduced to a vehicle of the single purpose of an 
external other. Pentheus and his fate can read as a lesson in the character and failing of being 
a ‘wanton’. He has not paused enough, has not considered how best to be and how to 
actualize his selected form of aretē.  
 
The gnomic wisdom of the chorus of bacchants is a wisdom concerning the quality of 
wisdom, gignōskein, and of care, meletān59, as they characteristically declare60. Thinking that a 
man is defined by station, gender, age, social and political role or power over others, 
Pentheus has not seen this fundamental, defining characteristic of a full person – a certain 
attendance to desires. As Frankfurt defines it: 
 
The essential characteristic of a wanton is that he does not care about his will. His 
desires move him to do certain things, without its being true of him either that he 
wants to be moved by those desires or that he prefers to be moved by other desires. 
The class of wantons includes all non-human animals that have desires and all very 
young children. Perhaps it also includes some adult human beings as well.61 In any 
                                                        
57 ἴδοις ἂν ἡδέως ἅ σοι πικρά: recalling that contrastive tension of the glukupikron “sweet-bitter”, this is an evocative instance of the theme 
of the friction that can characterize desires, their resistance and irresistibility. It naturally suggests the ‘bitter-sweet’ quality of erotic desire 
such as is expressed in a fragment with, I find, most Dionysiac tones, Sappho fr. 130: Ἔρος δηὖτέ µ' ὀ λυσιµέλης δόνει, / γλυκύπικρον 
ἀµάχανον ὄρπετον. 
58 820, and as an extended process 810-846. 
59Power over others: 877-80. Attending to desires see § 3.3.3 on Dionysiac melein. Dionysus hates the man who does not attend to what is 
truly desirable, µισεῖ δ' ὧι µὴ ταῦτα µέλει, 424. Everyone, including his servants, advises Pentheus, ominously, to “take care”, σοὶ δὲ τἄλλα 
χρὴ µέλειν, 450, or that he shall have this care in time, ἔτι σοι τοῦ Βροµίου µελήσει 536. There is no greater priority for a man than the right 
concern, rightly adjudicating what to value and attend to as a mortal. 
60 890-2: οὐ/ γὰρ κρεῖσσόν ποτε τῶν νόµων/ γιγνώσκειν χρὴ καὶ µελετᾶν.  
61 On the related notion of “competence”, see for example Giddens, 1984: 4: “The rationalization of action, within the diversity of 
circumstances of interaction, is the principal basis upon which the generalized ‘competence’ of actors is evaluated by others.”. For the 
“competence approach” of the cognitive study of religion and ritual, an idea borrowed from Chomskian theory of grammar, see the seminal 
work of Lawson and McCauley, Lawson & McCauley, 1990: esp. 60-83 and further development of their pioneering cognitive approach to 
religion in McCauley & Lawson, 2002. A good recent application of the cognitive science of religion to Ancient Greek sources is Larsson, 
2016. On the autist as “control” in establishing what “normal” agency is, see Tomasello, 1999: 56-93, esp. 76-7; Baron-Cohen, 1997.  
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case, adult humans may be more or less wanton; they may act wantonly62, in response 
to first-order desires concerning which they have no volitions of the second order, 
more or less frequently.63 
 
However we characterize Pentheus, the important point, perhaps, is that by the end Thebes 
(and Athens) necessarily has a differentiated picture of desire and volition and a more 
profound and articulated understanding of the nature of fuller personhood. The object, the 
horizon on which agency (most fully) realizes itself, is the horizon of that most elusive of all 
objects for a human, one’s own desires. 
 
It is not only amongst mortals with their actions and fates that we should look, in Tragedy, 
for an illumination of the structure of will, an exposé of the nature and functioning of 
otherwise hidden mechanisms of desire. The god whose mission it is to expose himself 
reveals also divinity’s deficits and, by extension, what is most desirable in human persons. 
Euripides’ Dionysus is little concerned with rightness or goodness (although his human 
followers, those ‘proclaimers’ and ‘interpreters’, prophētes, are64). He has an indifference to 
the lives of others and to the quality of his own desires. This is not atypical for the Greek 
gods, whose lack in “personal depth” is something for which neither longevity nor power 
compensate, in the eyes of human persons. Humans are marked by their habitual moral 
cares and unique potential to apprehend social others as subjects too, persons like self.  
 
Dionysus’s actions in Bacchae define him as what Frankfurt called a “rational wanton”. 
While reason is not a sufficient condition for personhood, it is a necessary condition. A 
wanton may possess reason, a person must65. The rational wanton “may employ rational 
faculties of a high order”,” but shows no interest in the discernment of any kind of hierarchy 
of value in their desires: “he is not concerned with the desirability of his desires themselves. 
He ignores the question of what his will is to be. Not only does he pursue whatever course 
                                                        
62 See my remarks above on characters in Greek Drama as in historical reality, as acting now this way, now another. This is an important 
point because Tragedy does not present persons or non-persons to its audiences, but in different scenarios shows protagonists as persons, 
wantons and what I am calling “zombies” (rather like “all non-human animals that have desires and all very young children”). Tragedy is 
prescriptive in showing the effects of wanton (tyrannical, infantile, self-destructive) and zombie-like behaviour and not only privileging 
personhood amongst its characters but seeking to inspire a ‘personal’, subjective, evaluative response in its audience. 
63 Frankfurt, 1971: 11. 
64 Prophētes: so the bacchants characterize themselves at 550-2: ἐσορᾶις τάδ', ὦ Διὸς παῖ/ Διόνυσε, σοὺς προφήτας/ ἐν ἁµίλλαισιν ἀνάγκας. 
In the first episode, Kadmos offers his arm to Teiresias, because ‘he does not see the light’, and declares that he will be his “explainer”, 
“interpreter”, 210-11: ἐπεὶ σὺ φέγγος, Τειρεσία, τόδ' οὐχ ὁρᾶις, / ἐγὼ προφήτης σοι λόγων γενήσοµαι. 
65 “In maintaining that the essence of being a person lies not in reason but in will, I am far from suggesting that a creature without reason 
may be a person. For it is only by virtue of his rational capacities that a person is capable of becoming critically aware of his own will and of 
forming volitions of the second order. The structure of a person’s will presupposes, accordingly, that he is a rational being”, (my emphases) 
Frankfurt, 1971: 11-2.  
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of action he is most strongly inclined to pursue, but he does not care which of his 
inclinations is strongest.”66 If Bacchae has seemed a riddle to critics67, it has often been because 
it has been hard to accept Dionysus, so incomplete as a person, as an immortal god. This is 
precisely, however, what Dionysus has arrived to affirm: that he is a god. The divine justice 
so beautifully celebrated in the Oresteia has become the arbitrariness, the radical libre arbitre, 
of divine desire in Bacchae. 
 
This is a god whose behaviour corresponds to that of the ‘rational wanton’. He is inflexible – 
agnamptos – as tragic mortals are, but without the tragical consequences68. He will arrive in 
Thebes laughing and vindictive and will undergo no change, no reversal, will learn nothing, 
pay no price.69 He is committed only to his desires – for face and recognition and revenge – 
which, he takes for granted, will be unproblematically intelligible to the human audience. 
His desires are primary. A certain dramatic irony may apply to him, in his not anticipating 
how problematic his intelligible behaviour and wishes may be for an audience composed of 
                                                        
66 Frankfurt, 1971: 11. 
67 See Bather, 1894; Norwood, 1908; Verrall, 1895, 1910; Nihard, 1912; Winnington-Ingram, 1948. On ‘rationalist criticism of Greek 
Tragedy’ see Ford, 2005. In contrastcontrats stand the ‘ritualism’ of Murray, and the somewhat positive valorization (under the influence of 
Freud on neurosis and suppression) of the irrational and inarticulate in Grube, 1935 and Dodds, 1929, 1960 (1944), 1951. See also Mason, 
1979: “The Bacchae Unriddled?”. 
68 Dionysus makes mortals bendy, he shows them as leaky, sticky and overflowing, this is the god of tragic poetry. The nature and meaning 
of Dionysus, for this is poetry, is expressed in many ways, and most concretely. The “bending” of purpose and desire, its “alignment” with 
the god’s will, takes many figurations. The organic, spontaneous nature of Dionysus’ worship, its liberation from the syntax of intention is 
expressed in the organic forms associatedassiciated with him, the ubiquitous wild curling hair, the abundant, uncultivated, i.e. not set in 
straight lines, vegetable life – he causes to run, roll and to curl or spiral: helissein. Dionysus makes pillars topple, upstanding houses prone, 
upright bodies to swing and collapse. He causes the straight lines of uniquely human agency to bend or to break, the upright – orthos – body 
to tumble or fall and move in circles, to forget purposes and the straight lines of effective cause. So evident is the identity of his purpose 
with organic roundness (the curlicues of Minoan art in all its delighted vitality and the Hellenic pillars wreathed in curling life-forms ( form, 
Bernabé’s remarks about ivy-decorated columns in Minoan and Mycenaean art as possibly aniconic representations of Dionysus come to 
mind, see in Bernabé: 32, with fig. 3.1) that he causes the upright tree, the pine, (which in Medea was turned to the calamitous purposes of 
skillful, tragic humans, Eur. Med. 3-5), not merely to bend to his will (ἔκαµπτεν ἐς γῆν, 1079) but even ‘to become a complete circle’  
κυκλοῦτο, 1066: 1064-74, [for a very detailed discussion of this passage with its strange technical imagery, see Rijksbaron ad loc.]. Οn ivy-
decorated columns, cf. the Orphic Hymn 47, to Dionysos Perikionios, cult title of the god at Thebes. The Scholion to Eur. Phoen. 651 cites 
Mnaseas on the myth behind this (FGH 3, fr.18): ἱστορεῖ γὰρ Μνασέας ὅτι τῶν Καδµείων βασιλείων κεραυνωθέντων κισσὸς περὶ τοὺς 
κίονας φυεὶς ἐκάλυψεν αὐτὸν, ὅπως µὴ αὐθηµερὸν καὶ ἐν µηδενὶ τὸ βρέφος διαφθαρῇ [καλυφθέν κισσῷ]· διὸ καὶ περικιόνιος ὁ θεὸς ἐκλήθη 
παρὰ Θηβαίοις. I.e. during Semele’s incineration. Aetiology for the fact that at Thebes he was worshipped as an ivy-wreathed column, on 
the site of the palace of Cadmus. 
On the bending, epignamptein, of persons to purposes in Greek poetry, see Snell’s telling remarks [he is discussing Il. 1.188-224, where 
Achilles feels the impulse to attack Agamemnon and must choose to act on it or not, the heart in the hero’s breast is “divided in debate two 
ways” διάνδιχα µερµήριξεν] at Snell, 1928: 20-1 “. . .  Achill steht vor einer Entscheidung. Er ist den einen Weg gekommen – plötzlich tut 
sich die Möglichkeit auf, abzubiegen und in anderer Richtung weiterzugehen. A diesem Punkt führt die homerische Psychologie immer ein 
äußeres Agens ein, un den Menschen umzustimmen – ἐπιγνάµπτειν ist ein häufiger Ausdruck dafür.” 
69 This single-mindedness, an inflexible answering only to his own unbending and unexamined desires, is all expressed most plainly in the 
prologue 1-63, the short addresses to the audience of bacchants and spectators such as 515-8, 604-37, 848-61, 971-6 and in the epilogue 
1330-51. 
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human persons; persons, that is, for whom judgements as to significance, worth and 
rightness are more important than only the correctness of transactions or the identification 
of facts.  
 
Dionysus is a person in whom there are no conflicting “first-order desires” and in whom 
there is no secondary volition. There is in him no wish that he were constituted differently 
as to his will. We cannot imagine him, for example, feeling constrained by Necessity and 
oracles or by an insuperable pattern that compels him to vindicate divinity, or wishing 
things were otherwise, or wishing that he did not feel so compelled. He is a “neutral with 
regard to the conflict between desires”70. Dionysus’ economy of desires is that of the wanton.  
 
Having second-order volitions entails a potentiality, a power for differentiation and 
discernment in oneself that may or may not be brought into operation. It is a capacity, a not 
necessarily actualized potential. A person may submit to the relative docility or slavery of 
impulse and unreflective desire, or exercise the capacity for second-order volition, which 
will redefine them as free, as a full person, but most human lives are spent somewhere 
between the qualities of agency. People are a variable mix of tendencies, in turn unreflective 
in turn self-reflexive. Freedom is a problem. For Frankfurt it is not only the having of first-
order desires and secondary volition that is constitutive of personhood, but also that 
freedom of will, which represents a problem for persons. Achilles in the Iliad, Agamemnon 
faced with the temptation of a dubious honour in the Agamemnon, Eteocles in Aeschylus’ 
Seven Against Thebes, Sophocles’ Odysseus, Creon in Antigone, Agamemnon and Menelaus in 
the Iphigenia at Aulis, Agamemnon confronted by Hecuba, Euripides’ and Aeschylus’ 
Orestes, Euripides’ Alcestis and Admetus – their freedom, or lack thereof, will consist not in 
any absolute independence from external forces or wills (always illusory, in any case, in the 
embodied, historical world of the human context), but in the qualitative assessment they 
make of their desires, their manner of measuring alternatives and in their sense and 
construal of action and will as problematic. How they are to act is determined by and will 
determine how others will see them and how they will see themselves. Tragic agency is 
inseparable from the question of identity71.  
 
The freedom of the spectator, precisely its identity as a subject confronted with alternative 
modes of life between which it must judge, that is what Tragedy most powerfully expresses. 
This is expressed through the drama of knowledgeability, false knowledge and ignorance. 
There is no exculpation for the king in arguing that he was not really “confronted by 
alternatives” because he did not recognize any alternatives in the first place. That failure to 
                                                        
70 Frankfurt, 1971: 12. 
71 For the sense in which “identity” is being employed here, see § 3.3.10. 
 153 
recognize confrontation by difference is perhaps exactly what his principle failure consisted 
of. Pentheus misjudges because he does not know, but he also does not know because of his 
misjudgements. The dialectical relationship of knowledge and judgement is a central 
problem challenging our view of the logic of causation and responsibility in understanding 
the psycho-ethics of tragic protagonists. This is especially the case when spectators are given 
to witness protagonists who have tragically misidentified the nature of their problems. This 
is certainly what Euripidean Tragedy dramatizes: the quality of alternatives and their 
pursuit; and action and choice qua problem72. As for the 20th Century philosopher, so too for 5th 
Century Tragedy, person . . . 
 
. . . can also be construed as the concept of a type of entity for whom the freedom of 
its will may be a problem. This concept excludes all wantons, both infrahuman and 
human, since they fail to satisfy an essential condition for the enjoyment of freedom 
of the will. And it excludes those suprahuman beings, if any, whose wills are 
necessarily free.73 
 
The arguments of Frankfurt and Taylor are so serviceable to the interpreter of Tragedy 
because they insist on the more primary kind of freedom, the freedom not to do but to wish 
alternatively. This is the freedom that interested the Greek poets. Human action and 
practical agency is impressive,74 but also hopelessly limited and very meagre when set 
against the capacity of divinity. Bacchae is an extended juxtaposing of human incapacity 
against the effortless efficaciousness of the divine. One of the many ways in which this is 
expressed is the framing of the encounter between Pentheus and Dionysus as if, at least by 
the rules of a time-bound game, they were equal, contesting counterparts75.  
                                                        
72 Resistance and Irresistibility: men are addicted to what they already know, the familiar, and to remaining how they have become through 
habituation, ethismos. Ēthos is not so immutable as physis, nature, but is similar and therefore still hard to transform, see Arist. Eth. Nic. 
1152 a 27-33. Dionysus transforms atmosphere and ēthos. He breaks the spell of habituation, of the familiar and the normal, with his festive 
intrusions into the space-time, which is the polis. Thus the vital sap of the new refreshes and renews the polis, see Otto, 1933: 145-54. 
Dionysus is that vital sap, just as he is the juice of the bursting grape. In Plutarch is he thus called dendritēs, Plut. 2. 675 and endendros by 
Pindar. Pentheus is offered, asked to “receive” Dionysus, he is asked to desire the god. The god’s sojourn in Thebes teaches mortals about 
the quality of desire and wish, which he demands from mortals. None of the reasoning or calculation (330-42); philosophical and 
interpretive explanation or persuasion (266-327, 787-91); passionate admonishment (358-69); impartial testimony (434-50, 769-774); 
miracles he himself witnesses (616-56); or Stranger’s warnings (490) and offers (802), have any effect on Pentheus, because he does not 
know what and how to desire to know and recognize Dionysus. 
73 Frankfurt, 1971: 14. 
74 The greatest expression of the awesomeness of human agency in Tragedy, the art at the centre of which stands the habitual, human over-
estimation of agency, hybris, is found in Sophocles’ Antigone at 332-75. In Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound there is a remarkable account by 
the philanthrope Prometheus, whose gifts to humankind, have, like Dionysus’, been defining for them; in certain senses Prometheus’ gifts 
are very similar, in others they are the very opposite of Bromios’, see PD 442-71. 
75 Demeter and her gift of bread, the dry, is a counterpart – ἀντίπαλον, 278 – to Dionysus and his gift of wine, the moist. Pentheus meets 
Dionysus and sees him like a contemptible adversary in the wrestling-ring, πλόκαµός τε γάρ σου ταναὸς οὐ πάλης ὕπο 455. He will be 
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Is there any part of a person that can become other than what it has already become by 
habituation, or by nature always been? This is a crucial question. Could Pentheus ever have 
desired other than he did, was his knowledge always circumscribed by his limited 
subjectivity? The play has certainly been read this way by many. Nevertheless, it seems from 
Tragedy and from its rejuvenating, revitalizing and renewing god, this neos theos, that 
change and insight and discovery of things that we ‘do not know we do not know’ are 
possible. Freedom is an epistemic potentiality. Actors seem in retrospect to have been 
predetermined. Yet it is precisely that which seems most radically to limit them, which may 
be the source of their true liberty: time, the perspective taken on self as some property – a 
possession or ktēma – that somehow persists in the midst of passing.  
 
If a subject begins to think of the limitations upon its alternatives, everything that constrains 
its freedom to act of its own pre-determined volition, it begins to look upon its future, in 
prospect, differently. It will begin to re-evaluate knowledgeability itself. One has not been 
entirely free in their choices, what kind of person is free or has some measure of autonomy? 
How should I re-evaluate my values to suit this existential predicament? It is the person 
who has first asked that question, one who recognizes that there are kinds of persons, 
different qualities of existence possible, and that is eph’ ēmin, in our power. It would 
represent a form of nihilism to resign oneself to the impossibility of becoming a different 
kind of person, which we simply do not find in Greek Tragedy76. 
 
Pentheus is a certain kind of person, just the kind who did or failed to make the choices he 
did; he became what he was, it seems. But in the moment of freedom which is the present, a 
kairos, Dionysus and Bacchae seem to imply, a subject may become otherwise, may be 
                                                        
called a monstrous “wrestler against” the gods, by the bacchants, ὥστε γίγαντ' ἀντίπαλον θεοῖς· 543-4. The terrible impiousness of warring 
against the gods is raised as terrible prospect in the play (ἀλλ' ὅµως χορευτέον, /κοὐ θεοµαχήσω σῶν λόγων πεισθεὶς ὕπο 324-5;  and 
strongly related to the inadvertent but culpable person of Pentheus: ὃς θεοµαχεῖ τὰ κατ' ἐµὲ 45, πρὸς θεὸν γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ/ ἐς µάχην ἐλθεῖν 
ἐτόλµησ' 635-5, 837, ἀλλὰ θεοµαχεῖν µόνον/ οἷός τ' ἐκεῖνος 1255-6. With Dionysus, here in this version of one of his myths at the very end 
of the Peloponnesian War, not receiving him as ally, symmachos 1343, in the right faith, is tantamount also to being at war against him, a 
god. The god is present, whether one wants to accept that or not is what will be determining. At 923 he is the kind of symmachos that a 
mortal should never have wanted, ὁ θεὸς ὁµαρτεῖ and by 1047 he is “leader” or escort in the spectacle, ξένος θ' ὃς ἡµῖν ποµπὸς ἦν θεωρίας, 
(also ποµπὸς εἶµ' ἐγὼ σωτήριος, 965). The bacchants are also his contestants, the enemies he deserves, 964: τοιγάρ σ' ἀγῶνες ἀναµένουσιν 
οὓς ἐχρῆν, 974-6. On theomachein see § 2.5 n. 273. Note that Euripides never calls Pentheus a theomachos, which might have suggested a 
deliberate choice to take a stand against divinity. He “fights against god”, but out of a willful ignorance, amathia, not a reasoned principle or 
reclaimed motivation (amathia 480, 490; failure of mathein 1281, 1345: it is essentially a form of obdurately weak volition, an ignorance for 
which men are held responsible; see also Plato’s Socrates on “willful ignorance” as the oppposite of syneidenai, see Fine in Inwood, 2008: 
61, and Pl. Ap. Leg. 688c). He is the inadvertent wrestler with a daimōn, like the not so woeful Jacob of Gen. 32. 22-31. Jacob is a man more 
like the ‘folk hero’, Oedipus, [see Nilsson, 1932: 100-6] whom he resembles even in the limp, they both acquire. For the very tragic theme 
of learning too late cf. 1345 and Di Benedetto’s remarks there and on Eur. Elec. 1201 ff.  
76 Except as a negative ideal, in the form of Aeschylus’ Eteocles, see § 3.3.11 below. 
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transformed in its desires and perspectives on itself. The play is meaningful precisely because 
actions, choices and persons have the potentiality to be meaningful, to feel concern for 
meaning: Pentheus, like all mortals, has not only reflexes, is not simply the sum of 
habituations, but has the capacity – agency – to review himself, to see a new self, to discern a 
new knowledge of self in spite of his normal condition, hexis. ‘Capacity’ is perhaps 
misleading in this radically temporal situation; perhaps opportunity is more accurate. 
Pentheus is offered, from the beginning, every opportunity to choose other than he 
characteristically would, to loosen his grip on his established self. It is precisely the 
unforeseeable nature of time – underdetermined and always coming into being – which 
might encourage subjects to become receptive to change, to different ways of being, in 
recognition of their own necessary, anagkaion, ignorance. 
 
What humans can do, the way in which they can be liberated is made manifest in the 
presence of the god of drama (present always in his theatre as well as in a fully embodied 
protagonist in Bacchae77). He is the god who rectifies resistance, unwillingness to himself and 
his double power is both to loosen volition and to deepen it. Humans can want differently. 
They can confront themselves as problematic and not automatic, frictionless executors of 
acts that arise out of an inscrutable, libidinal darkness. They can pause, interrupt the 
ongoing flow of interactions and transactions of daily life. They have the capacity to 
discourse, take and share counsel and reflect, exactly as Dionysus causes them to do in his 
theatre. They have also the negative capacity to stop reflecting and discover the meaning 
and limitations of reflection, through its loss. With his arrivals and interventions into the 
ordinary flow of time and the normal constitution of relations between persons, Dionysus 
may be seen also to activate this negative capacity – a danger, but also the paradoxical 
means by which the nature of capacity and agency takes on its depth and dimension. 
 
The Frankfurtian freedom of the will is not a question simply of desired objects and desired 
deeds (or the desire ‘to do what one pleases’), but the relations between desires, the will to 
will. The freedom of a person is freedom to “. . . want what he wants to want. More 
precisely, it means that he is free to will what he wants to will, or to have the will he 
wants.”78 Freedom of action concerns whether a given action is the one an agent wants to 
perform. Freedom of will properly means freedom to have the will one has.79 This is, I 
believe, the more appropriate light in which to read not only Bacchae, but the Oresteia, the 
Seven against Thebes, the Oedipus plays, the Iphigenia at Aulis and all the debates concerning 
freedom and constraint explored there.  
                                                        
77 For an apparent reference to a statue of Dionysus in the theatre, see Ar. Eq. 536 and Paus. 1.20. 1-3.  
78 Frankfurt, 1971: 15. 
79 Frankfurt, 1971: 15. 
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For Frankfurt, it is in securing the conformity of will to second-order volitions that persons 
are free. People are seldom free: freedom is a kind of living up to a potential, a potential 
indissociable from knowledge and reflection, from cognitive operations repeatedly 
thematized in Tragedy and of principal interest in Bacchae, where cognitive operations are 
also inseparable from emotional conditions. To his credit Frankfurt does concede that there 
is “as much opportunity for ambivalence, conflict and self-deception with regard to desires 
of the second-order . . . as there is with regard to first-order desires.”80 People are 
complicated, caught in a permanently dynamic stream of events, desires and perspectives. 
Human relations and apperceptions are messy and that is the very subject of Tragedy, it is 
precisely what it dramatizes.  
 
If an agent fails to identify himself properly with any of his first-order desires (becomes like 
a zombie and fails to make a preference that becomes his will) or with any of his second-
order desires (so that he forms a desire of a still higher order, “a case of humanization run 
wild”81), his personhood is destroyed. This question of the right identification with oneself, 
with one’s own desires, situates us squarely in the world of Dionysus. In the proximity of 
Dionysus the nature of relations between people becomes problematic (and also within 
them, between their parts, between their desires and their thoughts). Relations qua relations, 
their content, significance and nature, this is the problematic quality explored in Greek 
drama. A fundamental question about Pentheus and his transition in Bacchae, a question we 
do not ask about the frenzied women of Thebes and that we assume to know the answer to 
concerning Kadmos and Teiresias or the Tyrrhenian sailors of Homeric Hymn VII: is his will 
his own?  
 
Who owns that property called “Pentheus”? We tend to imagine that the owner is the 
controller; hence who controls, we think, is the owner. A different perspective on agency 
may set out to review the concept of ownership. Perhaps it is not a question of whether one 
owns one’s actions or not. Rather, remaining with this Metaphorik of tenure, human subjects 
should be seen as custodians, having a temporary lease on themselves. Pentheus’ will is his 
own to begin with, but we see him gradually lose ownership rights over it. Dionysus takes 
him, volitionally and psychologically, into custody. Pentheus’ “will” has been insufficiently 
externalized to himself, it has simply unfolded and thus he has been like a process of 
unfolding. He has not “done” his desiring; his desires have simply happened. An important 
point here is to ask what we should take from this. It is unlikely that Euripides wants his 
audience to think that people are slaves in the possession of their master desires and 
                                                        
80 Frankfurt, 1971: 15. 
81 One may think of the case of Shakespeare’s Hamlet, who for so long could not settle on which desires to identify himself with. 
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immoveably fixed characters. In the spectacle of a weak and weakened volition, we are 
being induced to re-evaluate and articulate the nature, limitations and possibilities of the 
relation between our own desires, choices and what we can learn, mathein, come to know. 
 
He seems to start off a most “willful” man and over the course of the play’s events to 
become estranged from himself; we are audience to his transformation into a mere 
“bystander to himself”82. From 810 until his final exit, 976 (as still intact physical person, “he” 
does return once more, but reduced to his decapitated head, the actor’s mask), Pentheus is 
transformed into a kataskopos, “observer”, “spy”, a secret bystander83. His preparation or 
training for this office of undetected detective, is to try to look upon himself from outside, to 
borrow the eyes of another84. He has already come out, a man who sees the world in 
duplicate. Rather than seeing things ‘within themselves’, they are simply, as he has become, 
outside of themselves, the same things again rather than the unique thing with depth or new 
dimension85. He is a man driven out of himself (ἔξω δ' ἐλαύνων τοῦ φρονεῖν, 853), truly a 
bystander; he has not understood that the show is his own life and death, his only concern is 
his appearance86; how he is seen and not that he will be seen is all that he sees87; and only now 
he “sees as he ought to, having been mentally unhealthy previously”88.  What we witness, in 
other words, is two visions of a man, two kinds of person. One with a certain degree of the 
capacity for free willing89, and one rendered captive to desires that he has not, would never 
have90, chosen. Pentheus is estranged from his own desires by the Stranger god, the foreigner 
who renews and estranges, the neos theos. 
 
Theories of subjectivity rooted in causal over-determination (such as predominated in the 
second half of the 20th Century) fail to explain “why we desire this freedom [freedom of will] 
                                                        
82 Cf. Frankfurt, 1971: 17. 
83 Kataskopos: 838, 916, 956, 981. 
84 How do I look? The spitting image of a bacchant, 925-7: Pe. τί φαίνοµαι δῆτ'; οὐχὶ τὴν Ἰνοῦς στάσιν/ ἢ τὴν Ἀγαυῆς ἑστάναι, µητρός γ' 
ἐµῆς; Di. αὐτὰς ἐκείνας εἰσορᾶν δοκῶ σ' ὁρῶν. 
85 On the famous and variously interpreted hallucinations of Pentheus where he is told, 923-4, by the bystanding Stranger that finally he is 
seeing as he should 918-22, see p.157. 
86 830-42, 925-6, 941-2.  
87 960, ὤφθη δὲ µᾶλλον ἢ κατεῖδε µαινάδας· 1075, and yet just as he did not see when it counted, when it counts most for his life, he is 
registered but not seen by his own mother, who is not in her right mind, (in lines grimly echoing 912 and 947-8), 1122-4: ἡ δ' ἀφρὸν ἐξιεῖσα 
καὶ διαστρόφους/ κόρας ἑλίσσουσ', οὐ φρονοῦσ' ἃ χρὴ φρονεῖν, / ἐκ Βακχίου κατείχετ', οὐδ' ἔπειθέ νιν. 
88 923-4: πρόσθεν ὢν οὐκ εὐµενής, / ἔνσπονδος ἡµῖν· νῦν δ' ὁρᾶις ἃ χρή σ' ὁρᾶν. Also 947-8: τὰς δὲ πρὶν φρένας / οὐκ εἶχες ὑγιεῖς, νῦν δ' 
ἔχεις οἵας σε δεῖ. 
89 Thus, is he repeatedly appealed to by all those around him, as someone who simply does not know but can learn, or someone who is sick 
and can choose a healthier attitude. 
90 850-53: πρῶτα δ' ἔκστησον φρενῶν, / ἐνεὶς ἐλαφρὰν λύσσαν· ὡς φρονῶν µὲν εὖ/ οὐ µὴ θελήσηι θῆλυν ἐνδῦναι στολήν, / ἔξω δ' ἐλαύνων 
τοῦ φρονεῖν ἐνδύσεται. 
 158 
and why we refuse to ascribe it to animals”91. Humans “care” and humans show 
“preference”. This fundamental fact about them is at the very heart of Tragedy and its 
experience, which indeed relies on the subjectivity of its audience, their inclinations and the 
assessment of their inclinations, their attachment to certain agents and their acts and their 
disinclination from others, but never their detachment. Tragedy provides the spectacle of 
actors, of persons rising or not to their potential for personhood, tangled in an insoluble 
chain of events and causes. They are somewhat free to have the will they want and by turns, 
alternis vicibus, sometimes apparently constrained to want as some other agent wants them 
to – free and not free actors. It represents a volitional and actional spectrum in which there is 
often a most life-like indefiniteness.  
 
It is in constituting one’s own will that one is free, according to Frankfurt. The constitution 
of one’s will is inseparable from a certain articulacy, a certain capacity for differentiation and 
expression. These will form the indispensable conditions of bouleusis. This articulacy finds 
one of its most brilliant formulations and representations in one of the earliest surviving 
forms of poetry: the dramatic poetry of the festivals of Dionysus. It is the articulacy also 
which Charles Taylor, developing Frankfurt’s ideas, identifies as the mark of that entity 
capable of the formation of second-order desires, the “agentful person”. 
 
 
3.3 Defining Person, Defining Agency: Charles Taylor 
 
The essays of the philosopher, Charles Taylor, make arguments that resonate very strongly 
with what we find in Tragedy. The temptation is to explain in detail how that is the case and 
to illustrate his arguments, particularly those found in Human Agency and Language92, with 
examples drawn from the surviving corpus of Attic Drama. Our limited space will not 
permit that here, but nevertheless I will sketch a few key ideas in Taylor and link them to 
Euripides’ Bacchae and hope that that will suffice to encourage the interested reader to 
undertake further study of Taylor and enjoy the excitement of seeing the great bearing on 
the Dionysiac art of his subtle ideas. 
                                                        
91 Frankfurt discusses Chisholm here, but his example of the hand moved by an order from the brain strongly recalls the later, much-
discussed paper of Libet, 1985 “Unconscious cerebral initiative and the role of conscious will in voluntary action”, discussed by Dennett, 
1991: 139-70, that apparently, and it would have been consistent with non-interest in judgements and preferences, fascinated Walter 
Burkert. But cf. Giddens, 1984: 65-6: on Merleau-Ponty on the body in time and “Wittgenstein’s question, ‘What is the difference between 
my raising my arm and my arm going up?’”. 
92 Human Agency and Language: philosophical papers I. Taylor, 1985. See also his magnum opus, Sources of the Self: The Making of the 
Modern Identity (Taylor, 1992) for a wide-ranging historical, philosophical discussion of the topic so important to us here, the character of 
subjectivity. For a recent account of the history of the anthropological constitution of subjectivity, see Brian Morris’ very useful 
Anthropology and the Human Subject, (Morris, 2014) towards a phenomenology of Tragedy, esp. 502-49; and for the question of 
interpretation versus explanation, “Anthropology as a Humanistic Science”, 732-82. 
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Taylor opens this work with a discussion and further development of Frankfurt’s ideas. He 
introduces the fundamental differentiation of “Strong and Weak Evaluations”. I shall 
discuss this idea and its relevance to Bacchae, and, related to it, Taylor’s notion of the 
articulacy and interpretiveness of agents, which, reflexively, is also constitutive of 
themselves as agentful persons. Closely related to these concepts are the ideas of depth, the 
searching for clarity and for “yardsticks” or measures; a philosophical vocabulary, the 
contents of which are expressed in the imagery of Tragic Drama. Taylor’s notions of 
“import” and “import-ascription”, of “subject-reference” (the subject’s emotions referring to 
its life qua subject, and offering insight into what this life amounts to) and the “mattering” 
and reflexivity indispensable to what in Tragedy it “is to be human”, have very strong 
bearing on what we see taking place in Bacchae and Tragedy generally.  
 
Tragedy itself is agentful, and we engage with dramatic performances in the same way we 
engage with persons93. This point will find its elucidation through an engagement with 
Taylor’s observations about language (and its role in the emotions) and the effect of 
questioning (and its role in constituting persons as such). Language, we might even say, is 
active and creative; it does not only reflect the reality of “objects” but re-organizes the very 
structure of will and evaluation, which define the agentful person. It gives form to the 
inchoate; it discriminates between desires and options as to their worthiness; it hierarchizes 
and poses a question “that can never be closed”: τί δράσω; or as Pentheus asks, τί δρῶντα;94 
That question takes on a special richness in this work in which the immortal god, addressing 
mortals, utters that haunting line to which we return so often in reconsidering this strange 
play: οὐκ οἶσθ' †ὅτι ζῆς† οὐδ' ὃ δρᾶις οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ95. The mortal loses all effectiveness in the 
presence of the god of inarticulacies, a god who “will not be still, neither acted upon nor 
acting”, 800-1.96 
 
I shall begin, however, with Taylor on ‘personhood’ and lead into these other, intimately 
related, topics from there.97 There is a common – moral and legal – notion of personhood: 
humans are responsible and bearers of rights. Taylor is concerned with the capacities that 
underline these. However damaged its capacities may be, a person has the potential (even if 
                                                        
93 See on Gell, 1998 on art objects and performances as ‘persons’.  
94 803, where Pentheus expresses his intolerance of becoming “a slave to my slaves”, and we may begin to see that his “slaves”, who have 
spoken as men and not mere instruments, have been far more helpful to him than the pathē; we say his pathē, but they are passions which 
have owned him. H, e has been a slave to these all along, we may be encouraged to suspect.  
95 “You don’t know what life you are living, what you are doing or even who you are” 506, see § 2.2.1.2 n. 122, (this fundamental sentiment 
is, typically, foreshadowed in the preceding actions and speech, e.g. Teiresias to Pentheus in the first episode, 358-9).  
96 For translations of trans. and comments on these lines see p. 91. 
97 “The concept of a person” in Taylor, 1985: 97-114. 
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it is sleeping, comatose) to have “a sense of self, has a notion of the future and past, can hold 
values, make choices; in short, can adopt life plans . . . a necessary (but not sufficient) 
condition [is that] . . . a person is a being with his own point of view on things.”98. The reader 
of Bacchae may be impressed. In this optic, the play can be said to be about or to explore 
what a person is, what its agency is. The sense of self; the sense of time; the catastrophic loss 
of these senses, and that of the self as an entity in time, as a binding together of a past and a 
future; having values, the relativity of those values and their consequences; the having and 
losing of life plans; the losing of point of view: all are at stake, all are thematic problems of 
Bacchae.  
 
The person is what Taylor, appropriately in a quite literal sense, for the protagonist of 
Tragedy, calls a ’respondent’: “The life-plan, the choices, the sense of self must be 
attributable to him as in some sense their point of origin. A person is a being who can be 
addressed, and who can reply. Let us call a being of this kind a ‘respondent’.”99 Persons are a 
sub-class of agents; animals carry out actions but are not respondent. The same goes of 
course for bacchants to whom we cannot bind choices or projects as to a personal point of 
origin. We find the imputing of full responsibility for Pentheus’ murder to Agauē 
problematic, as Oedipus’ guilt is problematic. Their person is not entirely theirs, but belongs 
to another agent, Dionysus or Apollo’s oracle, contingency, tuchē or anangkē, how things had 
to be. There is no addressing Maenads100. Their non-responsiveness more deeply articulates 
the nature of and potentialities inherent in dialogue – stichomythia, amoiboia, and rhēsis – 
the bacchic mode is a musical not a dialogic mode.101 In a Dionysiac state one has lost time, a 
sense of one’s own virtually divisible self, lost point of view. To fall into mania, to become 
bacchos, may be to become either enhanced or debased; either like a god, outside of time, or 
to lose something that may ultimately matter as much: human personhood, this 
responsiveness. Humans are this special class of agents who are also respondents – that is, 
for Taylor, “persons”. 
 
 
  
                                                        
98 Taylor, 1985: 97. 
99 My italics, Taylor, 1985: 97. 
100 731-47, 1118-24, 1244-64. 
101 Thumiger’s discussion of time and Bacchae represents, I find, the most insightful pages of a really excellent study, see Thumiger, 2007: 
178-6. See also Goward, 1999: 21-37, especially her very helpful distinction of the synchronic modality of the chorus, contrasting with the 
diachronic modality of the iambic, spoken parts. 
 161 
Two Views 
 
There are two views of persons (that correspond to the ‘bifurcation’ in hermeneutic 
approaches: objective and subjective102). These views will determine “two orders of question: 
scientific ones – how are we to explain human behaviour? – and practical-moral ones – what 
is a good/decent/acceptable form of life?”103. This division, which is perhaps the major 
theme of Taylor’s work (more precisely the inadequacy of the explanatory, scientific order of 
inquiry), is a division that runs through the study of Greek religion and Greek Tragedy too. 
In the first (seventeenth-century derived) view, a person “is a being with consciousness, 
where consciousness is seen as a power to frame representations of things.”104 In this view the 
nature or quality of agency is unimportant; it is a performative criterion: “The boundary 
between persons and mere things is not recognized at all, and is not seen as reflecting a 
qualitative distinction.” Here, a complex enough kind of artificial intelligence would qualify 
an android as being an agent105. Greek gods are super-natural agents, full persons in this 
sense, but they have a fundamental limitation in their absence of fuller reflexivity, in their 
under-developed, under-articulated sense of what matters to them. Dionysus, for example, 
seems marked by a drive for revenge: he travels from city to city106, borne by the impetus of 
his unscrutinized nature, desirous but himself no evaluator107.  
 
In the second view, the one that Taylor takes as his subject, it is the nature of agency that is 
the focus. It is not a performance criterion here that counts; a mechanistic view of such beings 
as animals is not possible. This is not the purely externalist view judging entities by their 
capacity to achieve certain goals. The crux here is not the agent’s ability to accomplish a telos, 
but that things matter to agents. If we studied Dionysus as a cultural phenomenon produced 
by human beings and not as a real existent, we might say that Dionysus’ purposes, his 
desires and aversions, are not original with him but attributed by people. In just the same 
                                                        
102 See his remarks on the “significance free accounts”, the “natural science model”, its reductivism and the insufficiency of “faddish” 
sociobiology in the discussion of culture, the practices of persons, Taylor, 1985: 108-11. This is consistent with the arguments against 
philosophical utilitarianism of “what is human agency?” Taylor, 1985: 15-44, and very helpful to read against the ‘scientist’ Burkertian 
analysis of Greek Culture. 
103 His italics, Taylor, 1985: 98. See on this the nuanced discussion of the problem of “interpretation versus explanation in Lawson & 
McCauley, 1990: 12-31. 
104 Taylor, 1985: 98. 
105 Two excellent recent films (Her, 2013, written and directed by Spike Jonez and Ex Machina, 2015 written and directed by Alex Garland) 
have dealt in very interesting ways with the implications of high-level artificial intelligence, performing consciousness. Judging by what 
people (audiences and film-makers) feel is problematic about robots, it does certainly seem that moral qualities, the having problems with 
compulsions and not merely compulsions (instructions, drives, programmes), being evaluative and feeling that things matter are instinctively 
understood also by to non-philosophers as indeed the challenge in the encounter between conscious person and only consciousness. 
106 13-22, 48-50. 
107 He has an insatiable appetite for recognition: 22, ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁπάντων βούλεται τιµὰς ἔχειν 208, τέρπεται τιµώµενος. 321, 342; and revenge: 
32-42, 515-18, 848-61, 971-6, ἀλλὰ τιµωρεῖσθέ νιν. 1081.  
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way a machine, a robot (Hephaistos’ robot, Zeus’ Pandora, the “ex tempore hergestellte 
Dionysos” of the Anthesteria108), perhaps even a knife or axe seen as ‘agentful’ and 
responsible in a ritual killing109, have what Taylor differentiates as “derivative . . . user-
relative” purpose. Humans are the “users” of the gods. These do not have “original” 
purposes; their functions are imparted to them by mortals110. An android, for all its superior 
practical abilities to flesh-and-bone persons, will only have the purposes with which it had 
been programmed (even if that includes learning to develop “new purposes”, that too will 
have to have been programmed).  
 
Incarnate beings – animals and humans – are “subjects of original purpose”. Taking 
seriously the difference between original and derived purposes is crucial for Taylor. The 
performance criterion falls away: a high operating artificial intelligence system that appears 
conscious cannot thereby be classed an agent, since having original purposes is a necessary 
condition by the second view of agency. This view “sees the agent/thing boundary as being 
an important and problematic one . . . offers . . . a different answer to the question, what 
makes a respondent? This is no longer seen in terms of consciousness but in terms of 
mattering itself. An agent can be a respondent, because things matter to it in an original 
way. What it responds out of is the original significance of things for it.”111 The agents in the 
theatre of Dionysus are the living, incarnate human beings and for these nothing is more 
crucial than that element in themselves which distinguishes them as living agents, who in 
time must succumb to transformation into inert matter. They, far more than a god like 
Dionysus, are the ones for whom things urgently matter and are problematic in an original 
way. 
 
Characteristically, human consciousness consists in more than just the power to ‘frame 
representations’ or the having ‘original purposes’, by Taylor’s reckoning; instead it can “be 
seen as what we attain when we come to formulate the significance of things for us. We then 
have an articulate view of our self and world. But things matter to us prior to this 
formulation. So original purpose cannot be confused with consciousness.”112 It is the case 
then, that neither original purpose nor “consciousness as representation” are what 
distinguish persons from animals. The two reasons Taylor gives for why this should be the 
case for “consciousness as representation” have to do, firstly, with the nature of 
                                                        
108 See § 6.7 n. 127. 
109 See above, p. 96. 
110 If you accept with me that the gods did not “exist” but were the products of Greek culture. Scholars have not always done so, even 
recently, Stavru on Otto in Otto, 2011 [1933]: 195-6; Bremmer in Bernabé: 4-22. This distinction is missing from Rivier’s analysis and 
distorts his conclusions. 
111 Taylor, 1985: 99. 
112 Taylor, 1985: 100. 
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‘formulation’ and, secondly, the nature and central role for humans of ‘significance’. Since I 
set out with the premise that Tragedy – art of the intervener, der kommende Gott – is not to be 
seen simply as a reflection of beliefs or practice, but as an agentful intervention, an active 
formulation and self-reflexively reformulating handling of what is most significant to its 
poets and their audiences, I find Taylor’s highly differentiated notions of personhood in 
such terms, naturally, most serviceable.  
 
 
Recursiveness: Knowledge redounds 
 
The recursiveness or non-independence of formulations is essential here. The ‘objective’ 
view of persons, which privileges consciousness, typically understands consciousness as 
framing representations of independent objects. This independence however is illusory; it 
does not hold “when we look at a certain range of formulations which are crucial to human 
consciousness, the articulation of our human feelings” – in other words, those very pathetic 
contents of experience, which Tragedy takes for its stuff113. Even those who argue that 
Euripidean drama, for example, is a drama of ideas, must concede that it is made of 
characters articulating and failing to fully articulate themselves, and that this is what we are 
given to watch.  
 
I wish to underline very strongly this point about the recursiveness (to use Gidden’s term) of 
formulation and emotion. Even when, perhaps especially when, the protagonists have not 
changed or when they have failed to learn, there is always one special agent, addressed as a 
person by the poet, who must be modified, enlarged through drama. That is the audience, of 
course. Tragedy is, amongst the other things it may be, a complex formulation of values, 
feelings, crucial human problems. It cannot, it strives not to, leave the world constituted of 
persons as it is, unchanged. As Taylor puts it: “Formulating how we feel, or coming to adopt 
a new formulation, can frequently change how we feel. When I come to see that my feeling 
of guilt was false, or my feeling of love self-deluded, the emotions themselves are different”114. 
Seeing things again, developing a different knowledge of them, seeing them anew, from a 
new perspective, changes them and changes the seer – this in fact would be one good way to 
sum up a moral or point of Bacchae or to express Euripides’ interpretation of the meaning of 
Dionysus and his relation to theatre. Dionysus is a most recursive god, the god of the 
dialectical relation, the most intervening, interlocutive and interactive of divinities. The non-
independence of representation-to-self of emotions and of significance is one of those 
elementary ways in which subjects may be seen to be entangled, through the re-bindings of 
                                                        
113 Taylor, 1985: 100. 
114 My emphasis, Taylor, 1985: 100. 
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language. We should not say they are entangled with themselves, but that the binding, the 
wovenness of consciousness with ‘objects’ of consciousness is in part constitutive of the self, 
the shape of persons, the structure of their wills. 
 
Pride, shame, guilt, sense of worth, love – the elementary emotions of Tragic Drama then – 
each is understood or explained only through the description of situations in which these 
are experienced. Tragedy dramatizes these situations and ‘describes’ these emotions; 
defining them, nuancing and differentiating them, it formulates persons in predicaments of 
significance. Formulating these feelings is inseparable from a judgement; the judgement that 
they are present in, or suitably describe, a given situation: “One could say that there is a 
judgement integral to each one of these emotions: ‘this is shameful’ for shame; ‘there is 
danger’ for fear, and so on. Not that to feel the emotion is to assent to the judgement . . . It is 
rather that feeling the emotion in question just is being struck by, or moved by, the state of 
affairs the judgement describes.”115 We describe emotions by describing situations; thus do 
we make responses intelligible; thus do dramatic poets realize emotions, making them both 
intelligible and also new, in renewing the situations described. We alter our feelings in 
altering the situation-descriptions we accept.116  
 
 
Knowledge concerning Knowledge 
 
What is the object of these ‘altered feelings’, one may reasonably ask. If Dionysus has a 
lesson it is not legal or doctrinal; rather, in Euripides’ treatment, it is the offer of a knowledge 
concerning knowledge. Here the difficult knowledgeability being conveyed runs something 
like this: just as a person is not made up of objectively demonstrable properties, but is some 
immaterial property, a relationship of value, so too is its highest knowledge a knowledge 
not of objects but a knowledge about knowledge. It is the “knowing”, sophia, not the 
“knowledge”, to sophon – the action not the object of the action or its objectification – which 
is most true and valuable, 395: τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία117. The alteration which Dionysus brings 
about is an alteration in relations to oneself, one’s mortal life to others and in the whole 
perspective in what life is for, its telos. It is no longer self-evident, after seeing Bacchae and 
the other works Euripides wrote for performance in the Theatre of Dionysus, that acclaim, 
kleos; timē, honour; ploutos, wealth; power, kuria and sovereignty turannida; or life itself, are 
                                                        
115 Taylor, 1985: 100. 
116 On this reflexivity so fundamental to our reading of drama: “. . . I can describe my emotions by describing my situation, and very often 
must do so really to give the flavour of what I feel. But then I alter the description of my emotions in altering the description I accept of my 
situation. But to alter my situation-description will be to alter my feelings, if I am moved by my newly perceived predicament.” Taylor, 
1985: 101. Dionysus’ Theatre is an intense laboratory of just such ‘newly perceived predicaments’. 
117 See also § 7.3. 
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absolutely valuable in and of themselves. Bacchae constrains the audience to a re-evaluation 
of values. It does not offer a new set or moral code, but suggests that the re-evaluation itself 
– the new valorization or knowledge concerning knowledge – an attentive bearing towards 
existence and value, is the highest value. 
 
We alter our feelings in altering the situation-descriptions we accept: do we accept that 
Aeschylus’ Clytemnestra is both a woman and man-like in her wrath and the execution of 
her revenge? Then we must accept a new more differentiated notion of women (and of 
manhood). Do we accept that Euripides’ Medea is both unjustly treated and wicked? We 
must nuance our notion of good and wicked, of the spectrum of motivations and the 
extensiveness of responsibility for deeds, its distribution through the agents in a given 
situation. Do we think courage and manliness, are intimately connected?118 We must 
reconsider when we see Alcestis’ sacrifice and that of the willing Iphigenia in Euripides119. 
Are the motives of Eteocles, Odysseus or Achilles pure or tempered, even explained by 
somewhat compromising desires? The nature of heroism has changed in the challenge. Is the 
human mind, a strange alternatingly present and absent property of persons, the “most 
awesome” phenomenon in a universe of wonders?120 Yet, the most mindful, strategic and 
cunning of men, Odysseus, is also depicted very poorly in Tragedy121, a man lacking 
something of great value. We have, as a result, a deeper, more contradictory and more richly 
qualified sense of what we thought we valued absolutely: 
 
We could say that for these emotions, our understanding of them or the 
interpretation we accept are constitutive of the emotion. The understanding helps 
shape the emotion. And that is why the latter cannot be considered a fully 
independent object, and the traditional theory of consciousness as representation 
does not apply here.122 
 
 
                                                        
118 Andreia (or andria) the Greeks called it, opposing “fearfulness”, deilia, to “manliness”;”, so did the Romans connect moral quality, 
virtus, with manhood. Courage and fear are degendered in Bacchae, one of the many ways in which Euripides (through his Dionysus) may 
be said to “dentaure” nomoi, norms and uses. 
119 In Aeschylus, she is not the pathetically willing child of Euripides’ IA; in the Agamemnon, we hear that measures are put in place to 
prevent her potentially cursing her family and killers, before she is slaughtered, see A. Ag. 235-7. 
120 See § 2.2.1.1 n. 75 above on the “awesome”, deinos, power of human cognitive agency. 
121 In Attic drama the great instrumentalist, the survivor Odysseus, is represented as shrewd but inhumanly dispassionate or unsympathetic. 
See, for example, Hecuba, Rhesus (where he is a familiarly shallow killer in the dark, while others around him are more suffering and 
marked by pathos, such as Hector, Rhesus and his mother the Muse, who curses Odysseus in her sorrow, as so many others are caused to do, 
Eur. Rh. 906-9), Iphigenia at Aulis (in which he does not appear, but this same character is evoked as a force in the background, which 
determines the choice of Agamemnon), and in Sophocles’ Philoctetes and Ajax. 
122 Taylor, 1985: 101. 
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Concern: Subjects of Significance 
 
Taylor’s second reason for the insufficiency of consciousness and its framing of 
representation as a criterion for personhood is the importance for persons of significance, 
their ‘moral agency’. In the second view (where it is the nature of agency that is the focus 
and the quality of life that is at issue, not merely the effectiveness of functions), in which an 
agent is understood as a “subject of significance”, we are compelled to see that there are 
“matters of significance for human beings which are peculiarly human and have no 
analogue with animals”123. These are precisely what I am terming the “stuff” of Tragedy. We 
distort Tragedy when we neglect to read it in this light and seek to explain it through an 
even vestigially objectivist historiography. A scientific history of religious practice, for 
example, will have a certain prestige amongst scholars, seeming to purge the contingent 
human agent from its analysis, treating human persons as acting out social, historical or 
biological imperatives that dwarf the individual scale. Yet Tragedy is not depersonalised 
ritual and simply does not make sense or have any interest if “matters of significance” are 
not seen as the primary matter124. As long as we identify agency uniquely with “strategic 
action”, and say that (a certain side of) Odysseus is what defines persons – that exemplary 
cunning of his, his “ability to envisage a longer time scale, to understand more complex 
cause-effect relationships, and thus to engage in calculations, and the like”, we cannot show 
a qualitative, but only a quantitative, difference between humans and animals. Of course, 
presuming no qualitative difference is what many scholars and the generally diffused 
consensus in the culture today does.125  
 
The reader of Tragedy must struggle with such a smoothing over of the cleft that separates 
humans and animals, for the humans of Attic drama possess just this quality of concern for 
what matters, this preoccupation with significance discussed so lucidly by Taylor126. 
Sophocles’ Oedipus may not be able to escape from Necessity, from Contingency or Curse, 
but we can hardly escape from the primary fact about him: he is a moral man, he feels 
repugnance at the prospect of the unspeakable shame he is forecast, when at Corinth, to 
bring upon himself and his house. He wants to do the right thing, as he understands right. 
Clytemnestra is a powerful and intelligible person because, as we can readily understand, 
she knows wrong from right even as she is very comprehensibly overcome by passion. 
                                                        
123 Taylor, 1985: 101. 
124 On the subject of drama misconceived as ritual, see Scullion, 2002, a paper which goes a long way towards repairing the misconception 
that can arise out of focus on the ritual dimensions of Tragedy or its origins in sacrifice. 
125 Taylor, 1985: 102. 
126 On the “gap” between human and animal in Bacchae and as a premise giving a peculiar profile to the interpretation of culture, see § 3.2.2 
n. 40 above. 
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Antigone is the very model of commitment to a sense of self as a moral agent for whom the 
mattering of things, their significance and the having of standards, is everything.  
 
How can things matter prior to the formulation of their value? Is not the hierarchy of value 
co-extensive with rather than anterior to values? The dilemma is in trying to establish if 
language is constitutive or re-constitutive of something original, subsisting and prior to its 
different manners of being expressed. This unresolved problem is one that haunts this 
philosophical poetry of Euripides, for whom philosophy and truth is not the opposite of 
darkness and irrationality, since he is such a consummate – teleios – poet. The radical 
recursiveness of values and expressions of value comes to light near Dionysus. Language is 
that most puzzling of all riddles: being like an effect which has constituted its own cause. 
We are born into a world of culture and we are, definitively language animals and language is 
normative, nomimon127. Yet, nomos which is derivative, is continuously becoming – phuein – 
original, phusikos, over time and in time. This enigmatic recursiveness of opposites is the 
magic thread running through Bacchae. It is beautifully expressed by the chorus at 893-96128: 
 
κούφα γὰρ δαFάνα νο/ί- 
ζειν ἰσχὺν τόδ' ἔχειν, 
ὅτι Fοτ' ἄρα τὸ δαι/όνιον, 
τό τ' ἐν χρόνωι /ακρῶι νό/ι/ον 
ἀεὶ φύσει τε Fεφυκός. 
 
Light is the expense to hold [nomizein “believe”] 
That it contains power,  
Whatever it is that is the divine [daimonion],  
And this, over the long durée, is upheld [nomimon]  
Will always be [phusei] and has always been [pephukos]. 
 
Origin, gignesthai, phusis and formulation, nomos: these by turns become each other. Our 
values, which are cultural and inextricable from tradition and habituation, are somehow 
prior to their (cultural) expression and co-extensive with that. Yet the same goes in reverse, 
for this is dialectical. By turns, the one is “prior”, then the other. Parallel with this is the 
relationship between ēthos, the character – which has developed out of “habituation”, 
“accustoming”, ethismos – and praxis, the act which is both product and producer of ēthos. 
 
 
                                                        
127 See also Taylor, 2016 The Language Animal. The Full Shape of th Human Linguistic Capacity. 
128 On these lines see also § 4.3 n. 101, § 5.5.3 n. 130 § 7.3. 
 168 
3.3.1 Theban Stratagems 
 
The problem of being strategic but not understanding how things matter, being 
calculatingly cautious or conniving, rather than having a more profound sōphrosunē, is 
raised in Bacchae with thematic force. Hera, unreflectively motivated by the passion of 
jealousy and anger, devised against Semelē, and Zeus was forced to counter-strategize, 
antimēchanasthai, “as a god is wont to do”129. The sisters of Semelē understood motivation 
only in terms of strategies of concealment and deception, thinking they knew too well how 
things “really are”. They attributed their sister’s pregnancy by Zeus to her promiscuity, and 
saw her explanation as a cover-up, which they attributed to their father Kadmos’ scheming, 
sophismata, 30130. It is that cynical inference, the reading of their situation in terms of strategy 
and calculation, for which Dionysus has punished them, driven them out of their minds, 
effacing the very faculty for calculation and inference, which they have imprudently, viz. 
tragically, overestimated131.  
 
Kadmos, who when focalized through the perspective of his own daughters (at least in the 
telling of Dionysus in the prologue, 26-31), has been identified as a contriver of sophismata, is 
indeed, we shall soon discover, a man too like that Hippolytus, who famously swore only in 
the saying, while his heart remained, unsworn, anōmotos132. He is a man too pragmatic in his 
approach to Dionysus; he mis-assesses the Dionysiac worship and, symptomatically, wants 
to drive in a carriage to the mountain, but that, explains Teiresias, would give the god 
diminished honour.133 This is a god who wants body and mind, an integrated intentionality 
transcending the simple pursuit of goals, negotiating of obstacles or mere performance of 
activities. Kadmos stands in contrast to his generational coeval Teiresias in other ways too. 
He thinks he ought to “magnify” Dionysus because of their family connection134. He does 
“not disdain” the gods, because he knows his place as a mortal (θνητὸς γεγώς, 199), while 
Teiresias very explicitly explains his own attitude, not in a manner that could be taken as the 
expression of judicious caution, but in terms of the very inadequacy of the mind, with its 
plans and circumventions, in the face of the inherited wisdom, which is a possession 
unassailable by logos or to sophon135. 
                                                        
129 Hera: 9, 96-8, 288-97. Zeus’ counter devising, 291-4, Ζεὺς δ' ἀντεµηχανήσαθ' οἷα δὴ θεός, 291. 
130 26-31. Sophismata, “ingenious stratagems”, “clever schemes” also alleged by Pentheus of Dionysus at 489. 
131 32-42. 
132 See Eur. Hipp. 612, where the tongue is as if an instrument detaching, by the intentions of the “mind”, phrēn, the subject from its 
objective words and their import, see similarly also Med. 737. 
133 191-2: Ka. οὔκουν ὄχοισιν εἰς ὄρος περάσοµεν; / Te. ἀλλ' οὐχ ὁµοίως ἂν ὁ θεὸς τιµὴν ἔχοι. See further on these lines at § 6.2.1.  
134 182-4: δεῖ γάρ νιν ὄντα παῖδα θυγατρὸς ἐξ ἐµῆς / [Διόνυσον ὃς πέφηνεν ἀνθρώποις θεὸς] / ὅσον καθ' ἡµᾶς δυνατὸν αὔξεσθαι µέγαν.  
135 Kadmos [199-203]: οὐ καταφρονῶ 'γὼ τῶν θεῶν θνητὸς γεγώς. / οὐδὲν σοφιζόµεσθα τοῖσι δαίµοσιν. / πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ' 
ὁµήλικας χρόνωι / κεκτήµεθ', οὐδεὶς αὐτὰ καταβαλεῖ λόγος, / οὐδ' εἰ δι' ἄκρων τὸ σοφὸν ηὕρηται φρενῶν.] “I for one, sincesonce I am 
mortal, do not look down on the gods. We don’t use cleverness when it comes to divine beings. Our predecessors’ traditions, which are 
 169 
 
Too calculatingly does Kadmos encourage Pentheus to accept Dionysus, 330-42:  
 
ὦ Fαῖ, καλῶς σοι Τειρεσίας Fαρήινεσεν. 
οἴκει /εθ' ἡ/ῶν, /ὴ θύραζε τῶν νό/ων· 
νῦν γὰρ Fέτηι τε καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς. 
κεἰ /ὴ γὰρ ἔστιν136 ὁ θεὸς οὗτος, ὡς σὺ φήις, 
Fαρὰ σοὶ λεγέσθω137· καὶ καταψεύδου καλῶς 
ὡς ἔστι Σε/έλης, ἵνα δοκῆι θεὸν τεκεῖν 
ἡ/ῖν τε τι/ὴ Fαντὶ τῶι γένει Fροσῆι. 
ὁρᾶις τὸν Ἀκταίωνος ἄθλιον /όρον, 
ὃν ὠ/όσιτοι σκύλακες ἃς ἐθρέψατο   
διεσFάσαντο, κρείσσον' ἐν κυναγίαις 
Ἀρτέ/ιδος εἶναι κο/Fάσαντ' ἐν ὀργάσιν. 
ὃ /ὴ Fάθηις σύ· δεῦρό σου στέψω κάρα 
κισσῶι· /εθ' ἡ/ῶν τῶι θεῶι τι/ὴν δίδου. 
 
My child, Teiresias has advised you well. 
Keep with us, not out of bounds of our custom; 
For you are agitated at the moment and thinking nothing thoughtful. 
And even if the god he isn’t, as you say, 
Let him be said to be a god, in your eyes; make a tidy lie of it 
Say that he is Semelē’s son, so that she seem to have carried a god 
And there be honour attached to us and all our kind. 
You see Actaeon’s wretched lot, 
Whom his own raw-flesh eating puppies, which he had reared, 
Tore to shreds, for he had boasted that he was greater  
In the hunt than Artemis, 
Which fate see that you do not suffer. Come, I shall dress your head 
With ivy, pay the god his honour with us.  
 
                                                        
coeval with time itself, are ours now, no logos [reasoning, argument, calculation] will topple these, even should it invent some science 
[sophon] through the heights of mind.” 
136 κεἰ µὴ γὰρ ἔστιν: note the echo with Dionysus’ dark innuendo in the prologue at 39: δεῖ γὰρ πόλιν τήνδ' ἐκµαθεῖν, κεἰ µὴ θέλει. 
Rijksbaron ad loc.: “A good example of the ‘scepticism’-value of εἰ + indicative, which is enhanced by the clause ὡς σὺ φήις; note the 
emphatic σύ.” 
137 παρὰ σοὶ λεγέσθω “Let him be said to be so in your eyes, by your judgement.” Rijksbaron ad loc.: “Verdenius is certainly right in 
rejecting the usual translations, which rest upon taking παρὰ σοὶ as referring to an agent.”. For the use of παρά with the dative he refers to 
Kühner & Gerth’s Ausführliche Grammatik der griechischen Sprache. Satzlehre. 1898-1904: 1, 511.  
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Kadmos’s characterization by others, the kinds of motives he reveals for his own acceptance 
of Dionysus and the terms in which he seeks to motivate others, reveal a man too strategic. 
His strategizing approach reveals a bearing towards the world, and therefore to Dionysus, 
for the insufficiency of which Kadmos will suffer terribly138. The spirit of utilitarian Realpolitik 
we discern in Kadmos (a figure like Odysseus who has wandered across the seas, the 
Phoenician [wily] Kadmos will face the prospect at the end of this story of further deferment 
of rest, strange wanderings at the head of an army139) is detected in another urbane wanderer, 
planēs. The “city-slicker”140 (τις Fλάνης κατ' ἄστυ καὶ τρίβων λόγων, 717) reported by the 
messenger at 717-23 is an opportunist, a man decidedly of the polis (he addresses the 
shepherds, pointedly distinguishing himself with urbane courtesy, Ὦ σε/νὰς 
Fλάκας/ναίοντες ὀρέων, 718-9), whose calculation is for profit, the king’s useful “favour”, 
charin (χάριν τ' ἄνακτι θώ/εθ', 721),) and whose instinct is to plan, conceal and seize 
advantage (θά/νων δ' ἐλλοχίζο/εν φόβαις/ κρύψαντες αὑτούς, 722-3).141 
 
Bacchae is the predicament of estimation dramatized through the story of a god’s disesteem 
and its tragic recoupment. It is a situation in which persons think only others will have to 
pay for their sophismata, contriving, and do not anticipate the punishment or fee for which 
they become liable through the weakness of their evaluations. Hence Pentheus tells the 
Stranger that he will have to pay the penalty for his “tricks”142, only himself to pay the 
ultimate price for his own foolish plan to become a spy on the bacchants. Pentheus has 
thought that he could buy access – /άλιστα, /υρίον γε δοὺς χρυσοῦ σταθ/όν 812 – buy an 
invaluable knowledge, one which stands outside of the economies of human intention. This 
is a knowledge beyond logical analysis or deconstruction, ineffable, impermissible to those 
untransformed by bacchic emotion, but “worth knowing”; for reasons, ironically, 
uncommunicable to those who have not first been admitted into the Dionysiac community 
of knowledge and affect143. Pentheus, Kadmos and the deranged women of Thebes show, in 
extreme, dramatic, fashion, the calamitous consequences for mortals of not having had, of 
gradually losing and having utterly lost, the faculty for qualitative discrimination.  
 
                                                        
138 1330-80.  
139 1330-39. 
140 Dodds’ (and Seaford’s) gloss on 717. The bacchants and Dionysus are ‘wanderers’ of a different kind, as at 148-9, where the baccheus is 
said to “excite (his) wanderers”: πλανάτας ἐρεθίζων.  
141 See also chp. 3 pp. on advantage, “interest”: onēsis. Material rewards and the weak evaluator’s desire for lucre surface in Bacchae – 257, 
812, as it does as a problem in many of Euripides’ works. He is a poet centrally concerned with existence, its value and its evaluation: see 
Orestes’ despairing questions on how to recognize value in persons at Eur. El. 373-9 [lines deleted by Wilamowitz, but retained by most 
editors]. 
142 δίκην σε δοῦναι δεῖ σοφισµάτων κακῶν. 489. 
143 ἄρρητ' ἀβακχεύτοισιν εἰδέναι βροτῶν 472, οὐ θέµις ἀκοῦσαί σ', ἔστι δ' ἄξι' εἰδέναι 474; insusceptible to logic, impervious to science: 
200-3. 
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In Euripides’ Iphigenia at Aulis Agamemnon and Menelaus (and on their peripheries, 
Achilles and Odysseus) and the victims of their ignobly judged “self-interest” embody 
exactly the same problem: the danger underlying human situations of misidentification of 
one’s own; one’s own interests, one’s own kin. The same can likely also be said of the 
Alcmeon at Corinth, a play which hinges on misrecognitions of kin, having what was lost and 
losing what was thought possessed – ownership and relation are questions of knowledge 
and recognition, properties that depend on ideas about them144. In all three of the Tragedies 
that Euripides presented at the Great Dionysia in 405 BCE, hybris will have consisted of a 
failure to adapt one’s identity. And identity is seen to be permanently reconstituted through 
ongoing choices and decisions, which repose on what figures have identified as the most 
valuable or estimable identity to have. These tragically agnamptoi persons have failed to bend 
themselves, to Dionysus’ helix postures, to a different vision of worth and misapprized the 
human situation. They have sought to bend others and their situations to their own 
mismeasure of reality and value. 
 
 
3.3.2 Concern: Proximate and Ultimate 
 
Humans as a kind are distinct by their concern, meletē145. They attend to themselves and the 
quality of their lives – “the ends which make up a human life are sui generis. And then even 
the ends of survival and reproduction will appear in a new light. What it is to maintain and 
hand on a human form of life, that is, a given culture, is also a peculiarly human affair.”146 
And indeed there is a concern with reproduction, with the survival of the house and the 
continuity or non-continuity of the city at the heart of Bacchae as well. Forms of life, the 
tensions inherent in the imperative for both their renewal and their extension over time, are 
evident and become articulated through this very god Dionysus. In Bacchae we hear 
exhortations from the older generation to the younger to receive and maintain the patrioi 
paradochai; we see in the failure to sustain a culture, to breathe vitality into established forms, 
the catastrophic reduction to non-human states: to beast and to object.147 
 
That things matter to Taylor’s moral agent is necessarily connected with consciousness, and 
how we can explain the great prominence, in this ethical and pathetic art form of Tragedy, of 
terms for and the examination of the nature and character of knowledge. To be a moral 
                                                        
144 See Nauck2 TGF Eur. frr.73-76, (frr. 78-87, from either Alcmeon in Corinth or Alcmeon in Psophis) Apollod. 3.7.7, and Hall in Stuttard: 
11-28. 
145 On this “care” or “attending”, see below § 3.3.3.  
146 Taylor, 1985: 102. 
147 201-2: πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ' ὁµήλικας χρόνωι/ κεκτήµεθ'. 
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agent is to be sensitive in a strong sense: one will follow certain standards but also “in some 
sense recognize or acknowledge the standard.”148 This is important: Dionysus requires just such 
a “sensitivity” from mortals, not simply that they follow certain forms or standards of 
behaviour, but that they authentically recognize or acknowledge what he means, the value of 
his gifts and his claims upon them. Dionysus demands to be known, he comes to be shown 
and seen, and if as a person he lacks a certain depth, as a phenomenon he represents a 
certain mode of life offered to humans, that mode of life articulated most impressively in 
song, by the chorus. They celebrate what matters and repudiate in song what does not 
matter; what bearing is best and what most destructive. They chant a Dionysiac re-
orientation towards time, towards mortality and its moral implications, and towards social 
others. The primary requirement for the liberated personhood, envisioned in Dionysus’ 
mode of life by the bacchants, is what Taylor has called this “strong sensitivity”, a true 
recognition and acknowledgement of the god and the deep significance that becomes 
manifest through his presence. 
 
“Some kind of consciousness”, “some kind of reflexive awareness of the standards one is 
living by (or failing to live by)”149 is essential to the significance of things to mortals, the fact 
that their lives and actions and bearing matter. This is a very great, even the greatest, part of 
the meaning of poetry and literature generally and of Attic Tragedy here. It is also a 
peculiarly important aspect of Bacchae. There we are both explicitly enjoined to reconsider, 
(skopein “observe”, athrein “look”, and thereby “learn!” mathe, which means also “take in” or 
“receive!” dechou) 150,  the standards or judgements by which we are living and to understand 
the nature and indispensable character, in a meaningful order of existence, of consciousness 
and reflexivity151. The collapse of the maenads’ minds, so powerfully narrated by messengers 
and so impressively dramatized in the person of Pentheus, as well as its recuperation in the 
case of Agauē, is a central element of the play. Consciousness discerns, makes distinctions, 
and there is, of course, no significance without the capacity to distinguish. And yet the 
Promethean agency of krisis, diairesis, diarithmein152 is displaced in Dionysiac proximity, with 
the gifts of fusion, blending, the unanimity of the equivocating god: the mixing of wine as 
the mixing together of persons into one person, krasis; the fastening together of persons and 
of the uniforms that show their unity with one another, the outward signs of their inward 
                                                        
148 My emphasis, Taylor, 1985: 102. 
149 Taylor, 1985: 103. 
150 So for example: σκοπεῖν χρή 317. Kadmos’ words to the Agauē he is trying to bring back to lucidity, might stand as an imperative 
underlying much of the play: ἄθρησον αὐτὸ καὶ σαφέστερον µάθε, 1281. 
151 See esp. 877-911, where the bacchant chorus sings about the best kind of life for mortals. Also the makarismos as at 73-77, 1002-7, 
1150-2. Humans need to make their judgements based on a cosmic perspective, of themselves as dying creatures in an order overshadowed 
by undying beings, 1325-6: εἰ δ' ἔστιν ὅστις δαιµόνων ὑπερφρονεῖ, / ἐς τοῦδ' ἀθρήσας θάνατον ἡγείσθω θεούς. 
152 See Aesch. PV 442-58. 
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binding, sunapsis; and their linking and yoking together in all ways sunesis153. This god does 
not segregate, even along the most fundamental lines of the Lebenswelt154, between old and 
young, the preceding and succeeding generation, 206-7:  
 
οὐ γὰρ διήιρηχ' ὁ θεὸς οὔτε τὸν νέον 
εἰ χρὴ χορεύειν οὔτε τὸν γεραίτερον.  
 
For whether they must dance, the god  
Has not discriminated between young or old. 
 
The paradoxical Dionysus comes surrounded by attendants who sing of matters of “ultimate 
concern”155, hymning what is to be distinguished as truly valuable in life, even as he makes 
mortals indistinguishable, 208-9156. All are simply mortals to this god; he, qua immortal, wants 
identical reverence, timē, from anyone and all alike157. 
 
This consciousness, however, is not simply the capacity for forming representations of 
independent objects or the laying out of strategies. The consciousness presumed by 
peculiarly human concerns does not only passively register or practically strategize, but is 
morally creative or agentful: 
 
Consciousness – perhaps we might better say language – is as it were the medium 
within which they first arise as concerns for us. The medium here is in some way 
inseparable from the content; which is why as we saw above our self-understanding in 
this domain is constitutive of what we feel.158 
 
If our “self-understanding in this domain is constitutive of what we feel” then not only is the 
enlargement and richer differentiation of our knowledge of self all the more urgent, but we 
                                                        
153 Krasis: Just as the head, κράς, is so important near Dionysus, it must be made prominent and dressed with wreaths, so too are his mixing 
bowls, krateres, always present (222, 687) and they wreathe human heads in sweet sleep 385. Hapsis, sunapsis: bacchic effects like the 
thyrsus and fawn-skin are ‘clasped on’ to the individual body to give it identity with other bodies 176; bacchants ‘clasp and yoke’ 
themselves together, 198; the fires of Dionysus ‘catch’, 594, 778; and Pentheus, in one of those moments in which he inadvertently utters a 
truth he does not comprehend, says that he ‘catches, cleaves to, fastens himself’ to what he deserves 594. Sunesis: images of such 
juxtaposing and linkage e.g. in the company of the Dionysiac thiasos hitched to the wandering god 57; the ‘compact’ that bacchants make 
175, 707-8; and the ‘holding together of houses’ expressed at 392, 1309. 
154 On Lebenswelt see § 4.6. 
155 See Burkert, 1996: 5-8 on three characteristics of religion, one of which is its occupation with what Tillich called “ultimate concerns”. 
156 See p. 105 for text and translation of these lines. 
157 The unexempting requirement of Dionysus from mortals, becomes by the end an unexempted catastrophe: τοιγὰρ συνῆψε πάντας ἐς µίαν 
βλάβην 1303, ὦ τέκνον, ὡς ἐς δεινὸν ἤλθοµεν κακὸν/ <πάντες>, 1352-3. 
158 Taylor, 1985: 103. 
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may begin to see how ingenious Euripides’ particular vision of Dionysus is as a model, how 
profound his Bacchae is as an illustration or exposition of the complex, recursive relationship 
between knowledge and affect. In this relationship language is not merely instrumental or 
representational. The language of drama, and by extension language in general, is seen to be 
– in its power of discernment and distinction, in its potential to open up persons and 
differentiate them, to articulate “the structure of their will” and reveal or give form to values 
– creative. If language is constitutive of personhood and agency in its fullness, we may say 
that language itself and this art of Tragedy realized, in large part, through language, are 
profoundly ‘agentful’. 
 
 
3.3.3 Melein: Dionysiac Attending  
 
The words – ‘the sophon is not sophia’ – have been intoned in the first antistrophe 
(respondent stanza) of the first stasimon, 386-401. In the second antistrophe, the wisdom of 
the mind is still the theme. Dionysus is connected with a certain kind of existential 
attentiveness, melein159. The servant who brings the captive Dionysus before Pentheus, 
recommends seeing that this figure is special, thaumatōn pleōs, “full of wonders”,160 but as we 
have seen, he resigns himself to the king’s authority with what will prove to be ominous 
words: “but this must be your concern” – melein – σοὶ δὲ τἄλλα χρὴ /έλειν, 450161. Mortals 
must take care to attend to Dionysus and everything he signifies. In those scenes of 
sensational, ironic reversal when Pentheus has emerged into sight in a female bacchant’s 
garb, the god “is taking care to serve” the mortal: ἡ/εῖς, οἷς σε θεραFεύειν /έλει, 932162.  
 
Melein and its nominal form meletē, (like telein and its nominal form teletē 163), is dear to 
Dionysus, his own concern. ‘Caring’, ‘attending’ and ‘intending’ are of course cognitive 
postures that are at once also affective bearings – the union of ‘heart and mind’. As we have 
been seeing, it is precisely in affective bearing and cognitive posture that Dionysus is 
experienced by mortals. It is these inner states and that which testifies to their authenticity 
and sincerity that he wants from human beings.  Euripides’ Dionysus wants a certain quality 
                                                        
159 Melein: Chantraine “sens <<être l’objet de souci>> ou <<de réflexion>> parfois avec une personne comme sujet.”  
160 πολλῶν δ' ὅδ' ἁνὴρ θαυµάτων ἥκει πλέως, 449. 
161 Note the echoes of this line in Dionysus’ words at the climactic close of the fourth episode, 976: τἄλλα δ' αὐτὸ σηµανεῖ. 
162 Therapeia: on service to the god and “amenability” eutrepes, see § 3.2.2 n. 40; Wildberg, 1999/2000. 
163 Teletē: usually translated as ‘rites’ or as in Seaford, for example, ‘initiations’, we may with justification render as teletai as 
‘consummations’ or ‘perfections’. The word derives from the verb telein ‘complete, accomplish, perfect, end’, as one sees in telos. What it 
refers to must certainly be recognized as ‘religious doings’, but the name suggests that the contents of those doings had to do with the 
processing of individuals or groups, with making them whole in a new, more perfect or finished identity in relation to each other in their 
social world and in relation to the undying gods. Dionysus declares that he has come to Thebes to ‘institute my teletai’, [καταστήσας ἐµὰς/ 
τελετάς, 21-2; cf. also 74, 238, 260, 465]. 
 175 
of relation with and amongst mortals. Time (that which brings recognition, whatever 
‘delay’, mellein), is the greatest revealer or uncoverer of the actual constitution of things; a 
stream of always partial knowledge that to mortals comes tragically after the fact, too late – 
ὄψ' ἐ/άθεθ' ἡ/ᾶς, ὅτε δ' ἐχρῆν οὐκ ἤιδετε, 1345 – hence one does not ever really know that 
one has escaped disaster or that one may rightly consider oneself ‘blessed’, or ‘happy’ until 
one is dead164. The chorus equates recognizing, gignōskein, with attending, meletān, when it 
sings also of Time. Time is inextricable from the knowledge, always a partial knowledge, of 
time. Here is the effect of something woven or plaited, like a shining thread that variegates 
the dark fabric of experience, poikilōs; it both covers up and uncovers, is alternately seen and 
unseen. Time itself has the dramatic contour of knowledge and its terminally unpredictable 
revelations. Dionysus offers a particular, healthy bearing towards time and knowledge. 
Divine power, to theion sthenos, is certain, piston (882-3)165; it is slow to stir and they (the gods) 
are said to conceal in complex ways, 888-92: 
 
κρυFτεύουσι δὲ Fοικίλως 
δαρὸν χρόνου Fόδα καὶ 
θηρῶσιν τὸν ἄσεFτον· οὐ 
γὰρ κρεῖσσόν Fοτε τῶν νό/ων 
γιγνώσκειν χρὴ καὶ /ελετᾶν.166 
                                                        
164 For this cornerstone of Greek wisdom see Solon’s exchange with Croesus at Hdt. 1.32 e.g. Hdt. 1.32.37-8 πρὶν δ' ἂν τελευτήσῃ, ἐπισχεῖν 
µηδὲ καλέειν κω ὄλβιον, ἀλλ' εὐτυχέα. Life is not done being done, until death one is subject to contingency. A mortal, a being in time, like 
a country, a kind of spatial identity, cannot ever “gather together”, cannot be seen ever as whole object, sullabein: Hdt. 1.32. 38-41, cf. 5.5.3 
n. 141.  See also on Time as the great discloser, the revealer of the opaque and the concealed cf. Soph. Aj. 646-7 Ἅπανθ' ὁ µακρὸς 
κἀναρίθµητος χρόνος/ φύει τ' ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται·. As human knowledge comes late so does divine justice; long in coming, 
nemesis always comes inexorable: see Hom Il. 4. 160f., Solon 13. 25 ff., Eur. Ion 1615, ff. 223, 800, Soph OC 1536. See § 2.2.2 on the 
tragic lateness of human knowledge. 
165 Cf. Pi. Nem. 10. 54: καὶ µὰν θεῶν πιστὸν γένος. 
166 Di Benedetto ad loc. offers the very prosaic ‘normatività dell’ uso’: “occultano gli dèi con destrezza / il lento passo del tempo / e danno la 
caccia a chi non li riverisca; / é bene non voler prevalere in intendimenti e atti / sulla normatività dell’ uso.” Roux 888-92: “Les dieux 
masquent par mille ruses / la lente marche du temps. / Ils font la chasse à l’impie. / Car nul ne doit jamais braver les traditions / dans ses 
pensers ou sa conduite.” Von Armin,1931 somewhat freely but with a strong sense of the poetry of the lines: “Heimlich lauert der 
Rächerarm, / Langsam zaudert der Fuß der Zeit, / Endlich wird der Frevler ereilt. / Unser Denken und unser Tun / Achte des Brauches 
Schranke stets.” For 888-90 Dodds translates: “They have crafty ways to cover the unhastening stride of time as they track the man without 
religion.” δαρὸν χρόνου πόδα is literally “long foot of time”. Dodds sees here a metaphor of the “long distance runner”, as dolichos in Plato 
and Anth. Pal. 9. 51, but that is unnecessary, the dancer’s foot is referred to several times in Bacchae, a light, flowing member to distinguish 
from the swollen feet of the plodding, talking, thinking man like Oedipus [‘swollen-foot’] and Pentheus who will not dance, cf. e.g.  862-4: 
ἆρ' ἐν παννυχίοις χοροῖς/ θήσω ποτὲ λευκὸν/ πόδ' ἀναβακχεύουσα (the feet in Bacchae are the feet of running dancers, animals, coursing 
bacchants and simple motion: 49, 184, 647, 765, 782, 943 etc.). Note how these lines echo the choral lines in Soph. Aj. 646-9, referred to in 
§ 3.3.3 n. 163. Dodds argues that the bacchants’ nomoi, “customs”, “conventions” are the same things as what Teiresias was referring to as 
the received wisdom referred to at 201, patrioi paradochai. The point he makes on 890-2 is important, in nomoi as in patrioi paradochai we 
may “suspect a contmeporary reference”. Euripides’ was an intellectual scene in which the traditional was being challenged by the new, 
nomos seta against phusis. Euripides himself is an author of variegated scenes: if he is somewhat revolutionary or ‘modern’, embracing the 
new in that fashion Thucydides thought characteristic of the Athenians (Thuc. 1.71.3.1-4.1, ἀνάγκη δὲ ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόµενα 
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Cover up in complex ways 
The lingering foot of time and 
Hunt down the unholy man, for 
Nothing is ever stronger than customs [nomoi] 
Mortals must recognize and attend to them.167 
 
It is of some interest that this verb “take care”, “have thought of”, “have as an object of 
thought or interest”,168 is related to the verb mellein, which can simply denote the futurity of 
actions or events or, further, situate a perspective in relation to what was going to, or is still 
going to, occur, that is to say its destiny169. The Greek imagination, quite comprehensibly, 
associates mental states and actions with specific temporal relations. Perspective is always 
perspective in time and fullest cognizance is always cognizance of time and mortal time-
boundedness – the entanglement of persons in perspective and relations, which are 
constituted in and through time.  Dionysus hates those who do not pay heed, at all times, to 
keeping the mind “wise”, sophan, 424-9170: 
 
/ισεῖ δ' ὧι /ὴ ταῦτα /έλει, 
κατὰ φάος νύκτας τε φίλας      425 
εὐαίωνα διαζῆν, 
†σοφὰν δ' ἀFέχειν FραFίδα φρένα τε 
Fερισσῶν Fαρὰ φωτῶν†.       429 
τὸ Fλῆθος ὅτι τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνό/ισε χρῆ-    430 
ταί τε, τόδ' ἂν δεχοί/αν.       433 
 
Dionysus hates that mortal, who cares nothing 
for leading a good life, by day’s light 
                                                        
κρατεῖν), he also offers many passages in which “choruses and sympathetic characters” dwell on the “ultimate validity of nomos and the 
dangers of intellectual arrogance” (Dodds ad loc.). See Eur. Hec. 799; Supp. 216 ff.; Her. 757 ff., 778 ff.; IA 1089 ff. 
167 “Stronger” for kreisson to echo the idea of divine strength which is sure at 883-4: πιστόν <τι> τὸ θεῖον/ σθένος. Seaford, 891-2: “For 
never should one think and act above the laws”. On nomoi see also the lines at 894-9, discussed at § 4.3 n. 101, § 5.5.3 p. 231 n. 130. 
168 LSJ: “µέλω, Med. µέλοµαι, used in both voices, either in neut. sense, to be an object of care or thought, or in act. sense, care for, take an 
interest in.” 
169 Mellein: Chantraine “sens <<être destiné à, être sur le point de, avoir l’intention de>>”. Mellein also bears the nuance, “surtout chez les 
trag.” of ‘to be late, to hesitate’, so in LSJ “to be destined or likely to, indicating an estimated certainty or strong probability in the present, 
past or future… to be about to… to be always going to do without ever doing: hence, delay, put off…”.  
170 Dionysiac attending, melein, displaces Promethean intending, Hephaistos’ objects. Here care-lessness is the higher quality of care. 
Dionysus alone overcomes Hephaistos. Paus. 1.20.3. While Hephaistos is an inventor, making tools and traps on commission from others 
who have their strategies and goals clear before their eyes, Dionysus, although he is described as a “discoverer”, is given to ‘invention’ of 
the musical kind, the extemporizing, inspired kind that comes as if from nowhere, having no pre-established telos, not looking ahead in 
elpis, issuing forth spontaneously in the moment. On elpis see also § 2.5 n. 249, § 3.1 p. 96, § 4.3.9 n. 182. 
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or by well-loved night, 
†or for keeping wise heart and mind  
apart from extreme men.† 
Whatever the simple people consider use- 
ful, this would I accept171. 
 
 
3.3.4 Looking Again 
 
A philosophy such as Taylor’s is far more fruitful for the interpreter of Attic Drama than the 
objective, scientific approaches of the late 20th Century (I mean especially classic 
structuralism and the functionalist premises that underpin ritualist interpretation). Like the 
sociology of Giddens, the anthropology of Gell, Hodder’s theory of archaeological method 
and the findings of Tomasello’s cognitive anthropology, it places the emphasis on human 
agency and the exploring of its nature (omnipresent in human culture), on consciousness 
and the recursive character with which consciousness invests experience. What we may 
conclude from the work of these scholars is a view of humans as persons, for whom value 
and significance are more important than anything explained by drives, functions or the 
practical needs of survival.172 These approaches, which often very explicitly confront the 
limitations of mainstream thinking (objectivist, instrumentalist, significance-free [Taylor]; 
structuralist and functionalist [Giddens, Hodder, Gell]) take seriously what any 
anthropology of Tragedy must also start with: that we have to do with creatures that talk – 
with the person “self” and with others persons – and mean. Meaning and talking, 
understanding and clarifying, penetrating and bringing a torch to the darkness of things (or 
a meaningful darkness back upon the too familiar, daylit world), uncovering truths, finding 
ways to correspond better to the truth of things – this is not only what people and 
                                                        
171 τόδ' ἂν δεχοίµαν: ‘this would I take up’, accept, receive, inherit, note the correspondence in the use of the verb dechomai with ‘the 
traditions of our fathers’ patrious paradochas evoked by Teiresias at 201. 
172 The notion of life having an absolute, inherent value rather than one contingent upon other factors – the quality of life, the idea we have 
of life – is raised, for example, in Euripides’ Alcestis. Alcestis herself is heroic and noble in her self-sacrifice, though she has been fungible 
to the men around her, Admetus and his father Pheres come off poorly, through their all too reasonable calculationg and reasoning, Pheres’ 
statement at Alc. 691 is eloquent: χαίρεις ὁρῶν φῶς· πατέρα δ' οὐ χαίρειν δοκεῖς; “You like existence [seeing the light], don’t you think your 
father does too?”, as is the entire exchange between father and son, Eur. Alc. 675-740. Nevertheless, compare this with the longing for the 
light of any kind of existence of Achilles’ shade at Hom. Od. 11. 488-91. At Eur Alc. 802 a drunken Herakles utters the famous, very 
Euripidean line “Life is not really life, but a catastrophe”: 802 οὐ βίος ἀληθῶς ὁ βίος ἀλλὰ συµφορά. Just as in Bacchae what knowledge 
and wisdom is is at stake and we hear sung that “science is not knowledge”, τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία, 395, so too is life and the adjudgement of 
its value are at stake in Alcestis. Heracles is saying that the “solemn and overly-serious” (τοῖς γε σεµνοῖς καὶ συνωφρυωµένοις Alc. 800) 
misjudge life and what it is for. Aristophanes got mileage out of this line, easily made out to sound like nonsense, see Ar. Ran. 1053-5, 1478 
and scholia ad loc. 
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protagonists spend much of their waking time doing, but what is also most important to 
them and how we judge them and their actions. 
 
It is, I hope, becoming clear how useful Taylor’s philosophy of agency and personhood, of 
humans as “self-interpreting animals” will be for the interpretation of Tragedy and, most 
paradigmatically, of Bacchae – a work in which so notoriously, when self-interpretation has 
fallen away, people have become beasts. Taylor provides a powerful vocabulary with which 
to think about subjects, their agency and their defining properties. This vocabulary finds 
many analogues in the imagery and lexicon of Tragedy. In the next pages I define some of 
this vocabulary.173 
 
 
3.3.5 Strong and Weak Evaluations 
 
Taylor takes up Frankfurt’s notion of the evaluation of desires and their definitive character; 
it is “an essential feature of the mode of agency we recognize as human.”174 He sets out to 
differentiate Frankfurt’s picture and distinguish between two different kinds of evaluation, 
which he designates “strong” and “weak”. Weak evaluation is concerned with outcomes, 
strong with the quality of motivation, “with the qualitative worth of desires”175. The weak 
evaluator is a “weigher”. She weighs up how to accommodate all their (potentially 
conflicting) desires, how to achieve maximum satisfaction. Kadmos is a weigher176. The 
strong evaluator takes pause, is concerned with the relative value of their desires. Teiresias 
and the chorus can speak and sing the language of strong evaluation: for them the concern, 
melein, is not simply with objects of desire, but with desire itself and with their situation as 
one envisaged in terms of the highest desires that ought to be nurtured177.  
 
One might say that we have here a question of accommodations: weak evaluation seeks to 
accommodate circumstances to desires; strong evaluation is not simply accommodating but 
wants to know the value of desires first, wants to accommodate itself to higher values. If 
desires are like strangers that seem to enter into the polis of the self, it is determining for the 
                                                        
173 The themes in Taylor’s work (Taylor, 1985) most serviceable for the reader of Tragedy are returned to thirty years later in an equally 
pertinent study, Taylor, 2016: The Langauge Animal – The full Shape of the Human Linguistic Capacity. 
174 Taylor, 1985: 16. 
175 Taylor, 1985: 16. Taylor uses many helpful examples to elucidate what I am reducing here to the abstract kernel of his arguments. 
176 On Kadmos’ “weighing” see above § 3.3.5 and Taylor, 1985: 23-4.  
177 Teiresias: 266-327. Chorus: prominently, for example, at 386-401, 877-80, 997-1006. 
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polis how that xenos, that guest, will be received, dechesthai178, by the host, xenos179. It is in this 
light that we should read the accommodating – eutrepes – manner of Dionysus and in which 
Pentheus becomes a case study in such kinds of evaluation and their implications180. 
For the reader of Greek Literature, Taylor’s formulation of strong evaluation may very well 
ring true, as a description of the kinds of person and their concerns, which we find there. In 
the evaluation of qualities of desire: 
 
. . . our desires are classified in such categories as higher and lower, virtuous and 
vicious, more or less fulfilling, more and less refined, profound and superficial, noble 
and base. They are judged as belonging to qualitatively different modes of life: fragmented 
or integrated, alienated or free, saintly, or merely human, courageous or 
pusillanimous and so on.181 
 
Euripides’ is an ethical, philosophical dramatic-poet in whom the distinctions elaborated by 
Taylor in the 20th Century are anticipated182. The bacchant chorus in Bacchae will, on these 
terms, certainly be seen as an adjurer to strong evaluation. For them what is essential is a 
mode of life, one marked by the presence of certain qualities and the absence of others.183  
 
What is most worthy here, is what is most desirable. What is called for is a new kind of 
motivation (inherited from earlier generations, traditional ergo nearly timeless). Desirability 
itself is recharacterized as to worth. In weak evaluation “there is ‘nothing to choose’ 
between the motivations”; they involve only, for example, choosing how to go about 
securing maximum pleasure, or putting off an action now in order to make another possible 
later. Such motivations are derived from a calculus of profit, not from consideration as to the 
moral value of the various actions. A weak evaluator will make a choice because ‘I feel like 
                                                        
178 Receptiveness: dechesthai as an internal, psychological kind of “act”, is significantly distinguished from the merely physical and 
typically ineffectual seizing, grasping and grabbing elsewhere: lambanein, harpein, and hairein. 
179 So much hangs on Pentheus’ reception, his manner of accommodating the outsider, who is an insider, Dionysus. On Pentheus and 
Dionysus as host and guest see Burnett, 1970. 
180 Eutrepes: serviceability, amenability: 440, 844; see § 2.2.5 p. 81 n.165, § 3.3.2 p. 145 n. 49. 
181 Taylor, 1985: 16. 
182 Clement of Alexandria famously called Euripides “the philosopher of the stage” (ὁ ἐπὶ τῆς σκηνῆς φιλὀσοφος, Clem. Al. Strom. V 688) 
and note the prior Latin usage (scaenicus philosophicus) at Vitruvius De Arch. VIII Praef. I, of the phrase the Roman author attributed to the 
Athenians. Cf. Teiresias’ homily in Bacchae of course and the cited remarks of the bacchants but also on the philosophy of law and nature 
Fr. 912, Phoen. 449-510, Supp. 196-213; on nature, knowledge and necessity Tro. 884-8; and the Pre-Socratic natural science colouring of 
the fragments of Chryssipus Fr. 836, Antiope Fr. 935 (incerta), and fr. 869 [Nauck2 TGF]. ForSee also Winnington-Ingram,1969 and for a 
recent discussion see Dillon, 2004. 
183 See the makarismos of the prosodos, 73-87 and those important and difficult lines, 997-1007, discussed above at § 2.2.5 p. 85 n. 182, 
translated on p. 108. 
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it’; the strong evaluator because it is more worthy184. Here we can anticipate the articulacy 
which is the mark of strong evaluation and the inarticulacy of the weak form. 
 
There is a degree of contingency in weak evaluation, which is not present in the stronger 
kind. Strong evaluation entails not only the presence of ‘second-order desires’, for one may 
desire to have certain desires rather than others for reasons not to do with the relative value 
of those desires but for unexamined motives. The necessary condition for the definition of 
an evaluation as strong is the distinguishing of desires as to worth. Taylor sets out two 
interlocking criteria: 
 
(1) In weak evaluation, for something to be judged good it is sufficient that it be 
desired, whereas in strong evaluation there is also a use of ‘good’ or some other evaluative 
term for which being desired is not sufficient; indeed some desires or desired 
consummations can be judged as bad, base, ignoble, trivial, superficial, unworthy, 
and so on. It follows this that (2) when in weak evaluation one desired alternative is 
set aside, it is only on grounds of its contingent incompatibility with a more desired 
alternative.185 
 
By Vernant’s reading of Aristotle, and crucially for his reading of Tragic agency, boulē 
‘reposes’ upon hexis186. Desire may be said to ‘arrive’, like Dionysus, unforeseen and 
unbidden187. Desires are in persons: they arise, unpredictable and unrecognized only at our 
peril. When Odysseus curses his hunger, it is not because appetite is less worthy a master 
than self-discipline, but because it is a hindrance to the accomplishment of other goals, 
which in his situation are of a practical nature188. Desires unacknowledged and 
                                                        
184 Taylor, 1985: 17. 
185 Taylor, 1985: 18-9. 
186 See § 3.1 n. 3 and Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972: 60. This is a misprision of Aristotle. Hexis is not the terminal foundation of 
a person on which its desires “repose”, for Aristotle. Hexis is not given as modern people may imagine DNA or the word historical global 
order are “données”. Hexis for Aristotle is a matter of habituation, ethismos (see Arist. Eth. Nich. 1098 b 4). Humans can and do take pause, 
review themselves and reflect also upon their habituations (nomoi). Bacchae is just such a moment of artiulate reflection upon the 
habituations-in-common of the polis, its patrioi paradochai or nomoi, what is fine because it has always been valued (ὅτι καλὸν φίλον αἰεί, 
881), what people in time and over time, in their wisdom, hold to be best: τὸ πλῆθος ὅτι τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόµισε χρῆ-/ταί τε, 430, 433. 
Vernant in effect argues that even if agents seem to choose amongst various desires, those alterantives issue from an opague origin of desire 
which is not chosen, ergo agency is always a kind of illusion and one that modern people misapply to Greek Theatre, which knew nothing of 
such modern valorizations of freedom of choice, the criterion which motivates so many assessments of the meaning of Attic drama, 
according to Vernant, 1972; and Rivier, 1968.  
1871-2: Ἥκω Διὸς παῖς τήνδε Θηβαίαν χθόνα/ Διόνυσος. On Dionysus as “der kommende Gott”, see especially Otto, 1933: 74-9, borrowing 
(unacknowledged) Hölderlin’s phrase. See Bremmer’s essay on Otto in Bernabé, 4-22, and Stavru’s postface to Otto 2011 [1933]. See also 
in Schlesier: Gödde: 85-104 and Henrichs: 105-116.  
188 Hom. Od. 12.340-351, 13.306-310, 15.343-345. It is not that Odysseus is only a weak evaluator, but this scene provides an example. One 
may of course argue that even when Odysseus is seen in all his calculating, value-free choosing, he is motivated by a choice as to worth, the 
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undistinguished as to value are very powerful; they dominate as an autocrat dominates and 
enslaves a population. They are opaque and ultimately inscrutable, objects in the contingent 
stream of phenomena; they remain independent of human intentions, undomesticated by 
the intentional person, θύραζε τῶν νό/ων, 331. There is no manumission from desires 
without their articulation and distinction. The essential point however, the one that Vernant 
would not accept as decisive, is that humans do retain a power of articulacy, discernment 
and can renew themselves and their outlooks. They do identify themselves and their 
habituations, and they can submit even those desires that may arise out of opaque, 
unlocateable origins to discrimination. It is imprudent to say that mortals are either entirely 
one thing or entirely the other. An argument for the radical freedom of individual subjects is 
not what is being offered here. We may not choose what desires live in us, but we do choose 
whether or not to groom certain wishes and cut back others, to nurture them and attend to 
them discriminatingly and articulately - or to let our desires go to seed or run riot, take hold 
however they will rather than we will. On peut cultiver son jardin.   
 
 
3.3.6 The Contrastiveness of Strong Evaluation 
 
Strong evaluation is articulating. It is descriptive, and its descriptions distinguish desires 
‘contrastively’. Its incompatibilities are not adventitious, have not the contingent, opaque 
character of desire, but the clarity and definition derived from contrastive characterization. 
As Taylor says of evaluation generally, so much is the case in Bacchae quite specifically: “For 
strong evaluation deploys a language of evaluative distinctions, in which different desires 
are described as noble or base, integrating or fragmenting, courageous or cowardly, 
clairvoyant or blind, and so on.”189 The spectator of Bacchae is induced to be a strong 
evaluator, to apprehend contrastively. She is not offered a set of values that easily congeal 
into doctrine, without losing a dynamism essential to their meaning; not knowledge of 
something else, but a knowledge about this present knowledgeability itself. Revealed to her 
is the value of an ad hoc readiness for encounters and to feeling confronted by difference with 
all its dangers and powers of renewal; and an attitude towards perspective-taking itself and 
the inherent value of a certain quality of relating to mortal and immortal persons. She is 
induced to reflect upon its manner of knowing and the worthier objects of knowledge. She is 
encouraged to pause and review that which passes itself off as knowledgeable, but is only 
                                                        
longing for the higher mode of life that returning home to Penelope and their son represents. If Homer’s characters were not the strong 
evaluators that they in fact are, we should find his poetry far less captivating. We relate to our kind: the one-dimensionality of the 
exclusively weak evaluator, belongs to such figures as the Cyclops and in certain moments of willful blindness or the depthlessness that is 
like having one eye, to tragic protagonists. 
189 Taylor, 1985: 19. 
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prejudice. The play problematizes arbitrary divine wish and weakly voluntary human wish. 
It reveals in what ways gods are more powerful than they are just, too human-like; and by 
extension how humans might behave “divinely”, which means, in fact, in a manner 
untypical for the gods: through compassion and moral self-reflexivity. Bacchae stimulates a 
deeper sensitivity to the possibility that knowledge and value are a quality of relations; and 
that true eudaimonia – fortune and happiness – inheres not in power over others or the 
possession of wealth, but in a certain healthy, wholesome-minded orientation towards 
others and self, the passing of time and one’s identity as mortal. Bacchae effects a re-
evaluation of basic values. 
 
The articulateness of contrastive analysis, or “diagnosis” to use Albin Lesky’s perhaps more 
appropriate term, is common in Tragedy, and Bacchae is no exception in this. Antinomies 
expressed through a proliferation of valorized pairs of antonyms abound, and these are 
more helpfully seen not in terms of a binary grammar, by which the parameters of discourse 
find elenchic significance, nor necessarily in terms of a syllogistic structure of motion 
through opposites towards thesis. As in all Attic Drama, there is a proliferation of 
antithetical pairings in Bacchae. The poet is principally concerned with values. He himself 
attends to value and meaning, and these are articulated in many ways, but especially 
dramatically through their opposites, through their absence and presence. He explores and 
struggles with the inherent difficulty of defining, securing and preserving what is of highest 
value and ought therefore to be of greatest concern to his audience.  
 
Bacchae paints a contradistinguished world on all levels. In the language of the play, as in the 
structure of the action, the concealed, krupton, is set off by the manifest, and revealed, 
emphanes190. The treacherous or hidden desire and what one may not know one is suffering, 
dolion, is set against declared desire, the apparently terrible or unconcealed threat, deinon, 
and the spectacular, thaumaton191. The healthy – hygies, sōphrōn – is set against the corrupt and 
diseased – sathron, nosion192. Because this is Greek Tragedy, just and unjust is an elemental 
distinction: dikos and adikos193. Freedom is set off by different forms of constraint, physical and 
                                                        
190 Concealed – krup-:  98, 549, 723, 730, 888, 954, 955: κρύψηι σὺ κρύψιν ἥν σε κρυφθῆναι χρεών, 1109. Manifest – phan-: 42, 501, 992, 
1006, 1011, 1199. Emphanes: 22, 818. Phain- 528, 538, 646, 1031 (but also in the sense of resemblance rather than revelation, an important 
accentuation: 925, 1283, and as the disingenuous expression of a judgement by the god at 629). Deik-: 47, 50. 
191 Dolion: 407, 885, 956. Deinon unconcealed threat: 246, 492, 642: πέπονθα δεινά, 667: ὡς δεινὰ δρῶσι θαυµάτων τε κρείσσονα, 674, 
[716], 760: οὗπερ τὸ δεινὸν ἦν θέαµ' ἰδεῖν, ἄναξ, 856: ἐκ τῶν ἀπειλῶν τῶν πρὶν αἷσι δεινὸς ἦν, 861, 971: δεινὸς σὺ δεινὸς κἀπὶ δείν' ἔρχηι 
πάθη, 1260, 1352, 1374, 1377. Thaumaton: 449-50: πολλῶν δ' ὅδ' ἁνὴρ θαυµάτων ἥκει πλέως / ἐς τάσδε Θήβας. 667, [716]. Deinon and 
thaumaton are strongly associated with real recognition in contrast not simply to non-recognition, but false recognition. 
192 Hygies: 262, 948. Nosion: 311, 327, 353, 1060. Sathron: 487: τοῦτ' ἐς γυναῖκας δόλιόν ἐστι καὶ σαθρόν. 
193 Dikon: 1011, 1249. The ransom that must be paid for justice, dikē, is prominent: 346, 356, 489, 676, 793, 847, 1010, 1312, 1327. Adikon: 
518, 995, 997, 1015, 1041-2: τίνι µόρωι θνήισκει / ἄδικος ἄδικά τ' ἐκπορίζων ἀνήρ; 1320, 1322, 1344. 
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non-physical194. The mark of free people and a just social order, free speaking and frankness, 
eleutheroi logoi, parrhēsia, is set against falsification and meaning that stands in only oblique 
relation to form, kibdēleuein, parocheteuein195. The counterfeit is opposed to the authentic as a 
tension or problem of quite determining importance196. Dry is set against wet, and the daily 
against the sabbatical, Brot against Wein197. The unestablished and exotic is set against the 
familiar and normative198.  
 
The ethical dimension expressing itself through an evaluative contrastiveness is only the 
more forcefully expressed through the simultaneous presentation of the collapsing of 
contrasts or values. The normal, accepted contrasts come, in this situation of problematized 
and re-articulated meaningfulness, not to matter. Hence, “the god does not discriminate”, οὐ 
γὰρ διήιρηχ' ὁ θεὸς, 206: young and old199; men and women200; the new with the known; 
indigenous and foreign; the house and the wild; the foreign and the familiar: these are not 
simply juxtaposed but become infused with one another, integrated through Dionysus the 
man-god hybrid. The Dionysiac summons is a call to come out of the domestic, familiar 
world, out into the familiar (but not intimate) city streets and further on – εἰς ὄρος εἰς ὄρος, 
116 – to the wild and unfamiliar mountains, 68-9201: 
 
τίς ὁδῶι, τίς ὁδῶι; τίς 
/ελάθροις; ἔκτοFος ἔστω, 
                                                        
194 Freedom and Constraint: passim but most dramatically at 604-59. See also the fantasies of utopian freedom and bliss sung by the 
bacchants at 402-31. 
195 Frank speech: 668, 775. Evasive speech: 475, 479. 
196 Counterfeit and Authentic: this antinomy has been discussed in some detail above at 24 n. 147. Perhaps it is worth mentioning here that 
there is a very vivid and effective contrast running between form, morphē, and flesh, ōmos. Morphē is falsifiable, reconstituteable and 
fungible: 4, 54, 917, 1388; also 353, 855. Flesh is spectacularly not so. Once disarticulated, the human body cannot be reassembled, 1125-
43, 1216-43. The god’s is an internal identity that must be externalised, shown in various forms, but he is not only any one of those given 
shapes; none have primacy. That is to say that “he” is something as spiritual and hard to pin down as “mind”, which masks itself, 
simultaneously hides and reveals itself in its forms, chosen and unchosen. In effect the play becomes a description of the strange property of 
persons, which we may come to regard as what they really are. 
197 Demeter and Dionysus: 274-85. Hölderlin accents this antinomy in his Brot und Wein, 1800. 
198 Establishing and instituting: katastēsis: 20-2: ἐς τήνδε πρώτην ἦλθον Ἑλλήνων πόλιν,/ τἀκεῖ χορεύσας καὶ καταστήσας ἐµὰς/ τελετάς, ἵν' 
εἴην ἐµφανὴς δαίµων βροτοῖς., kathidruein: 1339; Eisagein: 260. Foreign: Barbaron: 18, 56, 407, 482, 604, 1034, 1334, 1356. Neon: see p. 
n. Normal and indigenous: Ta nomisthenta: 71, 430-1. Nomos is expressed in its absence or deviance: 387, 484, 995, 1015. And, of course, 
the customs that Teiresias beseeches Pentheus to accept only look foreign; they are in fact long established by the usage of forebears: 
πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ' ὁµήλικας χρόνωι/ κεκτήµεθ', 201-2.  
19934-6: σκευήν τ' ἔχειν ἠνάγκασ' ὀργίων ἐµῶν. / καὶ πᾶν τὸ θῆλυ σπέρµα Καδµείων, ὅσαι / γυναῖκες ἦσαν, ἐξέµηνα δωµάτων·, 187-90, 206-
9. 
200 Dionysus himself will become associated, partly because of the powerful influence of Bacchae, with the proximity of male and female, 
so of course, in Pentheus’ eyes, τὸν θηλύµορφον ξένον, but cf. also Orph. Hym. 42.4 ἄρσενα καὶ θῆλυν, διφυῆ, λύσειον Ἴακχον. Διφυῆ, he 
has “two natures” again at Orph. Hym. 30.2. So in Diodorus Siculus was he called dimorphos, Diod. Sic. 4.5.2.8 - 4.5.3, see § 4.3.7 n. 915. 
201 So too does Teiresias summon Kadmos to come out of the domestic environment into the public world in the opening of the first episode, 
and Kadmos is “ready”, 170-80. 
 184 
 
Who is in the street, who  
in the house? Let him be outside,202 
 
Some differences are smoothed out, while what counts in this diacritical world (where that 
first segregation of mortal and immortal at Mekonē comes so readily to mind203) are other 
kinds of distinctions: health and sickness of judgement; moderation and excess; vision and 
blindness; reflexivity and self-forgetting; the articulacy and inarticulacy of wishing; a 
humble, open porousness or an aporetic, impossible, hybristic sealing-off of the self as if eine 
geschlossene Einheit, “a closed up Unit”204.  
 
In Bacchae we hear a great deal about that which one must and must not do – mortal 
existence is circumscribed by obligations, ties of service. “Why should I dance?” the chorus 
famously asked in Sophocles’ Oedipus Tyrannos, “if such things are honoured, timiai”205. In 
Bacchae dancing is one of the things that mortals, chrē, “must do”, χρὴ χορεύειν 207, 184, 
χορευτέον 324, and in the right way, 943-4. Greek dei is like the now uncommon English 
usage of “want” signifying ‘lack’ and therefore ‘require’, ‘need’, ‘ought to have’ as in, “That 
William, he wants a good hiding!”206. Thebes “wants to learn thoroughly, even if she does not 
wish to”, explains Dionysus from the outset, as we have seen207. This contrast of ‘ought’, 
‘must’ and ‘ought not’, ‘must not’; of ‘ought to want’ and ‘ought not to want’, runs like a 
faultline through Bacchae.  
 
One must also “look closely”, σκοFεῖν χρή 317, “take care” χρὴ /έλειν 450, 890-2. Some 
must take and others must pay, some must suffer and others must act208. All is determined by 
whether they have met the obligation (imposed on mortals by immortals, or more precisely, 
                                                        
202 Ektopos: means also eccentric, strange, foreign. These words could contain a subtext running something like, ‘let him become estranged, 
unfamiliar’ and that would be an instance of the important antithesis here to the domestic, the familiar, mundane space of the oikos. 
203 Hes. Theog. 535-6. 
204 Snell, 1928: 20-1 on Homeric figures. 
205 Soph. OT 895-6: Εἰ γὰρ αἱ τοιαίδε πράξεις τίµιαι, / τί δεῖ µε χορεύειν; See Henrichs, 1994, an important essay on choral self-
referentiality. In Bacchae the questions are how should I dance, where should I dance, should I want to dance. It is not “what should I do?”, 
but “how should I want to do?”. Dancing, which looks ridiculous to the outsider who does not want to enter the spirit of dancing and feel the 
rhythm of music, is a mysterious thing to do with the body and to do with others. It involves, even depends on, the relaxation of self-
awareness and of purposiveness, for its only purpose its own doing. It looks like the dissipation of the will, a being enchained to the 
command of music and a loss of autonomy to the unanimity of the dancing group, it can look like a kind of zombification, a turning of 
persons into robots, and yet that all depends on the manner of looking. How we look upon things depends on how we wish to look upon 
things, volition is inseperable from Dionysiac perspective. What seems robotic, faceless and shameless to Pentheus with his reflex reactions 
to things, is celebrated in Bacchae as divine, organic and an apparent loss of self that incurs a deeper quality of identity. 
206 On the loose, broad connotation of thelein, ethelein see § 2.5 n. 248. 
207 δεῖ γὰρ πόλιν τήνδ' ἐκµαθεῖν, 39. See § 2.2.3. 
208 δίκην σε δοῦναι δεῖ σοφισµάτων κακῶν 489, εἴφ' ὅτι παθεῖν δεῖ· 492.  
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imposed by the condition of mortality) to “want” as one should, because the polis “wants the 
right wanting”, so to speak. There is a way of seeing and judging what one “must”, and this 
stands in sharp contradistinction with the manifest ways in which one “must not”209. There 
are things one ought not to do, which, of course, one does, simply because one has not learnt 
or known how and what to want better210. How humans ought to have acted, been and felt: 
this is what they ought to have known and did not until it was too late211. What Dionysus 
craves (chrēzein: a strong form of desiring – χρήιζω 85) is what mortals must: the fastening 
threads of relation are the bindings of obligation. These hold mortal and immortal together 
in this mutuality, this reciprocity of a service which is compelled but beneficial, or resisted 
and deleterious; either most terrible or most sweet for human beings: δεινότατος, 
ἀνθρώFοισι δ' ἠFιώτατος 861. 
 
Purity and the pure is praised212 and dramatically contrasted with the impurity of the central 
protagonist213. Sanity and healthy thinking – euphronein, sōphroneien – are constantly evoked 
and contrasted with their highly undesirable and unserviceable antitheses: thinking that is 
unwell, οὐκ εὖ φρονεῖν 480. A mind which cannot recognize what it is, cannot diagnose its 
own misdiagnosing, φρονεῖν δόκει τι 311-2; the thoughts that no mortal ought to think τό τε 
/ὴ θνατὰ φρονεῖν 396214. Sebein, “awe” before the gods215, is evoked, as is its absence or 
opposite, asebein216. A healthy, whole-mindedness is one that feels due “terror”; hence 
                                                        
209 νῦν δ' ὁρᾶις ἃ χρή σ' ὁρᾶν, 924; οὐ φρονοῦσ' ἃ χρὴ φρονεῖν, 1123. 
210 µολεῖν χρὴ πρῶτον ἐς κατασκοπήν, 838. 
211 ὄψ' ἐµάθεθ' ἡµᾶς, ὅτε δ' ἐχρῆν οὐκ ἤιδετε 1345. See p. 57 n. 57 and p. 114. 
212 370-3:  Ὁσία πότνα θεῶν, / Ὁσία δ' ἃ κατὰ γᾶν / χρυσέαι πτέρυγι φέρηι, / τάδε Πενθέως ἀίεις; Dionysus’ pure and purifying practices 
(76-7, 114) are contrasted with human hybris (374-5, see following ftft.), which has been preoccupied itself with purity and impurity of 
intent, but through a calamitously misidentified contrast. Here see notably λυµαίνεται “cleanse from dirt” or “outrage”, “maltreat”, “ruin”. A 
usefully confusing homonym exploited by Euripides to sharpen the significance of sharply contrasted focalizations. Pentheus sees Dionysus 
as “corrupting” the beds of the women of Thebes 353-4: ὃς ἐσφέρει νόσον / καινὴν γυναιξὶ καὶ λέχη λυµαίνεται. Dionysus or “Bacchios” 
ruins (or does he cleanse, or is it cleanses the house through ruination) at 632-6, (πρὸς δὲ τοῖσδ' αὐτῶι τάδ' ἄλλα Βάκχιος λυµαίνεται, 632). 
Most commentators have not made much of the ambiguity of λυµαίνεται. See Di Benedetto on 632: “L’uso del verbo λυµαίνεται ha 
qualcosa di crudo…”. Gónzalez Merino ad loc.: λυµαίνεται “le hace escarnio . . . Observese la paronomasia latente λυµαίνεται / (µαίνεται, 
‘enloquece’).” 
213 ἀίεις οὐχ ὁσίαν / ὕβριν ἐς τὸν Βρόµιον, 374-5, ἀνδρὸς ἀνοσίου τυχών, 613. 
214 Cf. Eur. Alc. 799 ὄντας δὲ θνητοὺς θνητὰ καὶ φρονεῖν χρεών·. 
215 “Piety”, “reverence”, the word expresses an affective state or bearing, not to be confused with the ‘piety’, which in English can also 
suggest the falsifiable, formulaic religiosity of the sanctimonoious; in sebos there is nothing pejorative, only a “terror” in the face of the 
numinous, which modern people may struggle to understand or appreciate. Note the cognate semnos “solemn, holy”, which is what the night 
possesses σεµνότητ' ἔχει σκότος, 486; the mountains 411; and the fire which appears when Dionysus in human form vanishes, φῶς σεµνοῦ 
πυρός, 1083 are to Dionysus and his bacchants. The mountain plateau is “sacred” also to the “smooth talker”, who however, we may 
suspect, is adapting his speech to the desires of his hearers, his is the calculation and rhetorical know-how of the city-dweller, 718. See 
Musurillo, 1966 on piety in Bacchae. See Nilsson, 1969 and Mikalson on piety in Greek Tragedy, Mikalson, 1991 Honor Thy Gods: 
Popular Religion in Greek Tragedy, esp. 147-52. 
216 “Blessed is the one who feels awe”, sing the bacchants, 565-6: µάκαρ ὦ Πιερία, / σέβεταί σ' Εὔιος,. “Revere him”, “feel the fear in his 
presence” ὁ Διόνυσος ἀνὰ µέλαθρα·/ σέβετέ νιν, 589-90. His orgia “hate the man who practises irreverence, asebeia” says the disguised, 
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“Sōphronein and sebein of that which is divine [belongs to the gods] is the most beautiful 
thing”, 1150-1: τὸ σωφρονεῖν δὲ καὶ σέβειν τὰ τῶν θεῶν/κάλλιστον.  
 
“The most beautiful thing” finds its antipalos, its opposite or adversary, in to aischron, the 
“ignoble, shameful, base, disgraceful”. Bacchae represents a contest over the very definition 
of these contrasted values: “What is the wise, what more noble?” sing the bacchants at 877, 
897: †τί τὸ σοφόν, ἢ τί τὸ κάλλιον†217. The action is a struggle over the meanings and 
interpretations of acts and motives. Meaning is articulated through a kind of chiasmus of 
contrasted values, misidentified as their very opposites, organized on the axis of the 
problem of authenticity, judgement and recognition, viz. evaluation. The drama reveals that 
what Pentheus has called “specious” and “fabricated”, plastos; desires he thought really 
incited by “counterfeiture” kibdēleuein; practices he thought only “pretext” prophasis218; what 
he has thought kalliston in appearance but aischron in reality – /αινάδων αἰσχρουργίαν219 –  
are all in fact the very reverse. What he has alleged was really trumped-up, covered up, 
disguised abjectness – the aischron made desirable by the baiting, alluring force of the dolion220 
– are ultimately revealed in fact to have been kalliston. Thus does Pentheus think that the 
night is a cloak, inciting permissiveness221. To that claim Dionysus’ riposte is that one can 
“find out the aischron” by daylight too, demonstrating a much more agentful conception of 
how it is that the base comes about: by choices, not only by disinhibition222. This is a situation 
envisaged thoroughly in terms of value, in terms of what is noble and what ignoble, the 
desirable and undesirable - and their confusion, non-recognition or disastrous 
misjudgement. 
 
                                                        
smiling Dionysus (a laughing deity who, it may be said, makes mortals irreverent in the right way) at 476: ἀσέβειαν ἀσκοῦντ' ὄργι' ἐχθαίρει 
θεοῦ. Pentheus is too much like his mother, the bacchant under retributive divine compulsion; they felt no awe for the god, 1302: ὑµῖν 
ἐγένεθ' ὅµοιος, οὐ σέβων θεόν. On sebein see § 3.1 n. 10; on asebeia see § 2.2.5 p. 86 n. 184.  
217877, 897: Thus reads the text of manuscript P. It is a problematic line, Diggle: nec de sensu nec de numeris constat. The second τὸ is 
helpfully deleted by most editors, since Paley (Dodds p. 188 “The solution, however, is not, I think, to alter ἢ but to delete the article before 
κάλλιον. As Paley saw, this improves the metre as well as the Greek.” See Rijksbaron’s (pp. 109-13) extensive discussion of the textual 
problems with this line, which cites and assesses the relative value of the various editorial propositions. Note Dodds’ remarks ad loc.: 
“’What is wisdom?’ The Chorus do not stay for an answer, but seek one indirectly by asking a second and easier question. ‘Or what god-
given right is more honourable in the sight of men than to keep the hand of mastery over the head of a foe?’” Answering questions with 
further questions in thoroughly in keeping with the Stranger and the Dionysiac mode he represents. Dionysus does not bring answers, 
doctrines or ideas but the opening up of persons and questioning, this open-ended orientation, is the peeling away whose goal is its self, with 
Dionysus.  
218 Plastos: 218; kibdēleuein: 475; prophasis: 224. 
219 1062.  
220 Further on dolos the concrete sense of which is “bait”, “lure” i.e. a device for making the undesirable seem desirable, see § 4.2.2. 
221 The “agency” of darkness, consisting in its removing of any inhibiting agency in human social life; persons [women] in Pentheus’ eyes 
are passive, patients of their own impulses. 
222 486-7: Di. νύκτωρ τὰ πολλά· σεµνότητ' ἔχει σκότος./ Pe. τοῦτ' ἐς γυναῖκας δόλιόν ἐστι καὶ σαθρόν./ Di. κἀν ἡµέραι τό γ' αἰσχρὸν ἐξεύροι 
τις ἄν. 
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It is noteworthy how value is expressed also through the valorized, physical contrast of 
upright/fallen. The “eccentric posture” of humans223, by which they stand upright and face-
to-face, which gives their social inter-subjective life and its encounters the peculiar character 
that it has, is the necessary condition for the establishment and perpetual re-establishment of 
an order of values224. To be hyperochos or exochos “outstanding”, pre-eminent amongst peers, 
is a concept in Homer inseparable from being aristos, “the best”225. In Iliad we see how 
strongly excellence is associated with and defined through pre-eminence. So, for example, 
Thetis, a choryphaeus amongst the Nereids, sings of her excellent son Achilles “standing out 
among heroes”226. The nightmare of the Homeric hero is to be prone on the ground, 
horizontal, scattered matter, formless, undefined, and thereby the very epitome of the 
valueless227. In Bacchae too the finest, the most beautiful kind of life is counterpoised against 
Pentheus’ quality of life and most abject death - αἴσχιστα καὶ κάκιστα κατθανόνθ', 1307228. 
He has stood out above all others as king and delighted in being honoured and magnified229. 
In his contest with the god who tolerates no mortal standing out, who himself delights in 
being pre-eminent alone230, Pentheus will ultimately be atrociously laid-low231. Brought down, 
below even the suppliant’s level of the knees, he will become as reduced as a mortal can be: 
                                                        
223 Eccentric posture: Giddens, 1984: 66-7: “The body, of course, is not an undifferentiated unity. What Gehlen calls the ‘eccentric’ posture 
of human beings – standing upright and ‘outward’ towards the world – is no doubt the result of biological evolution. We need not transpose 
biological into a presumptively parallel form of social evolution to see the implications of this for human social processes in circumstances 
of co-presence.” 
224 For the many – positively valorized, ironically shaded – references to orthos, orthia, orthōs, “uprightness” and “setting right”, as making 
“upright” see: 693, 933, 938, 1062, 1070-4 [occuring three times], 1087. Even the common adverbial usage denoting “correctly”, “rightly 
so”, like German “gerade”, takes on a peculiar weight in this context in which this contrast is so operative, 838, 1279.  
225 See Il. 6. 208, 11.784: αἰὲν ἀριστεύειν καὶ ὑπείροχον ἔµµεναι ἄλλων. 
226 ἔξοχος ἡρώων Hom. Il.18.56. The deluded Agauē will tell Kadmos that he can boast the most excellent daughters, and she herself of all 
most outstanding, 1233-5: πάτερ, µέγιστον κοµπάσαι πάρεστί σοι, / πάντων ἀρίστας θυγατέρας σπεῖραι µακρῶι/ θνητῶν· ἁπάσας εἶπον, 
ἐξόχως δ' ἐµέ. 
227 αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσιν / οἰωνοῖσί τε πᾶσι Hom. Il 1. 4-5. 
228 Note that Teiresias, seer in this city once held captive by a sub-human monster, marked by its non-upright posture but human face, which 
had riddlingly required humans to define themselves by phases of uprightness and proneness, has told Kadmos to help him walk, for “to fall 
down [would be] shameful” for the two old men: γέροντε δ' αἰσχρὸν δύο πεσεῖν· 365. Contrast the delirious falling down of the bacchants in 
their states of greatest excitement when they become most savage, four-legged beings delighting in the eating of raw flesh, 135-9: ἡδὺς ἐν 
ὄρεσσιν ὅταν/ ἐκ θιάσων δροµαίων/ πέσηι πεδόσε, νεβρίδος ἔχων/ ἱερὸν ἐνδυτόν, ἀγρεύων/ αἷµα τραγοκτόνον, ὠµοφάγον χάριν. Cf. TGF 
Nauck2 Eur. Fr. 472 from Cretans 9-15, for the nocturnal rites of Dionysus-Zagreus, with “feasts of raw-flesh eating”. On “omophagia”, see 
Detienne, 1977; Burkert, 2011. 
229 319-21: σὺ χαίρεις, ὅταν ἐφεστῶσιν πύλαις/ πολλοί, τὸ Πενθέως δ' ὄνοµα µεγαλύνηι πόλις·/ κἀκεῖνος, οἶµαι, τέρπεται τιµώµενος. On this 
image, cf. the closely resembling portrait of his hybristic brother sketched by Menelaus at Eur. IA 335-48; see also IA 16-27, Med. 119-30 
on the unenviable estate of the powerful. 
230 206-9, see § 4.2.1 n. 36. 
231 Here in Bacchae as in other works of Euripides, the wisdom of the ordinary people (see p. 197 below) stands in contrast to the hybris of 
kingly families, just as the happy, peaceful and blessed life is typically aligned with the common people and the recognizing of ordinary 
gifts and woe against the distress, utter impoverishment and bereavement of the powerful (on this Seaford, 1994 Reciprocity and Ritual is of 
notable interest). See, for example: τὸ πλῆθος ὅτι τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνόµισε χρῆ-/ταί τε, τόδ' ἂν δεχοίµαν, 430-1; also Med. 119-30. 
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spread out on the ground, like the houses of Kadmos reduced to rubble232. The physical 
contrast is absolute; it is the embodiment of an ethical antithesis. The most extreme 
abjectness for a human being, the becoming only object, and still lower than that, mere 
matter, like the body of Hector if it had never been redeemed by Priam233 – this is the woeful 
fate of the man of woe, penthos, Pentheus. 
 
From the contrast mortal/immortal issue all manner of consequences. Thrasonical Actaeon 
(337-40), Pentheus (226-32), Agauē (who resembles Actaeon in the boasting over her 
dreadful hunting trophy, 1233-7)234 all have failed in not thinking or feeling as befits a 
creature that must die235. Thnēton /Athnēton is the definitive cleft in the cosmos, expressing 
itself through ramifying fissures; the divisions between the healthy and unhealthy, the 
wholesome and unwholesome, disease and health, nosos and hygies. Pentheus alleges that 
the foreign stranger has come to ruin the beds of Theban women, that he comes to infect, to 
introduce his disease – nosos – an epidemic, not a cure for madness, ὃς ἐσφέρει νόσον, 353236. 
He is himself responding to Teiresias’ claims that it is he, Pentheus, who is the sick one, and 
it is a sickness which attacks the very faculties of diagnosis, by which the king attributes 
power to human agency, not understanding that it is his impaired capacity for 
understanding alone that makes him think so, 309-12237. 
 
Pentheus is suffering from a most grievous disorder for which Dionysus is the only remedy, 
akē, 326-7: 
/αίνηι γὰρ ὡς ἄλγιστα, κοὔτε φαρ/άκοις 
ἄκη λάβοις ἂν οὔτ' ἄνευ τούτων νόσου. 
                                                        
232 Semelē was laid low by a Zeus thunderbolt and the machinations of Hera behind that strike. All that remains of her reduced house are the 
rubble, ereipia (6-9) and the flame that stands on it (8-9) and dances and flares up at heightened moments (594-5, 622-6). The earthquake, 
Dionysus’ prodigy, brings down columns and roofs and even the bacchants bodies are toppled edifices, falling on the ground (575-607). 
233 Or preserved from mutilation by Apollo, see Hom. Il. 24. 18 ff. 
234 πάτερ, µέγιστον κοµπάσαι πάρεστί σοι, 1233. 
235 Thnēton is not an incidental feature of humans; it is evoked consistently in relation to that fundamental question of identity, above all by 
Dionysus: 28, 42, 53, 1332, 1340 and 795, where it is used in a warning to Pentheus that he fails to heed. It is a mark of the 
knowledgeability of the “common people” (whose judgements are also praised by the bacchants at 430-1), that they are sensitive to this 
determining quality of mortality and therefore the presence of its opposite; hence the servants and messengers at 448, 1069, 1152. Kadmos 
199 and, of course, Teiresias 280, articulate themselves through this definition, which Pentheus never does. Cf. Eur. fr. 76 from the Alcmeon 
in Corinth performed alongside Bacchae, where the very Kadmos-like figure of an old king now sent childless into exile seems to have 
made the mistake of thinking thoughts inappropriate to a mortal, thnēton: ὁρᾶτε τὸν τύραννον ὡς ἄπαις γέρων/ φεύγει· φρονεῖν δὲ θνητὸν 
ὄντ' οὐ χρὴ µέγα.    
236 For his fear of ‘infection’, see also 343-4 and his view of bacchic worship as the “disease of the maenads” right up to the very end, 1059-
60: Ὦ ξέν', οὗ µὲν ἕσταµεν/ οὐκ ἐξικνοῦµαι µανιάδων ὄσσοις νόσων, (an instance that shows how his “light madness” has been a dosage 
administered by the god, which is strong enough to make him lose all shame but too weak to really have changed his character, or make his 
will and choice not his). 
237 See p. 118 for text and translation. 
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For you are most painfully raving mad, and neither with drugs [pharmakoi] 
Nor without them would you find a cure [akē] for your sickness [nosos]. 
 
Sickness and health, poison and remedy: the pharmakon that is Dionysus is a substance that 
will have regenerative or deleterious effects depending on the patient’s prior capacity to 
discriminate between contrasting values: to wish healthily enough. It is Dionysus’ very two-
facedness – diphuēs, dimorphos – that disposes him to become the god of theatre. In Attic 
Drama the contrast of values (and their articulation through a great variety of situations, 
always represented as multi-faceted and constituting moral predicament through the 
delineation of perspectives) is defined through valorized antitheses. The desire with which 
the contrastive adjudicator identifies, and which, recursively, becomes his identity, will 
determine whether he is in his life a futile fighter against the will and wish of immortals, an 
adversary – antipalos – of the gods, “wrestling with divinity” – theomachein – or whether he 
will have the god as an ally, symmachos238. 
 
When certain actions are incompatible with contrastively defined values such as courage, 
reverence, sanity, we may say that they are desirable or undesirable for reasons that are not 
merely contingent or circumstantial. They have been contrastively described, submitted to 
that process of evaluation by which persons are agents and not simply the passive, 
inarticulate sufferers of their desires or passions. Weak evaluators experience their desires, 
strong evaluators define them239. Pentheus has been defined by his defective judgement, 
which has been an insufficient master of its own pathē. Those pathē have not been recognized 
by Pentheus and therefore could not be articulated, denominated and evaluated. The true 
agents have been feelings or passions here, like the orgia that are said to ‘hate’: that, not the 
apparent subject who “has had” or “felt” or “practised” them, have shown agency. 
Pentheus, the ‘active’ man reaching for weapons and tools, screaming orders and delegating 
his will through the servants who are the prosthetics of his commanding, has been in the 
most significant way, passive. 
 
 
  
                                                        
238 Symmachos: § 6.2.1 p. 245 n. 65; theomachein: § 2.5 p. 80 n. 273. 
239 Taylor, 1985: 21, “For in strong evaluation, where we deploy a language of evaluative distinctions, the rejected desire is not so rejected 
because of some mere contingent or circumstantial conflict with another goal. Being cowardly does not compete with other goods by taking 
up the time or energy I need to pursue them, and it may or may not alter my circumstances in such a way as to prevent my pursuing them. 
The conflict is deeper; it is not contingent.” 
 190 
3.3.7 Depth & Articulacy – Articulacy about Depth 
 
Non-qualitative evaluations may be effective in all kinds of scenarios (abstract scientific 
knowledge, logistical, strategic); they may answer many questions and may be of use in 
solving all manner of problems, but they are not concerned with articulating things so that 
they are “more illuminating and true to reality”. Involved in qualitative decision is the 
conflict of self-interpretations – their choice will “shape the meanings things have for us. But 
the question can arise: which is more valid, more faithful to reality”240. The mandate that 
Taylor has given himself is to demonstrate that it is not only non-qualitative evaluation that 
is “authentic”, as utilitarians argue. Again, something similar may be said of Bacchae, where 
the question of the authenticity of motives is paramount and qualia are privileged. The 
question of faithfulness to reality is not a problem for Pentheus. He understands real 
motivations, he sees through the pretext of bacchism241. Concern for quality of evaluation and 
mode of life has nothing to do, Pentheus has prejudged, with Dionysus and the goings-on of 
his followers242. Pentheus exhibits no conflict in his self-interpretations, nor in his 
interpretation of other selves.  
 
The authenticity of Dionysus is not peripheral in Bacchae, it is central. Just so is the question 
concerning the correspondence of one’s life to reality, or the truth of things, central in 
Tragedy. Taylor’s lucid mobilization against utilitarianism casts a felicitous light on Tragedy 
and the articulation of its priorities. If we overlook the preoccupation in Tragedy with 
qualitative evaluation – its primary status and its authenticity of concern – we run the risk of 
becoming in our assessment of Tragedy what Pentheus is in his assessment of Dionysus, a 
“simple weigher”. 
 
Pentheus, a politician desirous of respect and popularity, like Agamemnon in the eyes of 
Menelaus in Iphigenia at Aulis, and like his grand-father Kadmos (who will also pay the price 
of losing human form) is a “simple weigher”. A simple weigher is not mindless: he can 
evaluate courses of action, he can calculate, he has cunning. He can even suspend immediate 
desires in his reckoning of how to accomplish his objectives. He has the necessary reflection, 
evaluation and will, but not the sufficient features for strong evaluation: “he lacks 
something else which we often speak of with the metaphor of ‘depth’.”243  
 
                                                        
240 Taylor, 1985: 22. 
241 Seeing through prophasis “pretext” 224, see § 3.2.1. pp. 141.  
242 See on Pentheus’ characteristic prejudgements and defective model of inference, § 2.6.  
243 Taylor, 1985: 36 “The line here between metaphor and basic theory is hard to draw”, (in his n. 10 where he points to Ricoeur’s De 
l’Interprétation [Paris, 1965]). 
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This metaphor of space and its relation to construals of time and the extension of self, is of 
great interest. It is through imagery that poetry expresses itself, and we do well to pay 
careful attention to that imagery, no less when it seems “natural” or obvious. The greatest 
survivor in Greek poetry, Odysseus, is a master of the successive (step following step) 
operations of the intelligence; of calculation and language. He endures – his most notable 
success is his continuance over time. He stands in contrast with the figure marked above all 
by spatial largeness, the man of depth; of capaciousness rather than simply capacities. 
Achilles, who hates the superficial man or the man whose depths are not also his surfaces244, 
deepens over the course of time. Agamemnon does not himself deepen, but others, 
including audiences, have a deeper knowledge of themselves and others through the lessons 
of his fate, the acquaintance with his character. Odysseus is a master of measures, of his own 
depths and shallows; he controls his surfaces. Dionysus is a mutable surface and Semelē, 
like so many of the women of Tragedy, is a depth, an authentic relation, denied. 
 
The weak evaluator defines his desires only to the extent of a reckoning of “what he desires 
plus a calculation of consequences” and obstacles. The strong evaluator has a “vocabulary of 
worth”; she is a nuanced describer; she characterizes richly; she defines hierarchies. She is 
not defined by desires but defines them; her evaluation is active and articulate. She goes 
beyond the mere comparison or weighing of the relative attractiveness of alternatives. This 
articulacy has the excavatory effect of giving depth.245 The reflections of the simple weigher 
are inarticulate in that they terminate in preference, or attractiveness, which ultimately is 
contingent: I like wine because it gives me pleasure; I prefer singing to speaking because it 
gives me more pleasure; I am a bacchant because it is fun, licentious and its consequences 
are minimal – so at any rate might a figure like Pentheus, a weigher, read the motivations of 
others, whom he naturally sees as weighers like himself. 
 
The usual predicament of humans is to be “faced with incommensurables”. The simple 
weigher cannot articulate “the superiority of A over B”. For her reflection will serve not to 
make the preferability of alternatives articulate, but only to calculate advantage and find her 
way to what is most desirable “concentrating on the inarticulate ‘feel’ of the alternatives”.246 
In the strong evaluator: 
 
                                                        
244 Hom. Il. 9. 312-313: ἐχθρὸς γάρ µοι κεῖνος ὁµῶς Ἀΐδαο πύλῃσιν/ ὅς χ’ ἕτερον µὲν κεύθῃ ἐνὶ φρεσίν, ἄλλο δὲ εἴπῃ. 
245 “The strong evaluator envisages alternatives through a richer language. The desirable is not only defined for him by what he desires, or 
what he desires plus a calculation of consequences; it is also defined by a qualitative characterization of desires as higher and lower, noble 
and base, and so on.”, Taylor, 1985: 23. 
246 Taylor, 1985: 24. 
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There is the beginning of a language of higher and lower, noble and base, 
courageous and cowardly, integrated and fragmented, and so on. The strong 
evaluator can articulate superiority just because he has a language of contrastive 
characterization. So within an experience of reflective choice between 
incommensurables, strong evaluation is a condition of articulacy, and to acquire a 
strongly evaluative language is to become (more) articulate about one’s preferences.247 
 
It should be added that one can inherit “a language of contrastive characterization”, for 
example as a component of a religious-ethical tradition. A deeply religious person may be 
someone who has passively surrendered herself to something like a routinized, unexamined, 
zombie-like piety. It is, therefore, not sufficient simply to “have” such a language, but to use 
it originally. This is what Socrates goaded his fellow citizens to do, to ask questions about 
their values. That did not equate, as it does not in Bacchae, to the denial of conventional 
values. On the contrary, it can rather mean to renew them, to revitalize them through a more 
active re-articulation. Re-articulating the worth of nomoi means participating more 
profoundly and agentfully in tradition248. It is not only for ancestors to articulate and for 
successors to passively “receive”, but for every generation and each subject to attain to the 
depth of an original agency – not to do so is in fact not to realize the potential for agency.  In 
Bacchae Euripides preserves nomoi and is simultaneously exploratory, inquisitive and 
articulative about them. Attic drama is agency. 
 
Human agency here is a ‘deepening’ articulacy. The strong evaluator is capable of a 
“plurality of visions”, which the weak evaluator is not – he has what we may call ‘moral 
imagination’. Pentheus is incapable of plurality of vision, and this receives a peculiar kind of 
expression in the fact that he is shown as prone to a multiplication of objects of vision but no 
plurality of perspectives on a single given situation. Pentheus is an hallucinator, 616-36, 918-
22. He sees doubly but never deeply. He sees many things in a situation but not the one 
thing which is the situation in dimension, its depth.  
 
A weak evaluator may change form, as Dionysus does and Pentheus attempts to do, to 
access the objects of his desires, but he does not change his desires by subjecting them to the 
reasoned examination of contrastive analysis. The articulacy and plurality and imagination 
of Tragedy, that which it anticipates and vitalizes in its audience, is of just this kind. As 
Taylor says of the strong evaluator, so we might say of Tragic Drama: he has “articulacy and 
depth which the simple weigher lacks. He has, one might say, articulacy about depth”249. 
                                                        
247 Taylor, 1985: 24-5. 
248 On nomoi see also the lines at 894-9, discussed at p. 175-76, § 4.3 n. 101, § 5.5.3 n. 130. 
249 Taylor, 1985: 26 and further in “articulacy” see also 36-40. 
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3.3.8 Clarity: [to saphes ou sapheia]*250 
 
Like people in everyday interactions with one other, the figures of the Attic stage are ever 
seeking clarifications. They want to know what their interlocutors actually mean and intend. 
The ordinary activity of seeking and securing clarity takes on a special depth in drama, 
where the trouble of working out what is meant can come to serve as metaphor, as a 
dramatizing motif and theme, of an art that is patently concerned with human life as having 
values and ‘meaning’, which are obscured in some essential way; an art concerned with lives 
coming into the clarity of real knowledge – anagnōrisis – after it is too late. Blindness, 
opaqueness, the hardness of discerning: these are offset by the momentary clarity that 
illuminates action in retrospect. Pelasgos in Aeschylus’ The Suppliant Maidens, expresses the 
value of the clarity required for confident decision, and its hardness of access, with a 
beautiful image, Aesch. Supp. 407-411: 
 
δεῖ τοι βαθείας φροντίδος σωτηρίου, 
δίκην κολυ/βητῆρος ἐς βυθὸν /ολεῖν 
δεδορκὸς ὄ//α, /ηδ' ἄγαν ᾠνω/ένον, 
ὅFως ἄνατα ταῦτα Fρῶτα /ὲν Fόλει,    
αὐτοῖσί θ' ἡ/ῖν ἐκτελευτήσει καλῶς, 
 
It needs deep thought for safety, I tell you, to reach the depths like a sponge-
diver with eyes that see and are not too clouded by wine, so that these 
matters may end (ekteleutēsei), first, without harm to the city, and then well 
for our own selves,251 
 
Articulacy is the means towards the telos of clarity. Characterizations of desirability are set 
against each other when persons ask themselves, “how shall I act?”, “ti drasō?” and “what 
do I want”, ti boulomai?252 The simple weigher balances preferences between options; the 
                                                        
250 “The clear is not clarity”, here I am playing on 395 where the chorus sings τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία, for which see also pp. 106-107 § 3.3 p. 
164, § 7.3 p.392. On the theme of clarity in Ba. see § 3.3.8. 
251 Trans. Collard: 2008. 
252Ti drasō: Orestes not asking himself but his second self, the friend Pylades, Aesch. Cho. 899:  Πυλάδη, τί δράσω; µητέρ' αἰδεσθῶ 
κτανεῖν; Soph. Aj. 809, 920, 1024: Οἴµοι, τί δράσω; Soph. Phil. 757, 908, 969, 1063 Οἴµοι· τί δράσω δύσµορος; 1350. Soph. OC 1254. As 
Rivier, 1968, argued, ti drasō  does not necessarily mean “what shall I do”, in the sense of ‘how proceed?’, but can also function as an 
expression of exasperated helplessness, faced with a feeling that there is nothing to be done. Eur. fr. 139, 66.52; Alc. 380, 537; in Med. the 
indicative (the determination upon a course of action) 927, 1019 and aporetic 1042, 1271 and interrogative, 1376, IA 356, Hec. 737, Phoen. 
734, 1277, Or. 309; deliberative at Heracl. 418 and Hipp. 177 τί σ' ἐγὼ δράσω, τί δὲ µὴ δράσω; and expressing deliberated resolution, Hipp. 
1088, Andr.731, Supp. 346, El. 986, HF 239, 606, IT 759. Aporetic: Hec. 419, HF 1157, Tro. 793, Phoen. 1310, 1615, Or. 1610. See Snell, 
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objects of his consideration are the objects of his desires. The strong evaluator confronts 
himself with choice as itself predicament, a ‘situation of choice’: “With strong evaluation, 
however, there can be and often is a plurality of ways of envisaging my predicament, and 
the choice may be not just between what is clearly the higher and the lower, but between two 
incommensurable ways of looking at this choice.”253 And indeed so it is in Greek drama, where 
protagonists – like Pelasgos of The Suppliant Maidens, or Eteocles in The Seven against Thebes 
and in Phoenician Women; like Agamemnon (in Aeschylus as in Euripides’ Hecuba and 
Iphigenia at Aulis); Orestes, Admetus, Jason, etc. – are not simply faced with choices.  
Presented to them, so to speak, and to the audience, are also the meanings and implications 
of their choices: they are made to look again at their choosing, and their choosing will be cast as 
inextricable from their identity. Values are again and again made to be intrinsic to identity, 
not epiphenomenal, but decisive and defining. In drama, choosing is the spectacle. 
Evaluating, weighing and resolving constitute the very ‘action’ we witness. Agency is not 
simply having intentions and seeing others as identically intentional, but activating certain 
intentions amongst others, and this action is at the very centre of Attic Drama, the spectacle 
of motivated human doings, ta dramata, ta prachthenta. 
 
Tragedy, we may say, is a ‘strong evaluator’, and it requires us to be strong evaluators. 
Certainly, it is realistic in that it does not divide the world into weak and strong, but shows 
that there is in persons the crucial potential for strong evaluation. Hence, there is a certain 
culpability in not realizing this potential. Protagonists tragically fail or are the victims of 
failures to strongly evaluate. Being or becoming a strong evaluator is not an inherent 
property of mortals but a form of aretē to which they are bidden by philosophy, poetry and 
religion. Not being agentful persons, Greek gods do not require of mortals that they be such: 
they do not speak of “modes of life” or “authentic and true” existences or the desirability of 
lives “commensurate with reality”. Their human followers do – Teiresias and the bacchants, 
and of course Euripides – for they are interpretative and evaluative in a much stronger and 
imperative way than gods. Euripides’ gods, like Dionysus, are relatively shallow, they know 
only desires and the frustration or enjoyment of desires; they do not know their lives as 
predicaments, situations possible to envisage from different perspectives. For gods, 
distortion of reality is a practical obstacle or an instrument in their stratagems 
(metamorphosis, disguise – Athena’s mist, achlus, Zeus’ and Dionysus’ polymorphēsis). For 
mortals unclarity is ultimately a moral problem of signal importance because establishing 
                                                        
1928 and Rivier, 1968; and § 1.2 Ti boulomai? Menelaus at Eur. IA 485: τί βούλοµαι γάρ; Cf. also the Medea heterorropēs ‘preponderating 
now this way now that’ at Eur. Med. 1044-68, e.g. 1049-50: καίτοι τί πάσχω; βούλοµαι γέλωτ' ὀφλεῖν/ ἐχθροὺς µεθεῖσα τοὺς ἐµοὺς 
ἀζηµίους; See also § 2.7 n. 324. 
253 My italics, Taylor, 1985: 26. 
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value and the comparative value of courses and modes of life is fundamental to them.254 
Hence they dramatize life as predicaments, scrutinize themselves and scrutinize what they 
have traditionally believed to be the nature of the gods. 
 
 
3.3.9 ‘Radical Choice’ is not Agentful 
 
An important strand of philosophy in late modernity, running from Nietzsche through 
Sartre and into some influential Anglo-Saxon moral philosophy carries in it, explicitly or 
implicitly, the notion of radical choice. Since the very nub of Jean-Pierre Vernant’s 
interpretation of Aristotle and his refutation of any kind of ‘modern notion of free choice’ 
turned upon his ascription to the modern view of ‘radicality of choice’, let us consider the 
argument again in the light of Taylor’s response to radical choice255.  
 
For Vernant boulē reposes ultimately on hexis, which he claims is not chosen but given. This 
is the ultimate or radical basis, the root of inclinations and it is, in Taylor’s terms, 
inarticulate; it terminates in “feel”, it is incommensurable. Radical choice is in the final 
analysis beyond analysis, it is inscrutable: “The Nietzschean term ‘value’, suggested by our 
‘evaluation’, carries this idea that our ‘values’ are our creations, that they ultimately repose 
on our espousing them. But to say that they ultimately repose on our espousing them is to 
say that they issue ultimately from a radical choice, that is, a choice which is not grounded 
in any reasons.”256 A radical choice is unreasoned, inarticulate. On the theory of radical choice 
there are no real moral dilemmas – dilemma entails the problem of choice, between choices. 
Option is dispensed with in the “seizing action”, so to speak, of the radical choice. The 
notions of strong evaluation and depth are incompatible with that of radical choice: “For a 
radical choice between strong evaluations is quite conceivable, but not a radical choice of such 
evaluations”257. In radical choice, there is no final responsibility for evaluations. A radical 
chooser is much like a simple weigher in the passivity and muteness of his bearing towards 
his own desires. The terminal spontaneity of radical choosing is also the muteness of the 
inarticulate. 
 
The difficulty of making judgements, of adjudicating in the midst of “a plurality of moral 
visions” is not one we can coherently hide behind such incommensurables, such opacities as 
                                                        
254 “The question at issue concerns which is the truer, more authentic, more illusion-free interpretation, and which on the other hand involves 
a distortion of the meanings things have for me. Resolving this issue is restoring commensurability.” Taylor, 1985: 26. 
255 Vernant in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1972, “Ebauches de la volonté dans la tragédie grecque”. 
256 Taylor, 1985: 29. 
257 Taylor, 1985: 29. 
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“Contingency” or the “structure of things”. Radical choice ultimately abdicates authentic 
strong evaluation in recusing subjects from the full realization of an articulated process of 
personal choosing. Judgement in tragic dilemmas is very difficult. Tragic poets generally 
sought to make the alternatives facing their protagonists as difficult as possible and thereby 
as tragikon, as tense and intense, as memorable, gripping and excruciating to behold, as 
possible. In Pentheus we find a man whose problem is that he has no dilemma. He does not 
recognize himself as choosing and cannot recognize the god that wants to be chosen, wished 
for and not merely grasped after or grasped. Pentheus’ tragedy is, in a paradoxical way, his 
failure to find himself in a situation of choice and its deliberation. Hence, perhaps, does his 
fate bear these comic traces. To gain the greatest purchase on the audience will have 
required the most skillful adaptation in dramatic situations of the intelligible with the 
extreme. The ethical interest in agency and theodicy is inseparable from the rhetorical, 
agonistic poet’s imperative to draw characters and situations such that they show the 
maximum power to involve the spectator. By the end of the 5th Century, Tragedy and its 
audience has become so mature, that the tragic situation can be appreciably so drawn as to 
not only be the traditional pattern of a protagonist faced with incommensurable alternatives, 
but one who has not even been able to look upon himself and his situation as one offering 
alternative possibilities. 
 
The tragic poet presented the predicaments of his protagonists as the predicaments of man, 
ho anthrōpos. Such predicament means to be faced with the dilemma of having dilemma, the 
problem that things matter profoundly but inexactly, and that morality – personal agency – 
cannot be easily surrendered without the surrender of something fundamental and of very 
great value in existence. We cannot coherently explain away responsibility by covering it 
with the veil of radical choice. That is the obscuring terminalism of ‘choice espoused’. As 
Taylor argues it, “this in turn leads to a second strong evaluation beyond the reach of choice 
. . . Granted this is the moral predicament of man, it is more honest, courageous, self-
clairvoyant, hence a higher mode of life, to choose in lucidity than it is to hide one’s choices 
behind the supposed structure of things, to flee from one’s responsibility at the expense of 
lying to oneself, of a deep self-duplicity.”258 Such honesty, courage and self-clairvoyance is 
exactly what the imperial city of Athens, with its hubristic and destructive policies and 
foolhardy expeditions, its vindictive retributions and insufficiently evaluated prosecutions 
of its best citizens needed to hear, as the disastrous Peloponnesian War drew to its end. It 
should not be understood that these values are good because they ensure survival or have 
political utility. It is rather that the reverse is more sure to bring a shorter or diminished life, 
βραχὺς αἰών, 397. Not losing what is at hand or present, right before your eyes, is the effect 
                                                        
258 Taylor, 1985: 33. 
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of Dionysiac wisdom, 397-9. It is not the telos of Dionysiac wisdom to survive, and adopt 
bacchic ways only as the means to that. Οne has clairvoyance, the right attitude and bearing 
to the gods and one’s own mortality. A consequence of the desire for those will be a mode of 
being, which is not self-destructive and oblivious of the desirability not of things absent, but 
of the good and pure that is present, ta paronta. 
 
 
 
3.3.10 Identity 
 
Pe. σοφὸς σοφὸς σύ, Fλὴν ἃ δεῖ σ' εἶναι σοφόν. 
Di. ἃ δεῖ /άλιστα, ταῦτ' ἔγωγ' ἔφυν σοφός. 
 
Pe. Clever clever you are, except in ways you ought to be clever. 
Di. How most I ought, that’s how I am clever. 
 
Bacchae dramatizes identity as problem. The common and automatic way for a Greek man to 
identify himself is to name himself, name his father and place of origins, which is to say, to 
locate himself in time and place and relation. Dionysus has many names and he and his 
worshippers return often to asserting the meaning of the name ‘Dionysus’ and its 
effectiveness in explaining his identity. Its effectiveness derives precisely from its binding 
him to his father, a testimony to his paternity259 (more than a sign which is flexible, and 
arbitrary, it is an index, almost an object, this name which is a trace, like the horkos of the 
oath-taker). When Pentheus is told he is not who he thinks he is, he answers as any Greek 
hero or man normally would260. The answer he receives is only the most literal way in which 
identity and identification are complicated and made not obvious (in a play in which 
disguise, transvestiture and metamorphosis, the limitations of the strictly literal and 
apparent, are so prominent).  
 
The connection of a person with a name, as person with body, is a tenuous, arbitrary, 
denatured one; or it is a strong, natured one, from case to case. Nomen can be omen. Humans 
are challenged to discern authentic, revealed or proclaimed truth, from the arbitrarily given 
meaning, the sign which is bound by convention to its referent, perilously subject to 
subjective motivations. It is the difference between prophēteia, access to truth, and prophasis, 
                                                        
259 For the phonic and semantic entanglement of Dionysos and “son of god” Dios huios, Dios pais, Dios gonos: Ἥκω Διὸς παῖς…Διόνυσος 
1-2, Διόνυσον οὐκ ἔφασκον ἐκφῦναι Διός 27, ὁ δαίµων ὁ Διὸς παῖς 417, Διόνυσος αὐτός µ' εἰσέβησ', ὁ τοῦ Διός 466, ὦ Διὸς παῖ/Διόνυσε 
550, 581, τὸν Διὸς /Διόνυσον 859-60, Διὸς γόνος 603, 725, 1342.  
260 506-7: Di. οὐκ οἶσθ' †ὅτι ζῆς† οὐδ' ὃ δρᾶις οὐδ' ὅστις εἶ. / Pe. Πενθεύς, Ἀγαυῆς παῖς, πατρὸς δ' Ἐχίονος. On the text here see § 2.2.1.2 n. 
122. 
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pretexts concealing truth. The naturalness or arbitrariness of names, a question of such 
importance for 20th Century theory and dealt with by Plato extensively in the Cratylus (an 
extensive “naturalizing” of language and the origins of words), is a question raised in 
Bacchae. Only the raising of certain kinds of questions, the introduction of different 
possibilities of seeing things, is sufficient to change our ways of seeing.261 
 
A strong evaluator, in its concern not only with ends, telē, but with the quality of its life and 
itself qua agent, may be said to be one who attends to its identity. Identity is “defined by our 
fundamental evaluations” as Taylor argues. A certain patriarchal political and social order, a 
patrilineal organization of the imagination of time and generations, an articulation of 
authority on the model of Zeus-like sovereignty and a code of honour and social currency 
that expresses itself in andreia and the legitimation of unchallenged birthright and paternal 
relation – all of this is certainly caught up in the system of values, expressed by the normal 
Greek understanding, (“So my lineage is part of my identity because it is bound up with 
certain qualities I value”262). This is a normalcy and intelligibility the play relies on and even 
exploits, in order the better to challenge. What it challenges is the unarticulated character of 
the normative. A work like Bacchae, and much of the Tragic corpus, is a provocation to the 
citizenry (as provocative in its “pricking”, “stinging”, oistrān, as the pressure of Socrates’ 
questionings) to become more articulate about itself, to take on an ever deeper identity, to 
become more agentful.  
 
Bacchae presents the prospect of figures “shorn” of their capacity to evaluate, “shorn” of 
their agency. The Theban women from the outset and Pentheus, in a process we are given to 
observe, are broken down as persons – theirs will have been a shearing of their selves 
asunder, a cutting of that which binds together a person. The binding of self to actions, a web 
or skein, which constitutes one as self, as person, comes undone, luein.263 We discern in their 
fates the integrally connected character of the evaluative capacity, the articulacy of 
personhood and agency.264  
                                                        
261 For challenges to views on identity see on Eteocles’ identity as a son, brother, man and warrior, how he envisages himself in following § 
3.3.11. Cf. also Hecuba at Eur. Hec 849-76; Agamemnon’s and Achilles’ exchanges in IA 317-542; and, of course, Pentheus’ as ineffective 
soldier, fighter and emasculated king in Bacchae. 
262 Taylor, 1985: 34. 
263 “Our identity is therefore defined as certain evaluations which are inseparable from ourselves as agents. Shorn of these we would cease to 
be ourselves . . . we would lose the very possibility of being an agent who evaluates; that our existence as persons, and hence our ability to 
adhere as persons to certain evaluations, would be impossible outside the horizon of these essential evaluations, that we would break down 
as persons, be incapable of being persons in the full sense.”, Taylor, 1985: 34-5. 
264The inarticulacy of mania: The play presents the spectacle of words, names and arguments losing or having lost their grip on things. In 
Bacchae inarticulate utterance displaces language amongst protagonists for whom language has not been powerfully discerning enough. 
Dionysus enchants Pentheus with a meaningless but entirely efficacious “Ah.”, 810. Amongst the worshippers of Dionysus, filled as they 
are with his animal-divine power, the ecstatic shout, the ululation and the bestial shriek unite them with one another and with their god, and 
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Taylor uses a language most apposite to the events of Bacchae, in his exploration of the 
notion of identity and its relation to the capacity for evaluation. Being forced by “torture or 
brainwashing to abandon these convictions by which I define my identity, I would be 
shattered . . . no longer a subject capable of knowing where I stood and what the meanings 
of things were for me . . . a terrifying breakdown of precisely those capacities which define a 
human agent”. This shattering, disorientation, abandonment and breakdown is just what 
occurs in Bacchae. Here, unlike for example in the case of Sophocles’ Oedipus in whose fate 
there is hope of redemption265, the most extreme forms of aporia, of the diminishment of 
agency, are brought before the imagination of the audience.  
 
Pentheus breaks down in his volitional capacities and his cognitive faculties; he is 
disoriented as in desires and what he thinks he is and then he is literally shattered in his 
body. He has repudiated some critical potential in mortals, to strongly evaluate, which is its 
own punishment, for “Such repudiation would both be itself inauthentic and would make 
me incapable of other authentic evaluations.”266 Identity “refers us” to those essential 
evaluations (the subject matter of Tragedy), which form the “indispensable horizon or 
foundation out of which we reflect as persons”. Bacchae, rather than a ‘crisis of symbols’267, is 
the dramatization of an “identity crisis” in this strong sense. Here we witness just that 
“terrifying experience of disaggregation and loss” of the lost or never discerned horizon of 
fundamental evaluations.268  
 
In a certain sense, the gods of Euripides269, Dionysus, the Theban women and what Pentheus 
will become are in fact Taylor’s ‘impossibilities’. The xenos aporos of Bacchae, is what Taylor 
                                                        
supplanted language with its powers of discrimination, e.g. εὔια τὸν εὔιον ἀγαλλόµεναι θεὸν / ἐν Φρυγίαισι βοαῖς ἐνοπαῖσί τε, 157-8. 
Bacchus, Dionysus himself is the shout, his name is the “holy cry” Euios, 566, 579. Similar is Iacchos for Dionysus, and the noun “shout, 
wail” iachē, such as we find at 148-9: πλανάτας ἐρεθίζων/ ἰαχαῖς. What belongs to him is described by this onomatopeic name, 238, 608. 
The bacchants identify themselves as a “band of the divine cry”, δέχεσθ' ἐς κῶµον εὐίου θεοῦ. 1167. The maenads are the very picture, 
always, either of chaste (e.g. 683-8) or uncanny hush (1084-5) or of wild inarticulacy: ἦν δὲ πᾶσ' ὁµοῦ βοή, / ὁ µὲν στενάζων ὅσον ἐτύγχαν' 
ἐµπνέων, / αἱ δ' ὠλόλυζον. 1131-3. They stir always not by the impulsion of an inwardly arising and personal imperative, but to the call 
from outside, 689-91: ἡ σὴ δὲ µήτηρ ὠλόλυξεν ἐν µέσαις / σταθεῖσα βάκχαις ἐξ ὕπνου κινεῖν δέµας, / µυκήµαθ' ὡς ἤκουσε κεροφόρων 
βοῶν. On Dionysiac mania see Jeanmaire, 1951: 105-56. 
265 In Sophocles’ Oedipus at Colonus the wary Oedipus meets his end summoned by the voice of god Soph. OC 1629, (see the messenger’s 
speech at Soph. OC 1586-1666); this is only forecast in the distant future for Kadmos and Harmonia in Bacchae 1336-9. 
266 Just as being virtuous is its own reward, as Socrates argues in Gorgias. 
267 Segal, 1997 [1982]: 272-347. 
268 Taylor, 1985: 35. 
269 Remarks on the gods: note Clytemnestra’s telling remark at Eur. IA 1034-5: “if there are <intelligent [and thereby intelligible]> gods a 
man will get rewards being just, if there are not, what is the point of making any effort in life at all”, but Diggle would delete <intelligent> = 
<συνετοὶ>, giving “if there be gods”, viz. of any kind: εἰ δ' εἰσὶ <συνετοὶ> θεοί, δίκαιος ὢν ἀνὴρ / ἐσθλῶν κυρήσεις· εἰ δὲ µή, τί δεῖ πονεῖν; 
When Euripides wrote these plays and put them together in 406, he was setting up the existence and certainly the nature of the gods as an 
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calls the person with no horizon of evaluation. Their identity, its dissipation in the strong 
internal sense, is expressed in the dissolution of individual personhood, in the insignia, 
skeuē, the marks of a falsifiable identity, items also borne by nathēkophoroi; the maenads are 
the Paradebeispiel of entities270: “utterly without identity . . . a kind of extensionless point, a 
pure leap into the void . . . description of the most terrible mental alienation.”271 Pentheus had 
thought he could take the position and perspective of a god, a perspective above that of 
mortals and the face-to-face interactions of the durée of human life. He had been tempted, 
which is to say that his weak desires had been used against him as bait, dolos272, into thinking 
that, like a god, he could see from above and not be seen. He thinks he can have what no 
human can, despite the pretensions of certain positivistic (hubristically optimistic?) strands 
of scientific approaches: a view from nowhere273. Looking down from above, out of an 
unimplicated consciousness as if from the theologeion, is impossible for mortals in a 
permanent way but only provisionally in the projective theatre, unless they are to incur the 
loss of what defines them most valuably, most essentially as persons, their intersubjectivity: 
homilia. 
 
In Pentheus’ fate we learn the nature of that profound diminution of humanity and the 
weakness of agency, that belongs both to the mad and to gods – those categories of person 
marked so much by their externality. Losing or not having need of bouleusis in a strong sense 
is to be a creature of radical choice. As Taylor fittingly puts it for us in our consideration of 
this radically irresponsible god of Euripides, Dionysus – the figure now embodied now 
disembodied274 – the subject for whom the subjectivity of others is dispensable, a “technique 
                                                        
open question, a torch which cast dancing shadows on human acts. On the gods in Euripides see Lefkowitz, 2016 Euripides & the Gods. Of 
Dionysus in Bacchae she writes, “Neither Dionysus nor any other god does anything to change the reality of human suffering.” (Lefkowitz, 
2016: 148), which is not quite true. Dionysus is repeatedly invoked as the god who brings the only relief from anxiety, merimnai, and who 
transforms ‘labour’, ponos, (τί δεῖ πονεῖν;) into something sweet, bringing the only ‘cure’, akē, for mortals. She is right that gods show no 
compunction, but it is the spectacle of this absence, which illuminates the deep importance to humans of compunction and compassion. On 
ponos see also above § 2.2.1.1 n. 81. 
270 The non-falsifiability of strong evaluation and thus of personal agency, is perhaps one of the deepest lessons or conclusions of Bacchae. 
271 Taylor, 1985: 35. 
272 See below § 4.2.2 on dolos.  
273 His ‘view from nowhere’ is an eminence like a monstrous thyrsus in which this head of state will be staked for his stake-out, 1059-62, 
[ὄχθων δ' ἔπ' ἀµβὰς ἐς ἐλάτην ὑψαύχενα 1061]. Its impossibility means he is only more conspicuous, isolated on his “eminence”, more seen 
than seeing, ὤφθη δὲ µᾶλλον ἢ κατεῖδε µαινάδας· 1075. They will spot him, ὡς δ' εἶδον ἐλάτηι δεσπότην ἐφήµενον 1095, and yet he will 
remain unseen 1115-24, for they are those collapsed points of view, the disastrous realization of that human dream to see “objectively”, as if 
from a “view from nowhere” which reveals iotself precisely to be as Taylor puts it the fate of one “utterly without identity . . . a kind of 
extensionless point”, Taylor, 1985: 35. 
274 He appears out of absence unforeseeable and makes himself unseeable in his presence as is emphatically expressed in the prologue, 1-63; 
he plays with the idea of an absent presence and a present absnce in the course of the episodes, 500-2, 629-30, addressing Dionysus in the 
second person 824-5, Διόνυσε, νῦν σὸν ἔργον· οὐ γὰρ εἶ πρόσω· 849, 850 and speaking both of “him” in the third and as him in the first as 
at 854-61, but also 923 and 975-6; but see esp. ξένος θ' ὃς ἡµῖν ποµπὸς ἦν θεωρίας 1046… καὶ τὸν ξένον µὲν οὐκέτ' εἰσορᾶν παρῆν,/ ἐκ δ' 
αἰθέρος φωνή τις, ὡς µὲν εἰκάσαι/ Διόνυσος, ἀνεβόησεν, 1077-8. 
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as person”, one of human creation, for the purposes of contrast: “The subject of radical 
choice is another avatar of that recurrent figure which our civilization aspires to realize, the 
disembodied ego, the subject who can objectify all being, including his own and choose in 
radical freedom. But this promised total self-possession would in fact be the most total self-
loss.”275 
 
 
3.3.11 Identity & Choice: Tragic Case-Studies 
 
For André Rivier the Furies, the atē which penetrates humans from without and ruins their 
mastery of self276 and the orgē (‘l’emportement’) or passion which carries off Eteocles in Seven 
Against Thebes: these are the objective realities of a world and a ‘theocentric vision’ 
insufficiently grasped by modern interpreters. It is a vision that gets inappropriately 
explained away in anachronistic terms, by modern scholars277. His orgē, the power of the 
Furies which is irresistible278, a madness which the chorus calls “heart-bursting, spear-raging 
frenzy” (θυ/οFλη-/θὴς δορί/αργος ἄτα279), these Aeschylean qualifications are 
irreconcilable with “la notion de volonté” that obtains amongst modern interpreters, 
according to Rivier280. Yet, what we see in both the dramas of those young Theban 
pretenders, Eteocles and Pentheus, is that what is definitive for a mortal’s identity is not 
whether he is or is not subject to daemonic influence, but in his handling of the recognition 
of limitations and compulsions laid upon him.  
 
Bacchae is the account of resistance to the god (a model for which was Aeschylus’ own 
Edonians281), a god coming from without, one who intervenes and invests the city, laying a 
cognitive and affective siege, driving the citizens out of their minds with mania, parakopoi282, 
                                                        
275 Taylor, 1985: 35.  
276 Atē: ‘madness’, a penetration of a person that disorders them cognitively and emotionally, so that they are not entirely their own. On 
Agamemnon and his identification of the cause of his acts, see Dodds, 1951: 1-18 
277 Rivier, 1968: 14. 
278 Orgē: Aesch. Sept. 678: ὀργὴν ὁµοῖος τῷ κάκιστ' αὐδωµένῳ. Irresistible Fury: Aesch. Sept. 70: Ἀρά τ' Ἐρινὺς πατρὸς ἡ µεγασθενής. 
279 Aesch. Sept. 685-7: τί µέµονας, τέκνον; µή τί σε θυµοπλη- / θὴς δορίµαργος ἄτα φερέτω· κακοῦ δ' / ἔκβαλ' ἔρωτος ἀρχάν. 
280 Eteocles feels himself pursued by his family’s curse, in words resonant for the Theban family depicted in the Bacchae, his “line”, γένος, 
is one driven mad by a god, θεοµανές, Aesch. Sept. 653-4: ὦ θεοµανές τε καὶ θεῶν µέγα στύγος, / ὦ πανδάκρυτον ἁµὸν Οἰδίπου γένος·. Cf. 
also in Aesch. Sept. 686-7, where Eteocles sounds truly the descendant of that House of Kadmos and the luckless Pentheus, the king borne 
off (ata pheretō 686). And the lines given the chorus at Aesch. Sept. 692-3, where Eteocles’ desire, himeros, is designated literally ‘flesh 
chewing’: ὠµοδακής σ' ἄγαν ἵµερος ἐξοτρύ- / νει πικρόκαρπον ἀνδροκτασίαν τελεῖν / αἵµατος οὐ θεµιστοῦ. 
281 On Aeschylus’ Lykourgus trilogy, about the Thracian king who refused to recognize Dionysus and his maenads and was driven mad and 
killed his own son, mistaking him for a vine his frenzy, see § 4.3.1 p. 172 n. 106, also Hom. Il. 6. 132-7. 
282Bacchae: ὄρος δ' οἰκοῦσι παράκοποι φρενῶν 33; µανείσαι πραπίδι / παρακόπωι τε λήµατι στέλλεται, 999-1000. Cf. Aesch. Ag. 218-27, 
where Agamemnon forced to choose, resolves to slaughter his own daughter at Aulis. He “puts on the strap of Necessity”, and is released to 
act by parakopa 223, “frenzy” or “derangement”, which makes men over-bold. 
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neutralizing the faculties of discernment, which thereby take on a critical, thematic place in 
the work. In the Seven Against Thebes, disputed in its reading on this point by Lesky and 
Rivier, there is a moment of great interest for the reading of agency in Tragedy283. Eteocles is 
readying himself to meet his brother in a duel, one that can only bring deeper malediction, 
the most abhorrent pollution of fratricide284. Throughout the exchange285, the chorus of young 
Theban women warns about extreme emotional states and their dangers, which they want 
the warrior to recognize in order to be able to escape. Eteocles, however, demonstrates a 
deep sense of his own fatefulness and that also of his family. The only thing to be done, 
since fighting is fatefully unavoidable, he says, is to go to it without disgrace, preserving his 
heroic identity in the eyes of others and of himself286. What must be clear about Eteocles is 
that it is a certain notion of himself, a certain identity that he wants to preserve. The impulse 
to protect this idea about himself entails a judgement about life and its value. Choosing to 
find oneself in an irresistible situation can also be a choice, the choice of acquiescence, the 
repudiation of a certain kind of active stance in favour of one more passive, which in this 
instance is judged more amenable by Eteocles. His bearing will have been a value call. 
 
Oedipus’ son thinks theologically, or perhaps he justifies a choice already taken with 
religious pretexts. Perhaps the lines between thought, belief and pretext are deliberately 
unclear, and that would surely be very true to human life and psychology. Therein lies some 
deal of the power of such a scene. Its psychological realism and intelligibility lie precisely in 
the inconclusiveness and scarcely distinguishable division of spiritual realities and 
psychological states. Can the daemonic forces that have prosecuted the Labdacids be both 
real and used as a pretext for taking certain courses of action? If not in the theomachein of 
Bacchae, then at any rate in a certain kind of chafing against the yoke of constraint, in a 
certain internal machein and resistance to being reduced to something of completely 
abdicated volition, there lies a redeeming agency. It is redeeming in that such a struggle (or 
resistance to the possibility of the irresistible) re-constitutes the identity of a person in its 
own eyes and in the eyes of others. 
 
Eteocles does not have a privileged knowledge of divinity. The gods and their minds are 
opaque in every way to mortals. Those who are said to have a special knowledge of the 
gods, seers, are typically attacked and discredited in Greek poetry287, which is significant 
above all because it points to the abiding anticipation amongst actors of pretexts that are 
                                                        
283 Lesky, 1966, Rivier, 1968. 
284 Aesch. Sept. 681-2. 
285 Aesch. Sept. 677-718. 
286Aesch. Sept. 683-5. 
287 Discreditable seers: see § 2.2.1.1 n. 73 § 2.2.1.2 n. 103, § 4.3.7 n.166, § 5.2.2 n. 13. 
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presumed to serve only the concealment of real motivations. Eteocles can, at moments, 
almost have the narcissistic resignation to a self-destructive fate, which he expects to define 
him – like the cynical and possibly vain suicide-killers of today, he is pursuing the “only” 
kind of glory, eukleia, available to him288. If this is an act that will incur moral pollution, it is 
also an aggrandizing gesture, but a god has brought it on, and forcefully so, says the 
fatalistic son of Oedipus that decent, upstanding (if hobbled, oidi-pous) fugitive from what 
had been ordained, Aesch. Septem. 689-91289: 
 
ἐFεὶ τὸ Fρᾶγ/α κάρτ' ἐFισFέρχει θεός, 
ἴτω κατ' οὖρον, κῦ/α Κωκυτοῦ λαχόν, 
Φοίβῳ στυγηθὲν Fᾶν τὸ Λαΐου γένος. 
 
Since a god very much hurries the business on, let the whole line 
of Laius detested by Apollo go along with the wind now that Cocytus’  
wave is its lot. 
 
Does Eteocles have a heightened sense of the divine will operating through the world? Or is 
he rather renouncing personal autonomy in the contemptuous gesture of a hero who 
abnegates a private life (and its pleasures and possibilities) for the ‘higher individualism’ of 
a famous death, in the service of an ideal greater than and external to himself? Eteocles 
views things in terms of curse, fate, the infection of an inherited guilt, but also of honour and 
shame, of man full of good and full of bad, of forces that are present amongst and also that 
abandon humans, of lot and of obligation to oneself, obligations stronger than any to family 
or city. He may very well be subject to objective forces, forces effectively outside of the 
human mind, in its consciousness and its darkness, but he is clearly concerned with his 
image of himself, and notions of how to comport himself contain great import for him. So 
we hear at Aesch. Sept. 698-703:  
 
 
Cho.  
ἀλλὰ σὺ /ὴ 'Fοτρύνου· κακὸς οὐ κεκλή-  
σῃ βίον εὖ κυρήσας· /ελάναιγις [δ'] οὐκ 
† εἶσι δό/ων Ἐρινύς, ὅταν ἐκ χερῶν                    
θεοὶ θυσίαν δέχωνται. 
 
                                                        
288 Aesch. Sept. 683-5: εἴπερ κακὸν φέροι τις, αἰσχύνης ἄτερ/ ἔστω· µόνον γὰρ κέρδος ἐν τεθνηκόσι·/ κακῶν δὲ κᾀσχρῶν οὔτιν' εὐκλείαν 
ἐρεῖς. 
289 Trans. Collard: 2008. 
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But do not yourself press on! You will not be called  
Ignoble if you secure your life well; 
The Fury cloaked in black storm will go out of the house 
Once the gods get your hands’ sacrifice. 
 
 
Eteoc.  
θεοῖς /ὲν ἤδη Fως Fαρη/ελή/εθα, 
χάρις δ' ἀφ' ἡ/ῶν ὀλο/ένων θαυ/άζεται· 
τί οὖν ἔτ' ἂν σαίνοι/εν ὀλέθριον /όρον; 
 
The gods are already past caring for me, it would seem,  
And the favour they prize from me is death. Why then should I  
still fawn to avoid my fated death? 
 
Eteocles is possessed of a powerful sense of human lot, moros. His drama suggests that a 
man may not choose his fate but at any rate can choose his comportment290. This person 
certainly comes across as a fatalist291. And yet he must repress his feelings292 and cling hard to 
the idée fixe of his inherited curse, force himself to action, nearly. His fatalism does not come 
as smoothly or effortlessly as fated things should. He seems to goad himself on, through a 
kind of self-loathing to which he very vividly and repeatedly returns293. The chorus deplores 
his readiness as “madness, mindless raging”, and beseeches him not to proceed, A. Septem 
705-8294: 
 
νῦν ὅτε σοι Fαρέστακεν· ἐFεὶ δαί/ων  
λή/ατος ἂν τροFαίᾳ χρονίᾳ /εταλ- 
λακτὸς ἴσως ἂν ἔλθοι θελε/ωτέρῳ 
Fνεύ/ατι· νῦν δ' ἔτι ζεῖ. 
 
Wait while it stands at your side, since in a late veer 
Of its will the divine power might perhaps 
Be changeable and come on more gently with its breath; 
But the storm is still boiling now. 
                                                        
290 Aesch. Sept. 683-5. 
291 Aesch. Sept. 719: θεῶν διδόντων οὐκ ἂν ἐκφύγοις κακά. 
292 Aesch. Sept. 656-7: ἀλλ' οὔτε κλαίειν οὔτ' ὀδύρεσθαι πρέπει, / µὴ καὶ τεκνωθῇ δυσφορώτερος γόος. 
293 Aesch. Sept.  πατρὸς δὴ νῦν ἀραὶ τελεσφόροι, 655; 695-7; 709-11. 
294 See also Aesch. Sept. µή τί . . .  ἄτα φερέτω 685-6, ἀλλὰ σὺ µὴ 'ποτρύνου, 698. I have modified Collard’s translation here, where he 
translated lēma at 706 with “mood”, I read “will”. See on lēma § 2.5 n. 255. 
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It has boiled up already, in his father, Oedipus’ curse, kateugma. He has seen as much in his 
dreams, which he takes to be true; they correspond to reality. They have showed something 
unbearable, the dividing up of his father’s wealth, a final scattering of any honour295. “Listen 
to a woman’s voice, even if you are disinclined to”, Aesch. Sept. 712; the chorus leader 
makes one last appeal, and here things become all the more framed in terms of character and 
the self-understanding of the participants. The exchange is now stichomythic and pointed, 
Aesch. Septem 712-18: Eteocles will not be dissuaded, he has become a pure instrument for 
the accomplishment of one kind of purpose, wherever that purpose may originate: 
τεθηγ/ένον τοί /' οὐκ ἀFα/βλυνεῖς λόγῳ, Aesch. Sept. 715.  
 
Is it really a trick of the modern eye here to sense a certain ambiguity, a crack in this 
theocentric world and a potential for alternative action?296 “But god also honours an ‘ignoble’ 
victory”, νίκην γε /έντοι καὶ κακὴν τι/ᾷ θεός, Aesch. Sept. 716: the chorus consistently 
opens up alternative, possible paths, here strikingly the non-heroic, kakēn, option in which 
there is, it claims, divine legitimation. The chorus is speaking Eteocles’ double language: 
male heroic and theological fatalist. He has set upon taking the course of violence, on 
realizing the curse, which he wants to see as ineluctably real; a man in armour will not be 
talked out of it, and not by a woman: οὐκ ἄνδρ' ὁFλίτην τοῦτο χρὴ στέργειν ἔFος Aesch. 
Sept. 717. “But do you wish to reap the blood of your own brother?” asks the choryphaeus; 
he deflects the question about his own desires with a gnomic declaration about what ‘one’ 
cannot get away from, Aesch. Sept. 718-9: 
 
Ch. ἀλλ' αὐτάδελφον αἷ/α δρέψασθαι θέλεις; 
Et. θεῶν διδόντων οὐκ ἂν ἐκφύγοις κακά. 
 
Ch. But is it your wish to reap a crop from your own brother’s blood? 
Et. If the gods give it, you can’t escape evil. 
 
Tragic persons like Eteocles are obligated; they are enmeshed in purposes and plans that are 
not theirs, in which they can be as if passive instruments. This goes as much for people 
today as ever before. What we find interesting about people, why we are drawn to the 
spectacle of fates whose outcomes we already know, is to some degree because in the 
spectre of resistance to Necessity (Oedipus), surrender to it (Eteocles) or its misjudgement 
(Pentheus), we witness the drama of the freedom of bearing, which engages us so powerfully 
                                                        
295 Aesch. Sept. 709-11: ἐξέζεσεν γὰρ Οἰδίπου κατεύγµατα·/ ἄγαν δ' ἀληθεῖς ἐνυπνίων φαντασµάτων / ὄψεις, πατρῴων χρηµάτων δατήριοι. 
296 Certainly, at any rate, not for a Euripides for whom not only the tightness of hold that daemonic forces have on humans is uncertain, but 
in whom the possibility that the gods ‘are not there’ or have no interest in human lives, is evoked, cf. Eur. IA 1035-7. 
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because, as Tragedy and much wisdom literature repeatedly reminds us, the import that 
things and situations have for us, is decisive. They will determine the nature and quality of 
our existences and we determine what import things will have, while we move among one 
another under the sun. In Pentheus it is his resistance that will define him, the choice 
through which is expressed his identity. In Eteocles it is in his unwillingness to resist 
daemonic forces that his volitional weakness is revealed. Neither has chosen to be an 
articulate chooser, to strongly evaluate or revise their motivations. Not Snell, Rivier or 
Vernant but Albin Lesky came closer to seeing this essential point. It is in their bearing 
towards fate, in their manner of choosing, that mortals are or fail to become agentful: 
 
The chorus reminds Eteokles of the inexpiable crime of fratricide, and when the king 
points out that this is a question of honour, the chorus retorts that he is not only 
accepting the fatal conflict but that he is desiring it out of his own will . . . Do we not 
find here again what our analysis of the passage in Agamemnon so clearly showed: 
man being led by fate to a terrible deed, however, he not only accepts but desires and 
passionately undertakes.297 
 
Pentheus of Thebes, the earlier ancestor of Eteocles, is also on a war footing298. He needs no 
justification; he is confronted with human shamefulness and reads everything, including the 
god whom he fails to recognize, in terms of human motivations. If he felt there were a 
family curse he might have said it were in the Theban surplus of women and their womanly 
motivations run amok. Yet, Pentheus is, in a certain light, a kind of anti-Eteocles. Although 
both are concerned with timē, honour, “face” and with aischunē “shame” – alike will they be 
carried back into Thebes, killed at the hands of their own kin; unhappy in their daemons, 
dying through impious motive, asebei dianoiai299 and mourned by maenadic voices300 – Eteocles 
casts himself as a collaborator with the dark will of unanswerable divine forces, while 
Pentheus and his Thebes fight against the god and forfeit everything, when they could at so 
little cost have had the god for ally, symmachos301.  
 
Pentheus detects human agency and human motivation everywhere; Eteocles declares 
himself suborned to a will not his own, a daemonic and inescapable will, but one that he 
does not at all resist. Both are men who willingly fight others but do not struggle with their 
own selves. Disinclination to even begin to countenance himself as other than he has already 
                                                        
297 Lesky, 1966: 83-4. 
298 45, 50-2, 226-32, 239-41, 653, but esp. 778-86. 
299ἀσεβεῖ διανοίᾳ: Aesch. Sept. 825-31. On Pentheus’ asebeia see § 2.2.5 p. 86 n. 184 and on sebein § 3.1 p. 137 n. 10 
300 Aesch. Sept. 835-6: ἔτευξα τύµβῳ µέλος/ θυιὰς.  
301 Little cost: 893-4: κούφα γὰρ δαπάνα νοµί-/ ζειν ἰσχὺν τόδ' ἔχειν. God for ally, 1341-3: εἰ δὲ σωφρονεῖν/ ἔγνωθ', ὅτ' οὐκ ἠθέλετε, τὸν 
Διὸς γόνον/ ηὐδαιµονεῖτ' ἂν σύµµαχον κεκτηµένοι. 
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projected is powerfully expressed in that feeblest of pretexts, that a man already dressed for 
battle does not like talking (about the different things that the gods may honour) οὐκ ἄνδρ' 
ὁFλίτην τοῦτο χρὴ στέργειν ἔFος302. 
 
For the spear and sceptre that are his normal instruments of power, Pentheus in his 
derangement will take up the “ivy-shaft”303; Eteocles in his raving is borne by a spear-raging 
madness304. They are males who fail to heed the maenadic voices of female Thebes. If it is 
difficult to discern the pattern of their deliberating and volition, if in fact things are so 
scrambled, so entangled that we can not cleanly separate divine intention from human acts, 
what is surely clear is that from one of the earliest surviving Classical Tragedies to the last 
(Aesch. Sept. 460s BCE, Eur. Bacchae 405 BC): agency is a problem. Where divine will ends and 
where human will starts is unclear; motivations are elusive, that of the gods, that of others 
and that even of oneself. What are actions and what only happenings; what acts and what 
mere movements – this is a problem for people to whom meaning matters305.  
 
After its last futile attempt to persuade Eteocles not to fight, the Chorus sings, now in 
fatalistic mode. Persuasion has failed. That Erinus, called up by the father, must be “working 
out Oedipus’ angry curse”306. A “child-slaying strife urges it on” Fαιδολέτωρ δ' ἔρις ἅδ' 
ὀτρύνει, 726. This Erinus, like an enduring prosthetic of a father’s dreadful will, is a 
“destroyer of houses, not like the gods, forgetting nothing [panalēthē], a prophet of evil”307. 
What would appear more of a refutation of the agency of mortal will than the notion of 
inherited guilt and responsibility? Yet, if one can inherit the merit that belongs to kings308, 
why not also, we might ask, inherit responsibility. In Tragedy the pattern is never to show 
mortals as ever only the objects of external powers, but rather always to detect a mix of 
causes defining human predicaments.  
 
Sophocles’ Oedipus asks if it were not reasonable to judge himself to have been the abject 
toy of a savage divine agency309. He, like Job in the Old Testament, is a man marked by a rare 
kind of innocence. Yet his father has brought about this state of affairs. He had chosen to 
ignore the oracle of Apollo three times. Laius was the “victim of his own unwillingness” to 
                                                        
302 Aesch. Sept. 717. 
303 κίσσινον βέλος, 25. In Bacchae the ordinary tools and weapons (λογχωτὸν βέλος, 761) are ineffective and displaced by the gods 
efficacious symbols.  
304 Pentheus: 941-2. Eteocles: A. Septem. 686: δορίµαργος ἄτα φερέτω. 
305 On Giddens on Wittgenstein on ‘movements’ vs ‘acts’, see Giddens, 1984: 65-6 and on ‘happenings’ as opposed to ‘actions’ from the 
point of view of the anthropology of agency in art, see § 4.3.2 n. 111. 
306 724-5: τελέσαι τὰς περιθύµους/κατάρας Οἰδιπόδα βλαψίφρονος·.  
307 Aesch. Septem. 720-2: πέφρικα τὰν ὠλεσίοικον / θεόν, οὐ θεοῖς ὁµοίαν,/ παναληθῆ, κακόµαντιν, 
308 Pentheus’ inherited power and status: 43-4, 213. 
309 Soph. OT 828-9: Ἆρ' οὐκ ἀπ' ὠµοῦ ταῦτα δαίµονός τις ἂν/ κρίνων ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ τῷδ' ἂν ὀρθοίη λόγον; 
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take good counsel, his aboulia, according to Aeschylus310. His ancestor Kadmos would suffer 
involuntary bereavement of male issue311; Laius did not have the good sense nor good 
fortune, to produce no issue, Aesch. Sept. 741-51: 
 
Fαλαιγενῆ γὰρ λέγω  
Fαρβασίαν ὠκύFοι- 
νον, αἰῶνα δ' ἐς τρίτον 
/ένειν, ἈFόλλωνος εὖτε Λάιος 
βίᾳ, τρὶς εἰFόντος ἐν 
/εσο/φάλοις Πυθικοῖς 
χρηστηρίοις θνῄσκοντα γέν- 
νας ἄτερ σῴζειν Fόλιν. 
 
κρατηθεὶς δ' ἐκ φιλᾶν ἀβουλιᾶν 
ἐγείνατο /ὲν /όρον αὑτῷ, 
 
Of the ancient transgression,  
I speak, its penalty swift; and it remains 
to the third generation, ever since, 
despite Pythian Apollo in his seat of oracles, 
the world’s navel, thrice telling him  
to save his city by dying without issue, 
 
Laius was conquered by pleasing folly [aboulia] 
and got for a son his own death. 
 
Zeus had long before assented to this destruction of Thebes and the oracle of Zeus had 
forecast the events that would follow after the close of the action of Bacchae. The play 
concludes with prediction of the uncanny, future life of exile for Kadmos and Harmonia312. 
Yet we have been made throughout to feel that Kadmos and the Kadmeians have made 
choices, have had the space to conduct themselves in ways that were not determined; their 
comportment and the import they attributed to things has been theirs all along. Mortals 
have always had this capacity of bouleusis, and this may be the most fundamental constraint 
                                                        
310 In Euripides’ Chrysippus Laius is also seen as tragically incontinent, knowing the right but not being able to hold back from doing the 
wrong, see Eur. fr. 841. 
311 1304-7: ὥστε διολέσαι δόµους/ κἄµ', ὅστις ἄτεκνος ἀρσένων παίδων γεγὼς/ τῆς σῆς τόδ' ἔρνος, ὦ τάλαινα, νηδύος/ αἴσχιστα καὶ κάκιστα 
κατθανόνθ' ὁρῶ·. 
312 χρησµὸς ὡς λέγει Διός, 1333, πάλαι τάδε Ζεὺς οὑµὸς ἐπένευσεν πατήρ. 1349. 
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upon them: since choosing not to evaluate strongly and deliberate is itself a choice, humans 
cannot avoid their fate, which is to choose and be determined by the quality of their choices. 
 
Aboulia, that could be a subtitle of Bacchae. The whole play is a dramatization of forms of 
will, of a god’s willful objective and its “working out”, telesai. It is a collision of wills. 
Human willfulness discovers through its enfeeblement and enchantment, through the 
spectacle of its violent disintegration in trance and frenzy, the priority of divine will – which 
only to have recognized had been enough. An attentive study of Bacchae, one open to not 
treating it only as a document in religious belief and practice, will cast a special light on the 
controversies in modern interpretation over the psychological, ethical reading of tragedy as 
dramatizing human subjects qua subjects. Bacchae is a portrait of human and divine 
desirousness. On the extent of agency it is as inconclusive as Aeschylus, as unclosed as any 
satisfying treatment of the subject, whose subjectivity is never done choosing how it will 
identify itself, how it must be.  
 
Dramatists (good ones), even if they had such terms as ‘free will’ in their suite of 
philosophical tools, do not make their figures speak in those terms. Their mode is dramatic, 
not only didactic or heuristic. Instead their characters feel and explain and excuse 
themselves, recuse themselves or follow their own intentions in spite of what they know. 
They persuade each other or fail to persuade each other, they know what is prudent and 
what gravely dangerous, but follow an imperative which they feel is their own. If power to 
follow their own inclination, articulate or not, is denied them they feel something essential 
about themselves is being violated. The state of volitional enslavement or enchainment is 
unbearable. Choice and actions express and constitute the identities of persons in their own 
eyes and those of others. Agency is inextricable from what a person thinks it is. 
 
 
3.3.12 Import 
 
In his essay “Self-Interpreting Animals”313, Taylor introduces further ideas with great power 
of illumination for an articulate reading of Bacchae. Emotions have objects, or as Brentano 
had first expressed it in the 19th Century, establishing an important premise of 20th Century 
phenomenology, subjects are “intentional”, their experiences are ‘towards’ or necessarily 
about certain objects of experience.314 Saying properly what feelings and motivations are like 
                                                        
313 Taylor, 1985: 45-76. 
314 See Brentano, 1924-5: 124. Thought is always intentional, it is thought of or about an object of thinking, the “standard philosophical term 
for aboutness is intentionality, derived from ‘intendere arcum’, aim an arrow, so Dennett, 1991: 333. See for a technical definition of 
“intentionality” from the point of view of the natural scientist Dennett, 1981: 4 and more comprehensively his The Intentional Stance, 1987. 
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“involves expressing or making explicit a judgement about the object they bear on.”315 
Emotions do not, however, simply have objects, but more precisely, are situational; they are 
“affective modes of awareness of situation”316. To be moved means to apprehend the quality 
or properties of a certain situation and this is not neutral – experiencing a given emotion is 
“to be aware of our situation” as having a certain quality, to have judged it as such. This 
may sound to many as excessively “intellectual”, as an underestimation of the spontaneous 
character of most experience. The philosophical point, which I am less concerned to prove in 
its universal validity is, however, of special pertinency in discussing drama, in which there 
can be no question that the audience is “aware” of situations, judging them and being 
guided to judge them in certain ways, in order to feel certain affects. 
 
The quality or property judged as defining a given situation (as, for example, humiliating, 
shameful, outrageous, humorous), Taylor designates as its import: “By ‘import’ I mean a way 
in which something can be of relevance or of importance to the desires or purposes or 
aspirations or feelings of a subject; or otherwise put, a property of something whereby it is a 
matter of non-indifference to a subject.”317 Identifying the import is not simply the passive 
registering of a felt experience but active; it entails the ‘picking out’ of what does, could or 
should give grounds for having a certain feeling in a situation: “saying what an emotion is 
like involves making explicit the sense of the situation it incorporates, or, in our present terms, 
the import of the situation as we experience it.”318 Import gives grounds for feeling a certain 
way, it is different from simply feeling a certain way: “experiencing our situation as bearing 
a certain import, where for the ascription of the import it is not sufficient just that I feel this 
way, but rather the import gives the grounds or basis for the feeling.”319. Pentheus reads his 
situation, he picks out exactly what about Teiresias and Kadmos makes them embarrassing, 
why they are shameless. He thinks that a man who comports himself as a woman or is too 
credulous or not sufficiently self-assertive is a man compromised and thus finds the 
situation with Dionysus intolerable. Dionysus wants to defend his mother’s honour and 
recoup his own status; the situation of mortals at Thebes is insulting, it has this import for 
him most decisively.  
 
                                                        
Consciousness and the ‘objects of consciousness’ being his constant object of inquiry, of great interest to questions of the cognitive 
dimensions of religion and theatrical experience is Dennett, 1991. On aboutness see Dennett, 1987 passim with “Reflections: about 
aboutness” at 203-11. 
315 Taylor, 1985: 47. 
316 Taylor, 1985: 48. 
317 Taylor, 1985: 48. 
318 Taylor, 1985: 48. 
319 Taylor, 1985: 49. 
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Since in experiencing an emotion, through the experience of the import of a situation, is 
involved a judgement, it stands to reason that the import of a situation can be misjudged. In 
the experience of physical pain, by contrast, there is no question of judgement. Similarly, 
one could objectively describe pain, its causes and effects, but sensation is very different 
from import. A physical sensation like pain does not depend on our notion of pain. Shame 
and its presence in a given context depend on our idea of what is shameful. We can 
determine, through questioning, that it were irrational to allow ourselves to feel shame in a 
certain situation. Attic drama demands just such a ‘picking out’, a reading of situations as 
having certain imports. It is a ‘making explicit of the sense of the situation it incorporates’. It 
does not simply push rhetorical emotional buttons in a manipulative way, as for example 
Alfred Hitchcock famously fantasized about doing to audiences320.  
 
Tragedy is fundamentally situational in this sense of Taylor’s. In the theatron – a kind of 
visualizing bouleutērion – it makes explicit, emphanes, the nature of affect, and of experience 
as affective condition. Its ambition is, in its complex and multi-perspectival way, to make 
existence itself the explicated situation, the sense of which it incorporates. Thus is Tragedy 
concerned with modes of life and its tutor is Dionysus, the great manifester, in whose art of 
drama, situations of importance are realized. They make evident their own import and the 
nature of the import that the adjudicating audience ascribes. Modern objectivist theories 
such as behaviourism321, that seek to explain “human motivation in terms, say, of underlying 
physical states” want to separate the subject from its subject experience, define knowledge 
as “experience-independent”322. Imports, however, are essentially “experience-dependent 
properties”.  
 
Here is that familiar determining bifurcation again: primary order – secondary order 
knowledge; subjective – objective; independent or dependent of experience; exothēn – 
endothēn. The conception of the subject and its place and role, the nature of its being or not 
being bound up in its experiences will be determining for our conclusions. For Tragedy we 
need a phenomenological hermeneutic, for this is no art of clear distinctions between 
persons and objects of experience. At its very heart is just that sense of situational import as 
delineated by Taylor in his essay. The very ambiguity of Dionysus, the entanglement in his 
vicinity of persons – that palē, sumplegma – in situations of tragical dilemma and the threads 
of judgement, by which persons are bound or not bound to their own acts and choices: these 
                                                        
320 Horror is much closer to Comedy as a genre than Tragedy. Comedy appeals at a certain level through something reflexive, humour; it 
elicits the more spontaneous reaction of laughter. Tragedy is more reflective, where one does not only feel but sympathizes (identifies and 
evaluates), summons the response of judgement through its construction of situations of importance. 
321 “ . . . the strange continuing obsession with this wildly implausible approach to the science of man”, Taylor, 1985: 51. 
322 Taylor, 1985: 50.  
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are just those elements, the very core of Tragic drama, which solicit from the audience 
evaluation and judgement. His theatre and his presence becomes a kind of ethical and 
pedagogical prosthesis, by which the citizenry may access knowledge, mathos, through the 
simulated pathos of others.  
 
 
3.3.13 Subject-Reference 
 
Shame is central in the action and motivations of Bacchae, and more broadly too for the 
understanding of Greek culture323. Shame is useful in illustrating what Taylor designates the 
“subject-referring properties” of imports. Nothing is objectively shameful. Shame is always 
the experience of shame: such as “a subject experiences in relation to a dimension of his 
existence as a subject”324. Feeling a sense of shame means necessarily having a sense of the 
meaning of things, the significance which, for me and my culture, they express. If I am one 
who runs away from battle, plucks my hair and speaks in a high voice, steals clothes from 
dressing rooms or steals sacrifices meant for the gods, or exploits others instrumentally for 
the accomplishment of my own plans – these things are shameful in my eyes and those of 
my social others because of the meaning that things have for us. 
 
Of certain objects of shame in given situations Taylor writes, “These properties are thus only 
demeaning for a subject for whom things can have this kind of meaning. But things can have 
this kind of meaning only for a subject in whose form of life there figures an aspiration to 
dignity, to be a presence among men which commands respect.”325 For things to have 
meaning in this way then, to have this aspiration and to feel the pressure of shame and the 
pull of dignity, one must be a “subject of awareness, of experience”. The existence of an 
emotion like shame is only possible through the existence of aware, self-reflexive beings326. 
But just as there may be new, unforeseen forms of knowledge and ignorance, there may too 
come different reasons for shame. Pentheus is not self-reflexive in an original way, he fails to 
                                                        
323 See especially Dodds, 1951; Adkins, 1960; and Cairns, 1993. 
324 Taylor, 1985: 53. In another, related context, discussing the nature and science of consciousness, Dennett describes “phenomena that 
depend on their concepts”, such as love and money. He writes: “On the view of consciousness I will develop in this book, it turns out that 
consciousness, like love and money, is a phenomenon that does indeed depend to a surprising extent on its associated concepts. Although, 
like love, it has an elaborate biological base, like money, some of its most significant features are borne along on the culture, not simply 
inherent, somehow, in the physical structure of its instances.”, Dennett, 1991: 24. 
325 Taylor, 1985: 53. 
326 “. . . the import shameful can be explicated only by reference to a subject who experiences his world in a certain way. . . emerging here is 
not the banal truism that nothing has the import shameful except for a subject for whom there are imports . . . Rather the point is that the 
term ‘shameful’ has no sense outside of a world in which there is a subject for whom things have certain (emotional) meanings. For the 
(linguistic) meaning of ‘shameful’ can only be explicated with reference to a subject for whom these (emotional) meanings have weight, and 
if there were no such subjects, the term itself would lack sense.” Taylor, 1985: 53. 
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discern unfamiliar reasons for shame and kind of unestablished values or non-obvious 
emotional logic. Import terms such as ‘shameful’, depend for their sense on subjects who 
experience the import as such. We could explain ‘fear’ to an alien; we could explain its 
physiology as a reaction, but never “this human business of shame and humiliation”. Import 
defines how situations are “relevant to our purpose or desires, or aspirations”327. Purposive, 
evaluative, reflexive beings alone find themselves in situations of meaningful import.  
 
With a strongly felt sense of aggrieved timē, Dionysus returns to the scene of his conception, 
the city of his birth and mother’s death. His telos is definite – it originates in his sense of 
things, the sense of injured aidōs. This is just the god’s very intelligibly human ‘aspiration to 
dignity, to be a presence among men which commands respect’. Shame is an emotion that 
depends on “the experience subjects have of it”, unlike measurable physiological 
phenomena, for example328. In accounting for the meaning of an emotion like shame, we must 
do precisely what Tragedy and Epic does, refer to “things – like our sense of dignity, of 
worth, of how we are seen by others – which are essentially bound up with the life of a 
subject of experience.” 329  
 
Subject-referring properties are the topic of Tragedy. Its object is the subject qua subject.  
There is no objective account to be made of shame or honour, love or hate: these concern the 
peculiar experience of life of unique subjects in particular cultures at specific and unique 
times. The protagonists of Tragedy experience their situations as having a sense that inheres 
in that experience 330. While gods or demons or contingency seem to stand and are behind 
certain motivations, actors and audience still read these situations as having certain 
meanings for them and these meanings residing in the situation’s experience. However 
sadly they may seem to discover that they have been the playthings of gods or necessity, no 
figure in Tragic drama is satisfied to be borne along simply by events and circumstances, 
except when those are a pretext for acting in a certain way. It is their orientation towards 
their situations and their fates, in the articulateness which it gives them and which they in 
turn lend those, that protagonists are most agentful.331 
                                                        
327 Taylor, 1985: 53. 
328 But what I experience I can dissemble and falsify to others, in connection with this point consider the discussion of the “smile” and its 
inferring in § 5.5 below. 
329 Taylor, 1985: 53. 
330 Taylor, 1985: 53. 
331 For Giddens’ definition of agency ( “Agency refers to doing.” Giddens, 1984: 10, reminiscent of Aristotle on Tragedy, which also is 
concerned primarily with showing ‘doing’, cf. Arist. Poet. 1449b 24-5 τραγῳδία µίµησις πράξεως σπουδαίας καὶ τελείας µέγεθος ἐχούσης . 
. . 36-8 ἐπεὶ δὲ πράξεώς ἐστι µίµησις, πράττεται δὲὑπὸ τινῶν πραττόντων, οὓς ἀνάγκη ποιούς τινας εἶναι κατά τε τὸ ἦθος καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν), 
see Giddens, 1984:1-16. He is concerned to distinguish agency and intentionality: “Agency refers not to the intentions people have in doing 
things but to their capability of doing those things in the first place . . . events of which an individual is the perpetrator . . . Whatever 
happened would not have happened if that individual had not intervened. Action is a continuous process, a flow, in which the reflexive 
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This has been a long and detailed detour. Taylor’s ideas are richly relevant to Tragedy and 
especially to Bacchae, in which the problems of knowledge, evaluation, desire, various 
qualities of volition and different aspects of personhood – its nature, shape and destruction – 
form the very matter and substance of the work, the meaning of its actions. We always have 
a philosophical position which informs and, indeed, forms the interpretations we make of 
works of poetry or religious practices. It is crucial that we take (proairein) our positions and 
not only have them. The human story in Bacchae concerns qualities of choosing, the dangers 
of losing reflexivity (of awareness self and of others as like self), of inarticulacy. It concerns 
the magnetic powerfulness of the mind and its power of articulation and concealment as 
well as the charisma of animal presence and the fearsomeness of divine co-presence. The 
interpretation of Tragic poetry needs to frame a commensurately strong evaluation of the 
dramas of evaluators. 
 
Now Taylor has been concerned to recuperate the value and authenticity of subjectivity 
from the vacuousness of objectivist, primary order, scientific modes of interpretation 
inappropriately applied to human doings. The detailed engagement here with his 
philosophy must not be seen as simply an attempt to swing the hermeneutic pendant back 
in the opposite direction. My aim is not to re-install the individual and its fate in the 
privileged seat, which remains better reserved for the priest of Dionysus. If anything, in the 
discussion of Dionysus and of Euripides’ great and subtle dramatization of the Pentheus 
myth, we will not be tempted to come down either in favour of primary- or secondary-order 
forms of knowledge, to choose either between persons as subjects or objects of influence, but 
rather only to win new, more differentiated perspectives, fresh knowledge into the 
intersubjectivity – intercourse, communion, company, homilia – of human life as that is 
imitated in the Theatre of Dionysus. Tragedy envisages the human situation ever more 
richly in offering ever more perspectives on and within peculiar situations that come to 
serve as models for a whole – existence – which is only ever knowable in parts, in fragments 
and under the play of moving lights and shadows.  
 
 
3.3.14 Dimension: Tragic Subjectivity as Depth 
 
In his development of an ethics founded upon articulacy, knowledge and seeking, which is 
expressed in articulate and contrastive evaluation of values, Charles Taylor has sounded 
much like the 5th Century Socrates. By the last years of the Peloponnesian War, Euripides has 
                                                        
monitoring which the individual maintains is fundamental to the control of the body that actors ordinarily sustain throughout day-to-day- 
lives.” Giddens, 1984:9.   
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left Athens, possibly some kind of exile from the polis that had not recognized him. He 
would die in 406 BCE. Socrates, who more than likely sat in the theatre in 405 BCE and 
watched the posthumous premier of Iphigenia at Aulis, Alcmeon at Corinth and Bacchae, is a 
figure whose presence is, of course, felt through the entire history of Western philosophy 
too. The Russian-doll-like ’satyr’, who was immortalized in Plato’s Symposium, a work set in 
405 BCE, would himself be unrecognized by Athens, a gadfly pricking his fellow citizens to 
become stronger evaluators. He would be sentenced to die in 399 BCE. The atheist Diagoras 
of Melos, who had been exiled from Athens for impugning the Mysteries in his poetry, was 
regularly derided by Aristophanes and others. Nicomachus, that luckless re-organizer of the 
sacral calendar, would also be prosecuted, not long after, for the innovations in religious 
practices at Athens that he had merely recorded332.  
 
Reading Taylor alongside Euripides, it comes to seem that the kind of agency he describes is 
just that kind of agency explored by the poet in this city of law-courts and their such 
scrupulously fine differentiations in qualities of agentfulness. Aristotle was heir to this 
intellectual culture and its peculiar ethical accents. It is not surprising that he should be so 
focused in his work on ethics with the nature and quality of agency and its relationship to 
knowledge and ignorance, for that is a relationship and a problem expressed and explored 
in multifold ways in Attic Drama, on which of course he was also such an expert and careful 
analyst. 
 
The most important questions that face humans as persons – kin, citizens and reflexive 
beings concerned with the import of their existence – are just those most difficult to respond 
to. They are also the ones that the tragic poet in his work, which naturally takes on all the 
problems of the religiosity out of which it first issued will be most concerned to grapple 
with. That religiosity is defined by adēlotes, non-obviousness or unclearness of the gods; the 
interactiveness and incessant communicativeness of humans as social beings and their 
projections of similar such deities; and their framing of ‘ultimate concerns’333. Agency in the 
philosophical vision of Socrates, as too in the ethical vision of Euripides, inheres in the active 
discernment of the good and its higher modes of life. Just so in Taylor: 
 
Now precisely these deepest evaluations are the ones which are least clear, least 
articulated, most easily subject to illusion and distortion. It is those which are closest to 
what I am as a subject, in the sense that shorn of them I would break down as a 
person, which are among the hardest for me to be clear about.  
                                                        
332 Diagoras: Ar. Ran. 320, Nub. 830, Av. 1073-4, Hermippus fr. 43. On Nicomachus, see Lysias 30 and on the prosecution of Lysias and its 
significance for the history of Greek religion, see Parker, 1996: 152-3.  
333 Burkert, 1996: 4-8. 
 216 
Thus the question can always be posed: ought I to re-evaluate my most basic 
evaluations? Have I really understood what is essential to my identity? Have I truly 
determined what I sense to be the highest mode of life? 
Now this kind of re-evaluation will be radical; not in the sense of radical choice, 
however, that we choose without criteria; but rather in the sense that our looking again 
can be so undertaken that in principle no formulations are considered unrevisable.334 
 
Religion can urge mortals to be strong evaluators, that is to say, autonomously moral. 
Alternatively it can establish a noble, strong evaluation as a foundational belief and enforce 
it as a self-evident truth, (and anticipate an obedience or adherence in which is implicit at 
least the possibility of a formalism, which is weakly evaluative, that of only the 
narthēkophoros335). Two kinds of things it often ask are: that its worshippers be articulators 
(reasoning out the good in any given peculiar situation) or accept an original articulation (on 
faith, by revelation, to live by rules). The depth of Greek Tragedy consists in its interpretant 
character: Tragedy interprets, it is not simply an inert object, which we interpret; it is a 
supreme act of agentful interpretation of values, knowledge and of its own meaning and the 
meaning of its god, Dionysus. It does not simply celebrate or entrench an established moral 
code, but re-articulates and calls for a like articulacy from its audiences. In Bacchae we are 
not just presented with, say, a coded dramatization of mystery initiation, or an 
unproblematic homily on Dionysiac rites. Instead we are presented with god and mortal as 
problems, an open problem that invites us not just to assent or dissent, to approve or 
disapprove but consciously to become judges of situations, to be originally evaluative and 
presumably to extend such evaluative originality and strength to ourselves, our lives as 
mortal persons in the common life of the super-subjective polis person.  
 
 
3.4 Summary 
 
Agency is a question of articulacy, the capacity to contrastively evaluate between desires. 
Being an agent means adopting hierarchies of values. Most of human life is lived out 
implicitly: in routinized states of reflex, habit and what Giddens called the “practical 
consciousness” as distinguished from the “discursive consciousness”336. Drama is a 
discursive moment. It aims to be a moment that endures. It seems to encourage the spectator 
to become a living theatre, unto itself, to become perpetually discursive as to itself, taking an 
articulate perspective on its existence, becoming ethical by knowing itself. Agency is a 
                                                        
334 My italics, Taylor, 1985: 40. 
335 See § 2.5 n. 271 on Pl. Phd. 69c 8 – d 2. 
336 See Giddens, 1984: 41-5. 
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potential of persons. It is a cognitive and volitional potentiality, not a phenomenal property 
of persons. It is activated though the confrontation with alternative choices, desires, options. 
An all-important point about human lives is the dynamism of their ethical environment. 
Their lot is to be always moving, to be radically subject to time. They habitually seek to 
define things by lifting them out of the frustratingly strong current of time.  
 
One is not either an agent or not an agent, but by turns more or less agentful at any given 
moment. There is an ambiguity latent in persons, which is a function of the potential 
character of agency. In a single life a person is now agentful, now not. In sleep, drunkenness, 
childhood, mania, inspiration, religious ecstacy – one experiences the annulment and/or the 
enhancement of one’s mental powers and emotional receptiveness. The capacity for insight 
into, or the state of being commensurate with, ordinarily concealed truths about self and 
others, waxes and wanes. The high and low moments of knowledgeability are also typically 
moments of crisis. The choice one makes, the degree to which one chooses, “shows” ēthos, as 
Aristotle put it. 
 
The division between mortals and gods is paradoxically both untrespassed and permeable. 
Gods are persons but not agents. They are not strong evaluators. They are not subject as 
mortals are, to time and the horizontal, biographical perspective, through which humans 
learn and deepen through self-reflexivity. Gods have only the vertical perspective, a 
privileged knowledge over others. They are not constrained by events and limitation to take 
a critical, evaluative perspective on self. Humans are immersed amongst others and 
immersed in themselves. They have not the infinite temporal extension of immortals. 
Instead of extension over time, they have the opportunity only for something like spatial 
depth in time, which is the capacity for knowledge of self and learning about value through 
experience. This is the effect of a moral and intellectual excavation, which is produced by the 
search for value. 
 
In this chapter, Bacchae has been subjected to an examination on the terms of the Taylorian 
philosophy of agency. Just as values are not foregone knowledge, so are the nature of tragic 
personhood and the agency expressed through choice and attitudes not settled or 
incontrovertible. Euripides is concerned in Bacchae as in his other plays, with values and 
evaluation and the meaning and consequences of choices and attitudes. These are revealed 
in crises. The arrival of a god in the city is a crisis that will be beneficial or destructive. It will 
depend on what mortals do, how they react, what quality of relation they desire and can be 
capable of desiring.  
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Mortals are deeply social, but their social life is troubled. They form a social life even unto 
their individual selves, and that too is troubled: the polis of the self is unruly. How and 
whether individual persons take counsel with themselves, whether they deny their desires 
or articulately examine them, whether they form a unanimous thiasos or sow the autocrat’s 
discord – these will be determining for their fates. Pentheus will become a ruined person 
and Thebes a ruined city. The House of Kadmos will have reeled and toppled, reduced to 
rubble by the end as Semelē’s house had been at the opening. Humans have been thwarted 
by their desires, they have not understood what was their true self-interest. In the next 
section we turn further from questions of agency and the desire and its handling, which 
have been so fundamental for the view the tragic poet has of his tragic persons, to questions 
concerning the detection, inference and interpretation of persons and motivations. Self-
interest and the choices and values to which they ought to commit persons are hard to locate 
and define because personhood itself is terminally vague. Identity is an elusive property; 
person or subjectivity is difficult to comprehend in the first place. In the following chapters, 
Part II, we study the riddles of the ontology of person in Bacchae, another dimension of the 
problem of agency and value which is central in Bacchae.  
 
The phenomenon of Dionysus compels certain questions about the communicability of 
values and the readability or intelligibility of persons. In the next chapter we shall see that 
predictability has been an essential idea for theorists of religion, who have tried to account for 
the near universal human reflex to anthropomorphize, to make intelligible and predictable, 
by populating the cosmos with divine persons. Dionysus’ unpredictability makes a theme 
out of prediction, just as his not being apprehended and understood brings the problem of 
clarity and intelligibility into the centre of the interpretation of his drama. Dionysus comes 
amongst humans looking mortal, wearing a human form and even adopting a ‘man’s 
nature’. The problem of recognition is the problem of knowledge and inference – how 
mortals ought to know gods and how they construe persons generally is the operative 
question in the vicinity of Dionysus. In the following chapter we examine the forms of 
inference required to discern the presence of human and divine personhood.  
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Part II 
Tragic Persons 
 
 
4 
 
Adēlotes: Belief and the Uncertainty of Persons1 
 
σε/νότητ' ἔχει σκότος2 
 
 
4.1 Introduction: seeing hearts and minds as objects  
 
In the previous chapters we have been concerned with the nature and quality of agency as 
ethical potential, a defining element of the Tragic subject. From this point on it is with the 
detection of agency and the identity of person in others that we are concerned. We turn from 
the psychology and ethics of volition to a social and cognitive anthropology of personhood. 
Before even arriving at that stage where we reflect on the character of agency and its relative 
quality and value, how do we know that others have the potential for agency at all? 
Individuals feel that they have minds, but how do they know others do too? Certainly 
raving women, drunken men or tyrants intoxicated with power can seem not to be fully 
human, diminished in respect of the autonomy and reflexivity which we discern as the mark 
of “agentful” persons and “agentful” behaviour.  
 
Classical scholars have argued about the depth of characters represented in Drama, from 
Aeschylus, through Shakespeare, Eugene O’Neill and to contemporary cinema3. The persons 
of poetry are fictions. Yet the persons of history – real persons – are in certain senses fictions 
too. At any rate their personhood is composed, in part, of the same stuff as fictional persons: 
mind, which is most readily discernible through language. We may venture so far as to say 
that this ‘stuff’ is language. At any rate, to one another historical persons have the same 
consistency, we can say, as poetic persons, the same texture. That is so at least in their 
manner of being apprehended by other persons. The social world is very like, if not 
                                                        
1 “Unclearness”, “opaqueness”, “uncertainty”, see above p. 150 n. 332 on Burkert’s employment of adēlotes as one of the three defining 
phenomena by which to account for religion. 
2 “The dark contains solemnity” 486. 
3 Easterling, 1973, Gould, 1978, the best recent work on character in Bacchae is Thumiger, 2007. 
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identical, to the virtual social worlds of dramatic mimesis, at least in regard to our manner 
of apprehending others. John Gould wrote that we “cannot follow home” characters in a 
play4. The humans amongst whom we live are, so the modern received opinion runs, unique 
and infinitely deep containing intrinsic value. Perhaps they are. How we could ever know 
their depths, however, is not very different to how we would “know” characters in plays. 
Even if we followed them home, we always remain “outside” our historical fellows’ minds. 
Here I discuss knowledge and recognition of subjectivity in terms of the manner of accessing 
others in the social context, which is the only context of meaningful human existence. 
 
At the heart of the social world, between agents, is uncertainty, adēlotes, instability, to 
sphaleron, and peril, kindunos. In Tragedy one way in which this is expressed is through the 
perennial searching after clarity. Humans read one another as having minds and intentions. 
These are not always manifest; they are concealed, krupton, dissimulable, plaston, and 
dissembling, eirōnikon. Minds are hard to read, all the more so since they are always so 
inchoate and ‘coming into being’ – aei epigignomena5 – so unarticulated, opaque even to 
themselves. Life amongst others is adumbrated by the problem of accessibility to what 
securely corresponds to reality, what is bebaion, safe, and reliable, piston. Discerning what is 
truly valuable and what is truly true is difficult: ta aie epigignomena comprises also ta 
epiphainomena, that which is apparent but potentially misleading. Since value is a function of 
judgements and relations, it is all the more challenging a fact of existence that persons are 
not evident in a simple way and that social actors are both compelled to anticipate 
intentionality and ignorant of the quality and nature of the intentions of their social others. 
Human life, from one perspective, is made up of constant monitoring of self and other, 
according to Giddens and Goffman before him6. Social actors perpetually interpret one 
another, construe the likely intentions of others and read their acts and behaviours as effects 
of causes presumed to be ultimately intelligible, even if not immediately apparent as such. 
This is definitive for social “competence”: 
 
In circumstances of interaction – encounters and episodes – the reflexive monitoring 
of action typically, and again routinely, incorporates the monitoring of the setting of 
such interaction . . . this phenomenon is basic to the interpolation of action within the 
time-space relations of what I shall call co-presence. The rationalization of action, 
                                                        
4 Gould, 1978. 
5 I draw this phrase from the remark in Thucydides’ that as in art so in politics what should always hold sway is “the new”, or what is “ever 
happening”, “always just coming about”, see Thuc. 1.71.3.1: ἀνάγκη δὲ ὥσπερ τέχνης αἰεὶ τὰ ἐπιγιγνόµενα κρατεῖν. 
6 Giddens, 1984: 43-4 “the essential importance of the reflexive monitoring of conduct in the day-to-day continuity of social life”; Goffman, 
1959.  
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within the diversity of circumstances of interaction, is the principal basis upon which 
the generalized ‘competence’ of actors is evaluated by others.7  
 
We do not know, or cannot agree, if we can ever know what it feels like, say, to be a bat8. We 
do however, fairly unproblematically, assume that we do know what it is not to be a fully 
human subject, a person like ourselves. We also feel – the point may seem too obvious to 
need making and yet it is important here – that we can understand the motives of human 
others and we instinctively behave as if their acts are motivated – that is, as if they have 
intentions, objects of consciousness. We know, without having to be cognitive scientists or 
philosophers, what it feels like to be a person. We know furthermore that we can be induced 
to or choose to see others as non-persons, not as the subjects who feel, as we do. We can also 
be induced to treat non-persons – idols, the dead, art works – as if they were in fact persons, 
having intentions and responses and life – as if beings having minds.  
 
The potential or the choice to see others as subjects, to feel pity for them and fear inspired on 
their behalf stands, in Greek drama, in contrast with the refusal or the inability to do so. 
Odysseus is perhaps the very pattern of the man who is so impressive but also so 
fearsomely ruthless in his ability, not only to suspend and “edit” his own desires as he does 
in Homer9, but to suspend, as he is depicted in Tragedy, any sense of the personhood or the 
subjectivity of others10. To the Odysseus of Tragedy, as to the Odysseus of Horkheimer and 
Adorno’s critique11, other persons are objects, instruments only for the realization of his own 
objectives. He is, in Tragedy, a man with telē but little or only the most private, hermetically 
sealed and hidden affective life. 
 
The first documentary film that was recognized with an Academy Award was called Hearts 
and Minds, 197412. There is a memorable passage of scenes in this film, in which an interview 
with an American basileus, General William Westmoreland, is intercut with a scene of purest 
tragedy. It occurs immediately after an attack on a village in Vietnam – there is screaming 
and mourning, utter aporia. The general opines that the Vietnamese have different attitudes 
towards death, towards their own lives and their families. People here are being naturally 
defined and, essentially, define themselves, in terms of the nature and quality of their 
                                                        
7 Giddens, 1984: 4.  
8 Cf. Thomas Nagel’s famous essay “What is it Like to be a Bat”, 1974; see also Budelmann & Easterling, 2010: “Reading Minds in Greek 
Tragedy”, which contains also useful list of works on cognitive science that are fruitfully to be brought to bear on Greek poetry, also 
Larson’s recent Understanding Greek Religion: a cognitive approach, 2016. 
9 See above p. 88.  
10 On Odysseus in Tragedy, see p. 69 n. 108, p.89 n. 195; p. 165, p. 180 n. 188.  
11 Horkheimer & Adorno, 1944: “Exkurs I: Odysseus oder Mythos und Aufklärung”. 
12 Hearts and Minds Directed by Peter Davis, 1974. 
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relations with others, and especially their closest others, kin – how they define and evaluate 
their relations is inseparable from their identities. Life, supposedly, does not have the same 
meaning or value to the Vietnamese, they do not care as Western people do, about their 
children or one another, so utterly other are they to Americans. Westmoreland expects that 
we will get it. He thinks we will understand what he is saying, that is, that we can define 
people through the manner in which they define themselves through their relations with 
others. The coolly authoritative general explains: “Well, the oriental does not put the same 
high price on life as does the Westerner . . . life is cheap, life is plentiful . . . as the philosophy 
of the Orient expresses it, life is not important”13.  
 
The master of this army, so highly trained and well-equipped to get “missions 
accomplished”, to pragmatically see off threats, sees his enemy as the instrumentalist, the 
being of diminished subjectivity, which means defunct inter-subjectivity, a barbarous 
indifference to what, so naturally Westerners think, is most important in life and is so. His 
talk (sitting in an idyllic landscape scene by a languid river), is spliced with the mourning 
screams, scenes of a highly tragic character. The Vietnamese village is burying its dead lost 
in a US bombing raid – wives, fathers, children, relations, only bodies wrapped and to be 
deposited in holes cut in the earth. There is no morgue, no container for the corpse, that will 
arrest its alarming decomposition. Co-presents are suddenly absent, the sight of the corpse 
reminds us of something both banal and alarming: the body was not the whole person, only 
a part of its identity. At another point in the film a Vietnamese man is addressing the camera 
turned on him, utterly at a loss; he cannot believe what is happening to him, his 
bereavement. The passionate and utterly desperate woe – penthos – over this unbearable loss 
leaves the viewer, especially in contrast with the cold, calculating nonsense of the general, 
(who sits calmly – hesuchos thasson14 – in his summer suit, his placid manner testifying to his 
mastery of situations), in a state of unforgettable aporia. The general is an articulate 
Odysseus figure, a utilitarian with a concept of utilitarianism, which he ascribes to others, 
while his own goals, we are expected to presume, issue from deeper moral sources.15  
 
                                                        
13 Hearts and Minds circa 01:43. 
14 622. 
15 Tragedy is very often the spectacle of people who are deeply sympathetic through their own deep attachment to people they care about, it 
is nearly everywhere in Tragedy and this is why the reverse, people who feel nothing and worse than nothing for those persons usually love, 
is so shocking. So, for example, are the scenes so touching at Soph. OC where Oedipus tells Theseus of his love for his children, Soph. OC 
1119-38. See in her recent discussion of the gods in Euripides, on Bacchae and its final scene, Lefkowitz, 2016: 147 “The mortals’ repeated 
expressions of affection for each other help to set into clear relief the stark contrast between the natures of gods and mortals. The portrayal 
of their affection for one another allows the audience to see some the ways [sic] in which humans can try to overcome even the most terrible 
aspects of their fate simply by enduring and caring for each other.” 
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The Persians in Aeschylus may have their exotic colouring, but like Trojan Andromache and 
Hecuba or Colchian Medea in Euripides or most impressively like the Asian Hector and his 
father Priam in Homer, are no bats living in Cyclopes’ caves. They are persons presented as 
intelligible, sympathetic, having a mixture of motives and feeling very deeply for those they 
love and who love them, and an attachment to their own lives and their quality. Out of 
perhaps the most vivid poetry ever written, some of the most memorable scenes are those of 
Hector with his wife and son in Iliad 616, and the pathos of Priam17. Things matter and very 
deeply to those barbaroi, non-Greeks, and that is the most identifiable quality about them 
(the quality that we most easily identify and by which they will become identified).  
 
We can imagine what it is that others feel but also what it is not to feel. Achilles wishing to 
reduce Hector as absolutely and mercilessly as possible to the most degraded object is 
something we also find intelligible, even if we find it repugnant18.Tragedy, successor of epic, 
presents both sympathetic figures and unsympathetic, and its realism is that often it shows 
characters who can be either and who are by turns – en merei19 – one way now and another 
way after. 
 
Pentheus seems to be a figure who sees others as objects amongst other objects. This, in its 
most extreme version, is the nightmare of the hero in Greek poetry – to become some 
person’s property or to be reduced to an object. Greek heroes find most horrific the idea of 
being left as fodder for wild beasts, to be left unprocessed, so to speak, uninducted – atelestos 
– into the next phase of existence, to dwell permanently in the memories of one’s people and 
as a shade in Hades. Pentheus’ fate then, since this is the ironic world of Tragedy, is to 
become such an object. For by the end, shredded to pieces of meat by his own family, he is 
reduced not even to the status of an object, (which has at least the minimal quality of 
“unity”, coherence with itself in space, and in time “persistence” or “object permanence”20), 
but to abject matter: scattered on the ground – κεῖται δὲ χωρὶς σῶ/α, 1137 – the 
contemptible, decomposing ‘objects’ or goals not of any human or divine intention and 
attention, but only of the appetites of wild animals21.  
                                                        
16 Hom. Il. 6. 390-493. 
17 Hom. Il. 24. 507-70. 
18See Hom. Il. 24. 1-24, for Achilles’ grief and the abuse of Hector’s corpse, which he uses to serve for an emotional outlet.  
19 See below § 7.1. 
20 Strawson, 2009: 65-7 “Thing” and on “The Persistence Belief”, see 217-64. “Object permanence”, the recognition in a child that objects 
do not depend on its apprehending of those objects but endure independently of itself is an essential idea in the very widely influential work 
of the Swiss cognitive psychologist Jean Piaget, see Piaget, 1937, La construction du réel chez l'enfant. His La représentation du monde 
chez l’enfant (Paris, 1947) is also a key work; in it he develops his notions of the child as passing through stages towards its fuller grasp of 
causality: the child exhibits “realism”, “animism” and “artificialism”. These intriguing ideas were an important source for Guthrie, cited 
below, in his (cognitive psychological) argument on the congenital anthropomorphism by which he accounts for the belief in divinity. 
21 1125-39, 1216-21. 
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He had read his situation as a hunt, the targeting of persons as objects. The hunt and its 
luckless hunters, is the poet’s model of man as “intentional” – someone who aims at prey, 
the objects of his desire taken by stealth, cunning, technology or violence22. Dennett in his 
discussion of intentionality notes that “intend” itself derives from a hunting term, “to draw 
and point a bow”, intendere arcum in23. Tragedy, the theatre of complex qualities of agency, is 
the art defined by such disastrous hunts and problematic intentions as exemplified in 
figures like Oedipus, vaunting Actaeon and Pentheus24.  
 
At the opening of Bacchae the bacchants were wild animals to be brought back into the 
domestic sphere, the environment brought under the sway of the human intentional 
economy. Pentheus wants Dionysus hunted down and locked up with the tamed animals 
that serve human purpose25. To the last, even when subject to the “light madness” with 
which Dionysus has touched him (for touch is infectious in this world26), Pentheus sees 
others as wild animals to be hunted and caught27. Ultimately, he himself will be attacked and 
killed by maenads who hunt him down as an animal prey. They cannot recognize his 
human visage and voice28. He will be carried back, his head a trophy, an extinguished 
subject, an invalidated person, held up for all to see, a misapprehended object, a prey or 
prize29.  
 
                                                        
22 On the “hunting model”, literal meaning and figurative of such scenes in Bacchae, see Thumiger, 2006. 
23 See Dennett, 1991: 333, “The standard philosophical term for ‘aboutness’ is intentionality, and according to Elizabeth Anscombe (1965) it 
“comes by metaphor” from the Latin, intendere arcum in, which means to aim a bow and arrow at (something). This image of aiming or 
directedness is central in most philosophical discussions of intentionality, but in general philosophers have traded in the complex process of 
aiming a real arrow for a mere ‘logical’ arrow, a foundational or primitive relation, made all the more mysterious by its supposed simplicity. 
How could something in your head point this abstract arrow at a thing in the world?” 
24 Ichneuein: “track”, “hunt down”, means to catch by inferring presence from traces left. The chorus in OT wishes to “hunt down the adēlon 
man”, whom they do not yet know is the manifest man who is their king, Sop. OT 475-6: τὸν ἄδη- / λον ἄνδρα πάντ' ἰχνεύειν·. Pentheus has 
wanted the xenos hunted down, exichneuein, from the outset, 352-3: οἱ δ' ἀνὰ πόλιν στείχοντες ἐξιχνεύσατε / τὸν θηλύµορφον ξένον. 
Dionysus will counsel darkly, when he has just begun his bewitchment of the king, that the maenads will “hunt you down even if you should 
go secretly”, 817: ἀλλ' ἐξιχνεύσουσίν σε, κἂν ἔλθηις λάθραι. Pentheus is the prey in this hunt because he has failed to understand the nature 
and significance of his own and of Dionysus’ intentions and the fact that one’s “real” identity is one’s intentional identity. As much as the 
figurative hunter, Pentheus, literal hunters are typically imprudent “vaunters” in Bacchae: 337-40, where Actaeon κοµπάσαντ' ἐν ὀργάσιν, 
340 and 1233-7, Agauē deluded thinks her father “may brag”, at having such a fine hunter for daughter, πάτερ, µέγιστον κοµπάσαι πάρεστί 
σοι, 1233. 
25 509-10: χώρει· καθείρξατ' αὐτὸν ἱππικαῖς πέλας / φάτναισιν, ὡς ἂν σκότιον εἰσορᾶι κνέφας.    
26 Touch: note Pentheus’ hyper-sensitivity to the dangers of touch; at 343-4 he fears the bacchant contact and the chance that they should 
“wipe off [exomorxēi] your folly on me”: οὐ µὴ προσοίσεις χεῖρα, βακχεύσεις δ' ἰών, / µηδ' ἐξοµόρξηι µωρίαν τὴν σὴν ἐµοί; 
27 957-8. 
28 1115-24. See also Chapter 6 on face and voice. 
29 Vividly and extensively at 1197-1243.  
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In Bacchae we are made to see how human persons can be like animals, can have the grace 
and strength and beauty of animals, their spontaneity and freedom from deliberation and 
calculation. The bacchants are leaping buck and they clothe themselves not in the product of 
human manufacture, textiles, but becoming wild are also covered in the skins of 
undomesticated animals30. They are the most extreme instance of the fantasy of 
theriomorphosis, the utopia of an existence liberated from time, consciousness of self and 
other, and all the burden of sociality. Recognizing Dionysus has meant a suspension of the 
weight of social recognition of self and others, a suspension of social and cognitive vigilance. 
The deranged women of Thebes abandon their human young to run in the mountains, 
where they are seen to breast-feed wild animals, bind their dress with living snakes and 
respond only to inarticulate, animal voices31. Kadmos, whose sister had been spirited off by 
Zeus in the shape of a bull, Kadmos who originally killed the serpent and sowed Thebes 
with its teeth to engender an earth-born race, and Harmonia, herself the daughter of a god, 
Ares – this couple will at the culmination of the play, themselves face a literal 
theriomorphosis: becoming serpents at the head of an army of mixed foreign peoples32. 
 
Dionysus, who has come to reveal his inner identity, his personal and natural relation to 
Thebans and to Zeus, the truth or depth of his mother’s motivations and the humanness, for 
all its savagery – to omēstes – of his own motivations, is himself very strongly associated with 
wild animals, creatures of pure externality. His effect also is to give the ambiguous gift to 
humans of animal vitality, a temporary suspension of time and consciousness of self, and 
therefore of others as selves. In Dionysus we begin to discern what wildness is and what 
consciousness, how we distinguish others as persons, what it is about ourselves and others 
that we identify as “person”, what the threads are that bind subjects in complex inter-
subjectivity. At the centre of this is the mind. This is fundamental but vague. It is hard to 
locate, hard to define and hard to know. On its ability to recognize depends so much. It 
must recognize others and recognize itself. It must recognize the likeness of others and self, 
and out of this ongoing recognition and interpretation constantly issues the human world, a 
strange admixture of the virtual and the concrete – the fluid and by turns congealed – 
constantly modified, interminably recursive. The problematic and unreliable recognition at 
the centre of human sociality is also the theme at the centre of Bacchae, a tragic episode from 
the life of a god who travels the world with the objective of being recognized truly. 
 
 
                                                        
30 See § 3.2.2 p. 145 n. 40 and § 5.4 p. 321 n. 93. 
31 689-91: ἡ σὴ δὲ µήτηρ ὠλόλυξεν ἐν µέσαις/ σταθεῖσα βάκχαις ἐξ ὕπνου κινεῖν δέµας, / µυκήµαθ' ὡς ἤκουσε κεροφόρων βοῶν. On the 
significance of the spatial configuration of city and mounatin, see Segal, 1997 [1982]: 78-124; and Friedrich, 1988. 
32 1330-39, 1352-62. 
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4.2.1 Anticipating Intentionality: Theory of Mind 
 
Recognizing Dionysus will mean recognizing him as person with divine identity. To 
recognize means to apprehend the intentional identity of Dionysus. Thebes is a supra-
generational person, the ‘person’ of the city33. Does Thebes, if a kind of ‘person’ (having and 
giving identity, desiring and making judgements and choices), have a mind, we may ask. 
Customs, rites, traditions, in a sense these represent something like the externalized ‘mind’ 
of a community, since they trace values, desires and intentions and are expressed in 
language and symbol. This is a personhood that does seem to exist. Indeed, it is no more 
virtual than the mind of an individual; even, since so concretely and multifariously 
instantiated, much more ‘real’, in the sense of enduring and stable, than the individual 
person and its ‘merely subjective’ mind.  
 
It is the virtual mind, the whole complex of intentions and their embodied traces, an order 
that subsists between subjects, which is the nomoi or patrioi paradochai. This is the ‘living 
tradition’, a web of relations and practices between the living and dead and not yet born, we 
call culture. Dionysus, the institutor of consummative rites – teletai – that bind together 
individual psuchai,34 into the unified person of the throng, thiasos; a god whose bacchants 
constitute a “community of the holy proclamation”35; who smoothes away distinction and 
redefines persons by just one single criterion – not by gender, age, class, ethnicity36, but by 
whether they be mortal or immortal: this is the god of the intersubjective. He brings together 
inside and outside in another important way: in fusing together or smoothing out the 
difference, between the mind of individuals and the mind of the body politic. 
 
                                                        
33 Thebes as person: ὦ Σεµέλας τροφοὶ Θῆ- / βαι (105-6), 1036-8: Ag. Θήβας δ' ἀνάνδρους ὧδ' ἄγεις <×–⏑–/ ×–⏑– ×–⏑– ×–⏑–>;/ Ch. ὁ 
Διόνυσος ὁ Διόνυσος οὐ Θῆβαι / κράτος ἔχουσ' ἐµόν, 39: δεῖ γὰρ πόλιν τήνδ' ἐκµαθεῖν, 50-2: ἢν δὲ Θηβαίων πόλις / ὀργῆι σὺν ὅπλοις ἐξ 
ὄρους βάκχας ἄγειν / ζητῆι, 1295: πᾶσά τ' ἐξεβακχεύθη πόλις. 1368-9: χαῖρ', ὦ µέλαθρον, χαῖρ', ὦ πατρία / πόλις·. Is this simply metonymy? 
Human identity is by its nature designated synechdochically, through reference to necessary elements for its being present or viable. It is not 
easily located, never apprehended as a whole. It is so terminally elusive that we constrained to designate it by referring to aspects of it. 
Personhood is a referent “not easily located”.  
34 76-8: καὶ θιασεύεται ψυ- / χὰν ἐν ὄρεσσι βακχεύ- / ων ὁσίοις καθαρµοῖσιν. 
35 1167: δέχεσθ' ἐς κῶµον εὐίου θεοῦ. 
36 Those telling lines at 206-9: οὐ γὰρ διήιρηχ' ὁ θεὸς οὔτε τὸν νέον/ εἰ χρὴ χορεύειν οὔτε τὸν γεραίτερον, / ἀλλ' ἐξ ἁπάντων βούλεται τιµὰς 
ἔχειν/ κοινάς, διαριθµῶν δ' οὐδέν' αὔξεσθαι θέλει [on 209: διαριθµῶν, see Verdenius, 1962: 342 contra Dodds, “The point is not that 
Dionysiac worship was essentially collective’ (Dodds), but that the god wants to be worshipped by anybody, whatever his status. In other 
words ἁπάντων does not have a quantitative but a qualitative meaning.” He wants to unite mortals under one mortal identity; if they do not 
wish this, he unites them in one common catastrophe, 1303: τοιγὰρ συνῆψε πάντας ἐς µίαν βλάβην. Cf. Adkins on Plato, Gorgias and 
Aristotle on hekousios blabē, see Adkins, 1960: 373 ff. 
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In cognitive science, scholars speak of “Theory of Mind” 37. This refers to the reflex human 
ascription to others of intentionality38. We are all natural theorists, wrote Dennett, (similarly 
did the great sociologist, Anthony Giddens, famously write that we – competent social 
actors – are all “dazzling interpreters . . . expert sociologists”); we all theorize and interpret 
constantly, even when we are sure we are only registering or perceiving39. The foundational 
theorizing, on which we (cognitively competent actors that is) operate is this ‘theory of 
mind’, the attribution to others of a mind and intentionality like our own. On it stands also 
the theory of agency being offered here, for mind and its objects of consciousness are 
necessary conditions of agency, as that is being articulated. Persons are tragic because they 
have minds, which means language and the potential to take or have taken counsel with 
themselves, bouleusis. Being tragical is necessarily predicated the awareness of a tragic 
identity. Thought itself, deliberative and articulative, is a language act, a form of internal 
communication, an internal process of interpretation, judgement and counsel-taking. 
Because of the nature of language, thought can remain internal or private or it can be 
externalized, public.  
 
 
4.2.2 External and Internal Conceptions of Theory of Mind 
 
There are two conceptions of the theory of mind-attribution: internal and external. They are 
really two perspectives on the origin and nature of mind and its attribution. This is how the 
anthropologist, Alfred Gell, explained the theory of mind and its internal conception, which 
is fundamental for this theory of agency in a Greek Tragedy40: 
 
                                                        
37 Theory of Mind (ToM): For Dennett’s formulation of the “Intentional Stance” (on which see Dennett, 1971, 1987, 1991), “…what I call 
the intentional stance … we must treat [the human subject of a scientific experiment, as we habitually do our social fellows, marked also by 
their use of language in ‘reporting’ themselves] as an agent, indeed a rational agent, who harbors beliefs and desires and other mental states 
that exhibit intentionality or ‘aboutness,’ and whose actions can be explained (or predicted) on the basis of the content of these states.”, 
Dennett, 1991: 76. For one critique of Dennett (amongst others) see Slors, “Why Dennett cannot Explain what it is to Adopt the Intentional 
Stance”, 1996.  
38 Gell, 1998: 127: “It seems that ordinary human beings are ‘natural dualists’, inclined, more or less from day one, to believe in some kind 
of ‘ghost in the machine’ and to attribute the behaviour of social others to the mental representations these others have ‘in their heads’. 
Behaviour is caused by factors which well up from within a person, thoughts, wishes, intentions, etc.” On theory of mind in the study of 
religion see Boyer in Boyer [ed.] 1993, 1994, 2001. In the application of cognitive science of religion to Greek religion, see Larsson, 2016. 
In a discussion of Cognitive dimensions in Greek Tragedy see Easterling & Budelmann, 2010; also Chaston, 2009 on cognitive theory and a 
reading of Tragedy, with a chapter on Bacchae and its handling of masks. 
39 Dennett, 1991: 3-20. 
40 Gell, 1998: 127, my italics. He writes further on the congenital internal conception of mind that humans seem to possess: “It seems that 
ordinary human beings are ‘natural dualists’, inclined, more or less from day one, to believe in some kind of ‘ghost in the machine’ and to 
attribute the behaviour of social others to the mental representations these others have ‘in their heads’. Behaviour is caused by factors 
which well up from within a person, thoughts, wishes, intentions, etc.” 
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The ‘internalist’ theory of mind, according to the cognitive psychologists, is a 
‘module’ – a kind of theory (or principle of interpretation) with which we are born, 
along with the principle that there is a basic distinction between living and non-living 
things.  
 
So we have an innate predisposition to construe others as mindful others, agents having 
intentions, according to this conception. This is an account that leaves too much unexplained 
for some. Supposing others are simply born with minds such as we “know” ourselves to 
possess requires a certain amount of faith. It is a scientifically insufficient response to that 
philosophical problem of zombies: how we can know whether our social fellows do in fact 
have “minds like ourselves” or are not just very good approximators of persons with minds. 
Perhaps others are, in fact, like those frightening sociopaths who lack any feeling of the 
subjectivity of others (this is a big problem in Greek poetry, that humans can behave like 
sociopaths, as it is in historical life), really mindless zombies, automatons or like those 
computers apparently already on the historical horizon, only very complex and persuasively 
human-seeming programmes of artificial intelligence41.  
 
Another conception of mind attribution circumvents the problem of inwardness and the 
inaccessibility of mind and any need to go on faith that others have mind. This is the 
external conception and it is also apposite here with the “most manifest” god, theos 
epiphanestatos42, most public, most plain to see, who “delights in festivals”43. Gell borrows 
Wittgenstein’s formulation ‘Forms of Life’ to describe what ‘mind’ is under the externalist 
conception. The echoes of what above Giddens was seen to refer to as the ‘competence of 
social actors’ inhering and being manifest in their continuous, reflexive monitoring, will be 
noted: 
 
According to Wittgenstein, and a great many other subsequent philosophers, the 
possession of a mind is something we attribute to others provisionally, on the basis of 
the intuition that their behaviours (i.e. their linguistic behaviour) follows some ‘rule’ 
which, in principle, we may reconstruct . . . If I can get along with the other in the 
give-and-take of interaction, if our practical efforts to deal with one another work 
out, then the other is a producer of intelligible (meaningful) behaviour, and hence 
has a mind, intentions, volitions, etc. I cannot really tell, from the outside, whether 
                                                        
41 Zombie problem: Dennett, 1991: 72-98. Tomasello’s theory of joint attention (Tomasello, 1999) amongst its advantages, would explain 
the innateness of theory of mind; see also on “Joint-Attention”, Tomasello, 2014a. 
42 Theos epiphanestatos: In an inscription from the 3rd Century CE Dionysus Eubouleus (of good counsel) is described this way, see Jacottet, 
2003: II. 267-8, No. 161. See Henrichs in Schlesier: 105-16. 
43 Delights in festivals, 417-8: ὁ δαίµων ὁ Διὸς παῖς/ χαίρει µὲν θαλίαισιν. On the public nature of Dionysus a god of civic festivals, see 
Pickard-Cambridge, 1969; Deubner, 1969; Parker, 1996; and Gasper, 2009: Der Kult des Dionysos im öffentlichen Leben Athens. 
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the ‘other’ is a zombie or an automaton, who/which mimics the behaviour of an 
ordinary human being but does not have any of the ‘inner experiences’ we habitually 
associate with this behaviour. But this does not matter because the whole panoply of 
‘mind’ is not a series of inner, private experiences at all, but is out there in the public 
domain, as language, practices, routines, rules of the game, etc.; that is, ‘forms of life’. 
Call this the ‘externalist’ theory of agency-attribution. 44 
 
The whole panoply of mind is indeed – with der kommende, epiphanestatos, deinotatos, ēpiōtatos 
Gott – in the public domain. In Bacchae Euripides presents a vision in which this public 
domain – the relations between persons and even persons as relationships between parts or 
aspects of their internal selves, selves which they “see” and examine and address, objects of 
intention, projected outwards45 – is what counts. Dionysus is the institutor god and his 
“institutings”, katastaseis, have either a public, common face or a secret, mysterious and 
veiled face. All that is required for access to either kind of them in Bacchae is the desire, the 
right bearing, the relationship that Dionysus wants when he wants to be recognized. 
 
The forms of life which are common between subjects and conveyed through time by 
generations of predecessors, co-presents and passed on to (receptive) successors are 
identified by Gell with Bourdieu’s notion of the habitus: “the sedimented residue of past 
social interaction which structures ongoing interaction – is not a transcription of common-
sense mentalism or ‘folk psychology’, but is precisely a notion of mind externalized in 
routine, practices, that is, the prevailing ‘form of life’.”46 Bourdieu was a scholar in the 
tradition of the materialist historiography of his times47, who nevertheless wanted reasonably 
to incorporate into his analysis of culture the clearly mental or intellectual dimension that is 
everywhere with humans. Cornelius Castoriadis’ notion of the Imaginaire is in this regard an 
even more powerful conceptual tool, as is the work of Anthony Giddens, who also takes the 
notion of structure and the nature of institutions to a subtle level of differentiation48. The 
essential point in all three is so too with Dionysus: the relationship between the outside of 
                                                        
44 Gell, 1998: 126. 
45 I am suggesting here that persons are not merely beings with language but that language constitutes personhood, and since language 
entails a relation, the generation of signs and their interpretation, person is in fact always a multiple kind of thing, a thing of parts, something 
that comes about inside an entity in whom there is already difference, a vessel of voices in which there is always ‘gathered together two 
more’ in a single name. 
46 Gell, 1998: 127. 
47 His magnum opus, in which he offers the notion of habitus; Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique was published in 1972, see esp. 256-84. 
48 Castoriadis, 1975: 171-326. It is interesting to read this theorist on social change and the limitations of a positivist, materialist method in 
understanding history alongside the archaeological works the following decades, which come, from the perspective of a very material kind 
of science, to very similar conclusions. See for example, Cauvin, 1994 and Hodder, 2006, 2010, 2014. In Giddens, 1979: 9-48. For a 
discussion of the limitations of Lévi-Straussian structuralist methods in approaches to Greek culture, from the point of view of a scholar 
who can seem to tend towards a sophisticated biological functionalism himself, see Burkert, 1979: esp. 1-34.  
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culture and the inside of mind, the relationship – a not entirely passive one at all, but quite 
recursive – between individuals and their inherited and perpetually re-constituted social 
worlds.  
 
 
4.2.3 Exōthen: mind always “external” 
 
Dionysus is the god of intersubjectivity. He is the god of both the transformed, heightened 
mind (prophecy, poetic afflatus, the power of the ecstatic ritual community49) and of that 
punishment, which is the effacement of mind through mania. These are his two sides – the 
capacity for the highest forms of relation and for the destruction of any form at all of relation 
with others and with self. The self, subjectivity, person, psychē, agency – whatever we call it 
– it is a virtual property and “seen” in special ways, traced by special forms of inference. It is 
not self-evident but is mediated, symbolically. Like “property”, in the sense of ‘owned 
things’ – land, goods, money – the property of identity is not an objective “thing”, but a 
relationship, the awareness of that relationship, its articulation and acknowledgement by 
others.  
 
At Thebes, it is unclear whether Dionysus is a divine person having agency or a “made-up 
person”. Perhaps the unspeakable – arrhēton – point is that the distinction does not matter50. 
The Kadmeians have thought that ‘Dionysus’ is not a divine person, but a pretext for human 
impulses. Is there an immortal, divine mind behind the mask or only animal appetites and 
cunning schemes to dissemble these? The problem in Bacchae is detecting and recognizing 
the quality of mind, the intentional identity of the one standing opposite one. It is deeply 
connected to the problem of mind per se: not only is it difficult to determine the quality of 
mind or intention but even first the presence or absence of that strange, immaterial property. 
Presence and absence are as if plaited together in mind. Mind becomes apparent and 
unapparent, by turns. It is not easy of detection and is ambiguous. It invests human doings 
and relations with its own ambiguity.  
                                                        
49 See on Plato’s differentiation of types of mania Pl. Phdr. 265a 5-b5, see § 2.6 p. 123 n. 320. On the relationship of strength, menos, to 
mania see Burkert GR “Der Weinrausch als Bewusstseinsveränderung wird als Einbruch eines Göttlichen gedeutet. Doch geht die 
dionysische Erfahrung über das Alkoholische weit hinaus und kann davon ganz unabhängig sein; ‘Wahnsinn’ wird zum Selbstzweck. 
Manía, das griechische Wort dafür, bezeichnet seiner Herkunft nach, in der Verwandtschaft mit ménos, das ‘Rasen’ nicht als Abirren des 
Wahns, sondern als Steigerung der selbsterlebten ‘geistigen Kraft’.” These lines opening Burkert’s chapter on Dionysus, have struck me as 
raising something essential about Dionysus, viz. that something inherent in this god invites alternative interpretations and through the 
antithetical nature of the alternatives raises and articulates interpretation itself as a problem or phenomenon of great import, interpretation, 
pretext, depth and apparence qua problem.  
50 Dionysiac doings are said by Dionysus in his first interview with Pentheus to be “ineffable” or not permitted to speak, 472: ἄρρητ' 
ἀβακχεύτοισιν εἰδέναι βροτῶν. This contrasts suggestively with the searching for permission to speak elsewhere parrhēsia 668 and of 
course with the desire of Pentheus to know and find out, to permit himself. 
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It may be uncertain whether the effigy of the god carried in his processions at the Athesteria 
and Dionysia – the double mask hung on a shaft, the mask suspended from a tree, the statue 
in the theatre, the god drawn on a wagon, even the thyrsus51 – are only representations or 
whether they are presences. Is the god, clearly not being a human person, so smilingly serene 
because he does not have the power to move, or because he is a god and chooses not to, does 
not have the desire, to move52. Is he mere object or higher kind of subject? By the externalist 
theory of mind, the conception which seems to come naturally to humans, it does not 
matter. Dionysus is interacted with. Humans in his vicinity do have a relationship with 
“him”, just as their ancestors have had.  
 
In exactly the same way, it does not matter if the persons onstage are not “persons we can 
follow home”, as Gould put it, in the sense of historical entities with minds, bodies and 
unique, non-fungible perspectives and experiences and a life that goes on outside of the 
determined limits of the dramatic performance. We relate to them all the same as if they 
were. Persons historical – underdetermined and always coming into being – and poetic – 
variably determined but not subject to time and strictly circumscribed by the determining 
boundaries of their poetic worlds: we relate to all persons in this cognitive way – through 
memory and anticipation. Human and embodied co-presents and all those whose bodies are 
not here: the dead, the absent, the fictional, the divine – these all engage us and become 
engaged by us as persons. The lived criterion for personhood is not a general faith 
articulated and reasoned out or not. Humans very unproblematically interact with others as 
                                                        
51 Thyrsos as person: in the second stasimon we hear the bacchants summon a Dionysus carrying a thyrsus with a “golden face”, 553-54: 
µόλε, χρυσῶπα τινάσσων, / ἄνα, θύρσον κατ' Ὀλύµπου. The thyrsos a torso with a head and hair is effigy-like and like a person always 
moving: ἀνὰ θύρσον τε τινάσσων, 80; ὡς οὐ κάµοιµ' ἂν οὔτε νύκτ' οὔθ' ἡµέραν/ θύρσωι κροτῶν γῆν, 187-8; παύσω κτυποῦντα θύρσον 
ἀνασείοντά τε/κόµας, 240-1. It is, like the human head, is the garlanded instrument, (kissinos belos, 25, kissinos baktros 363) like the 
thunderbolt, keraunobolos, that Zeus carries, 598-600, which is taking on the properties of not merely an object, but of an agent. Its agency 
is super-natural, it is like the head of mortals which devises schemes and labours to make nature productive to its needs, causes 704-7: 
θύρσον δέ τις λαβοῦσ' ἔπαισεν ἐς πέτραν, / ὅθεν δροσώδης ὕδατος ἐκπηδᾶι νοτίς·/ ἄλλη δὲ νάρθηκ' ἐς πέδον καθῆκε γῆς/ καὶ τῆιδε κρήνην 
ἐξανῆκ' οἴνου θεός·. In Asia Minor, where the thyrsos and other aspects of their Dionysiac religion were thought to originate, there is a 
precedent for an instrument of human techniques being construed as a kind of descendant of the sign of heavenly agency, so explains 
Burkert at GR: 67: “In kleinasiatischer Tradition, die in Karien und Lykien später noch zu fassen ist, gilt die Doppelaxt in der Hand eines 
männlichen, oft Zeus bennanten Gottes offenbar als Blitzwaffe des Wettergottes.” Agency is distributed through objects; in Bacchae 
Dionysus’ agency is re-distributed through his ritual objects to human persons. 
 and has power.  
52 Dionysus’ effigies: on idols of Dionysus see § 6.3 below. Motion and stillness (fluttering anxiety or still self-possession) are meaningful 
in perhaps the most kinetic of all Greek Tragedies, with its calm, hēsuchos, god at the centre. See Gell on the motion and immobility of idols 
and their significance, Gell, 1998: 124-26. He refers to the fascinating case of the ‘chosen, intentional’ immobility of the statue of Shiva 
explained by Pillai Lokacarya, cited by Eck. Gell, 1998: 126, “ . . . there are no ‘material tests’ for the possession, or non-possession, of 
agency, there is nothing to prevent us from asserting, if we wish to, that the behaviour of a statue (standing still) occurs because the statue 
has a mind, intends to stand still, and does as a consequence of this prior intention stand still.” 
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if they have minds, needing only minimal conditions in place. A theatrical or fictional “as if” 
seems to be a most important element in the identification of persons. 
 
What is most persuasive is if others talk and move (or even only could talk and could move). 
The characters of poetry are much more real in the way they are experienced than historical 
persons: they are more rhetorically developed, more complete – teleston – fictions53. In a 
sense, person is always discerned through something like a performance, always detected 
through the traces of intention; one seldom sees more than a certain aspect or face of 
persons. Above all this is so because the personhood of our fellow mortal, her mind, is made 
of the same stuff (only much less accessible to us) as the creations of poets – language. A 
person is a being or thing that one has a social relationship with. Relations between people, 
notwithstanding the intermittent erotic entanglements of some bodies, are mental and 
linguistic. They are not only ‘mediated’ by symbols and language. They are constituted by 
and of these. 
 
We might say that, in life as it is lived, while appearing to potentially have a mind is the 
precondition for standing in a personal relation, the logical order is almost reversed. 
Humans – such habitually personalizing construers of agency, so “ultra-social”54 – 
unproblematically form relations with projected persons and simultaneously, or 
consequently, discern mind. Humans may be natural theorizers, but they are not cognitive 
scientists. What is primary with them is not the abstract issue of the presence or innateness 
of mind as necessary condition, but the formation of all kinds of social bonds with others, 
and these are imaginé. As Gell wrote, “The externalist theory is not really about the ‘psyche’ 
or ‘consciousness’; it is an account of intersubjectivity rather than subjectivity . . .”55.  
 
The intersubjectivity, which is everywhere evident with humans, testifies to their social and 
therefore cognitive competence. Humans are naturals when it comes to intersubjectivity. 
They instinctively rely on an external conception of mind. An individual’s social 
engagement by and with others – human and non-human – minimal as it is, consists in their 
construing one another as persons having minds. Because they do so their social fellows 
                                                        
53This brings to mind a memorable passage from the memoirs of the critic Marcel Reich-Ranicki, touching on many of the issues in 
Bacchae, viz. theomachein, absence, presence, credibility and fictionality, Reich-Ranicki, 1999: 56-7: “Einer jüdischen Maxime zufolge 
kann ein Jude nur mit oder gegen, doch nicht ohne Gott leben . . . Die Rebellion des Goetheschen Prometheus – «Ich dich ehren? Wofür?» –  
ist mir volkommen fremd . . . Als ich viele Jahren später einem Freund, einem gläubigen Christen, sagte, für mich sei Gott keine Realität, 
sondern eher eine nicht sonderlich gelungene literarische Figur, vielleicht vergleichbar mit Odysseus oder König Lear, antwortete er 
durchaus schlagfertig, es könne überhaupt keine stärkere Realität geben als Odysseus oder König Lear.“ I tend to agree with the friend. 
54 See Tomasello, 2014a, 2014b: “The ultra-social animal”. From a philosophical perspective, which complements Tomasello, the 
scientist’s, work in fascinating ways, see Taylor, 2016 The Language Animal. The full shape of the human linguistic capacity. 
55 Gell, 1998: 127. 
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may do so too. This “construal” is not necessarily reasoned or conscious; it is shot through 
with unconscious inferences and motivations, a pre-conscious reflex or a factor of the 
“practical” rather than “discursive” consciousness56. Hence, this intersubjectivity is shaped 
by the hidden and the latent and unarticulated at least as much as, and probably more than, 
by what is expressed or “out there”. Such is the state, halfway between knowledge and 
ignorance – metaxu sophias kai amathias – in which human life transpires.  
 
That we are speaking, interpreting, anticipating each other; that I follow the thread of your 
successive discourse in turn-taking talk; that I take your next move and the motives for 
earlier acts as intelligible and communicate with you on the premise of your intelligibility; 
and that we, through all our comic and tragic misunderstandings and clarifications, do 
communicate and miscommunicate, these provide sufficient proof that the mind we have 
instinctively ‘theorized’ in one another, has been there. Even our miscommunications 
represent strong evidence from which we can infer our likeness to one another. In the 
context of this argument, the effectiveness of communication does not lie primarily in what 
we, successfully or not, communicate, but that we do, that we try, that we assume or simply 
act as if it is possible to relate.  
 
The internal conception requires faith and is therefore problematic for scientists. The 
external conception requires only the appearance of mind, for it to hold valid. Mind is 
apparent in those objective traces of intentionality – ancient city walls, temples, rites, myths, 
names, histories, technologies – from which we infer the erstwhile presence of persons 
having motives. What is striking is that, by both conceptions, the human subject generates the 
world in its mental dimensions. The mindful human construes others and the world on its 
own mentalist terms. Is Dionysus out there? It may not matter; he was always constituted 
through relation. It may even be that “out there” is an unhelpful description, in that the 
mind that we consider our most intimate possession is in fact “out there”, something 
between persons rather than hermetically sealed kernels within individuals. Or it may be 
that individuals contain a virtual “out there” within, an internal public culture, that they 
represent an elision that diminishes the apparently absolute division of exōthen and endothen.  
 
Whether we take it on faith that Dionysus is a divine person with an immortal mind, (virtual, 
a property that in a god takes any physical form it ‘wishes’) or whether it is so because we 
have a relationship with Dionysus as a god, (which we could only have with a being with a 
projected mind, and an immortal god he must be if “he” has been interacted with 
[worshipped] for generations, i.e. is not subject to time as humans are): it may amount to the 
                                                        
56 Giddens, 1984: 40-5. 
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same thing. It may not appear to matter for the everyday life of the polis, the historical, 
human social world, how it is that we recognize the personhood of others, only that we do. 
 
Yet, Dionysus, Euripides’ Dionysus in Bacchae, is a god who unifies the two conceptions of 
mind as two modes of inferring person. He wants us to have an innate faith that he is the 
god Dionysus, that he has the intentional identity of a god. Dionysus comes amongst 
mortals in their poleis that they may “know him”. What is it we recognize or know when we 
know Dionysus? It is not a material form or shape, for he takes any morphē he wishes. It is 
clearly something “behind” form, or within form, something alternatively hidden or 
revealed by form. He insists on his birth and his name and his relation to Zeus, he insists on 
his identity and he shows his mutability. He makes patent and manifest what he is, yet what 
he is is a quality, a relation, that hard-to-locate property which is everywhere: a mind.  
 
Why “mind” and not “presence”, one may ask. How do we distinguish between these two 
properties? Are not “presence” and “mind” not very nearly the same thing? We address the 
fiction of someone’s mind when we address the absent; even when we create a simulacrum 
of their body, it is the mental identity that is the “target” of our intention. Dionysus takes 
many forms, even a disembodied voice in the air. What we communicate with and feel 
communicated to by, is the presence of a mind. A body can be present but not have 
“presence”, which depends always on the discernment of a personal identity being there. 
That identity is immaterial, its necessary condition mental. The presence of a mind is a 
sufficient condition for our feeling the identity is present.  
 
Dionysus wants us to know him through his rites and festivals, through his moods and 
atmospheres, through the affective state which is the mark of his presence. We know 
Dionysus through the relationship he offers with himself (which also entails, as a side-effect 
of this divine pharmakon, a certain quality of relation with others). That he is god and son of 
Zeus, he wants mortals to know, by any conception of mind there may be available to them. 
Dionysus, as ever, threads together the internal and the external in the endless unbinding 
and rebinding, which always belongs to him.  
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4.2 Aphanēs Nóos 
 
 
ὀργὰς FρέFει θεοὺς οὐχ ὁ/οιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς.57 
 
 
So a theory which only relates actions to (inner, prior) intentions, even if adequate 
psychologically, is socially inadequate.58 
 
 
Opaque in their intentions are the gods. As the poet and statesman Solon had put it a 
century before Euripides: Fάντηι δ' ἀθανάτων ἀφανὴς νόος ἀνθρώFοισιν “in every way 
opaque, aphanēs, to mortals is the mind of gods” 59. In their passions and tempers, however, 
the gods in Euripides are only too like mortals, only too readily intelligible. In this section we 
explore the significance of the simultaneous intelligibility and inscrutability or opaqueness – 
to aphanes – of Dionysus, this paradoxical person always in turn a kruptos and an 
epiphanestatos theos60.  
 
The predominant readings of Euripides’ Bacchae since Dodds’ seminal edition and 
commentary, have been religious-anthropological, ritualist, psychological, structuralist and 
post-structuralist. Everyone gets the Dionysus he or she deserves, quipped Versnel61. Does 
the drama defer meaning in the endlessness of ambiguity and mise en abîme, does it offer a 
glimpse into the unfathomable, the never explicable, only diagnosable abyss of irrationality? 
What, quite, are we to make of its opaqueness? It is a complex work, long discussed in the 
literature as a “problem” or a “riddle”. Over the last  70 years, a certain Doddsian consensus 
has more or less established itself as interpretive orthodoxy, resolving the “enigma” by 
locating it anthropologically and historically, through a vestigially Freudian Kulturtheorie in 
which Civilization (in all its Unbehage) is implicitly construed on the tripartite model of the 
individual subject (Ego, Super-ego, Id), having its drives and repressions and terminally 
inarticulable and elusive irrational depths, hidden and becoming intermittently and 
involuntarily unconcealed in crisis and comedy. 
 
                                                        
57 1348: “It is not fitting for gods to resemble mortals in their passions.” 
58 Gell, 1998: 127. 
59 Solon fr. 17. 
60 Kruptos: “covered up”, “concealed”: see 98, 459,  and see Dionyus’ remarks to Pentheus at 955-6. 
61 Versnel, 1990: 96 “Every reader gets the Bacchae he deserves.” see § 1.2 n. 20. 
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Bacchae has much in common with Iphigenia at Aulis. There is a scheme, or deception, with 
gruesome consequences that triggers the actions of both. Agamemnon bluffs Clytemnestra 
with the prophasis, pretext that he has arranged a marriage for their daughter; Dionysus 
plays a double-bluff on Pentheus and Thebes. In both dramas a god’s desire will spread 
through the context of human agents and instruments through rebarbative acts and 
disastrous consequences. There is in both, a thematic interest in the opposition between 
concealed intentions, their non-decipherment and dramatic revelation – the standard model 
of tragedy, perhaps, but it bears underlining when both plays can so easily be taken instead 
as if “Miracle Plays”, as if primarily occupied with an enactment of religious myths and 
aetiologies of their corollary rites62. The concealment and revelation of motives is a thematic 
opposition, represented in Homer by those two types of man, Achilles and Odysseus. Both 
of these, (even if Odysseus never appears onstage, his presence at Aulis is effective), play a 
very significant part in the Iphigenia at Aulis, as they do in other tragic dramas, with very 
similar roles63. In the Bacchae the contrast between Achillean parrhēsia and Odyssean krupsis is 
sharply drawn. 
 
A god viewed so much in the popular imagining, since at least the late-Romantic Nietzsche, 
as a figure of nature and unbridled emotion64, the Dionysus of the Bacchae is in fact marked 
by absolute, indeed god-like self-possession, by equanimity and self-mastery. That those in 
his proximity have lost or are losing any power of agency over their own wills, only more 
intensely heightens this fact about him. That this is the consequence of their attitudes and 
choices makes a theme of human judgement and bearing. Euripides in the Bacchae, as in his 
other works, is exploiting a religious myth for its plot65, but the content and substance of the 
tragedy, its focus and main interest, is the complex nature of the human social world, its 
being of nature and culture; and its ethical Problematik (and that includes divine social actors, 
as seen here in Bacchae itself only a special category of social other)66.  
 
This is a context constituted of and by agentful human subjects deliberating and scheming, 
dominating and becoming dominated, habitual talkers sizing up each other, failing to size 
up themselves and dramatically discovering how near the inassimilable or uncanny – to 
                                                        
62 The event of the performance of Euripides’ plays in 405 BCE is not one in which Dionysus, his myth and rituals, is a singular topic. 
Bacchae is a play amongst, or alongside other plays. What it has in common with those plays reveals something important about Bacchae 
on its own. See on this point Hall in Stuttard: 11-28.. 
63 Cf. for example, Odysseus in Sophocles’ Philoctetes, Ajax and in Euripides’ Hecuba where both Odysseus and Achilles as a vengeful 
wraith, are represented as repugnantly unsympathetic. 
64 Henrichs, 1984, “Loss of Self, Suffering, Violence: The modern view of Dionysus from Nietzsche to Girard” is one of the best 
discussions of the modern career of Dionysus. 
65 For a scholar like Seaford, however, it is the reverse: the religious myth is not pretext for a play but the play an occasion for a ritual event. 
66 Thumiger, 2007 is an accomplished study of characterization in Bacchae. Rather than “character” I am concerned with the Euripidean 
anthropology of subjectivity, the sociological dimension of which, intersubjectivity, is indissociable. 
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deinon – stands to them. A quintessential form of agency in the social world of Tragedy and 
here specifically in the Bacchae, is not only to be able to read and evaluate one’s own values 
and desires, but the ability to decipher, to read and interpret social others and self – the art of 
penetrating exteriors, discerning the relationship between form and content. The obverse of 
this capacity is the power to dissemble, to devise decoys, to disguise. The mastery of 
outward form is a special skill of the gods67. It is a skill which humans – actors – have in a 
kind of enfeebled version, so artistisch ist der Mensch68. Dionysus is an outstanding example of 
this, elsewhere but very eminently so in Bacchae69. 
 
Tragic protagonists are inhabitants of a world marked by the very social perils, the contests 
and frictions, which everywhere mark historical, common-life. In this world the most 
powerful and therefore most dangerous phenomenon is the agency of social actors, both 
human and divine. Forms of agency and their limitations (their character as both 
compromised and threateningly hidden within subjects, behind their opaque, dissimulable 
social faces): this is a part of what Euripides explores and dramatizes in Bacchae. The Greek 
tragedian is doubtlessly a dazzling interpreter, an expert sociologist and also a penetrating 
anthropologist, for his own work represents an anthropology of the polis, which invites from 
us a commensurately social-anthropological reading70. 
 
From swift-footed Achilles, the hater of liars in Homer, to the coursing maenads of 
Euripides’ Bacchae, in whom any faculty for dissimulation or calculation has been dissolved; 
from the disguised wanderer, learning the “cities and minds of men” of the Odyssey71; to the 
shape-shifting god of Euripides’ Bacchae, who travels from city to city to ultimately unmask 
                                                        
67 Divine disguisements: Ovid, who I think was a penetrating reader of Euripides, exploits the divine capacity for change as a comic foil to 
the pathetic human condition of irreversibility, in his brilliant cosmic panorama Metamorphoses. 
68 See § 4.3.7 p. 274 n. 171.  
69 See especially Aristophanes’ Frogs, where much comedy is juiced from the identity crises that typically transpire where Dionysus is. For 
Dionysus in Aeschylus’ see from his Lykurgeia Ffr. 23-4 Bassarids, (in which Orpheus suffers Pentheus’ fate of being torn to pieces by 
followers of Dionysus, called not bacchants but “bassarids”) and Ffr. 57-62 Edonians and  the satyr-play Lykurgus. Aeschylus also wrote a 
Bacchae and other Dionysus-themed Tragedies, a Pentheus and Xantriai in which the events take place on Mt. Cithaeron and the death of 
Pentheus is mentioned – Lyssa is not “light” in this work apparently; a Semelē or Hydrophoroi; and a satyr-play Trophoi “Nurses of 
Dionysus”. On these see also Jouan, 1992 and West, 1990 and on Bassarids, Seaford, 2005. For the background in the history of drama to 
Bacchae see Dodds xxviii-xxxiii and Sommerstein in Stuttard, 29-41. 
70 “Dazzling interpreters”: “Even the crudest forms of reified thought, however, leave untouched the fundamental significance of the 
knowledgeability of human actors. For knowledgeability is founded less upon discursive than practical consciousness. The knowledge of 
social conventions, of oneself and of other human beings, presumed in being able to ‘go on’ in the diversity of contexts of social life is 
detailed and dazzling. All competent members of society are vastly skilled in the practical accomplishments of social activities and are 
expert ‘sociologists’.” Giddens, 1984: 26. This is a very important idea in Giddens and one with very great import for the interpretation of 
Tragedy. Tragic protagonists are knowledgeable, in the way that normal (competent) “lay persons” always are. See also his “reiteration of 
basic concepts”, Giddens, 1984: 281-4. 
71 Hom. Od. 1.3: πολλῶν δ' ἀνθρώπων ἴδεν ἄστεα καὶ νόον ἔγνω. 
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himself with great drama72 – the detection and concealment of identity and motive constitute 
a recurrent theme in early Greek Poetry. Bacchae is a work studied in the 20th Century 
sometimes for its supposedly ritual – telestic – content and patterning73, interpreted from 
points of view for which agency and subjectivity have had very little place. Nevertheless, 
the theme of detection of and failure in detection of agency, so expressive of general concern 
with the human person and its identity as “agentful” subject, is most prominent in the play.  
 
It is a dramatic vision deeply interested in humans as distinguished for their mental powers, 
limitations and errors and their reflexive attribution of these faculties to their qualitatively 
identical social others, mortal and immortal. Such a claim and approach may be at odds 
with the orthodoxy of the previous century, which had dispensed with the Tylorian 
“intellectualism” of its preceding century in favour of the study of humans as the objects of 
amoral, libidinal and irrational forces – historical and psychological – which are never 
completely manifest to themselves. Humans by such a view are not so much agentful 
subjects, as the passive objects of study such as we find so impressively articulated in the 
scientistic visions of Freud and Lévi-Strauss. Still, implicit in the poets’ thematization of 
krupsis and apokalypsis is a cognitive sociology of protagonists, which sheds helpful light on 
the values, preoccupations and anthropological Weltanschauung of the Attic poet. 
 
In Bacchae we may discern the expression of a poetic social-anthropology. Here is mania, the 
loss of self-control (the Dionysiac dissolution of personal agency, of the capacity for self-
regard); tuchē, contingency, (the arbitrary force of circumstance); and the healthy bearing 
towards existence (sōphrosunē); the circumventions (technē), that its circumstances summon 
up from persons. Ubiquitous is the mind – phrenes, nóos, prapis, kardia, psuchē – in various 
states of well-being, which is determining for the predicament of the “owner” of that mind. 
The action and its circumstances serve at least as much to illuminate the nature of human 
agency, its social and cognitive character, as to represent Dionysiac religious experience (if, 
in any case, that could meaningfully be separated in the Theatre of Dionysus from the 
question of existence, its meaning and value per se). The experience of Dionysus must, in any 
case, be regarded as a certain permutation of cognitive and social states in which human 
agency becomes both (or either) dissipated and (or) uncannily empowered. One of the 
things that might be said of what Euripides set out to do in Bacchae, is that it was to 
illuminate and interpret the nature of control – political, social, volitional, cognitive: kratos, 
kuria, dunamis – of agency and mind in the spectre of its disintegration; the consequences of 
its absence; and in the comparatively morally vacuous form it takes in a god. 
                                                        
72 Much like the Odysseus of Hom. Odyssey 22. 
73 Murray, 1913, an important voice amongst the ‘Cambridge Ritualists’ (on whom see Ackerman, 2002); Seaford, 1981, 1994, 1996; 
Foley’s notion (1985) of ‘ritual irony’ is perhaps the most sophisticated permutation of a ‘ritual’ approach. 
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4.2.1 Polis: an endless crisis of solidarity 
 
νοῦς δέ γ' οὐ βέβαιος ἄδικον κτῆ/α κοὐ σαφὲς φίλοις. 
 
An unsure mind [nóos] is an injurious property and opaque to one’s 
own [philois: family, friends]. 74 
 
The composite picture of 5th C. life that Greek history, biography, lyric poetry, drama, 
forensic oratory, inscriptions, legal records and even philosophical dialogue paint, is of an 
enviably vibrant social world. Life at Athens is marked by tension, contestation and all the 
threats to unity, prosperity and the survival of the community in its given shape, that 
emanate from the human tendency to be both or either collaborative and competitive; 
curious and violently appetent; imaginatively sympathetic of stupidly selfish, mōros75. Greek 
history can, from one perspective, be seen as the insoluble difficulty the different Greek 
cities had in getting on, in not fighting each other, not to mention working together bound 
through a sustained pan-Hellenic identity. Aristophanes’ celebration of the veterans of the 
Persian Wars – marathōnomachai – is so poignant because the unity that had once saved 
Greece, is no more by the end of the century, in the midst of the war with Sparta, when he 
was composing many of his great works76. Iliad is a story about war and betrayal, where 
politics is personal. The Greek leaders cannot get on, husbands and wives deceive one 
another, men scheme and plan and gods are not much different at all. In the Greek 
imagination, the social world of persons – divine and human – is one in which these are 
beset on all sides by the potentially dangerous motives, desires and stratagems of others. It 
is a perpetual agōn, a scene of contest for honours, of jealousy and rivalry as well as 
friendship, love and reflection. This is a contest demanding vigilance, which is temporarily 
and rhythmically relieved – in symposion, kōmas, festival, sleep and the deliverance of 
imagination and exhilaration – by the god of healthy, joyful sociability: Dionysus. 
 
Anthropological constants are themselves contested claims. I am going to lay myself open to 
disagreement here and contend that the desire to live amongst other persons and, 
simultaneously, the difficulty that humans have in getting on with one another, in 
conjoining their purposes in a sustained way: this is an anthropological constant. People are 
social. People are hard to get on with. They always have been and, doubtless, always will be. 
                                                        
74 Menelaus to his brother Agamemnon at Eur. IA 334. 
75 As Teiresias warns pentheus, 369: µῶρα γὰρ µῶρος λέγει. 
76 Marathōnomachai: Ar. Ach. 181, Nu. 986. 
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They are frustratingly attractive to one another. They frustrate one another’s desires.  
Literature is very much about this, uses it as its material. Modern history, cinema, novels: 
one does not need to look far before one comes upon examples supporting this thesis. 
Perhaps an instance from the history of Christian religiosity, so redolent of Dionysiac 
religiosity, will suffice for illustration of what I mean. In his The Making of Late Antiquity, 
Peter Brown memorably described an instance of the recognition of what I am calling the 
troubled sociality of humans. In the context of his discussion of St. Anthony, St. Pachomus 
and the origins of monasticism he wrote of “a crisis of solidarity”, a “tension as old as the 
village itself”, which are terms well apposite to Thebes and the other cities of the Greek 
Tragic vision: 
 
The villages seem to have been passing through a crisis of solidarity more acute than 
the usual unresolved tensions of peasant life . . . The villages from which the ascetics 
came were not inhabited by the docile and overtaxed fellahin of modern imagination, 
but by singularly abrasive small farmers77, for whom violence of body and tongue alike 
were normal: “‘He who dwells with brethren’ said Abba Matoes ‘must not be square, 
but round, so as to turn himself toward all.’ He went on: ‘It is not through virtue that 
I live in solitude, but through weakness; those who live in the midst of men are the 
strong ones.” 78 
 
“Becoming round” means taking on a social and ethical bearing, a posture apposite for the 
day-to-day durée of social life, which requires a strength and attention, a resilience with 
which mortals are clearly not born79. Mortals are born more like Cyclopes, appetent, easily 
deceived, solipsistic and not yet having developed the “strengths” that would equip them 
for complex group life. Individual human persons are like cities: over-populated with a 
citizenry of desires. Human cities constituted of such “overpopulated subjects” are 
therefore, a fortiori, always themselves ‘over-populated’ places.  
 
                                                        
77 The singularly abrasive small farmer may well be a good candidate for the basic social and economic identity of the “man in the street” of 
history in the longe durée. 
78 On the desert ascetics of Late Antique Egypt, Brown talks also about the ‘friction points’, tensions and strains of life in Egyptian villages, 
where “Neighbourliness was always under strain”. It is away from the difficult context of human common life (“the space-time of the polis”, 
“the flow of day-to-day interactions”, “the durée of history”, as Giddens might put it) that the monk turns to the promise of a wholesome 
sociality in god. Human beings struggle to get on and this fact, though it does not wholly explain religion, is integral to understanding 
religion, the content of which very often has to do with the nurturing of some kind of alternative way of relating between persons (historical 
and projected). Religious rites have the power or simply the effect to transform identities and therefore relations. See Brown, 1978: 83, he is 
quoting from Matoes Apothegm. 13, 293C. 
79 Rather as in the Platonic fantasy in Symposium by which humans once were integers, afterwards split accounting for both the 
attractiveness of others and the sense of the incompleteness of the lover that can only be satisfied through re-union, but also we may 
imagine, the difficulty of getting on with such unfinished beings. See Pl. Sym. 190c – 193b. 
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Cities and persons require constant counsel-taking, bouleusis. Individuals have desires and 
reflect upon them, devise means of realizing, suppressing or concealing them. Institutions 
are like common minds for deliberating upon and articulating the conjoined intentions of 
the community. Tensions between individual persons can threaten the conjoining of 
purposes and the institutions, which express those yoked-together purposes or telē. The 
challenge for citizens and their common identity, the polis, is to manage tensions and at best 
to martial the energies of individuals and competition productively. Institutions, themselves 
identities conceived to resolve tensions, need to be continuously groomed, just as relations 
between individuals are constantly subjected to grooming, checking, pruning and cutting 
back of the very psychological energy and libidinal vitality, never definitively suppressed, 
always coming into being, which creates those tensions. Individuals are habitually self-
serving; they are not consistently, desirably servants of the common purpose. Their 
selfishness is a constant threat to the common, intersubjective order. In a democracy, or at 
any rate in a fairly sophisticated form of social-political life, it is not by force, bia, that 
individuals will get their way. They will use persuasion, peithō, and any form of guile, dolos, 
to turn the minds of others to their own ends. 
 
 
4.2.2 Dolos 
 
ἔνθ' οὔ τίς Fοτε /ῆτιν ὁ/οιωθή/εναι ἄντην 
ἤθελ', ἐFεὶ /άλα Fολλὸν ἐνίκα δῖος Ὀδυσσεὺς 
Fαντοίοισι δόλοισι, Fατὴρ τεός, εἰ ἐτεόν γε 
κείνου ἔκγονός ἐσσι· σέβας /' ἔχει εἰσορόωντα.  
 
Then there was no man who wanted to be set up as equal (homoiōthēmenai) 
for cunning (mētis) opposite godly Odysseus; he far surpassed them 
in every kind of stratagem (doloisi); your father if truly (eteon) 
you are his son; and wonder (sebas) seizes me when I look on you (eisorōnta). 80 
 
In Tragedy this crisis of solidarity – as old as the village itself – is expressed, for example, 
through a typical way of turning towards others and seeming round. This is the 
circumvention of others’ wills – a 'getting round' of fellows – which is deception, dolos. 
Pentheus is caught in a bolos, the hunting net of Dionysus’ devising. 81 The network of 
façades, yards and chambers of his own palace, (which Dionysus will make to reel, 585-603) 
                                                        
80 Hom. Od. 3. 120-3. Trans. Lattimore, 1967 with some modifications. 
81 848-9: γυναῖκες, ἁνὴρ ἐς βόλον καθίσταται,/ ἥξει δὲ βάκχας, οὗ θανὼν δώσει δίκην. This must be read with all its irony against the earlier 
(and later) threats and plans of Pentheus, to hunt out the bacchants: 226-32, 352-7, 497. 
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is the trammel – bolos – in which transformed, he becomes the prey ensnared. So too was his 
cousin Actaeon once metamorphosed, as too his grandparents Kadmos and Harmonia shall 
be and as his mother and aunts – though these last lose their minds and not their bodies, 
while the others their bodies but not entirely their minds82. The young king is lured inside his 
own royal house to be made over, tricked out in the disguise of a female bacchant, a 
ridiculous victim of divine dolos, “treachery, craft”. Having earlier remarked that where 
women are involved things will be “cracked and devious”83, Pentheus himself is now lured 
inside to be transformed, by Dionysus’ craft, into a “crafty surveyor”, a treacherous spy – 
dolion kataskopon. So does Dionysus describe him, laying on with very great emphasis, the 
point about Pentheus’ concealment, krupsis, 953-6: 
 
Pe.  καλῶς ἔλεξας· οὐ σθένει νικητέον 
       γυναῖκας· <ὑF'> ἐλάταις δ' ἐ/ὸν κρύψω δέ/ας. 
Di. κρύψηι σὺ κρύψιν ἥν σε κρυφθῆναι χρεών, 
      ἐλθόντα δόλιον /αινάδων κατάσκοFον. 
 
Pe. Finely have you put it, it is not by strength that women 
       Are to be overcome, <under> the fir-trees I shall conceal my frame [demas:    
       body]. 
Di. You’ll be concealed in the concealment, in which you must be concealed,  
      when you come as a crafty (dolion) surveyor on the maenads. 
 
Euripides makes of his projected Thebes, Aulis and Corinth and their social actors, ad hoc, 
collapsible models of impermanent human existence. Metamorphosis is an important 
feature in these models. Actaeon, Pentheus, Kadmos, his daughters, Harmonia, the female 
citizenry of Thebes; Semelē, Hera, Zeus and Dionysus at Thebes: the city is the scene of 
continual disguisements and transformations. The Labdacids will have the opposite 
problem: Laius, Oedipus, Eteocles, Polyneices, Antigone – these do not conceal their 
intentions, they are not transformed, they are only too much what they are. Metamorphosis 
and reversal have this prominent place because the Greek poet dwells on the real problems 
of individual and common social existence: securing continuity, the relationship of identity 
to form, the mending of ruptures and bonds, transience, survival, death.  
 
                                                        
82 Actaeon: 337-40, 1291, cf. Ovid Met. 3. 228-52. Kadmos and Harmonia: 1330-9. Agauē and her sisters: 31-8, 677-768, Agauē regains her 
temporarily lost mind at 1259-1301. 
83 486-7: Di. νύκτωρ τὰ πολλά· σεµνότητ’ ἔχει σκότος./ Pe. τοῦτ’ ἐς γυναῖκας δόλιόν ἐστι καὶ σαθρόν. 
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Dolos has the basic sense of ‘bait, lure’ for its original meaning84. In its more abstract or 
extended sense, however, dolos and its composites will be familiar to readers of Homer. It is 
a term and a phenomenon, “craftiness”, that appears often in the Homeric world, most 
typically in respect of four things – human relations (especially connubial); scheming god; 
devices (mēchanai); and the man of consummate and multiform craft, the great improviser, 
Odysseus. Dolos, since basically denoting “dangerous gift-giving, lures, bait, catching and 
trapping”, connotes imperilled relations, fabricated bonds, hidden intention. 
 
Inherent in dolos is the image of the ligatures between actors that will turn out in fact to be 
negative entanglements: nets and lassoes, brochoi85. Dolos is manipulation of the will of others 
through dissemblance of motive: concealment, kryptein; surprise, ta nea; sabotage, ellochizein; 
ambush, lochos86. It will not be surprising if etymologically it turns out to be related quite 
simply to talk87. Talk is itself inherently dangerous, because human relations are always 
imperilled, clarity is hard to secure, ambiguity ineradicable. The light which human minds 
manage to throw on things is the light of a dancing flame, it throws dancing shadows and 
glancing illuminations. People, even when they think they are most wary and not 
ingenuous, will be taken in by the wily. A social and psychological fact, this represents an 
immoveable political problem. Hence, for example, could the great statesman-poet, Solon, 
write of his fellow Athenians: 
 
ὑ/<έω>ν δ' εἷς /ὲν ἕκαστος ἀλώFεκος ἴχνεσι βαίνει, 
σύ/Fασιν δ' ὑ/ῖν χαῦνος ἔνεστι νόος· 
ἐς γὰρ γλῶσσαν ὁρᾶτε καὶ εἰς ἔFη αἱ/ύλου ἀνδρός, 
εἰς ἔργον δ' οὐδὲν γιγνό/ενον βλέFετε.   
                                                        
84 Chantraine “<<tromperie, ruse>>… parfois avec un sens concret chez Hom.: le cheval de Troie, le filet où Héphaistos attrape Arès, 
l’appât pour un poisson (Od. 12, 252), ce qui peut être le sens originel”. See in a discussion of narrative technique in Tragedy, Goward on 
“Narrative deceit: dolos” in Tragedy, Goward, 1999: 39-52, (focussed on Aeschylus and Sophocles, not Euripides or Dionysus’ dolos). 
85 Brochoi: “slip-knot, snare” 545, 615, 619, 1021, see also § 2.2.1.1 n. 68. 
86 The man of low-cunning, that “city slicker” who instigates a failed attempt to catch the bacchants and collect a reward, gets the shepherds 
(“dwellers of the holy plateaux”) to hide in ambush, 721-3: εὖ δ’ ἡµῖν λέγειν/ ἔδοξε, θάµνων δ’ ἐλλοχίζοµεν φόβαις/ κρύψαντες αὑτούς. An 
ambuscade is a concealing of bodies in a “thicket” lochmē: κἀγὼ ‘ξεπήδησ’ ὡς συναρπάσαι θέλων,/ λόχµην κενώσας ἔνθ’ ἐκρύπτοµεν 
δέµας. Later Pentheus deluded thinks he will hunt down the bacchants in their “thickets/ lairs”, but it is they who will ambush him, his 
camouflage too will serve the very opposite telos from the one he had anticipated. When Dionysus summons the made-over Pentheus out of 
the palace it is as a “spy on your mother and her lochos” “ambush, band” [and even, I think not insignificantly in a play in which we have 
heard so much about parturition and all things obstetric, lochia “child-birth” (89, 94)]  914-16: ὄφθητί µοι,/ σκευὴν γυναικὸς µαινάδος 
βάκχης ἔχων,/ µητρός τε τῆς σῆς καὶ λόχου κατάσκοπος·. 
87 Chantraine suggests that dolos may be historically connected with “talk”, dolos s.v.: “. . . l’étymologie de δόλος reste douteuse: on a 
évoqué v. isl. tal ‘compte, discours’ et tāl ‘ruse, tromperie” etc. angl.-s. tæl f. “blâme”, etc., german. commun *tēlo- ; ou sans plus de raison 
lat. dolāre et δαιδαάλλω; si le sens originel était “appât”. etc., on pourrait penser à δέλεαρ [bait]”. In addition to “talk”, consider also “tell” 
and Dutch ‘Taal’. Dólos, whatever the historical etymology, in Tragedy and in Bacchae is “talk”. Through talk actors take in one another, 
exploit one another’s desires, fail to recognize the dangers of their own impulses. 
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Your trouble is, each of you treads the fox’s way, 
       but your collective wits are thin as air. 
You watch a crafty fellow’s tongue, and what he  
says, [eis epē] 
        but fail to look at anything he does [eis ergon]. 
 
In the theatron of Dionysus (the place for spectating – theāsthai – looking at what crafty 
fellows do), what persons do is primarily talk: address, respond, take turns, counsel, 
deliberate, desire, judge and become judged, talk in time with one another, i.e. sing. The 
ergon of drama is epē. Persuasion (peithō) is regularly opposed to Force (bia) by the 
Athenians, but in fact with the right kind of mind, the enchanting power of Peithō can itself 
become only another, even more forceful form of Bia. The life of the democratic city, with its 
bouleutēria (counsel chambers) and bouleis (counsels), has at its centre the agora, the scene 
where people with their orexeis, appetites and bouleis, desires ‘gather’, ageirein, and address 
each other, agoreuein. The polis, the human social world, is a scene of talk more than anything 
else, and talk incurs dangers. Talk is entanglement and the means to solve entanglement. 
Such is the fix in which humans find themselves. 
 
A fisherman is said to cast a dolos into the sea, bait for little fishes88. As a device it may be said 
to reify human will and purpose. Tools are, of course, artefacts that embody human 
intention, because they are prosthetic extensions of intention. They are means towards ends 
which one way or another, are always human. In Odyssey 4, Menelaus narrates how he had 
once walked alone on an Egyptian beach, (this is the solitariness of the leader in Ancient 
poetry, like the isolation of Pentheus who “alone travails for the city”89). He, meanwhile, has 
left his men behind; oppressed by hunger, they are casting fishing lines and hooks – doloi – 
into the sea. He is going to learn how, by another kind of device taught him by Proteus’ 
(treacherous) daughter Eidothea, to wait and catch that Old Man of the Sea90, who “always 
speaks the truth”or is “infallible”: nēmertēs; “straight”: atrekēs; “a deathless person who 
knows the depths of the sea”91. Persons are catching one another to find out how to become 
freed.  
                                                        
88 Hom. Od. 12.252 ἰχθύσι τοῖς ὀλίγοισι δόλον κατὰ εἴδατα βάλλων. 
89 Pentheus’ isolation: 963-4 µόνος σὺ πόλεως τῆσδ’ ὑπερκάµνεις, µόνος·/τοιγάρ σ’ ἀγῶνες ἀναµένουσιν οὓς ἐχρῆν.   
90 Menelaus’ story (and his telling it) prepares the audience, nicely in miniature, for the similar pattern of entrapment on an island, help from 
a magical female, cunning intelligence, disguise (as seals) to outwit the Proteus who is a herder like the Cyclops, a voyage into a (watery) 
underworld and ultimate escape: see Hom. Od. 4.351-592. Exactly the same pattern of smaller actions preceding larger ones is what we have 
in Bacchae, a kind of Russian doll of events. Actaeon’s fate prepares us for Pentheus’, the sparagmos of the bullock narrated by the servant 
at 677-768, prepares us for the identical fate of Pentheus, who will be mistaken for a bullock (1185-7) narrated by the messenger at 1114-39. 
91 Proteus: Hom. Od. 4.384-6: γέρων ἅλιος νηµερτής, / ἀθάνατος, Πρωτεὺς Αἰγύπτιος, ὅς τε θαλάσσης/πάσης βένθεα οἶδε. 
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Strange as it may sound, a fisherman has a kind of social relation, if of the crudest kind, with 
the fish he catches. It may be mediated by inert objects, tools; the fisherman, who casts out 
bait for fish, hooks them on his dolos, and scoops them up “in his hollow ox-horn . . . and 
throws them on the dry land gasping and struggling”, may not think of the fish as persons, 
but he has corresponded with them as persons typically do one with another92. He has had to 
engage them, he has had to offer them a kind of gift, to take on the apparent role of fosterer 
or the unapparent character of chance, (it appears that no one has offered the food, it was 
just there). He has exploited their desires against their unwitting selves. It is a kind of 
performance, this angling, in order to snare the fish; all this ultimately to foster his own 
flesh, on theirs.  
 
Dolos is a gift which is not what it seems; its benefit accrues to the giver and the loss will be 
the receiver’s. In Homer the wooden horse given the Trojans was a dolos; erotic gifts are 
demands, so Aphrodite and Circe are marked by dolos; as is the connubial relationship 
generally, (Clytemnestra’s deception of Agamemnon or the account of Hephaestus’ 
discovery of Aphrodite’s infidelity with Ares93); and those guileful spouses, Penelope and 
Odysseus. Dolos is a rudimentary form of illusionism. It has this in common with theatre: it 
is illusionist and encodes relations, in which desire and choice are made an object of 
speculation or manipulation. The hunter captures, the poet captivates94. Dolos is a desire 
disguised as reciprocity or simply covered up – krupton – to hide the presence of an ulterior 
agency.  
 
Not particularly wishing to advocate for a ‘lexical method’, with a poet like Euripides it is 
nevertheless important to keep the concrete sense of terms in mind. He generates a very 
richly textured world, dense with images and evocations of things, bodies, substance and 
sounds. His is a sensual world in which events and actions – not merely ideas, but the 
relation of terms to phenomena, signs to referents – are dramatized. Euripides plays 
precisely with the concrete and abstract sense of various given terms and designations. This 
is particularly apparent in the interplay of metonymies and the thematically redolent 
confusion of literal and figurative significations in Bacchae95.  
 
                                                        
92 See also Hom. Od. 12.251-5, for a vivid simile of the angler, (with here men as washed up “gasping” like little fishes), a picture of the fish 
most reminiscent of Odysseus himself washed up and gasping on a beach at Hom. Od. 451-73. 
93 Aigisthos in the Odyssey, is Αἴγισθον δολόµητινHom. Od. 1. 300, 3.198, 3. 250, [3.308], 4.525, Klytemnestra: Κλυταιµνήστρη 
δολόµητις, 11. 422, σοὶ δὲ Κλυταιµνήστρη δόλον ἤρτυε τηλόθ' ἐόντι., 11. 439. Ares’ discovery of his spouse’s treachery Od. 8. 276-82. 
94 On the “enchantments” of technē, see Gell, 1988 and also his “The technology of enchantment and the enchantment of technology”, 1992.  
95 See Segal, 1997 [1982]: 27-54; Thumiger, 2006, 2007: 189-96. 
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A dolos too is what Pentheus fears and finally suffers. He is a man who has been baited and 
who will become lured and finally broken into pieces, as flesh is when it is used to bait and 
catch further flesh. Something “crafty, treacherous” – dolion96 – is what Pentheus had feared 
was being “devised against me”, es eme mēchanai, by the Dionysiac Stranger97. Like Hesiod’s 
Zeus faced with the discreetly smiling – ēka – Prometheus98, he fears being rendered aporos 
(“resourceless, without means, without affordance”) by a slippery, smiling counterpart. The 
wording of Dionysus’ response to this allegation will be especially loaded, 805-6:  
 
Pe. οἴ/οι· τόδ' ἤδη δόλιον ἐς ἐ/ὲ /ηχανᾶι. 
Di. Fοῖόν τι, σῶσαί σ' εἰ θέλω τέχναις ἐ/αῖς; 
 
Pe. Oh, here now are you devising treachery against me. 
Di. What kind of a trick is it, if by my arts I wish to save you? 
 
Hunting with traps is rather like that Promethean sacrifice that humans make to the gods, in 
which the gods were given the simulacrum of the best portion, a gift which is a dolos. It is a 
kind of theft, a trap in which the receiver is snared, and the giver gets away with it. Actaeon, 
the cousin of Pentheus, was a hunter whose relationship to prey had been reversed. He 
becomes the hunted stag, he loses voice and face and therefore social identity99. He loses 
social relation with his own dogs, whom he had reared, to whom he was fosterer. 
Reciprocity has become thwarted. His hounds “repay” their master, with the fate that 
anticipates Pentheus’ own, rending his flesh savagely. Pentheus’ dolos, his own desire 
dressed up and camouflaged, will be a bait not taken in by the theriomorphosed bacchants. He 
will become the bait to be shredded by his own family, who have ceased to be able to 
recognize relation at all. Pentheus is the bait on the hook of his own too mortal and 
suggestible desirousness. Too cunning, too guilefully focused on an object not properly 
evaluated, too unreciprocating: human desiring has been the baited trap in which humans 
have themselves been catastrophically caught. 
 
The stranger is disarming. He represents the neutralization of human purposiveness and his 
subversions (for the survivors at Thebes and the Athenian audience) the entailed re-
evaluations of ordinary purpose. The city is the objectification of human purposes, 
generations of intentions, desires, needs and their communalization, materialization and 
                                                        
96 487, 805, 956.  
97 805-6: Pe.οἴµοι· τόδ’ ἤδη δόλιον ἐς ἐµὲ µηχανᾶι./ Di. ποῖόν τι, σῶσαί σ’ εἰ θέλω τέχναις ἐµαῖς; 
98Hes. Theog. 546-7: τὸν δ’ αὖτε προσέειπε Προµηθεὺς ἀγκυλοµήτης,/ ἦκ’ ἐπιµειδήσας, δολίης δ’ οὐ λήθετο τέχνης·. Reminiscent of the 
smiling Dionysus of unrecognized motives at Hymn. Hom. 7.14-15: ὁ δὲ µειδιάων ἐκάθητο/ ὄµµασι κυανέοισι. 
99 So at any rate do we vividly picture his fate when once we have read the unforgettable version of Ovid at Met. 3. 131-252. 
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common organization. The social world of the city modulates and attenuates desires and 
relations in its habitus or forms of life. The same social dynamic persists and is everywhere 
persons are: in the human world people compete with one another, if not (in ordinary 
circumstances) to consume one another’s bodies, then to take possession of them in other 
more or less intricate, social or anti-social ways. Eventually, Pentheus will undergo a 
transformation in his desiring. His volition, dangerously weakened, like that of a man 
intoxicated, he will become a figure of fatally loosened will, of tragical velleity. It is by his 
very own desire, his own personal will, that Dionysus traps Pentheus. A lure is what is most 
undesirable dissembling itself as the desirable. Significantly, the tyrannos conceives of value, 
affordance and obligation, in those commercial or transactional terms, which form the basis 
of one face of city life. That face – the identification of the city as the banausic scene of 
transactions, commerce in honours, calculation, deception and competition for prominence – 
that vision of existence is negated or made no longer an absolute value here, in the 
proximity of Dionysus. 
 
 
4.3 Just keep dancing: Belief as Stratagem 
 
κεἰ /ὴ γὰρ ἔστιν ὁ θεὸς οὗτος, ὡς σὺ φήις,100 
 
In all social situations there inheres a more or less dangerous ambiguity, which emanates 
from the underdetermination of time and also from the concealability of intention, the 
cryptic, invisible nature of the mind, the difficult nature of other people (how to proceed in 
the social world, getting on with others) and of social life. One’s fellows are not always 
amenable, eutrepes. Not only will they not be easily bent to one’s own purposes (they are 
agnamptoi), but they are even so unruly as to have their own, which they regard as more 
important than one’s own. Co-present persons are treacherous, or at any rate tricky, dolion; 
the gods – fantastic magnifications of mortals – all the more so. Hence did Solon say that 
“The mind of gods is in every way opaque to mortals”. It is hard to know when it is the 
truth that is manifest, advisable always to assume hidden dangers, for one loses little if one 
over-attributes agency or the presence of person to that which does not contain (conceal) it, 
and one risks a great deal in presuming the absence of agency or personhood, which in the 
event turns out in fact to have been present, “there”.  
 
“Light is the expense” – κούφα γὰρ δαFάνα 893 – sing the bacchants, but they do not mean 
that it is easy to pretend, rather that it is not a great price to pay to have an authentic, deeper 
relating, one not predicated on competition. Dionysus has come to reclaim a kin-relationship 
                                                        
100 “Even if the god is not he, as you say”, 333. 
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for himself. A dangerous deficit in affective relations between persons in the polis is 
foreshadowed in the sibling rivalry of the daughters of Kadmos. It has been too late for the 
Kadmeians to learn the lesson that mortals must attend to their relations with themselves 
and with their co-presents. We have seen the deficiencies of the Thebans and the deficit in 
mercifulness of the son of Thebes, Dionysus. Their failure provides the Athenian audience 
with a photographic negative of strong evaluation and the absolute importance of certain 
qualities of agency, recognition of self and other as like self for healthy sociality.  
 
Time and its habituations makes things what they are, transforms custom into nature; it is 
fallacious to ‘denature’ what people do by “historicizing” that, because the historical world 
is not different from the real world of continuous change and metamorphosis of the vital 
and contingent into the necessary and transcendent: this Dionysus affirms101. If Dionysus is a 
weak evaluator, this tragedy shows him inadvertently teaching the audience what stronger 
evaluation might have looked like. The “original sin” of Bacchae is the denial by the 
Kadmeians of Semelē’s relations with Zeus, which was also a betrayal of the affective bond 
between kin (or was it the machinations of Hera motivated by jealousy or the irresponsible 
desirousness of promiscuous Zeus – the point is perhaps that origins are not absolutely 
determining, every situation originates in some prior one. There is a continuous dialectic of 
motivation and action, each informing the other endlessly, and the wise attends to what is at 
hand, ta paronta). Such affective bonds, relations predicated on emotion rather than form or 
calculation are being reclaimed by the poet – whose dramatic creations, mortal and 
immortal, teach us by example what ethical inadequacy looks like – as the authentic kind, 
the ones most to value. 
 
While Teiresias counsels an open-hearted reception of the bacchants and their chorēgos 
(Dionysus incognito), Kadmos, as we have seen, is more politically minded. The former king 
of Thebes – the exiled wanderer from the realm of mētis, ‘cunning intelligence’ (for such is 
the sea, where alone the clever and technically capable survive), native of that nation of 
skilled and cunning seafarers, the Phoenicians – Kadmos has passed on his authority to his 
favourite grandson102. As we have seen, this old veteran is strategic, a man of Realpolitik as 
                                                        
101 893-6: κούφα γὰρ δαπάνα νοµί-/ ζειν ἰσχὺν τόδ' ἔχειν,/ ὅτι ποτ' ἄρα τὸ δαιµόνιον,/ τό τ' ἐν χρόνωι µακρῶι νόµιµον/ ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός. 
“Light is the expense to hold [nomizein “believe”] that this contains power; whatever it is that is divine [daimonion], this in time becomes 
upheld [nomimon “tradition”, “customary belief”], and will always be of itself natural.” Di Benedetto: “non costa fatica non porta danno/ 
ritenere che questo è ciò che conta:/ è il divino qualunque cosa esso sia/ ed è la norma in uso/ che nel lungo corso del tempo/ ha assunto la 
qualità dell’eterno/ e la naturalità dell’essere.” Roux: “Il en coûte bien peu de croire à la puissance/ et du divin, quel qu’il puisse être,/ et de 
la tradition consacrée par les siècles,/ qui, toujours, est issue de la nature même.” See also p. 167, § 3.3.11 p. 206 n. 301, § 5.5.3 n. 130, § 
7.3 p. 396. 
102 Passed on authority 43-5: Κάδµος µὲν οὖν γέρας τε καὶ τυραννίδα/ Πενθεῖ δίδωσι θυγατρὸς ἐκπεφυκότι, 
Favourite offspring 1316-22, esp. 1316-17: ὦ φίλτατ’ ἀνδρῶν (καὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ’ ὢν ὅµως/ τῶν φιλτάτων ἔµοιγ’ ἀριθµήσηι, τέκνον), 
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survivors tend to be. He suggests a politick wager on the authenticity of Semelē’s 
posthumous offspring as being the son of Zeus, kei mē gar estin, “even if he is not”103. 
Pentheus will not take this bet, even though as Kadmos implies, there is little to lose and, 
either way, something to gain from recognizing Dionysus. To Pentheus’ mind there is much 
to lose. Honouring an effeminate stranger, or the bastard son104 of a dead aunt, herself 
dishonourable, will compromise his own dignity. It will imperil the time, honour and 
legitimacy, kuria (derived by birth) which, political man that he by nature is105, he refuses to 
gamble away106.  
 
In Bacchae belief as “faith” and “emotion” is contrasted with belief as “calculation” and 
“strategy”. The god of revelation, which is Dionysus, will clearly privilege one kind of belief 
over the other. The problem of knowledge is always topical with Dionysus. He wants a 
certain kind of relation with him, in Euripides’ vision of Dionysiac religion, relations are 
essentially the manner of knowing persons. The quality of knowledge and the quality of 
bearing are inextricable. 
 
 
  
                                                        
103333-43. See § 3.2.2 n. 49. 
104 Bastard son, Eur. Ba. 26-30: ἐπεί µ’ ἀδελφαὶ µητρός, ἃς ἥκιστ’ ἐχρῆν, / Διόνυσον οὐκ ἔφασκον ἐκφῦναι Διός, / Σεµέλην δὲ 
νυµφευθεῖσαν ἐκ θνητοῦ τινος / ἐς Ζῆν’ ἀναφέρειν τὴν ἁµαρτίαν λέχους, / Κάδµου σοφίσµαθ’, 244-5: ὃς ἐκπυροῦται λαµπάσιν κεραυνίαις/ 
σὺν µητρί, Δίους ὅτι γάµους ἐψεύσατο. 
219-20: τὸν νεωστὶ δαίµονα/Διόνυσον, ὅστις ἔστι, the note of scorn here echoes with the earlier ἐκ θνητοῦ τινος, 39 and with the probably 
sarcastic question Pentheus put to the Stranger at 467: Ζεὺς δ’ ἔστ’ ἐκεῖ τις ὃς νέους τίκτει θεούς; 
105 Political man: 319-21, see § 3.3.6 n. 228.  
106 Effeminate stranger: τὸν θηλύµορφον ξένον, 353. We should not exaggerate the “femininity” of Dionysus, as sometimes the scholarship 
can tend to do. Pentheus is much more often designated as “female” (855, 912-17, 980). Dionysus is seen more as “attractive to women”: 
453-59. The notion that we have to do with an effeminate Dionysus is traceable to the understanding that Euripides’ model, at least one of 
them, was the Dionysus of Aeschylus plays on the themes. See Aesch. fr. 60 in Edonians τίς ποτ’ ἔσθ’ ὁ µουσόµαντις † < –  x > ἄλλος 
ἀβροβάτης ὃν σθένει† [in the lacuna before ἄλλος found in the Suda Sommerstein posits < γύννις>; Hermann and Friebel posited 
ἀβροβάτης for the manuscript’s ἀβρατοῦς, in other words, we find a possible but not definite “epicene” Dionysus in Aeschylus, see 
Sommerstein 2008]. Dionysus is addressed by Lykourgos in a w ork with a very different tone as gynnis (in a line that recalls Bacchae 460-
4, e.g. 460: πρῶτον µὲν οὖν µοι λέξον ὅστις εἶ γένος.) in the satyr-play Lykourgos fr. 61. 135 (ad Bacchum captivum)· ποδαπὸς ὁ γύννις; τίς 
πάτρα; τίς ἡ στολή;. On representations of Dionysus, from originally typically Olympian masculine (beard, seniority) to the later less 
masculine, beardless ephebe of the late 5th Century, see Carpenter in Masks: 185-206; Carpenter, 1986 and 1997; Jameson in Masks: 44-65 
“The asexuality of Dionysus”; and Gherchanoc, 2003: “Les atours féminins des hommes : quelques représentations du masculin-féminin 
dans lemonde grec antique. Entre initiation, ruse, séduction et grotesque, surpuissance et déchéance”. 
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4.3.1 Morphēn brotēsian: Anthropomorphisms 
 
Stuart Guthrie’s work represents an early instance of the “cognitive turn” in religious 
studies107. In Faces in the Clouds: a new theory of religion108, Guthrie brought together his 
arguments into a theory of “religion as anthropomorphism”. This work represents a recent 
permutation of that modern “intellectualist tradition” that reaches back to E.B. Tylor. The 
Victorian scholar’s theory of the animist impulse that allegedly explains so many forms of 
religiosity in their “development” from primitive forms “upwards” was unfortunately 
hierarchical, tainted by the European’s 19th C. colonial hybris. It was thereby seen as fatally 
compromised by the 20th Century, with its (admirably but not itself unproblematically) more 
scientific (and self-aware) approach to the anthropology of religion109. The value of 
Intellectualism for interpreting the religiosity expressed in Greek Poetry, and culture more 
broadly is, essentially even if only implicitly, repudiated by many of the ethological, 
functionalist, structuralist and ritualist readings of 20th Century scholarship on Greek 
Religion and Dionysus110. Yet, as I have been arguing, agency, which we must construe as 
very largely mental in character, is a fundamental element of cultural life and of its complex 
expression in Greek Tragedy. Dianoia, thought, is not less real or somehow posterior to 
thumos, passion, orexis appetite or boulē, “reflected on desire”: these are dialectically related, 
each continuously shaping and becoming shaped in turn by the other. 
 
 
  
                                                        
107 Guthrie, 1980. This cognitive turn is most notably signalled in the publication by E. Thomas Lawson and Robert N. McCauley in 1990 of 
their very influential Rethinking Religion: connecting cognition and culture. Jennifer Larson’s Understanding Greek Religion: a cognitive 
approach (Larson, 2016) is a very welcome discussion of Greek religion through the lenses of the cognitive science of religion. The 
category of ‘Religion’ is not unproblematic, as Larson discusses (see her Chapter 1 “What is Religion”), with reference to an important 
work on the question by Brent Nongbri, (Nongbri, 2011). On this question in another recent study of Greek Religion, see also Julia Kindt’s 
Rethinking Greek Religion, 2012. 
108 Guthrie, 1993. 
109 Tylor, 1871 and on Tylor, a kind of rehabilitation or development beyond his work, one of the first modern anthropologists, see Guthrie, 
1993. and Saler in Stausberg [ed.], 2009, for a critical appreciation of Guthrie and his influences. Note the appearance in 1892-94 of the two 
volumes of Rohde’s important Psyche: Seelenkult und Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen, a historicist interpretation of the god Rohde 
could not know would prove with the Mycenaean excavation of the 20th Century to be echt Greek. On Rohde and the historical, cultural 
formations of the 19th and early 20th Century, which have been formative for subsequent conceptions of Ancient Poetry and its 
interpretation, see Schlesier, 1994.  
110 On the idea of progress in Antiquity, see Dodds, 1973. 
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4.3.2 Agency Detection 
 
Agency, its habitual detection by humans and its explanatory power in accounting for 
human belief in gods, is a key idea in Guthrie. Alfred Gell, focused rather on developing a 
true anthropology of art-works, a subtle conceptualization of agency and its nature and 
“distribution” through objects, represents an important recent contribution to an 
anthropology of art and person for the 21st century. Agency in both scholars is, 
quintessentially, always social. As Gell put it,  
 
Whenever an event is believed to happen because of an ‘intention’ lodged in the 
person or thing, which initiates the causal sequence, that is an instance of ‘agency’. 
Putting the word ‘social’ in front of the word ‘agent’ is in a sense redundant, in so far 
as the word ‘agency’ primarily serves to discriminate between ‘happenings’ (caused 
by physical laws) and ‘actions’ (caused by prior intentions). ‘Prior intentions’ implies 
the attribution to an agent of a mind akin to a human one, if not identical. Animals and 
material objects can have minds and intentions attributed to them, but these are 
always, in some residual sense, human minds, because we have access ‘from the inside’ only 
to human minds, indeed to only one of these, our own. Human minds are inevitably 
‘social’ minds, to the extent that we only know our own minds in a social context of 
some kind. ‘Action’ cannot really be conceptualized in other than social terms.111 
 
The doings of drama – its dramata: ergon as epē – ought not to be conceptualized in any but 
social terms. André Rivier, in his discussion of agency in Aeschylus112, took emotional and 
psychological events effectively to be ‘happenings’. They are never only such; they are 
always also ‘actions’, except when persons have become zombies. As actions initiated by 
non-human motives and persons (gods, Furies, Atē) they may seem to not belong to 
humans, but only happen through and to them. Rivier’s is a theory of Tragic agency, only 
one locating agency beyond – exōthen – individual human agents. The actors of Tragedy are 
persons not zombies, and Tragedy does have a concept of “zombie”; that is what the maenad 
                                                        
111 Gell, 1998: 17, my italics. Cf. Dennett in one of the key texts in the vigorous debates about mind, consciousness, agency and intention, 
Consciousness Explained, “. . . consciousness, the special ingredient that turns mere happenings into doings”, Dennett, 1991: 32, (his 
italics). For Giddens’ definition of actions and agency, see Giddens, 1984: 5-13, 281-4, on intentionality and its not being the equivalent of 
agency, see 8-12. The importance of intentionality in its modern formulation (for it was a topos of scholastic philosophy) is traced back to 
the work of Franz Brentano, whose influence, via Husserl and Heidegger was immense for the 20th C. Dennett, 1985: 67: “Consider that 
warhorse in the philosophy of mind, Brentano’s Thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental: all mental phenomena exhibit 
intentionality and no physical phenomena exhibit intentionality. This has traditionally taken to be the irreducibility thesis: the mental, in 
virtue of its intentionality, cannot be reduced to the physical.” It has been Dennett’s project, as a natural scientist, to demonstrate the 
physical (not metaphysical, not mystified) basis of consciousness. 
112 Rivier, 1968. 
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is or the deranged killer of his own unrecognized family, like the Euripidean Herakles (Eur. 
HF). 
 
Even if virtual, representational, having only ever artificial intelligence, characters in plays 
appear to have in place the minimal conditions for effective personhood, i.e. they can be 
taken for persons, as having minds, because they talk and are talked to, they see and are seen 
and know themselves seen. Even in a monologue, even the most isolated protagonist like 
Medea or Philoctetes – or more than isolated, in those who are alienated, made other even to 
themselves, like Euripides’ Pentheus, Agauē, Orestes in Orestes or the Heracles of Hercules 
Furens – is presented as intelligible and as revealing something social in their aberrant 
asociality or anti-social condition.  
 
Drama is by its nature a sociology113. The agency detected in Tragedy is always humanoid 
agency, for that is the only wavelength of agentfulness that human beings – poets, 
audiences, suffering protagonists – are equipped to detect. Humans trace a definitively 
human, anthropomorphic agency everywhere and always. They habitually engage with and 
feel engaged by human and humanoid agency. They can relate to and feel related to, only by 
the intelligible, the recognizable personhood, which belongs to motivated, communicating 
persons. Agency means human agency. Agency and its detection are expressive of the 
Grundprinzip of human existence: its sociality. 
 
There are certain fundamental relationships that pre-occupy the Greek poets and thinkers. 
The relationship between nomos and physis, between intentions and circumstances, the 
disjunction between desire and reality in human life, the connection between what Gell calls 
“happenings” and “actions” and, further still, between “actions” and those special 
happening-like actions, which are the doings of super-natural agents. These are some of the 
fundamental issues of Tragedy. They are so, because they articulate the most basic concerns 
of a human social world constituted of social actors, mutually engaged, limited in their 
agency but also defined by their agency as inter-subjects of a common, material and 
symbolic world.  
 
This world, though it looks given and even timeless, is always one of perpetual 
reconstitution and re-imagination – always radically temporal114. That is a dangerous thought 
in the weight it lends to profane, human agency; perhaps it is better left taboo, arrhēton, a 
“no-go” topic for talk, abaton, sacer. Nicomachus was an Athenian who may be said 
inadvertently to have paid the price for raising this delicate problem in his revision of the 
                                                        
113 See Hall in Easterling, 1997: 93-126. 
114See on agency and the imaginaire Castoriadis, 1975: L’Insitution imaginaire de la société. 
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sacral calendar. The unwelcome implication of too radical changes in religious practices and 
new beings recognized as gods, may be that responsibility for the gods, a most dreadful 
agency, lies with human beings115. The dangerous possibility that it is humans that give birth 
to gods had been raised in the 5th Century. At the end of the 5th C. BCE it is, like the 
uncertainty and dynamism of war, in the air116. 
 
Greek drama is performance: it is contrived to be experienced, to be perceived as sensation 
and intelligible action117. It is a performance always radically constrained – as is the mortal 
existence it dramatizes and reflects upon – by time: mortal, irreversible time, a constant 
shifting of perspective, the mind’s intentional objects118. The stream of sensations and 
perceptions of time, which constitute human experience are made intelligible by the mind 
and thus assimilable into the fundamentally, unalterably social (shared, communicated and 
made common) order of human existence. Time and change and cognizance of change and 
of the uncertainty or indeterminacy of things, lend human life its special character and 
compel in humans an interpretive orientation. As Guthrie writes, 
 
. . . scanning for order and meaning is continuous, because the perceptual world 
always is underdetermined and always coming into being . . . The more successful an 
interpretation, the more it reveals and the more information is integrated into our 
understandings and actions . . . In making any interpretation we choose some 
context. Our choice depends on our purpose . . . we attribute various hierarchies to 
the world, of varying interest.119 
 
Perception is rendered, through cognition, in a syntax of cause and effect, through which 
alone the otherwise disorderly flow of events becomes tolerable. For chaos, to adopt a 
Geertzian notion of culture, is unbearable to humans. Its threats to human life are too great, 
in that they remain indistinct, unpredictable and cannot therefore be assimilated into 
                                                        
115 On Nicomachus and his calendar which we know from a speech by the orator Lysias, see § 3.3.14 p. 149 n. 331. 
116 See the famous poem of the early 5th C. Xenophanes ffr. 13-14 [West, 1972], he presents an argument for the anthropomorphism of belief 
in gods based on a recognition of the relativity of cultural practices and beliefs; this is the spirit in which Herodotus, two generations later 
would look upon the great diversity of beliefs and practices amongst the diverse ethnē. See also Parker, 1996: 152-98 “The Fifth Century: 
New Gods” and “Annexe: Foreign Gods”. 
117 Hall in Stuttard. 
118 Cf. Giddens on the ‘reversible’ time of routine. A special character of Tragedy is that it enacts irreversible scenarios within the 
parameters of the reversible, repeatable “routine” which is ritual. 
119 Guthrie, 1993: 44. The notion of “development”, of the primitive and the modern, of timeless peoples and historical, i.e. agentful, self-
conscious and self-modifying peoples, is, of course, still very much current in the imagination of even, indeed especially, educated people. It 
is a pertinacious kind of mythology, the basis of which are certain suppositions about agency and time and the temporal posture of different 
cultures. It seems that a given culture’s self-conscious identification and constitution of itself in time is determining. It is of great interest 
that in Dionysus come together these very topics of time and its perception, spontaneity, the foreign and consciousness. 
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manageable, anticipative, human, symbolic economies. They cannot be transformed into the 
useful or valuable, cannot be neutralized, negotiated or warded off by human ingenuity120. 
Chaos is the unbearable absence of the agency, which co-ordinates reality meaningfully. The 
Pre-Socratic scientist’s ordering of causes and discriminating of principles is a good example 
of how humans will either discern agents that shape phenomena or become the agents 
themselves discriminating chains of causation, taken to account for nature’s “happenings”. 
 
Life is experienced as a stream of perceptions, as their recalling (or virtual re-experiencing) 
in memory and as their analysis and aggregation in communicable (shareable) concept.  In 
communication between subjects there emerges a third order, outside of any particular 
individual, independent of any one human subject. There is a kind of collective, virtual 
subject, the collective perspective on things (also shifting in time but less perceptibly, more 
geologically, than the individual human’s perspective), that we may call a culture. A culture 
is an instituting, the institution of objectivity, a trans-subjective perspective as an outlook on 
objective reality.  
 
This is not only apparently objective; culture is real. It does subsist independently of 
individuals, even if paradoxically it can only be activated, through the life of biologically 
vital human beings, which are also discrete creatures. Culture – the forms of life in Bacchae 
designated as paradochai, nomoi, orgia, praxeis, mythoi, synthetoi logoi121 – subsists outside of 
individual minds. It is constituted through the inter-subjective community that survives 
time and process. It is not thnēton, mortal, in the way that human bodies are. It is the set of 
practices and artefacts in common between social subjects. This is objectivity in that sense of 
the anthropology of ritual of Maurice Bloch122. That which is communicable is that which, by 
definition, has been redeemed from the flux of perception and the idiotic (in the sense of 
privately individual, purely self-involved) subjective experience of time. It has been made 
common, subsistent in a virtual order between, and not only within, discrete social actors. 
 
Guthrie argues (drawing on a variety of other scholars in various fields and adducing much 
evidence for his contention about the ubiquity, also among modern “non-primitive” people, 
of his purported anthropomorphizing reflex)123, that humans habitually detect agency in 
                                                        
120 On the ordering of experience and the imagined earlier indistinctness of things, before humans were supposedly endowed with the full 
faculty of mind by the great philanthrope, Prometheus, see Aesch. PV 441-50. With that origins-speech in mind, should we perhaps read that 
other great homage to the agency of the human mind in Sophocles at Soph. Ant.332-75.  
121 Paradochai 201; nomoi 484, nomimon 895, 1009; orgia 34, 79, 262, 470, 471, 476, 482, 998, 1080; sunthetos logos 297: συνθέντες 
λόγον. 
122 As argued in Bloch, 1992: Prey into Hunter: the politics of religious experience. 
123 See also Gell, 1998: chp. 7 “The distributed person”, 96-154, esp. 121-37. For a critical evaluation of Guthrie’s work see, Saler in 
Stausberg [ed.], 2009: 39-52. 
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phenomena. This is the effect of that survival strategy, by which humans and other 
organisms, caught in the struggle for survival, prepare themselves for the most dangerous 
contingencies in their context in order to best preserve themselves. Humans bet on agency 
behind effects, not mere random causes, but motivated and therefore more dangerous 
causes. The more “complexly organized” a form of danger, the more agentful – the more 
relevant it must be to a subject’s assessment of its environment – the dangers to itself that 
are present. This reflex animism, a “deep biological design trick”, in the words of one 
prominent biologist, serves as the primary means for organizing and analysing experience 
for survival in the constantly shifting circumstances of time124.  
 
Guthrie’s is a very Kadmean account of the origins of gods. For Kadmos too employs a 
rudimentary “game theory” in his approach to Dionysiac rites and Dionysus’ identity. 
Guthrie argues on a principle of struggle for survival and evolutionary imperatives for 
preservation. In his argument agency amounts to survival, continuance; an agent is an 
existent person of some kind, mortal or divine. This is agency expurgated of its ethical, 
volitional or psychological contents. Yet human belief in divine persons and interaction with 
co-present persons is much more complex that this picture comes near to suggesting. It is far 
less rational or calculating. Survival is very important to human beings but only a necessary 
condition, it seems, insufficient for what they consider a most desirable existence. Survival 
strategy and calculating profitable alternatives does not begin to exhaust human religious 
behaviour. The opportunism and pragmatism of Kadmos, the great survivor who loses 
everything, is just the problem in Bacchae. Affective qualities of relation, bearing, 
                                                        
124 Guthrie, 1993: 44-5. Cf. Dennett, 1991: 32, “Originally, to say that something was ‘animate’ as opposed to ‘inanimate’ was to say that it 
has a soul (anima in Latin). It may be more than just comforting to think of the things that affect us as powerfully animate; it may be a deep 
biological design trick, a shortcut for helping our time-pressured brains organize and think about the things that need thinking if we are to 
survive.” On the notion that humans “animate” to understand in terms of most complex forms of organization and that this is the basis for 
the near-universal discernment of divine agencies behind phenomena and events, compare Burkert 1996: 26-7 and Luhmann’s conception of 
religion as simplification, “reduction of complexity, in Luhmann, 1977. Tracing highest orders of organization may, it can be said, be the 
most effective way of simplifying a reality so radically “underdetermined and always coming into being”. Burkert wrote, “By a process of 
reduction, religion provides orientation within a meaningful cosmos for those who feel helpless vis-à-vis infinite complexity . . . One way to 
effect a radical reduction of complexity is to devise a dualistic system, positing containers into which to place any new phenomenon or 
experience.”, Burkert 1996: 26. Yet Dionysus is the god for whom none of the “containers” that humans have at their disposal is sufficient. 
Even the human being in the tragic container is a broken container, sathros, and overflowing from koros, surfeit and hubris, excess. The 
functional explanation of Guthrie, Burkert and Luhmann is ultimately unsatisfactory, seeming sometimes to ascribe to “religion” their own 
(scientist) desire or need to account for a diversity of strange phenomena by “reducing their complexity” to a functional imperative, which 
essentially transposes agency from the human subject or divine subject to the invisible “subject” of evolutionary change or “Biology”. 
Persons reify to make sense of things but in their actions and interactions in the flow of everyday life, in which they all live, they are the 
knowledgeable agents of an articulable order and perpetually unfolding predicament. Giddens is excellent on this complicated but 
fundamental point. For his response to functionalism (then dominant in social and cultural studies) see Giddens, 1984: xiii-xxxvii, 293-7 and 
Giddens, 1979 passim. “Structuration” with its sophisticated conceptualization of the subject and agency is his response to structuralism and 
functionalism. On the limits of structuralism and functionalism from an anthropologist’s point of view, see Geertz’ classic essay “Thick 
description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture”, in Geertz, 1973: 3-30.  
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recognition; actions without outlook or apparently useful ends: these are most important to 
Dionysus. Dionysus and his festivals suspend economic life, suspend the transactional 
modality of relating and re-introduce the no less “real” Dionysiac modality of 
transformations – psychological, emotional, social, spiritual, epistemic. Transformation 
displaces transaction and exchange for a time. Kadmos, however, treated Dionysiac 
transformation as another kind of transaction, like one of Guthrie’s game-theorists.125  
 
A prudent survival strategy, a form of evolutionary sōphrosynē, the reflex to detect agency is 
in effect also a translation of the non-human – events and phenomena – and the foreign and 
the new, into the intelligible, predictable terms of the familiar, social world of oikos and 
polis. This may be described, in a sense, as a kind of domesticating tendency, an intellectual 
annexation of nature, time and contingency into the familiar economy of cause and effect and 
of relation. Humans, by this understanding, habitually draw “indoors”, draw into 
controllable channels the flood of time. The nomoi are “inside”, existence defined, distributed 
and divided up: they constitute the familiar environment where humans order experience. 
Beyond the social environment of persons lie danger and anomie. In just such terms Kadmos 
exhorts Pentheus, 331-2:  
 
οἴκει /εθ' ἡ/ῶν, /ὴ θύραζε τῶν νό/ων· 
νῦν γὰρ Fέτηι τε καὶ φρονῶν οὐδὲν φρονεῖς. 
 
House with us, not outdoors of custom [nomoi: laws, definitions]. 
For right now you are aflutter [petēi] and are thinking no thoughts. 
 
The problem is that the horizons of inside and outside are complex and interpenetrant. 
There is an “outside” also within human persons. In the world of nature there seem also to be 
minds. The work described by Freud – wo Es war, soll Ich werden126 – is ongoing and as 
fruitfully aporetic as the Socratic desiring after sophia, which never reaches its goal, being 
itself, this love, a kind of goal. Exactly so does Dionysus want acts – his orgia and teletai – to 
be their own goals, telē, rather than intended elsewhere. Civilization is predicated on 
irrigation and agriculture, the distribution of land and ownership, by border, nemein. 
Humans bring the wild river of phenomena into the carefully planned channels of the 
anthropic kosmos. That is an order for which the house – dōma – with its generation of 
specific and thoroughly human modes of time and sequestered space, may serve usefully as 
model. 
 
                                                        
125 Agency detection in Larson, 2016: 20-1, 75- 9. 
126 Freud, 1933. See § 1.3 n. 36. 
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4.3.3 Underdetermined and Always Coming into Being 
 
The ascription of agency is the attribution of fundamentally human-like social and cognitive 
characteristics. It is the cosmic extension of the “theory of mind”. Humans habitually order 
experience and invest it with meaning, which is to say they assign symbolic value and 
therefore further relatability to the contents of their experience. When something has a 
symbolic value, it has a social relation to the attributor and that is another way of saying that 
it is drawn into the syntax of cause and effect, of social agency. Experiencing and detecting 
agency is the main feature of human self-understanding and the understanding of others. 
Humans do constantly “theorize” (Dennett); they are (all competent social actors) always also 
“dazzling, expert sociologists” (Giddens). We may say this of them observing their skilled 
and continuous study, construal and anticipation of others, the meaning of their fellows’ 
postures, gestures, talk and intentions. One way or another, human subjects (and this is pre-
eminently the case in the theatre of Dionysus, the god of unrecognized motivations and 
deranged intelligence) are striving continuously to make experience and the objects of 
perception intelligible. 
 
The phenomena of experience are “underdetermined and always coming into being”. 
Interpretation is, thus, necessarily continuous. It expresses human needs and interests. 
Because of this indeterminacy or contingency inherent in phenomena, and because of the 
fact that interpretation always entails human perspective and concern, the human 
interpreter, according to Guthrie and others, rather overestimates dangers; it exaggerates and 
magnifies the agency that it posits to be standing behind effects127. The underdetermination of 
nature and events requires a commensurate over-anticipation from humans. Coping with 
effects at hand and preparing for future effects and unidentified causes, it anticipates 
highest risks. It prudently expects the greatest perils, which will be the most “complexly 
organized” sources of causation. That is human-like agency, providing a never subdued 
threat of dolos. 
 
Humans may, like all animals, have aggressive instincts but they are set apart from all 
animals in the intensity with which they modulate, attenuate, mediate, communicate, 
sublimate, institute, articulate and deliberate upon their instincts, their desires, their primary 
cause or motivation, archē, at any given time. The notion that “hexis reposes on boulēsis” 
paints a misleadingly static picture. In human beings there is no reposure, no determining 
ground on which all other parts stand or from which they issue. Instead, human 
                                                        
127 Guthrie’s is, as he puts it, a “game theory” account of religious motivation –  perhaps the natural theory of religion for the Reagan era and 
the Cold War world. 
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consciousness and unconsciousness is as subject to the constant becoming and 
underdetermination of all reality. It is precisely their radical temporality and the fact that 
they can take perspective on this temporality, the transience of themselves that means non-
habitual acts are always possible, desires can change, thoughts can become the desire for 
something other than one’s apparently spontaneous, immanent desires. The self is a virtual 
audience on its acts, the acts and the feelings motivating acts and motivating the wish for 
certain kinds of motivations. 
 
Humans are creatures of concern. Critical for them is the meaning of their acts and those of 
their always socially, cognitively parsed others. The predominant “instinct” amongst human 
beings, the master impulse into which all others are subsumed, to which all others are 
continually suborned, is the social instinct. Biological drives are not somehow prior to this, 
not in some way more real or concrete. We may go so far as to say that the need for 
recognition, of a socially satisfying order of mutuality has been far more important to people 
in human history than any drive for more concrete, material forms of satisfaction128.  
 
As difficult and vexatious (and satisfying) as life with others can be, still humans 
everywhere, nearly always entangle themselves in a world of others (a cynic like Diogenes is 
the predecessor, a kind of typology, of that Abba Matoes quoted above, who turns away 
from the world) 129. Troublingly violent and destructive as human history appears to us, it 
would be hard to try denying that human life is nearly entirely a story of the undiminishable 
drive to and difficulty of accomplishing common life with others – both virtual and 
physically co-present. Humans are so constituted that of course “social world” need not 
mean a real world of human co-presents. The monk in the desert really is in the society of 
                                                        
128 An example, amongst countless, from recent history: Recent Nuclear negotiations with Iran, where the foreign minister and lead 
negotiator for Iran Javad Zarif, repeatedly and emphatically explained that for Iran the nuclear programme, for which they had suffered 
years of isolation and disabling economic sanctions, was primarily a question of their timē, “dignity”, how they may think of themselves 
because how seen by others. Whether his assertion is true or not, what is most telling is that he thinks, or thinks that we think that “dignity” 
is a perfectly intelligible motivation. For the Russians a tyrant like Putin, although their economy has shrunk and their currency violently 
devalued on account of his polices, is a hero. This is not because they are irrational, but because self-interest as that is felt to be by humans 
is far more complex than is subsumed in the liberal logic of economic prosperity and social security. Those who think they have the upper 
hand (Pentheus, the West very often) think that practical “things” are at stake that can be solved technically. Those who feel snubbed 
(Dionysus, Iran) know the primary place of affect. 
129 “L’enfer, c’est l’autre” as a protagonist, in that very Greek 20th C. drama of Sartre’s Huis Clos, puts it. For a truly profound reflection on 
l’autre and l’alterité see the work of Emmanuel Levinas. His discussion of presence and the face of the other may be fruitful for a strong 
reading of Bacchae and its masked god who comes to reclaim face, see esp. Levinas, 1972, 1974. Henrichs puts the idea of “the other” in 
interpretations of Dionysus in its historical place, in his essay in in Masks: 34 n. 54 “Like Gernet, Vernant derives his notion of the Other 
rather casually from the Platonic categories of tāutón and to heteron. In current usage, however, including Vernant’s own, the Other is a 
decidedly post-Freudian, psychological category rather than a Platonic one. Vernant’s Other invites comparison with Freud’s definition of 
“das Unheimliche” . . . Rudolf Otto’s concept of the sacred as “the entirely Other” (“das ganz andere”), which inspires a special kind of fear 
(cf. Schlesier 1987b); it is less comparable to the self/ other distinctions found in Lacan and Bakhtin.” 
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the god to whom he constantly turns his mind, heart and words. The scholar in her or his 
library, deeply engaged with long dead authors and obviously fictional beings, is not 
outside of real socializing. Sociality has always the fictive, imaginative dimension which is 
only more apparent in those examples. That it is the case that people are so ultrasocial is 
attested to by the ubiquitous theme of love (in all its forms and permutations) across so 
many cultural expressions: forms of love, the binding and being bound to others, is the 
essentially social theme of a great deal of art and religion. This is the paradox from which 
issue the tragic and comic situations of so much poetry and of Greek drama most patently. 
Humans both seek ot and flee from the ultra-intense sociality of human homilia. 
 
 
4.3.4 Wagering on divinity: si vous perdez, vous ne perdez rien 
 
If perception is interpretation, that is so because in it there inheres always a certain measure 
of ambiguity. An explanation is always a kind of gamble. From one understanding, the 
objective of human endeavour, the perceptual and cognitive strategy that best assures 
human survival, is a bet in which one loses least but has most to gain. For Guthrie, 
 
Perception is active inference, a mostly unconscious process of hypothesizing the 
causes of a given sensation or cluster of sensations. Stated this way, “interpretation” 
and “explanation” become closely related enterprises130. Since multiple interpretations 
are possible, our choice of interpretations constitutes a guess. As the art historian 
Ernst Gombrich puts it, perception is betting.131 
In the detailed and exhaustive work in which he lays out his thesis, Guthrie evokes Pascal’s 
wager more than once132. For Pascal, famously, one ought to bet on the existence of god, 
without hesitation, because it is a bet which to lose means already to be lost (since 
unredeemable), but to win is to gain everything (an eternal and perfect relation with the 
highest and most perfect person): 
                                                        
130 For a very important discussion of the hermeneutic relation of interpretation and explanation, their non mutual-exclusion, of great 
relevance to the student of Greek Religion considering the functionalism of Burkert, who has been so much the dominant scholar of his 
generation, see Lawson and McCauley, 1990, especially pp. 12-31. 
131 Guthrie, 1993: 42.  
132 Guthrie, 1993: 4, 6, 45. 
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Pesons le gain & la perte en prenant le parti de croire que Dieu est. Si vous gagnez, 
vous gagnez tout; si vous perdez, vous ne perdez rien. Pariez donc qu’il est sans 
hésiter.133 
Humans typically bet on agency and on highest orders of significance, to account for the 
events they perceive134. Inherent in perception is ambiguity, the uncertainty which is the 
unavoidable consequence of the fact of human subjectivity, of perspective which is always 
perspective in and of a world undetermined and in constant flux. The radical condition of 
perspective is the ceaseless flow of temporal existence. The wager on god, that paragon of 
agentfulness, may be viewed, as Guthrie does, as a transposing of the reflex wagering that is 
the stratagem of humans in the natural and social world in which they find themselves. 
Projecting divine beings is “a simple form of game theory”: 
 
If perception requires choosing among interpretations and therefore requires betting, 
and if the payoff is discovering significance, then the first bets to cover – those with the 
biggest payoff – are bets as high on the scale of organization as possible. The 
discoveries of order they yield are those we most need . . . The strategy for 
discovering these patterns is, again, that of Pascal’s wager, namely, guessing high. 
Pascal’s version is that in the face of unresolvable uncertainty as to whether God 
exists, one should bet He does, since the gain if one is right outweighs the loss if one 
is wrong. The principle is the same in betting something is alive. This strategy also 
resembles the one supposedly once recommended to an aspiring youth: When 
opportunity knocks, jump. “But how do you know when opportunity’s knocking?” 
asks the young man. “Just keep jumping,” is the reply.135  
 
Dionysus, however, and this is crucial, requires more than cunning strategy from mortals. It 
is not good enough to carry a thyrsos and just keep jumping. Strategy and the politick 
wager, the diplomatic reception and only tactical Gastfreundschaft will prove inadequate. For 
Dionysus is a god, for all his superficial similarities to a masterful person like Odysseus (the 
wanderer to the cities of men, the unrecognized homecomer, who takes revenge on those 
who deny his existence, who have not recognized his political and social prerogatives, his 
identity as king), is a figure much more akin to that Achilles who longs for authentic, 
emotional, affective relations and abhors transactional ones. Achilles as an incorporeal 
shadow, a disembodied mind in Hades, longs for the existence of corporeal sensation, even 
                                                        
133 Pascal, 1671: §54. He puts forward his famous wager at §§ 54-6. 
134 Guthrie, 1993: 47-8 “Animism, then, results from a simple form of game theory employed by animals ranging at least from frogs to 
people: the best bets are the highest, because those have the highest payoffs and lowest risks.”  
135 Guthrie, 1993: 45-6, my emphasis. 
 261 
the humblest life in the light under the sun, longs so pathetically for that very embodiment 
and sensuousness, which is the distinct mark of Dionysus, his festivals and gifts. The 
difference between Achilles and Dionysus is that the Achilles of the Odyssean Nekuia is a 
fluttering mind that has not the power to become embodied. Dionysus takes any form he 
wishes and penetrates the sublunary world of embodiment at will136. 
 
Navigating the social world of mortals and immortals in Greek Tragedy, as in the political 
context of human life generally, consists to some degree in taking care not to be taken in, in 
establishing strategies for clarification and verification and in remaining alert to the threat of 
falsification, kibdēleuein. Social others, recognisable as like self, nurse plans, disguise their 
ambitions and belie or exaggerate the reach of their agency. On a certain level, gods (in their 
also social world) and humans deploy lures – doloi – they bait and catch one another out, 
they mask and disguise their stratagems, and act so as not themselves to be caught out. 
Agency, like Heraclitus’ physis, “likes to conceal itself”137. This is not an argument that all 
interactions are false or that human persons are always deceiving one another and on the 
lookout, only that there is a very consequential potential underlying social experience, viz. 
the ambiguity inherent in the interpreted character of experience.  
 
The danger of falsification is inherent in all interactions. This is, furthermore, a complex or 
multifold danger, for the human world is not one, as we may have given the impression, of 
largely deliberate acts and weighed-up decisions. Rather, it is a shadowy context in which 
agents tend not only to overestimate the danger of others, but to overestimate themselves, 
their own reach and range and autonomy. When they are most manipulating, they are often 
most manipulated by some mute part of themselves, some desire unaccounted for or 
unacknowledged. This is the tragic dimension of agency detection unaccounted for by 
Guthrie’s theory and its too logical or pragmatic terms. The danger of falsification incurred 
in social life is one incurred in the life of the individual too, in the society of the self. The 
great entanglement of baiters being baited and roles being reversed in turn, is the very 
inextricable predicament dramatized in Attic Tragedy. 
 
 
  
                                                        
136 Achilles’ an intangible phantom that longs for embodiment, even if as the lowest slave, rather than to be the king of the realm of shades: 
Hom. Od. 11. 488-91. 
137 Heraclitus fr. 123 <φύσις> δὲ καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον <κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ>. See also § 5.5.3 n. 158. For an exhaustive discussion of this 
fragment and seven possible translations of its only three words, see Hadot, 2004. 
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4.3.5 The Precipitative Context of Drama 
 
Bacchae is a work in which being saved, freed and released by Dionysiac will and by 
Dionysiac dark arts, technais emais, the denied god’s super-natural agency, is set against the 
failure of human will and its prosthetic extensions, technology. “The daimōn will release me 
himself, whenever I wish”, Dionysus – Lysios – had warned Pentheus138. Pentheus is a man 
entangled with an inscrutable figure139. Dionysus is inscrutable but not an unknowable or 
unintelligible figure. His is an ethical inscrutability, he is not subject to the same critical 
assessment we make of human persons. Nevertheless, he makes himself known in the shape 
most easy for humans to interact with and he explains his motivations in the most perfectly 
intelligible human terms: a duty to family honour, a sense of personal outrage at not being 
recognized, a desire for an acceptable kind of relation with others, one commensurate with 
his identity.  
 
This figure is in Thebes, in the deep irony of the work, to make himself known as a god, but 
to do this comes seen and revealed precisely in the form and even with the “nature of a 
man”140. The inscrutability of divinity and the opacity of the gods’ plans and intentions on the 
one hand and on the other, the blindness of humans and their failure to see (and not only 
read or misread), their being always constrained to interpret what stands before them, is a 
constant feature of tragic situations. This is the quite exact configuration of protagonists we 
have found from the very outset in Bacchae. 
 
More generally speaking, the opaqueness of others is a most fundamental problem and 
challenge in the human social world and consequently of the Greek poetic imagination and 
Greek Drama, the product and reproducer, by inspiration or instinct, of a contemporary 
social world and not simply of eternal verities. The world of Greek Tragedy is a causal 
milieu,141 in which precisely such mundane human difficulties as typically (seemingly 
                                                        
138 λύςει µ’ ὁ δαίµων αὐτός, ὅταν ἐγὼ θέλω, 498. Cf. Hom. Hym. 7. 12, where the Tyrrhenian pirates had ‘wanted to’ (ethelon) bind with 
painful bonds’ Dionysus, καὶ δεσµοῖς ἔθελον δεῖν ἀργαλέοισι. On the liberation theme with Dionysus, see Seaford on 497-8. On 
‘demonisme’ in Euripides see Rivier in Euripide – Entretiens sur l’Antiquité Classique de la Fondation Hardt: Tome VI, 1960: 43-86. 
139 ἀπόρωι γε τῶιδε συµπεπλέγµεθα ξένωι, 800. See p. 92 n. 206 and p. 125. 
140 54: µορφήν τ’ ἐµὴν µετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν. 
141 Precipitating Context: Oranje cites Beckerman’s Dynamics of Drama: Theory and Method of Analysis (New York, 1970) in Oranje 1984: 
55 ft. 139: “The action of a play is divided into dramatic segments. A dramatic segment is described by Beckerman (56 ff.) as an organic 
unity, i.e. a unity defined by activity, to which there is a ‘precipitating context’ and whose action follows a curve of ‘becoming, crux, 
decrescence’. The actions of the characters within a dramatic segment are directed towards a goal, something which does not yet exist, and 
which must be brought into existence. Beckerman calls this a project: ‘the project is the concrete focal point of a character’s energy, and it is 
the project that the performer enacts’ (71).”.This will be a useful vocabulary for a social anthropology of Greek Tragedy, defined by its 
always still invisible goals. Acts are the context of further acts and persons are always precipitative and precipitated, directed towards a telos 
which they will come to recognize other than they may have expected, elpizein. Elpides are the Promethean recompense for ignorance of the 
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universally) preoccupy mortals are central: the impermanence of happiness; the insecurity of 
life; the fleeting nature of beauty, youth and health; the imbalance in social relationships; the 
misunderstandings and asymmetry between women and men; the contingency 
unforeseeably shaping things; the great difficulty of binding and holding together the 
diverse perspectives of individuals for a common social good; the destructive temptations of 
money and power; and the great danger that the excessiveness of desire and lust and energy 
–  the super-abundant vitality of humans – represents for their relations with one other.  
 
The opaqueness of others – mortals in one’s vicinity and immortals who intervene 
unannounced into one’s vicinity – this finds its corollary in the undiscerned nature of 
circumstances and their manner of hanging together, in the impenetrable contingency of 
things, how they chance to be – kinduneuein, tuchein. Pre-eminent here is the challenge of 
binding minds together. This, simply put, is what that great polis project is: to collectivize, to 
bind together oikē, households. Theseus founded Athens because he instituted a synoecist 
identity, bringing diverse groups together by identifying them as parts of what was to be 
imagined as having formed a whole. It is to unite and hold together persons, the house as 
person, the individual as person, and the group of houses, kōmai, villages (in Sparta) and the 
dēmoi, townships (of Attica), and to knit together the atomic bodies that comprise their 
respective phylai, tribes142.  
 
The task of the polis is to endure, to uphold or conserve itself, which means to sustain a 
centripetal impetus and hold off the constant threat of entropy. It holds together, i.e. is a 
“binding together” of houses: ξυνέχει δώ/ατα·, 392, 1308-9. The work of the city – a never 
consummated existential labour – is to integrate the insides of the house and the insides of 
each mind into a common, public “consubjective” whole. This is a complex, never finished 
work of Pflegen. Euripides suggests that this survival depends not simply on pragmatic 
strategies of survival but, in a prior way, on an ethical quality of recognition, co-habitation 
and a higher kind of existence. Existence is something more substantial than mere 
subsistence. Demeter and the gift of bread may be necessary, but the quality of emotion and 
relation marked by Dionysus, god of wine, provides the sufficient condition for a good life, 
for eudaimonia143. 
 
                                                        
day of death, i.e. the unclosed character of human existence, its underdetermination (and the elpides are correspondingly ‘blind’, tuphlai) 
and continuous coming into being, cf. Aesch. PD 248-50. 
142 On the civic dimensions of the dramatic festival of Dionysus, see Goldhill, 1990, 1997; Cartledge, 1997; Easterling, 1997. On Athenian 
religion as “polis religion” see Sourvinou-Inwood in Buxton [ed.], 2000: 13-55 and for Tragedy and “polis religion”, see Sourvinou-Inwood, 
2003. For a recent re-appraisal of the notion of “polis religion” see Kindt, 2012: 12-35. 
143 Demeter, counterpart – antipalos – of Dionysus: 274-85. 
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Persons are, by nature, mutually regarding, self-reflexive, mutually interpreting, constantly 
monitoring, contentious, jealous, deceptive, competitive and alternately vigilant and careless 
kinds of actors, who are typically not duly self-monitoring. Perhaps what finally saves them 
and their cities from falling apart is the feeling of being under the surveillance of persons 
with a privileged perspective, whose monitoring of the human scene serves as an 
indispensable check, 386-94: 
 
ἀχαλίνων στο/άτων 
ἀνό/ου τ' ἀφροσύνας 
τὸ τέλος δυστυχία· 
ὁ δὲ τᾶς ἡσυχίας 
βίοτος καὶ τὸ φρονεῖν 
ἀσάλευτόν τε /ένει καὶ   
ξυνέχει δώ/ατα· Fόρσω 
γὰρ ὅ/ως αἰθέρα ναίον- 
 τες ὁρῶσιν τὰ βροτῶν οὐρανίδαι. 
 
Of unchecked mouths 
And mindless lawlessness 
The telos is misfortune. 
The life of tranquility and the mind 
Unshaken endures and holds together 
Houses, for although far off 
Dwelling in the aithēr, the sky gods 
See what mortals do. 
 
Humans construe persons and even objects, apparent non-persons, as agentful. They invest 
phenomena with the minimal conditions for a relatability, thus for social interaction and 
assimilation. A perceptual reflex that becomes a congenital cognitive strategy, this 
investment of non-human phenomena with the primary characteristics of human actors – 
intelligibility, interpretability, communicability – serves to bring order to experience144. 
Natural anthropocentrics145, humans are marked by what Michael Tomasello has recently 
called “ultra-sociality”146. In the ultra-social context in which they live their lives, which they 
                                                        
144 On the intelligible (“thick”) description see Geertz’ classic, 1973, The Interpretation of Cultures. From a philologist’s point of view, 
taking the Geertzian premise of the intolerability for humans of disorder, see Gould’s fine essay “On making sense of Greek Religion” in 
Gould, 2001: 203-34. 
145 For we seek to relate things, events, others to ourselves and the only way we can do that is by drawing them into a symbolic, social 
world, which is necessarily a human world. 
146 Tomasello, 2014. 
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constitute, humans are oriented always towards one another, towards other social agents147. 
Concealed, dissimulated, masked, the cognitive nature of human agency incurs a special 
problem for the social world constituted by intersubjective agents. It entails ambiguity, the 
problems of securing clarification, verification and authentication.  
 
 
4.3.6 Morphēn d’ameipsas: Metamorphosis and Strategizing for Unpredictability 
 
σὲ γὰρ αὐτὴν Fαντὶ ἐΐσκεις 
For you liken yourself to everything.148  
 
Dionysus has come to reveal, to assert and demonstrate the truth of his paternity, his 
defining relation. He has arrived to expose an undetected circumstance, a hidden, disputed 
fact. The disguised god is quite emphatic that this is his mission; this is his motive and the 
precipitating cause for the subsequent action. He has come to redress a problem of 
knowledge, which is also a problem of acknowledgement. His visit to Thebes, the first city 
in Greece he has come to, is for him above all a deixis, a demonstration, as he puts it in his 
frank and revealing prologue, an autobiographical sketch, 47-50149: 
 
ὧν οὕνεκ' αὐτῶι θεὸς γεγὼς ἐνδείξο/αι 
Fᾶσίν τε Θηβαίοισιν. ἐς δ' ἄλλην χθόνα, 
τἀνθένδε θέ/ενος εὖ, /εταστήσω Fόδα, 
δεικνὺς ἐ/αυτόν· 
 
On account of which, to him and to all Thebes, I shall demonstrate  
That I was born a god. Then into another country, 
Once I have set things aright here, shall I shift, 
Having shown myself. 
 
His bacchants threaten to be brought out of the mountain by force by “the city of the 
Thebans”, Thēbaiōn polis, 50. Should this occur Dionysus is here to lead the raving women as 
                                                        
147 On the constitutive, not merely reflective, character of language acts, see Taylor 2016. On the complex nature of society’s ongoing 
“constitution” by knowledgeable, agentful, social subjects, see Giddens, 1984: The Constitution of Society: outline of the theory of 
structuration.  
148 Odysseus to Athena. See Hom. Od. 13. 312-3: ἀργαλέον σε, θεά, γνῶναι βροτῷ ἀντιάσαντι/ καὶ µάλ’ ἐπισταµένῳ· σὲ γὰρ αὐτὴν παντὶ 
ἐΐσκεις.: “It is hard to recognize you, goddess, for a mortal standing opposite you, even if he is very clever, for you liken yourself to all 
things.” 
149 On this “deceptive prologue”, for a discussion of how not everything promised is realized and the significance of this, see Thumiger, 
2007: 182-3 nn. 76 & 77. 
 266 
their “general”, stratēlatōn, 52. For this reason he has done what is characteristic of Greek 
divinities – he has altered his own form, whatever that is, for “mortal aspect”. We are none 
the wiser what the god’s prior or original “form” might have been; all we can be sure of is 
that it was a form (he has “altered/swopped” and “changed” it after all), which contained 
this speaking identity. The unchanged element of this being, which is identical irrespective 
of the outward, bodily form, is telling us that it is called Dionysus and that it has the 
capacity to take different forms. It is telling us, furthermore, that its identity is the most 
crucially important question to itself. Its identity does not depend on its outward shape; it is 
an interior or somehow invisible property, which binds the current form to whatever its past 
forms have been. The god goes on to explain that it has gone so far as to exchange its 
“shape”, morphēn, for the “nature”, phusin, of a man 54-5: 
 
              ὧν οὕνεκ' εἶδος θνητὸν ἀλλάξας ἔχω 
 /ορφήν τ' ἐ/ὴν /ετέβαλον εἰς ἀνδρὸς φύσιν. 
 
That is why I have transformed and taken mortal aspect 
And changed my own shape into the nature of a man.150 
 
The point of his disguise, this metamorphosis that gives him mortal appearance and a 
“man’s nature”, is lent very strong emphasis. In fact, he has already made the point in the 
opening lines of the work, where he had announced, 4-5: 
 
/ορφὴν δ' ἀ/είψας ἐκ θεοῦ βροτησίαν 
Fάρει/ι ∆ίρκης νά/αθ' Ἱσ/ηνοῦ θ' ὕδωρ. 
 
I changed from a god’s into the shape of a mortal 
Here I am by the streams of Dirkē, by Ismēnos’ fluid. 
 
“Born a god”, “being divine”, θεὸς γεγὼς at 47, or simply γεγὼς, “having become” i.e. 
“being”, is a phrase or term that will have an ever higher density and richer texture over the 
course of the work151. Dionysus is born a god, he is a god: being in the Greek is “having 
become”, as being present is “having come”, hēkō, 1. In some of his last words as he stands 
revealed on the theologeion (the upper rostrum of the stage-set typically reserved for divine 
or non-human speakers), he explains again that “although having been born a god”, he has 
been “violated”, “deprecated” – hubrizomēn – by the Kadmeians, καὶ γὰρ Fρὸς ὑ/ῶν θεὸς 
                                                        
150 As nomoi and patrious paradochas were presumably “contemporary references”, so is physis here likely so too. See § 3.3.3 n. 61. 
151 See Conacher, 1967: 73 on the way that terms accrue meanings over the course of a Euripidean work. 
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γεγὼς ὑβριζό/ην, 1347. He has been explaining and prophesying to Kadmos, making clear 
again what it is that he is, a son of no mortal father, 1340-1152: 
 
ταῦτ' οὐχὶ θνητοῦ Fατρὸς ἐκγεγὼς λέγω 
∆ιόνυσος ἀλλὰ Ζηνός·  
 
This, not as one born of a mortal father, do I speak 
But as Dionysus son of Zeus. 
 
“As a god”, emphatically is he known amongst his worshippers. Pentheus and his family, 
like the raving Theban women, is a “birther”, denying the legitimacy of Dionysus, denying 
his nativity and birthright. By contrast, even when in the form of matter (and thus we may 
reasonably expect, also when “in” the form of objects such as masks or idols). The bacchants 
identify him as one born of Zeus, having the status and identity of a god: he is a divine 
presence. So “being (born, come about) a god” he is poured, preaches Teiresias, 284-85: 
 
οὗτος θεοῖσι σFένδεται θεὸς γεγώς, 
ὥστε διὰ τοῦτον τἀγάθ' ἀνθρώFους ἔχειν. 
 
He, born a god to gods is poured, 
So that through him humans acquire what is good. 
 
What Dionysus is, how he came into existence, is the fulcrum on which the balance of the 
action of this drama turns, certainly from his point of view. He comes to show himself and 
what he is, which is to say how he “came into being” became, so to speak, “manifestable”153. 
And yet what he is is emphatically belied, is disguised and reshaped by this transformation 
he has contrived. He comes unrecognizable to punish a non-recognition. Morphē, shape and 
shape-shifting, is both the evidence that this is a divine being and its manner of concealing 
its divine identity: at once revelation and dissimulation, giving knowledge and complicating 
it. Recognition is the primary problem here. And what must the protagonists recognize, 
what can they infer? It is certainly not something immediately “evident”; instead they must 
penetrate the evident and discover nóos, the “god-shaped mind”, the divine intention behind 
the practices, forms and feelings that Dionysus brings into the city with him.  
                                                        
152 Cf. 367-9, where it is an important issue for Teiresias in what capacity, from what identity, he is saying what he is saying: Πενθεὺς δ' 
ὅπως µὴ πένθος εἰσοίσει δόµοις / τοῖς σοῖσι, Κάδµε· µαντικῆι µὲν οὐ λέγω, / τοῖς πράγµασιν δέ· µῶρα γὰρ µῶρος λέγει. Speaking without 
need for interpretation, straight ‘from the heart’, ‘clearly’ (τἀπὸ καρδίας σαφῶς) without ulterior motives or dissembled pretexts is a motif in 
Bacchae as it is in Iphigenia at Aulis (see Menelaus’ sincere captation benevolentiae at Eur. IA 471-503, e.g. 475-6 ἦ µὴν ἐρεῖν σοι τἀπὸ 
καρδίας σαφῶς / καὶ µὴ 'πίτηδες µηδέν, ἀλλ' ὅσον φρονῶ. 
153 See 22, 42, 47, 50. Cf. 1200, for Agauē’s gruesome “showing” of Pentheus. Phanera “the manifest”:  501, 992, 1006, 1011, 1099. 
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4.3.7 Krubdēn mēd’ anaphanda: Concealed, not Manifestly154 
 
Gould, as we have seen, argued that one could not “follow home” the protagonists of drama 
even, of course, Shakespearean and 20th Century drama despite its premium on an intimacy 
and detailed, individuated characterization and promise of individual depth not found in 
Greek drama155. In Bacchae the chief character, to exploit Gould’s notion for a sense not quite 
as he intended, has in fact come home. Dionysus, like other famous figures of Greek poetry – 
Odysseus, Orestes, Oedipus – has come home unrecognized and the problem of the play is a 
web of concealment and revelation. Identity, recognition and deception and all their 
implications for the nature of personhood per se are the constant interest of Greek poets. 
 
The religious procedures for relating to gods (here we should hear the root sense of the term 
religiosum “re-binding”), recapitulate the communicative procedures between human social 
actors in everyday life. They transpose the same strategies for the divining of motives in the 
human social world, by which communication is ever possible156, to the social relations with 
divine persons. Recognition and failure to recognize identities, to detect the nature of an 
interlocutor’s agency, the fullness of his or her personhood is not merely a social error but 
represents an existential threat. That is a lesson the Kadmeians would learn too late in 
Bacchae. The lesson is that existence is not something separable from the social entanglement 
with others. That is existence – its contents are relations. There is never anything mere about 
social relations. The quality of relation between persons and between individuals and their 
own selves is not a peripheral or even secondary issue – the quality or bearing of persons is 
of absolutely determining importance.  
 
Although born to the House of Kadmos, Dionysus is “excessively harsh” – ἀλλ' ἐFεξέρχηι 
λίαν, 1346 – and destroys the house, laments Kadmos: Βρό/ιος ἄναξ ἀFώλεσ' οἰκεῖος 
γεγώς, 1250. In the high pathos of Kadmos’ apostrophic address to a Pentheus (the person 
having a mind and the capacity to relate, not only the physical body) who is no longer there, 
Kadmos “is become childless of male offspring” ἄτεκνος ἀρσένων Fαίδων γεγὼς, 1305157. 
                                                        
154 The shade of Achilles, a man who did not know how to hide his feelings, is counselling the cunning Odysseus in the Underworld to 
return home “undercover not conspicuously”, see Hom. Od. 11.455-6: κρύβδην, µηδ’ ἀναφανδά, φίλην ἐς πατρίδα γαῖαν/ νῆα κατισχέµεναι, 
ἐπεὶ οὐκέτι πιστὰ γυναιξίν. 
155 Gould, 1978. 
156 See Tomasello, 2010, 2014. 
157 On apostrophe, see § 6.1.2 and cf. the brief theatrical address to a future “Iphigenia”, who too will not be there, in that case entirely 
because of the speaker’s future (the Agamemnon projected by the Agamemnon speaking) self not having known how to be properly loyal, 
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He is bereft of the child “born of his own child” Fαιδὸς ἐξ ἐ/ῆς γεγώς, 1309. The social 
breakdown has been an existential breakdown and has been brought about by the cognitive 
collapse which is both Dionysus’ punishment and also the punishment in itself, which social 
derangements represent for humans. Pentheus himself had addressed his closest kin, who 
“was not there” in another sense and who could not detect that Pentheus was “there”, when 
in the moments before his death he reveals himself, tearing off his disguise and vainly 
struggling to re-establish identities, 1115-24. The play, like all Tragedies, depicts humans in 
the predicament of being subjects amongst other subjects, misprized as objects. 
 
Shifts in appearance are throughout contrasted with the fact of an original and defining 
genesis, or “coming into being” (birth and taking form are repeatedly evoked in the drama). 
Such is it even in the case of the foretold metamorphosis of Kadmos and his wife, Harmonia, 
daughter of a god, Ares, the god of war who himself at some point took mortal shape to 
engender a hybrid of mortal and immortal, 1330-2: 
 
δράκων γενήσηι /εταβαλών, δά/αρ τε σὴ 
ἐκθηριωθεῖσ' ὄφεος ἀλλάξει τύFον, 
ἣν Ἄρεος ἔσχες Ἁρ/ονίαν θνητὸς γεγώς. 
 
Changed, you shall become a serpent, and your wife 
Turned into a beast (ekthēriōtheis’) will change her shape for a snake’s, 
Harmonia, whom you got from Ares when he took mortal form. 
 
Man and god dance around one another in Bacchae. Pentheus does not know how to dance 
or that he dances, but the central parts of the drama are very much social interaction as 
dance. To Pentheus’ mind this is the dance of wrestlers158. To the spectator it is a kind of 
                                                        
not having valued the right values and relations, at Eur. IA 462-4. Cf. Eur. fr. 76 from the Alcmeon in Corinth, performed alongside 
Bacchae: ὁρᾶτε τὸν τύραννον ὡς ἄπαις γέρων/ φεύγει· φρονεῖν δὲ θνητὸν ὄντ’ οὐ χρὴ µέγα. 
158 Wrestlers dancing around one another: Teiresias refers to Dionysus’ moist gift of wine as the counterpart, literally “wrestling opponent”, 
of Demeter the dry, 278-80: ὃς δ’ ἦλθ’ ἔπειτ’, ἀντίπαλον ὁ Σεµέλης γόνος/ βότρυος ὑγρὸν πῶµ’ ηὗρε κἀσηνέγκατο/ θνητοῖς. In the first 
moments of their first meeting, Pentheus mockingly identifies Dionysus as no adversary for the wrestling ring, 455: πλόκαµός τε γάρ σου 
ταναὸς οὐ πάλης ὕπο [cf. Pl. Phdr. 239d.]. At 543 the bacchants in turn call Pentheus not a human but “like bloody giant wrestling against 
the gods”: φόνιον δ’ ὥστε γίγαντ’ ἀντίπαλον θεοῖς. In this light we might also read those memorable words of Pentheus about being 
“entangled with an unmanageable stranger”, 800-1: ἀπόρωι γε τῶιδε συµπεπλέγµεθα ξένωι, / ὃς οὔτε πάσχων οὔτε δρῶν σιγήσεται, where 
aporos has that concrete sense of “finding no affordance”, “no purchase”, see p. 89. Further on palē, wrestling with gods and men, see also § 
4.5. For discourse and argument as wrestling see, e.g. Pl. Phdr. 236c 1, where not long after he will call the atmosphere very Dionysiac and 
himself in a state of dithyrambic inspiration, blurring the lines, even in that peculiar jesting way that was Socrates, between discursive and 
manic, Pl. Phdr. 238d 1-4’ see also Pl. Sym. 215c, where Alcibiades claims of Socrates that he has the same enchanting power as the 
muscial satyr Marsyas, differing from him only in that he achieves the same effect of charm “with simple prose rather than with flutes”, Pl. 
Sym. 215c 6 –d1: σὺ δ' ἐκείνου τοσοῦτον µόνον διαφέρεις, ὅτι ἄνευ ὀργάνων ψιλοῖς λόγοις ταὐτὸν τοῦτο ποιεῖς. The enchanting, slippery 
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snake dance, performed by the charmer Dionysus. The wrestler has a clear telos, to make his 
upright opponent prone, (just as the wine god, to excess, can make mortals prone). The 
dancing of bacchants and of Dionysus seems pointless to Pentheus, movement without 
objective; it is undignified, it is not moving towards the obtainment of any kind of value, as 
he conceives that. Just before the extended “dance” around one another is about to begin, 
the servant has brought in a disguised Dionysus, who calmly maintains his singular 
imposture, 438-40159. 
 
Pentheus will more deeply confirm the picture of a man always taken in by outward aspect. 
He betrays this weakness for appearances and self-revealing deductions when he infers 
lewd motivations in the Stranger. The inference is really a form of weak interpretation, 
revealing his own habitual and feeble grasp of the nature of the relation between real 
intention and apparent or deducible motivation, 453-54: 
 
ἀτὰρ τὸ /ὲν σῶ/' οὐκ ἄ/ορφος εἶ, ξένε, 
ὡς ἐς γυναῖκας, ἐφ' ὅFερ ἐς Θήβας Fάρει· 
 
But, Stranger, in body you are not misshapen (amorphos), 
To women, for which very reason you are here in Thebes. 
 
The operative paradox underlying things here, is that Pentheus should remain open to the 
Stranger, his meaning and motives, xenos, a guest in the city, precisely because he is 
inscrutable, as all people can be (and that, most paradigmatically foreigners, newcomers, 
different and unfamiliar persons but also, sometimes most so, one’s most familiar social 
others). Here the xenos, guest, will turn out to be the xenos, host, the native of the city and 
master of the city, who gives his gifts, wants the citizens’ respect and controls its destiny 
more than this human king ever did. A stranger turns out to be both more alike and more 
opaque than the young king had fathomed and so ever are social actors to one another, more 
alike each other in their care, concerns and motivations and having more depth, more 
hidden recesses and “ethical substance” than they are often ascribed. The tragic context, this 
vicinity and proximity of Dionysus, constitutes a social and ethical predicament: how ought 
mortals to know how to believe; how recognize others and self; how to integrate the new, 
the unfamilar, that which seems dangerous but may be be curative and even redemptive. 
 
                                                        
Socrates – misidentified introducer of new daimones and corrupter of the city’s youth – who causes mortals to revise their notions of what 
their true identity is, is a most Dionysiac figure, even if his mode is discursive, Talk rather than Song. 
159 See § 2.2.5 p. 82 for text and translation of these lines, also p. 363. 
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Pentheus’ interest in the Stranger’s looks reflects both something about Pentheus and about 
all persons: everyone reads their co-present social others, infers the quality of their minds 
and motivations from the apparent character and features of their aspect and doings. 
Interaction rituals are interpretive encounters,160 and this, both banal and fascinating, truism 
of social life is something made evident in Greek Tragedy and in these scenes in Bacchae. 
Pentheus’ interest has been read by scholars as revealing a latent homoeroticism or the 
sarcastic contempt of a puritan in the mould of Ion or Hippolytus. It must, nevertheless, be 
said that the Stranger will quite reasonably stand out for his ephebic attractiveness here, 
without our really needing to impute any too exceptional or deviant psychological condition 
to Pentheus.  
 
The representation of Dionysus has undergone a visible change in the latter half of the 5th 
Century. In vase-painting the image of the god has itself experienced the rejuvenation, 
which his wine usually brings mortals and which Kadmos and Teiresias appear to undergo 
in the first episode161. From about the last quarter of the 5th Century, Dionysus at Athens is no 
longer the bearded Olympian senior of earlier tradition162. This god disguised becomes 
manifest (he is depicted) as a young man. He has an erotic beauty that seems to frustrate any 
too strict notions of gender; he is beardless but a man, his very form representing a temporal 
cusp, kairos, that moment in the life of the body when it can seem the very paragon of 
beauty, 455-9: 
 
Fλόκα/ός τε γάρ σου ταναὸς οὐ Fάλης ὕFο,    
γένυν Fαρ' αὐτὴν κεχυ/ένος, Fόθου Fλέως· 
λευκὴν δὲ χροιὰν ἐκ Fαρασκευῆς ἔχεις, 
οὐχ ἡλίου βολαῖσιν ἀλλ' ὑFὸ σκιᾶς 
τὴν Ἀφροδίτην καλλονῆι θηρώ/ενος. 
 
For your locks are long, not cultivated for wrestling, 
They flow over down your cheeks, full of desire; 
                                                        
160 For Goffman’s definitions of “interaction”, “encounter”, see Goffman, 1959: 15-16 he offers some definitions: “. . . interaction (that is, 
face-to-face interaction) may be roughly defined as the reciprocal influence of individuals upon one another’s actions when in one another’s 
immediate physical presence. An interaction may be defined as all the interaction which occurs throughout any one occasion when a given 
set of individuals are in one another’s continuous presence; the term ‘an encounter’ would do as well.” For his conception of “performance”, 
see § 6.2.2 n. 67.  
161 187-90, e.g., 189-90: ταὔτ’ ἐµοὶ πάσχεις ἄρα·/ κἀγὼ γὰρ ἡβῶ κἀπιχειρήσω χοροῖς. 
162 Carpenter, in Masks: 185 “From his first appearance in art ca. 580 B.C. until the last quarter of the fifth century, the Dionysus of Attic 
vases is a bearded adult, usually fully clothed. Then, around 425, this form is all but replaced by Dionysus the beardless youth, who is 
usually naked (or only partially clothed). The change is first seen in sculpture from the Parthenon, but soon thereafter it appears on vases 
and quickly becomes the dominant form.”, cf. also Diodorus’ remarks on the ‘two forms’ of Dionysus, dimorphon, at Diod. Sic. 4.5.2.8 – 
4.5.3.1 
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And by contrivance you have pale flesh, 
Not for the sun’s beams, but for pursuing  
Attractive Aphrodite in the shadows. 
 
How else ought Pentheus to read this stranger and how intelligible that he infers as he does, 
(his reactions are not entirely, as the entreating Kadmos put it, “outdoors from custom” 
θύραζε τῶν νό/ων, 331). What place could a “man” like this leader of bacchants have in the 
city organized, defended and ruled as it supposedly “must be” by mature men (bearded, no 
longer having the ungendered, sexually almost indistinct bodies, skin and hair that belong 
to children163)?  
 
Much attention, it will be clear, is paid to outward form in Bacchae, to evident, outward 
appearance and hidden intents, concealed meanings. Dionysus exhibits the ease of 
transformation we should associate with gods and certain “god-like” figures, like dios 
Odusseus. Pentheus, on the other hand, exhibits a deadly failure to penetrate disguise, and 
betrays also a clumsiness with his own disguisement164. He remains always excluded from 
the true nature of motivations in others and himself; he relies exclusively on an external 
conception of mind and quality of mind as conforming to types. He is thus easily deceived 
in expecting always deception and pretext. The doubleness of things, the nature of the 
relation between an apparent inside and outside, has eluded him. He has not had the 
versatility, which may have led him to new kinds of relations, emotions and perspectives. 
He is hopelessly caught up in the cosmetic, the façade, politesse, the struggles at the gates 
and in the yard, such struggles for face and status that constitute life lived under the eyes of 
one’s “square-shaped” others165.  
 
Like Dionysus, Pentheus also wishes to accomplish a deixis, an “exposure”. He wants to 
show that Teiresias is a fraud, that the seer has not the depths of knowledge he claims, but is 
                                                        
163 The reason, for example, that in the myths Achilles could be raised as a girl. Gender can be seen itself as a function of time in the 
biological life of the body, which when it walks on four feet is almost indistinguishable in this regard; when it walks on two, is dressed 
distinctly, speaks, has strength and grows hair differently, but when it approaches the phase of “walking on three feet”, old age, it starts to 
become once again, ever less distinct. On Achilles’ childhood as a girl see Scholiast on Homer’s Iliad, xix. 326; Ovid, Metamorphoses 
13.162ff., Pseudo-Apollodorus, Bibliotheca iii. 13. 8, Statius, Achilleid, ii. 167ff.  
164 He is ridiculous in his undercover outfit of a female bacchant at 925-70. His incapacity to dissemble his form is dramatized in his failure 
to find the invisibility amongst the bacchants that he had expected (ὡς ὁρῶιµεν οὐχ ὁρώµενοι 1050); so in his spy’s vantage point he is more 
seen than seeing, 1075-6: ὤφθη δὲ µᾶλλον ἢ κατεῖδε µαινάδας·/ ὅσον γὰρ οὔπω δῆλος ἦν θάσσων ἄνω. At 1115-21 his failure to be 
disguised has led to a moment of terrible anagnōrisis (κακοῦ γὰρ ἐγγὺς ὢν ἐµάνθανεν, 1113) and another ironic failure, this time futilely 
tearing off his ineffective disguise he fails to become recognized, 1115-6: ὁ δὲ µίτραν κόµης ἄπο/ ἔρριψεν, ὥς νιν γνωρίσασα µὴ κτάνοι. 
165319-21: ὁρᾶις; σὺ χαίρεις, ὅταν ἐφεστῶσιν πύλαις/ πολλοί, τὸ Πενθέως δ’ ὄνοµα µεγαλύνηι πόλις·/ κἀκεῖνος, οἶµαι, τέρπεται τιµώµενος. 
Cf. the vivid portrait that the angered Menelaus paints of his political brother and his desire to be well thought of at Eur. IA 334-49. 
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in fact a mere surface, his motives plain166. The king will consistently pay every attention to 
the exterior of Dionysus. Before he has even encountered him, the defining feature of the 
Stranger is his form, a “woman’s form”, thēlumorphon, 353-4: 
 
 
τὸν θηλύ/ορφον ξένον, ὃς ἐσφέρει νόσον 
καινὴν γυναιξὶ καὶ λέχη λυ/αίνεται. 
 
The female-looking xenos, who is introducing a new 
Epidemic amongst the women and defiling their beds167. 
 
“Female-form” appears here to be a peculiarly malleable kind of stuff. Just so in Hesiod was 
the first woman a plaston parthenon, a “moulded maid”, an anthropoid with only artificial 
intelligence168. Of women it is inferred, apparently, that they are especially susceptible to the 
veiling and making-up – plastein, katakosmein, paraskeuē – of the face, that is to say, to the 
dissimulation of the “real” mind within169. It reads consistent in Euripides that his Helen, the 
most captivating face in history, like this thēlumorphon son of Thebes, could be such an 
extreme example of falsification as we find in Euripides’ drama Helen, produced in 412 BCE, 
just 7 years before Bacchae. There, as with Dionysus, a piece of the aithēr is broken off to 
make a decoy to be taken hostage, homeros, a second Helen170. The real, organic Helen has thus 
never eloped and was never at Troy. Menelaus’ wife has always preserved intentional 
integrity, the objects of her desire and her actions have never been impure. Through the 
artificial we discover a more authentic or deeper person in Helen. Yet the general view 
seems to be that women (and those, like the Stranger, who look like women), enhance or use 
subterfuge only to falsify their true identity.  
 
By true identity one usually means actual and not only apparent intentions. For people the 
distinction is important. The authentic identity is the intentional identity, the character of 
one’s intentionality. Around Dionysus, at any rate, identity means the identity that desires 
                                                        
166 The conventional duel between kings and seers in epic and tragedy, his hybristic kings – Oedipus, Creon, Agamemnon, Pentheus –  
typically accusing priest figures of venality, see on seers also § 2.2.1.2 n. 103, § 3.3.11 p. 141, § 5.2.2 n. 13. 
167 Note the ambiguity of λυµαίνεται – either “defile” or “cleanse” – LSJ s.v. Perhaps a Paradebeispiel of Pentheus’ tendency to say more 
than he means, to speak the truth only hekousion – involuntarily – and not consciously or fully intentionally. 
168 Pandora was Zeus’ fabricated person, a dolos, used to dupe the slow-witted Epimetheus who so easily took the bait, which is this kind of 
gift, see Hes. Theog. 550-616 and Hes. Erga. 59-105. 
169 On this theme see Zeitlin, 1985 “Playing the other: Theater, Theatricality and the Feminine in Greek Drama” 63-96, and there esp. 84-96 
“Mimesis”.  
170 Homeros: “pledge, “decoy” fashioned from aithēr: Dionysus: 288-97. Helen Eur. Hel. 31-51. 
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and holds its wishes to be its own, rather than in the phenomenal, falsifiable sense of, say, 
gender, class, ethnicity171. Identity in Bacchae is the wishing with which persons identify.  
 
Ironically for one always expecting treachery, it never dawns on Pentheus that the stranger 
may be disguised, that by this very Dionysiac reversal, the authentic may be what is veiled; 
he thinks the foreigner’s motives are all too apparent and that his identity is clear, not 
opaque. It all strikes a chord with that notable formulation of Dionysus at 55, where he has 
told us explicitly that he has taken a “man’s nature”, eis andros phusin. This is impersonation 
in the strongest sense, becoming a person and not only the imitation of some person. What 
does that mean, if not that he has taken on the nature of someone, which is to have been 
born and be constituted of a body and a mind pullulating with thoughts and desires, which 
are apprehended as the contents or material that constitute the self. This is a sophisticated 
theatre, the tragic equivalent of a farce, but one in which apparent identity and actual, 
intentional identity are repeatedly confused.  
 
Pentheus will himself be led through the streets of the city, a man made risible in a woman’s 
form, gunaikomorphon. He will have been poorly transformed, decked out in an only too 
penetrable cover, 854-56: 
 
χρήιζω δέ νιν γέλωτα Θηβαίοις ὀφλεῖν 
γυναικό/ορφον ἀγό/ενον δι' ἄστεως 
ἐκ τῶν ἀFειλῶν τῶν Fρὶν αἷσι δεινὸς ἦν. 
 
I want him to incur ridicule among the Thebans 
As he is led through the city in a woman’s shape 
For his earlier boasting, when he was so scary. 
 
Recalling, for example, the Athena of Odyssey 13, Dionysus is seen as a master of disguises 
who plays along with an all too easily detected, “uncovered”, mortal cover. In the famous 
transvestiture scene that is so clearly backlit by Pentheus’ earlier first encounter with 
Dionysus172, Dionysus flatters the king for his disguise; he is “in form quite suited to one of 
                                                        
171 See Nietzsche’s discussion of this point at Die fröhliche Wissenschaft, 1882: Section 361, where Nietzsche is discussing “Vom Probleme 
des Schauspielers”. Those disadvantaged in the organization of the social world – women, Jews – have to become actors, “Das Weib ist so 
artistisch”. That is certainly the case in Euripides and a thread picked up by that most Euripidean of Roman poets, Ovid. 
172 Where his focus on the Stranger’s trappings is so telling. He alleged they were designed in order to catch women. It is a logical misstep, 
an inference that exposes his own intentional posture. There is no evidence of such ‘womanizing’; Pentheus simply deduces the meaning of 
effects from the causes he thinks always explains human behaviour. 
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the daughters of Kadmos”, FρέFεις δὲ Κάδ/ου θυγατέρων /ορφὴν /ιᾶι, 917173. Pentheus is 
become now the falsified progeny, which accusation about himself, Dionysus has come to 
Thebes to refute. 
 
 
4.3.8 Philoxeinoi, nóos theoudēs: “Welcoming strangers and having a god-fearing 
mind”174 
 
The Greeks endowed their gods with idealized bodies and the typical features of the human 
social world. Greek gods are characters invested with specific identities, backstories, 
biographies, objects that function as stage-props (Hermes’ staff; Athena’s aegis; Dionysus’ 
thyrsos and lamaps, torch; Zeus’ thunder-bolt, Hephaistos’ fire; Herakles’ leopard skin and 
club). Gods are said to have temperaments, preferences, desires, a capacity for pleasure and 
even pain and a most humanoid tendency to suborn whatever means they can devise to 
accomplish their very intelligible objectives. Gods, in human culture, are persons with 
whom humans, in any number of forms, on any number of models of relation, interact175. We 
may safely posit that, in the broadest sense of the term, gods are projected persons with 
which humans must be able to socialize. In any number of ways they must feel interacted 
with or that there were the potential for any kind of interaction or communication. 
 
Greek mortals imputed “mind” to their immortals. They had necessarily to be social persons 
and the minds they projected onto the gods, were the minds they felt themselves to possess. 
They imputed precisely that part of mortal nature, which is most ambiguous and irreal, so 
mysteriously loosened, apparently, from the bonds of time. Ultimately, the structure of the 
gods’ will is human and their emotive responses make them very intelligible (even if 
terminally unknown) and, more to the point, sociable (in the sense I am using this term of 
“capable of having a relation with”). The will of the gods, like those of human persons, is 
concealed from us, unknown but imagined to be intelligible, to issue from sources that are 
                                                        
173 “Chased down and goad to madness” the “female-imitator a frantic spy on maenads”; the bacchants goad on the (absent) maenads who 
are otherwise blind to symbolic distinctions, who have lost their own “social forms”, “forms of life”: 979-81: ἀνοιστρήσατέ νιν/ ἐπὶ τὸν ἐν 
γυναικοµίµωι στολᾶι/ λυσσώδη κατάσκοπον µαινάδων. 
174 Nóos theoudēs: Hom. Od. 13. 187-202, Odysseus has washed up in Ithaca but does not yet know it, not recognizing the home that will 
not recognize him; Athene has cast a mist achlus over things, a concealer of herself and of the man she loves most. Odysseus groans, he 
wonders if he has been washed up amongst violent savages (ὑβρισταί τε καὶ ἄγριοι οὐδὲ δίκαιοι, 201) or amongst sociable persons who 
recognize others, φιλόξεινοι, as he puts it, people who “relate to”, “value”, philein, strangers xenoi, who do so because they have the mind 
(social, self-reflexive, self-assured and not only impulsive but cultivated) which is god-like: καί σφιν νόος ἐστὶ θεουδής, 202.  
175 For example: master-slave; patron-client; parent-adult; king-subject; supreme judge-polity; inscrutable, immortal force-hapless, 
ephemeral; beneficent lord-indentured labourer; distant humanoid sovereign-freewheeling, cunning adventurer; or as relations of reciprocal 
service or friendship, etc. 
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not chaotically inconceivable. If we did know them they would be understandable because 
divine persons have an agency – a nóos – necessarily anthropoid. 
 
Above all it is their language, the mutual discoursing, politicking, scheming; the laughter 
and tears; the anger and rage and vindictiveness, the memory of sleight nursed, the dignity 
stood on; the favouritism and slipperiness of the gods that make them so socially (and 
therefore so very immediately) intelligible. Similarly, it is the pathetic content of drama, 
(rather than the formal, ritual or theatrical outlines176 or so-called philosophical ideas177) in 
which its effective power and meaning is to be located. Dramatic persons, like Dionysiac 
gifts and Dionysiac sickness, are communicable; in Dionysus they are even transferrable. 
The relational and social character of existence is manifest in Tragedy. Its topic is precisely 
the life of subjects qua subjects and the dangers that beset the common life of persons who 
are always both unique and intelligible. 
 
It is through their attribution of nóos theoudēs (the “god-fearing” by which in fact is meant 
the most humane mind) that gods are socially and cognitively realistic, through which any 
kind of social relation between mortals and immortals is ever possible. Gods have that 
property which is a fascinating subject of Greek Drama: they have insides, phrenes, mind. 
They necessarily have minds, however, in a lesser way than do human beings, since gods 
are derivative of human purposes. If the action of Bacchae seems to contradict this, we need 
                                                        
176 As in the dramatic effectiveness of the “opportunist reading” by which inconsistencies in characterization are explained through an 
appeal to dramaturgic effectiveness: see Easterling, 1973: 5 “the opportunist view, undiluted Tychoismus as propounded by Dr. R. D. Dawe . 
. . The implication of this is that once you have shown how dramatic considerations take the place of psychological ones you have answered 
all your questions: there is no need for a reason, other than dramatic effectiveness, why a particular action should have taken place.”, see 
also Thumiger, 2007: 21-2 on this “critical perspective . . . stigmatized by Garton as the ‘chameleon view’, according to which characters 
are, so to speak, ‘creatures of the situation’, whose behaviour and discourse change as a mere function of the dramatic purpose within the 
scenic context”, traced back to Tycho von Wilamowitz-Moellendorf on Sophocles, 1917, see also Wolff, 1929; Howald, 1930; Dawe, 1963; 
Garton, 1957, 1972. On divergent notions of character in tragedy and Gill’s step “towards a plausible reconciliation”, see Thumiger, 2007: 
20-6. Thumiger’s “own position is composite”, 22: she seeks to “transcend the mind /world opposition”, 22; tries “to illustrate this balance 
between individual and world through a number of literary examples . . . the proportions of this balance are a function of mentality . . . and 
of the nature of the single work.”, 23. Thumiger works on the premise that there are two components that “work to make a human portrayal 
in a fiction – two aspects of identity, so to speak. One I will call psychological depth, and the other sense of individuality.”, 23. Her remarks 
following in which she elaborates on these ‘components’ are most pertinent. I am interested in the nature and consequences of the spatial 
Metaphorik by which we speak of ‘depth’ and of the temporal identity of persons (by which we come to see them as unique), how these 
form two intersecting axes of person and determine our notions of quality of person. I think that persons are always ‘fictions’, that living, 
organic mortals are peculiar because they are subject to time in a peculiar way, always still unfolding, always incomplete, until they die, 
when they are no longer humans, but only matter and a no longer unfolding, static rather than dynamic virtual presence. The depth of 
persons is a function of their temporal uniqueness and the openness of time, the unforegone alterantive always implicit in its 
underdetermination. 
177 So called, because it makes as little sense to separate out philosophy, in that categorical way so dear to scholars of all things poetic, as to 
strain drama to get to its “religious” kernel. It is falsifying, certainly distorting, to analyse out certain qualities and thereby lose the grip on 
the whole, which is what dramatic poetry seems to encourage us never to lose, i.e. a sense of the identity of knowledge and belief, of justice 
and goodness, of freedom and service. 
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only to recall that it is a drama written by a human poet and performed by human actors. 
The gods have no life independent of their human creators and re-creators. This fact is never 
denied by the Greeks. No priestly class of editors ever takes the culture’s poetry in hand, 
denies that men wrote it and that divine intervention in the historical world accounts for the 
origin of the work, as in the Hebraic tradition, for example.  
 
Tragedy is itself an instance of humans at their best: deliberating on, interpreting, 
articulating and thereby extending their understanding of themselves as moral, interpretive, 
articulative explorers of their predicaments. This is their predicament: the predicament of 
finding life to be a predicament, a problematic situation in which things matter absolutely. 
The profundity of Dionysus and his theatre, certainly here in the Bacchae, inheres in the 
problem that instinct and irrationality represent for humans in their understanding of 
themselves. The depth that humans feel themselves to have through their apprehending of 
their irrationality, is a depth to which they do not in a servile way surrender. At their best, 
such as in a Euripides, humans endlessly explore their depths in order to articulate. They 
thereby open up themselves as depths, like the lucid pearl-diver of Pelasgos. They take on 
dimension, becoming always a little more like that changeable Proteus, the man who always 
spoke the truth and knew the depths of his world178. 
 
 
4.3.9 Pollai Morphai 
 
In the formulaic coda affixed to several of Euripides’ works179 and quite aptly concluding the 
Bacchae, we would hear sung a summing up of what was presumably thought, if not by the 
poet himself then by another interpreter of the play, (for Euripides too was himself 
interpreter) an interpolator or editor, to be one of the most important lessons of the 
preceding action, 1388-1391: 
 
Fολλαὶ /ορφαὶ τῶν δαι/ονίων, 
Fολλὰ δ' ἀέλFτως κραίνουσι θεοί· 
καὶ τὰ δοκηθέντ' οὐκ ἐτελέσθη, 
                                                        
178 Pelasgos: Aesch. Supp. 407-411, see § 3.3.8. Proteus: Hom. Od. 4. 383-4 speaks the truth, τοιγὰρ ἐγώ τοι, ξεῖνε, µάλ' ἀτρεκέως 
ἀγορεύσω. / πωλεῖταί τις δεῦρο γέρων ἅλιος νηµερτής, knows the depths: ὅς τε θαλάσσης/ πάσης βένθεα οἶδε, 385-6. For another the 
likening of interpretation to the diving into depths with clear eyes, Diogenes Laertius records an anecdote by which Euripides is said to have 
given Socrates a copy of the work of Heraclitus, and upon asking the satyr-like father of philosophy what he thought of it, Socrates said that 
it was excellent, gennaia, both the parts he understood and did not, “only, one has to be a Delian diver” to get at it, Diog. Laert. 2.22 φασὶ δ' 
Εὐριπίδην αὐτῷ δόντα τὸ Ἡρακλείτου σύγγραµµα ἐρέσθαι, “τί δοκεῖ;” τὸν δὲ φάναι, “ἃ µὲν συνῆκα, γενναῖα· οἶµαι δὲ καὶ ἃ µὴ συνῆκα· 
πλὴν Δηλίου γέ τινος δεῖται κολυµβητοῦ.” 
179 Alcestis, Medea, Andromache, Helen, Bacchae. 
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τῶν δ' ἀδοκήτων Fόρον ηὗρε θεός. 
 
Many the shapes of the divine beings, 
Many things do gods bring about unforeseen; 
And what was expected was not accomplished, 
For the unexpected, god found a way. 
 
Pollai morphai tōn daimoniōn: the gods take whatever shape they desire. By contrast, mortals 
have this one shape, and the indissimulable mortal nature, which Dionysus, as a god, had 
counterfeited180. They only ever clumsily mask and cover themselves, only temporarily and 
most often too ineffectively conceal themselves and the truth of their nature and identity. 
They must never count themselves happy or blessed181, for while they live they can always be 
“found out” by events, by chance or the equally unpredictable tempers of the gods. Those 
are truths and theirs are motives that become revealed in Tragedy as in the tragic 
predicaments of historical life.  
 
Mortals, certainly Athenian mortals, are creatures of elpis, (hope, expectation, anticipation)182. 
They are prospective, planning, strategizing, forward-oriented: having telos, being 
stochastikos, “skillful in aiming at”, “able to hit”, “arcum intendentes in”183. Gods bring things 
to pass krainousi, and that aelptōs, “unanticipated, unplanned for, unlooked for” by mortals. 
A god finds a poros “ford”, a way to accomplish what mortals had not conceived, tōn 
d’adokētōn. A mortal, a creature consigned to labour, mochtos, and effort, ponos, and its only 
ever temporary relief184, finds itself aporos (“without affordances”), a being of doxai 
“expectations”, “assessments”, “opinions”, “judgements”, which prove wrong. Their doxai 
remain “unconsummated”, “unrealized”, ouk etelesthē185. Uncertainty and error are as if built 
into the human mind and its prospective outlook, encoded in its social world. The most 
impressive, the only availing form of agency in this context is the searching, unfinished 
interpretation of this unstable context, the making sense of this predicament. This searching, 
                                                        
180 54. 
181 On eudaimōn (happy or blessed) see § 2.2.1.1 n. 77. 
182 Mortals used to live lives free of trouble and pain, but after Zeus’ terrible gift, the dolos Pandora, released all manner of “woeful cares” 
kēdea lugra; all that humanity retained was Elpis, “anticipation”: see Hes. Erga. 90-105. On the Athenian disposition from the point of view 
of a contemporary Athenian (in the words of a hostile Corinthian delegation to Sparta), see Thuc. 1.70-1. On elpis as the cure, pharmakon, 
given mortals by Prometheus for having taken from them the knowledge of the day of their deaths, see Aesch. PD 248-51. On elpis see also  
§ 2.5 n. 249, § 3.1 p. 96 and elpis contrasted with melein see § 3.3.3 p. 176 n. 170. 
183 stochastikos: see Arist. Eth. Nich. 1141b13, 1106b15. 
184 278-83, 421-4, 772: τὴν παυσίλυπον ἄµπελον δοῦναι βροτοῖς. 
185 Like the very city of Thebes, which Dionysus finds ateleston “uninitiated” i.e. unperfected, uncompleted, because uninducted into his 
mode of time and being, 40. 
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interpreting and re-articulating for depth is a task which a work like the Bacchae not only 
reflects and seeks to encourage, but enacts. 
 
 
4.4 Barabaroi: Stranger Talk 
 
Persons are others whom I understand. If you are intelligible you can be a person; if you are 
a person I expect you are going to be intelligible. If you are as yet unintelligible I may decide 
you are not a person. I may conclude that you are not an object containing subjectivity, but 
only an object, at best an instrument for the purposes of actual agents. If you are intelligible, 
but I insist on not seeing that you may contain a subjectivity not co-extensive with the object 
of your body, I may be making myself an object, like a thing of diminished reflexivity and 
itself a lesser subject. Talk constitutes relations and constitutes persons as such. The 
constitutive character of language – it being not merely designative, it being not simply 
descriptive distance from reality, but recursive entanglement with experience – is what 
makes Tragic drama, and poetry generally, profoundly realistic186. 
 
At the opening of the third book of Homer’s Iliad, a poem on the face of it about the war 
between Greeks and non-Greeks, there is a memorable and rightly famous description of the 
onset of the barbarian army, Il. 3. 1-9: 
 
Αὐτὰρ ἐFεὶ κόσ/ηθεν ἅ/' ἡγε/όνεσσιν ἕκαστοι, 
Τρῶες /ὲν κλαγγῇ τ' ἐνοFῇ τ' ἴσαν ὄρνιθες ὣς 
ἠΰτε Fερ κλαγγὴ γεράνων Fέλει οὐρανόθι Fρό· 
αἵ τ' ἐFεὶ οὖν χει/ῶνα φύγον καὶ ἀθέσφατον ὄ/βρον 
κλαγγῇ ταί γε Fέτονται ἐF' ὠκεανοῖο ῥοάων 
ἀνδράσι Πυγ/αίοισι φόνον καὶ κῆρα φέρουσαι· 
ἠέριαι δ' ἄρα ταί γε κακὴν ἔριδα Fροφέρονται. 
οἳ δ' ἄρ' ἴσαν σιγῇ /ένεα Fνείοντες Ἀχαιοὶ 
ἐν θυ/ῷ /ε/αῶτες ἀλεξέ/εν ἀλλήλοισιν. 
 
Now when the men of both sides were set in order by their leaders, 
the Trojans came on with clamour and shouting, like wildfowl, 
as when the clamour of cranes goes high to the heavens, 
when the cranes escape the winter time and the rains unceasing 
and clamorously wing their way to the streaming Ocean,                        
                                                        
186 On language as constitutive versus designative, see Taylor, 2016.  
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bringing to the Pygmaian men bloodshed and destruction: 
At daybreak they bring on the baleful battle against them. 
But the Achaian men went silently, breathing valour, 
stubbornly minded each in his heart to stand by the others.187 
 
In war men can kill most unproblematically. When the enemy is flesh and blood, like the 
animals one slaughters with little pity or regret, when the enemy is a skull to be dashed, 
knees to loosen, tendons to slice apart, innards to run through, so much bone and flesh and 
fluid to reduce to the ground, then killing is no dilemma. It may begin to become a dilemma 
when the barbaric muttering of foreigners comes into focus, not as the squawking of beasts 
(κλαγγῇ τ' ἐνοFῇ τ' ἴσαν ὄρνιθες ὣς), but as language. Language is the evidence of mind 
and person. A speaking, intelligible enemy is a difficult kind of thing, one too easily 
recognizable as like self. By the external conception of theory of mind, language and 
symbolic exchange is sufficient for the attribution of mind.  
 
The Cyclops, for illustration, is not a non-person, only a very diminished one, a shallow or 
one-dimensional one; he has language but not self-reflexivity (not being self-aware, he is 
unaware of double-meanings in language: outis “nobody” is a sound attached to his visitor 
as name, “Nobody”, having no other meaning hidden within it). Things are what they seem 
to him, language is equivalence just as there is no space between his desires and what would 
be his ‘self’. There is as if no internal space, in which he would pause, reflect and examine 
his desires as if objects. His desires are not objects of his intending mind, they are therefore 
inarticulable. What of barbarians or primitive savages, who do not speak anything 
discernible as language but only make sounds like animals – bar-bar-bar or hot-tot-tot?188 
Their sounds are not proof of mind, just as animal calls and shrieks are the sign not 
necessarily of mind but only of the lower state of hekousion and akousion, the passive 
condition that only articulate and prospective humans have transcended. 
 
Women – wailers, singers, at best bird-like chatterers that they are, by the conventional 
Greek perspective of the time – these do not move in the public world of agora and 
bouleutēria but live in the darkened confines of the house with children and servants – the 
poor and slaves who have no voice: for these the external conception of mind provides only 
a weakened kind of proof of their personhood. They are not fully in the “public domain”189. 
                                                        
187 Trans. Lattimore, 1967. 
188 The onomatopoeic origins of “Hottentot”; cf. also kwere-kwere-kwere from which “Makwerekwere”, the xenophobic designation of non-
South African Africans common in South Africa today. 
189 Thuc. 2.45.2.1-5. If Pericles thought the best thing for a woman was to remain unheard, perhaps what he really saying is that the best 
think for the patriarchal order which privileges men like him is not to be confronted with the personhood of women and the best way to 
avoid that is not to let the start having the access to the public domain. 
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They can seem, because they are not permitted to partake fully in the encounters and 
interactions that constitute the communal life of the polis, not to fully possess “the whole 
panoply of ‘mind’”. They are peripheral to the ‘forms of life’ by which the city knows and 
defines itself. They are in some ways restricted to “a series of inner, private experiences” 
excluded from and through “language, practices, routines, the rules of the game”.  
 
Shall we assume then that foreigners, women, children, slaves (and even animals) are 
simply not full persons, that they have not agency or, still more significantly, always the 
potential for agentful action and outlook? Certainly that is the assumption that has been 
made throughout history. A social and political configuration has been taken as evidence of 
a cognitive and moral deficit. Exclusion has proved that the peripheral ought to be excluded, 
in the same way that those in power, like Pentheus, feel in their circular way, that being in 
power, not the possession of any particular quality of mind or awareness, is the sign of its 
own legitimacy, the complete justification for remaining in power, 504-5: Di. αὐδῶ /ε /ὴ 
δεῖν, σωφρονῶν οὐ σώφροσιν. /Pe. ἐγὼ δὲ δεῖν γε, κυριώτερος σέθεν.  
 
While the Vietnamese gibber and shriek like wild animals, no doubt the American general 
will tell us that the Western soldier is a stoic warrior who “breathes valour”, an individual 
who understands collaboration for a higher telos. They, the warriors who speak our 
language and heed our commands, are doubtless “stubbornly minded each in his heart to 
stand by the others”. This may remain so, perhaps, until we see a foreigner as a mourning 
person, some entity which relates and for whom its relations matter profoundly, whether it 
be a man in a rice paddy on a screen, the menschenähnliche hare whose offspring have been 
killed and inspire pity in Artemis190 or a person on a stage in the Theatre of Dionysus. When 
we see its situation becoming intelligible to us as a predicament, when it cares and forms 
relations, which matter to it, we have already begun to see an entity or representation as a 
person and an agent with a mind.  
 
So too in history it has been works like the poetry of Homer that change everything. They 
may in instances, such as at the opening of Iliad 3 be described in non-human terms, but for 
the rest of the work, the Trojans, an army of mixed foreign peoples, are as human and even 
more so than some of the ruthless Greeks in their worst moments. To the great and lasting 
credit of his culture and its civilization (and despite the frankly wrong criticisms of those 
who discern the roots of Orientalism in Greek culture191), Homer’s Trojans are persons, 
                                                        
190 See Aesch. Ag. 134-7, see also § 3.1 n. 7. 
191 Saïd, 1977: 55-7. Saïd’s influential work Orientalism, is very shallow in its reading of Homer, Aeschylus and Euripides Bacchae, (whose 
god, it has escaped his notice, is a Greek god and Theban), see “In The Bacchae, perhaps the most Asiatic of all the Attic dramas, Dionysus 
is explicitly connected with his Asian origins and with the strangely threatening excesses of Oriental mysteries [p.56] . . . The difference 
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talkers and responders, people whose acts are predicated on intelligible and deliberated 
motivations. They themselves, the barbarians of Greek poetry – just like the squabbling, 
competing, counsel-taking and counsel-refusing Greeks – are enmeshed in a web of relations 
with others. They therefore crucially possess the potential for agency and for being evaluated 
on the terms of that potential agency. Squabbling cranes are neither weak nor strong 
evaluators – they do not evaluate and thus cannot be judged by the criteria of agency. 
Homer and Tragedy show non-Greeks and marginal persons as persons having agency, 
people to whom things matter. They are thoroughly intelligible, except when they are not, 
but then they are not ethnic types but asocial types, like the Cyclopes192. Barbarians, like 
Greeks, understand and identify themselves – like Pentheus, like Hector in the famous 
scenes in Iliad 6, for just one of countless examples – through their relations. In Bacchae, 
Euripides explores the contents of relations between persons, the social identity, which they 
take to be so important to their self-understanding. He re-articulates identity, some form 
having contents. 
 
Euripides’ Dionysus – Euripides the poet, who in his career has put such articulate women, 
such human servants and inhumane gods on stage – is a “woman-shaped” foreigner who 
brings the threat of enslavement and even bestialization193. His foreignness is of course an 
illusion; he is a Theban son. In his person we discern the falling away of any meaningfulness 
in the contrast foreign/non-foreign. He travels the cities of the world and a point is made of 
the fact that, although he has arrived from the East it is an East also where Greeks and non-
Greeks share cities, 17-19: 
 
Ἀσίαν τε Fᾶσαν ἣ Fαρ' ἁλ/υρὰν ἅλα 
κεῖται /ιγάσιν Ἕλλησι βαρβάροις θ' ὁ/οῦ 
Fλήρεις ἔχουσα καλλιFυργώτους Fόλεις, 
 
                                                        
separating East from West is symbolized by the sternness with which, at first, Pentheus rejects the hysterical bacchantes. When later he 
himself becomes a bacchant, he is destroyed not so much for having given in to Dionysus as for having incorrectly assessed Dionysus's 
menace in the first place.”, 56-7. Saïd writes very confidently about “Euripides’ intention”, “Oriental mysteries”, “the rational Western 
mind” as if uncomplicated, unproblematized matter of the drama. If Greek poetry were as one-dimensional as he assumed, I wonder if it 
would have the power that it does and invite the diversity of readings it has from readers for so long. 
192 The Cyclopes, Giant and brigand (as in the myths of Theseus and Herakles) form the most obvious antitheses to the human who is 
philoxeinos and to whom there is nóos theoudēs. On this theme of the cognitive incompetence that is the mark of the anti-social (Pentheus’, 
the “inhuman one like a blood-stained giant”, 543-4, is a permutation of this disorder, a kind of polis Polyphemos), see also Hom. Od. 9. 
146-566, note especially 272-80, for Polyphemos as being both anti-social and uncivilized and also feeling no awe for Zeus (god of xenia) 
and “the other blessed god”. In Euripides see the satyr-play Cyclops, on which from the perspective of a great expert on Dionysus and 
Bacchae see Seaford, 1984.  
193 Douleia – Service: 366, Slavery: 803. Thēriomorphosis: 1330-2. Dionysus – a bull, snake, goat, lion – has untamed the women of 
Thebes; they have been “wilded” having undergone a cognitive theriomorphosis. 
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And all of Asia which lies along the salt sea 
Which has fine-towered cities filled 
With Greeks and Barbarians mixed together, 
 
He is fanatical about his birthright and his Theban origins. He has come to defend the 
honour of his mother Semelē194, yet at the same time he is accompanied by a group of barbaroi 
women and he repeatedly characterizes them as such195. The bacchants too, define themselves 
emphatically in these terms, 1034-5: 
 
               εὐάζω ξένα /έλεσι βαρβάροις· 
οὐκέτι γὰρ δεσ/ῶν ὑFὸ φόβωι Fτήσσω. 
 
           I shout the holy cry, a stranger (xena) with barbarian songs, 
No longer do I cower in fear of bonds (desmōn). 
 
These are not merely ornamental attributes – they speak to the fundamental themes of the 
play, which presents women who have lost all agency, who have lost language and self-
awareness; they have been driven out of their minds and out of the city196. It presents the 
losing of mind and therefore of identity, of the king of Thebes. It does so powerfully because 
it portrays this loss as a process. This process of loss of self is the dramatization of the 
intimate entanglement of volition and cognition. It presents foreigners as a category of social 
actor which, from the unhealthy perspective of Pentheus, seems radically different, opaque, 
the foreigner being not like self and yet all too like self. In his first exchange with Dionysus 
this comes up explicitly, 481-4: 
 
Pe. ἦλθες δὲ Fρῶτα δεῦρ' ἄγων τὸν δαί/ονα; 
Di. Fᾶς ἀναχορεύει βαρβάρων τάδ' ὄργια. 
Pe. φρονοῦσι γὰρ κάκιον Ἑλλήνων Fολύ. 
Di. τάδ' εὖ γε /ᾶλλον· οἱ νό/οι δὲ διάφοροι. 
 
Pe. Is this the first place you have come with the daimōn? 
Di. Everyone of the barbaroi is dancing these rites. 
                                                        
194 Note also the tradition of Semelē as foreign goddess, see Dodds: pp. 62-6. 
195 56-7: θίασος ἐµός, γυναῖκες ἃς ἐκ βαρβάρων / ἐκόµισα παρέδρους καὶ ξυνεµπόρους ἐµοί. 604-5: βάρβαροι γυναῖκες, οὕτως 
ἐκπεπληγµέναι φόβωι / πρὸς πέδωι πεπτώκατ’; 
196 32-6: τοιγάρ νιν αὐτὰς ἐκ δόµων ὤιστρησ’ ἐγὼ/ µανίαις, ὄρος δ’ οἰκοῦσι παράκοποι φρενῶν, / σκευήν τ’ ἔχειν ἠνάγκασ’ ὀργίων ἐµῶν. / 
καὶ πᾶν τὸ θῆλυ σπέρµα Καδµείων, ὅσαι / γυναῖκες ἦσαν, ἐξέµηνα δωµάτων· 
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Pe. Because they have minds (phronousi: “think”, “are minded”) much worse 
than Greeks’. 
Di. In this at any rate very healthy minds. Beliefs differ. 
 
How ought we to recognize the personhood of those who are peripheral, those who seem 
incapable of showing that they can participate in the public domain? If we shall not see them 
as zombies, it will be on the basis of an internal conception of mind. We shall have to 
assume that all humans are born with minds, that all are, at least potentially, like ourselves. 
They will then arouse our sympathy and we shall feel for them as we feel for those in our 
proximity with whom we do share forms of life, or at least as we would feel for ourselves. 
Yet even closest kin we often fail to recognize as ‘like self’; sharing forms of life is no 
guarantee of healthy mutuality – the endless internecine struggle of the social world surely 
teaches that lesson again and again. Seeing others as subjects of experience, as having the 
agency by which we know them as persons, will very often require more than an external 
conception of mind. It will require and reveal a certain quality of evaluation or, in its 
negative examples, the failure, on the part of protagonists, to articulate and choose. 
 
Acting selfishly, as the Greek kings consistently do, being anti-social and not rising to the 
potential to strongly evaluate, to act justly and not only egotistically: nothing is more 
intelligibly human. We are critical of behaviour only when we have first recognized 
intelligible agency. We do not feel that a Cyclops acts badly: his behaviour, like that of a 
ravening lion, is simply nature, it happens and is negotiated. One does not appeal to the 
morality of non-agents. Their deeds are happenings not actions. We feel outraged when 
agents treat others as if objects, when beings with the capacity for recognition of subjects fail 
to, or choose not to, apprehend the subjectivity and personhood of others. Humanity, self-
reflexivity, agency – these are potentialities in persons. No one is always sensitive to the fact 
of the fullness of personhood of others, not least because the idea that all persons are fully 
realized, equal and self-reflexive agents is at best an expedient legal fiction. Agency, 
personhood, humanity – these are qualities on a graduated and shifting spectrum. There are 
only ever degrees of these. It is precisely the shifting and dwindling character of these 
properties, their being potentialities and not stable objects and their vagueness, from which 
source Tragedy partly emanates. Persons must activate themselves ethically, in a sense, and 
this they typically fail to do. They learn what they ought to have done too late, and that is 
what they all have in common. 
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4.5 Polis as Palē: “The struggles you must face await you”197 
 
The polis is palē, a wrestling. Social life is a kind of grappling, an ongoing contest: tussling 
with unmanageable others198. Nevertheless, the polis and its nomoi can serve to normalize and 
circumscribe tensions in the need to neutralize them and the threats to its equilibrium. 
Disequilibrium, in Greek history, is the constant and irrepressible danger to the social and 
political order. Athens in the 5th Century is unlike almost all cultures everywhere and 
throughout time in the originality with which it expressed the tensions running between 
conservatism and the embrace of the new. The democratic, imperial city’s notion of itself, its 
desires and intentions and strategies, were contestable and vigorously contested. The most 
fundamental values and concepts of governance were still disputed, as we read in 
Thucydides, Herodotus and Plato. Tragic drama evokes a world where the most profound 
questions were up for discussion and the values that underpinned them were not matters 
that were deemed settled at all. Personal clashes on the Attic stage became pretexts or 
precipitants of the radical appraisal of meaning and value as such. 
 
The unwillingness to receive Dionysus has been the failure to receive also the transmitted 
traditions of earlier generations, the inherited customs cherished by “the ordinary folk”: 
patrioi paradochai, nomoi; as the bacchants sing: τὸ Fλῆθος ὅτι τὸ φαυλότερον ἐνό/ισε χρῆ-
/ταί τε, τόδ' ἂν δεχοί/αν, 430-1199. The challenge of the integration of the new and the 
foreign is knit with the problem of the institutionalization of the practices of the volk; of the 
educative challenge of inducting the young into the timeless ancient wisdom of the culture; 
and of the preservation of established knowledge by its successful transmission. Bacchae is a 
kind of music played on the tense cords stretched between several antipaloi: younger and 
older generations; common knowledge and individual, tragic ignorance; self-assertion and 
                                                        
197 963-4: µόνος σὺ πόλεως τῆσδ’ ὑπερκάµνεις, µόνος·/ τοιγάρ σ’ ἀγῶνες ἀναµένουσιν οὓς ἐχρῆν. 
198 800-1: ἀπόρωι γε τῶιδε συµπεπλέγµεθα ξένωι,/ ὃς οὔτε πάσχων οὔτε δρῶν σιγήσεται. For these lines see p. 92 n. 206 and p. 125. 
199 See pp. 123-4 for translation of these lines. Cf. µάλιστα γάρ νιν δήξοµαι δράσας τάδε, 351, where Pentheus is threatening to make his 
own display, by desecrating the seer’s seat of auspicy, a threat of blasphemous outrage against the respected traditions and honoured 
practices. Even without an official priestly class the Greeks often manifest scepticism and the marked anti-clericalism of later historical 
periods of Reformation and Enlightenment. See also 200-3 see 161. Mikalson, 1991. On nomoi see also the lines at 894-9, discussed at § 3.3 
p. 175-80 and n. 186, § 4.3  n. 101, § 5.5.3 n. 130. This ‘seat of auspicy’ is mentioned by Pausanias at 9.16. 1.8-2.1 Θηβαίοις δὲ µετὰ τοῦ 
Ἄµµωνος τὸ ἱερὸν οἰωνοσκοπεῖόν τε Τειρεσίου καλούµενον καὶ πλησίον Τύχης ἐστὶν ἱερόν. Like the lightning-blasted thalamos of Semelē 
it was shown to visitors to Thebes as a famous sight, it is mentioned also at Soph. Ant. 999. It provides an instance of the dialectical 
relationship between poetry and tradition. Just as the roles of the maenads who travelled to Magnesia to bring their orgia may very well 
have been shaped by Euripides’ imagining of maenads in Bacchae (his in turn, of course, informed by cult practices as well as earlier poets 
like Aeschylus),  – see Henrichs, 1978 – so is it unclear in the case of the sights at Thebes, whether the ‘infrastructure’ of real, material sites 
shaped the ‘superstructure’ of Tragedy, vice versa or in a complex way they served to dialectically underwrite one another, over time. Thus 
Dodds wrote of Teiresias’ Seat in his comments on 347 “ . . . one of the ‘sights’ shown to tourists at Thebes . . . Hence perhaps mention of it 
here and Soph. Ant. 999 – unless it was these passages which stimulated the Theban guides to ‘discover’ it.”, my italics. Cf. also Porres 
Caballero’s “Maenadic Ecstacy in Greece: Fact or Fiction?” in Bernabé: 159-84. 
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esprit de corps; traditional receptiveness and innovative refutation; transmitted wisdom and 
empirical knowledge; the local and the foreign; the timeless and the historical; exclusion and 
participation; bacchic joyfulness and political woefulness, penthos. It is a Paradebeispiel then, 
of the tensions inherent in human culture and culture’s constant challenge to integrate the 
vigorous, destructive forces of youth and its vitality, with the preservative, abstracting 
intentions of age, viz. with transcendence.200 
 
Drama imitates this complex situation of fundamental tensions and of actors “entangled” 
with each other, competitively, deceivingly and even unwittingly: their acts and the acts of 
others constituting a dynamic causal milieu, a precipitative context. This social world of 
interactions is one for which Euripides finds the metaphor of wrestling useful. Social agents 
read one another’s moves and seek to get a hold of each other and evade being captured and 
pinned down. The figures of Bacchae escape one another, captivate and elude; they face and 
deface each other; they use language to both illuminate and darken their meanings and 
intentions. Their slipperiness and desire to dominate is a dramatically enhanced and 
rhetorically exaggerated, kinetic portrait of just the kind of interactions which constitute the 
social world of persons. The work is thoroughly realistic in this sense and its power derives 
from its intelligibility to social actors who will recognize its situations. 
 
We ought not to overstate the uncertainty and ignorance that I have said “adumbrates” 
social encounters. It ought, at least, to be said that much of the time people do have an idea 
of what is going on in one another’s minds – that is the basis of communication; people 
anticpate what the other means and intends them to know (and usually also what the other 
means to do). It is only that there is always a degree of uncertainty and this is highly 
significant: it has been a most consequential factor for humans in their social contexts and a 
great resource for dramatic poets. I do not know what it is like to be a bat. Perhaps I can 
never know and although I think I can know exactly what a person would or should feel in a 
given situation, and although much depends on a kind of routinized and diffuse empathy in 
the social world, I should remain aware that my social fellows can be not only troublingly 
angular but apparently even too round, very slippery. It is hard to find a purchase in the 
wrestling with social fellows, no “docile fellahin”.  
 
Perhaps in retrospect it will seem to have been natural for readers of Bacchae and students of 
Greek Religion in the early 21st Century to have been peculiarly alert to the cognitive and 
social aspects of the world it represents. Ours is a time in which the technological prostheses 
for the mind and its social engagement are becoming ever more invasive and effective in re-
                                                        
200 On vitality and transcendence, see Bloch, 1991. 
 287 
shaping (and manifesting anew) our forms of life. Humans develop ever newer, ever more 
intensified means of externalizing themselves and internalizing the perspectives, the 
intentions, minds and meanings and the virtual presence of others. This however is an 
intensification, a quantitative not qualitative modification, of the perennial human activity 
of communication, exchange, engagement and self-presentation. It does not represent a 
crisis for “naturalness”, for humans may never have been “natural”, if by that we mean 
somehow safe from the abstracting, “virtualizing”, and cognitive nature (the physis andros, 
“man’s nature”, one may say, adopted by Dionysus to go with the assumed morphē brotesia, 
“mortal form”), which defines the human201.  
 
 
4.6 The Lebenswelt of Agents 
 
Κρύψαντες γὰρ ἔχουσι θεοὶ βίον ἀνθρώFοισιν.202 
 
Using Bacchae as a sample, we may take a small step in the direction of an anthropology of 
Greek Tragedy with fresh inflections. I have set out from the premise that humans ought not 
to be studied as “objects among other objects”. Significance, value and meaning are 
fundamental to human persons who, crucially, understand themselves as subjects and 
deliberate upon their subjectivity, and for whom this deliberation does shape their 
motivation and, recursively in turn, their subjectivity. Humans are reflexive and perpetually 
interpretive and this is just the sense of them we find expressed and enacted in the Attic 
Theatre. They act as knowledgeable agents,203 initiating and selecting or failing to select which 
of their desires shall be their effective desires, the ones they ultimately act upon204.  
 
These self-aware and mutually aware protagonists understand themselves as constituting a 
sequence of generations, a sensual, phenomenal Lebenswelt marked by tensions, change and 
continuity. In this life-world, their day-to-day existences are lived out amongst co-present 
social actors in a context that is typically ultra-social but also imperilled by the anti-social 
impulses and acts of individuals in what is something like an unclosed, social ecosystem of 
agents, in which a certain measure of disequilibrium is always on the horizon. By Lebenswelt 
I mean the context constituted of humans in time, a common order generated by commonly 
perceived phenomena: the basic fact of human intersubjectivity; life as always common life 
with common objects of perception and intention.  
                                                        
201 Contrast the concerned perspective of Burkert in the face of increasingly pervasive digital technology, Burkert, 1996: 177-9. 
202 Hes. Erga 42: “For the gods keep life concealed from human beings.” 
203 See § 4.2 n. 69, for Giddens, 1984: 26. 
204 Cf. §3.2.2. 
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A polis is a temporally extended (“stretched” in Giddens’ phrase) Lebenswelt of generations 
and their time-bound perspectives coming into being, mingling and dying away. This is the 
sequence of “predecessors”, “contemporaries”, “successors”, any of whom at any given time 
may or may not also be “co-present”205. The polis is fundamentally a scene of complex co-
presence; the international and cosmopolitan polis like Athens in the 5th Century includes in 
its Imaginaire and in intermittent co-present contact, a much wider world of contemporaries 
too. The solipsistic Cyclops, Polyphemos, enjoys no symposia (and is thus additionally 
vulnerable to wine), he lives in an atomized world of rare co-presence and an apparently 
minimal concern with a world of persons beyond itself either spatially (contemporaries) or 
temporally (predecessors and successors). 
 
As in ordinary conversation and daily life in human contexts, the protagonists of Greek 
drama are ever seeking clarity, saphes, verification, basanizein, bebaioun and that which is 
sure, asphaleia, through forms of elegchos. The piston and alēthes are often denied to them and 
this denial, the difficulty of securing truth and justification, is one of the most fundamental 
features of human common life, viz. the uncertainty or darkness of things, adēlotes. In the 
dark, one is liable to be laid low, to trip up, it is sphaleros and yet also, full of divine mystery, 
σε/νότητ' ἔχει σκότος, 486. It is the god who sees in the dark by an uncanny fire and the 
god through whom humans begin to discern differently. Perhaps, Pentheus himself 
expresses this inadvertently, when he says scornfully that the Stranger locked up in the 
stalls may “gaze on shadowy darkness”, ὡς ἂν σκότιον εἰσορᾶι κνέφας, 510206.  
 
Humans are beings for whom judgement and the establishment of value forms not a 
peripheral but a central problem, a persistent and never consummated project integral to 
their understanding of themselves. Humans are not definingly rational but as Charles 
                                                        
205 Lebenswelt: A notion with many cognate conceptualizations such as in Heidegger (Sein), Bourdieu (l’habitus) and Castoriadis 
(l’imaginaire). It derives from the recognition that there is no “objective” reality and yet there is a shared experience of life amongst diverse 
subjects which has the character of the “objective”. See Edmund Husserl: Die Lebenswelt in Gesammelte Werke Band XXXIX 1916-37; 
developed in Merleau-Ponty, 1945; and in sociology, in a manner that would be influential for thinkers like Anthony Giddens, by Alfred 
Schutz, 1967: The Phenomenology of the Social World and Schutz, 1932. The polis, as I see it, is the knitting together of perspectives and 
persons into a common, objective order. It is a context of “joint attention” (see Tomasello, 2000) and Theatre is a special context of 
intensified joint attention, a space privileged for heightened co-presence, as it were. See also Bloch, 1992 on the “political” function of ritual 
to integrate predecessors and successors and generate “objectivity”. Dionysus is the god who knits together individual minds with their 
solipsistic tendencies, integrating many perspectives. The consequence of this (to call it ‘function’ might imply that the need arose first and 
the theatre answers the need, but I suspect that theatre arose out of something like the playfulness that comes naturally to singing, dancing, 
acting humans) is that he becomes recognized, certainly by Euripides, as the god of the broken mind and the healthy mind, the god through 
whom the polis can become unanimous, which is to say a person. Cf. “our predecessors’ traditions, coeval with time, which we have come 
town”, πατρίους παραδοχάς, ἅς θ' ὁµήλικας χρόνωι/ κεκτήµεθ', 201-2. 
206 Dionysus had already hinted to the unreceptive Pentheus that the god has and imparts night vision, 469-70: Pe. πότερα δὲ νύκτωρ σ' ἢ 
κατ' ὄµµ' ἠνάγκασεν;/ Di. ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα, καὶ δίδωσιν ὄργια. 
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Taylor puts it, are “interpreting animals”, and agents to whom things matter. By what light 
or fire will humans ever illuminate what matters most to them, the nature of their own lives 
as ephemeral persons and the inaccessible, shadowy minds of the divine persons? This 
“mattering” and its articulation is at the very heart of Tragedy and tellingly, Dionysus is a 
god born of fire and accompanied always by bright torches in the night. 
 
Humans strategize for unpredictability. The mind has a falsifiability and plasticity, a 
concealability which represents a fundamental problem for social actors. The body of 
Pentheus is poorly concealed and its unrestoreability once it has been deformed is 
grotesquely realized. Human social actors have minds, as gods do. But human minds, by 
contrast, inhabit and constitute a social world of great complexity and an existence, which 
by its nature necessitates a constant attention and striving for right judgements. Because of 
their non-privileged perspective in a face-to-face environment rather than remote, surveying 
perspective (kataskopon, Fόρσω /γὰρ ὅ/ως αἰθέρα ναίον-/τες 392-4), humans in drama are 
constantly assessing and testing and verifying.  
 
Tragedy by no means presents a typical scene of life or average situations. Its predicaments 
are the intensified moments of crisis in which ethical contours and character become 
heightened and sharply delineated. The mortal predicament, as depicted in Tragedy, is to be 
insecure but also to judge and seek to identify value and meaning. They cannot, like 
Oedipus, leave it at that, terminally uncertain, they must know. In such a situation the 
disguise, the mask, the unreadable face and dissembled motive become powerfully invested 
epitomes of the broad and pervasive challenges of human existence. Drama imitates an 
always thoroughly social world constituted of many diverse perspectives radically subject to 
time and change, and subject to constant, mutual monitoring and (when persons are strong 
and original evaluators of their cultures, traditions and identities) to constant re-evaluation 
of self.  
 
How Dionysus was born, is a fundamental question in Bacchae – what ignited him, 
engendered his identity, what spark does he have dancing in him? Was he conceived by the 
divine seed of Zeus’ fire, or was he the product of a purely organic process and the animal 
lust of a girl who herself could not have had relations with divinity; who had only the low 
cunning and the appetites that also animals have? In Bacchae mortals have been asked to 
have an internal conception of Dionysus’ divine mind, to infer not only from the familiar, 
from one’s own local perspectives on people and motives, from what is intelligible simply 
because it is in the public domain. Dionysus is a god of common, public festivals and of 
ineffable, private mystery-cults. Both aspects are presented in Bacchae at the Great Dionysia 
in 405 BCE. Equally, Dionysus manifests the different conceptions of agency and its 
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inference: internal or external. The god who is both local-born and foreign, both historical 
and divine, straddles the iambic mode of human homilia – intercourse, agora, talk – and the 
lyric, bacchic mode of choral song with its special knowledge and privileged purview over 
time and human doings. 
 
 
4.7 Summary 
 
This chapter has further developed the themes of agency, evaluation, judgement and the 
nature of persons as self-reflexive subjects introduced in chapters 2 and 3. It also stands as a 
bridge between the first part of this study, focused on agency as an ethical bearing and 
articulacy, and the second part, which takes up the themes of the social character of agency 
and persons. Agency, from the ethical perspective, is a potentiality of persons to be strong 
evaluators, to assess their desires or know themselves. From the point of view of Gell’s 
anthropology of art or Guthrie’s thesis for the motivating of belief in super-natural persons, 
agency is a quality of mind possessed by actors and inferred in different ways.  
 
Bacchae is a work in which questions of evaluation and judgement and the identification of 
persons form the central problems. An anthropology of Greek Tragedy must be an 
anthropology of subjects and agents. Subjectivity and agency form the principal concerns of 
Tragedy, as is patent in this particular work in which the god of Tragedy plays a central role. 
Bacchae does not solve problems so much as productively problematize the familiar. Human 
identity and the identity of values – the self and self-interest – are at issue and at stake. 
Knowing what to wish for and how to wish for it, and what to judge valuable, is inextricable 
from the problem of understanding one’s own motives, identifying the quality of 
personhood in one’s social others, and recognizing the nature, meaning and real claims of 
divine persons. 
 
Human existence is indeterminate – now underdetermined, now overdetermined – and 
always coming into being, aei epigignomena. Consciously and unconsciously, routinely and 
habitually, humans are interpreters of those in their midst. Most of human life is not spent 
pondering. Tragic drama is an exceptional moment of intensified scenes of crises in 
solidarity and crises of values. They are moments of historical pause for discursive 
perspective-taking on the nature of desires and identity ordinarily – outside of Dionysus’ 
affecting presence or perhaps of philosophical talk and inspiration, mania – taken for 
granted. Human protagonists consistently see and treat others as objects: indifferently, as 
instruments of their own purposes, or as purely passive things, objects denied personhood. 
Alternatively they may recognize others as like self, subjects having outlooks, concern and an 
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intelligible emotional responsiveness, which inspires sympathy and pity. Human actors 
ascribe or “theorize” mind in other social actors. This ascribing can be suspended, that itself 
entails an original or at least prior, and usually unreflective, value judgement. Mind is a 
quality alternatively treated as, by the internal conception of theory-of-mind, innate in other 
persons or, by the external conception of mind, as evident from their social and cultural 
competence, proof of mind through competence. 
 
How and what we infer about the character of various classes of social others is determining 
for the quality of relations possible between persons, and thus for the character of and 
possibilities for social life. Human beings are intensely and definitively social. They are also 
susceptible to an anti-social egotism. Common life is marked by tensions that need 
continuous care, notably that between intense sociality and a susceptibility to anti-social 
behaviour, between the collaborative and competitive instinct. Group life is imperilled 
always by a crisis of solidarity. Bacchae, as Tragedy typically does, presents an episode that 
in a heightened way expresses the tensions by which the polis is riven and a certain powerful 
facet of the crisis of solidarity, that between kin and that between mortals and immortals. 
Euripides’ play makes manifest ordinarily latent problems and dangers.  
  
In negotiating co-presence and the antagonism and competition of group life, actors are seen 
to strategize, to dissemble and to enchant in order to achieve their desired objectives. 
Decrypting intentions is a problem or challenge cognate with decrypting intentional 
identity, viz. detecting agency. The social problem represented by other mortal persons is 
transposed onto the philosophical and theological problem of recognizing and knowing the 
desires and intentions of divine persons in Bacchae. Dionysus has come to defend – 
apologēsasthai 41 – his mother’s reputation and simultaneously reclaim his divine identity, 22: 
ἵν' εἴην ἐ/φανὴς δαί/ων βροτοῖς. Her relationship with god has been denied: Dionysus has 
come to assert the historical truth of a relation and the timeless truth of his divine identity. 
In Euripides’ vision, the politick acceptance of Dionysus is insufficient. Quality of bearing 
and authenticity of desire have a central, thematic value. Whatever the nature of Dionysus’ 
motivations, there is an important lesson about the quality of human motivation too. 
 
Knowing others – divine and mortal – is inherently difficult. Knowing oneself –a special 
category of social other – is similarly perilous. Dionysus takes different shapes and shifts 
form, morphē; he is outstandingly hard to identify. He raises, with great force, the problem of 
the identification and location of personhood. Social life is in fact always overshadowed by 
ignorance. Knowledge is not a steady beam of light but more like light and shadow thrown 
by the dance of a fiery torch. Securing stable knowledge, verification and authentication are 
difficult, as much due to the peculiar structure of persons as to the indeterminacy of things: 
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personal motivation is concealable and concealed even from subjects themselves. Humans 
are enmeshed in complex relations with unknown or only ever partially known persons. 
Gods are extreme exemplars of this social reality: taking any form they wish, their intentions 
and perspectives are terminally opaque to humans. 
 
Strangers are not as they seem. Persons taken as easily understandable are revealed to be the 
most uncanny kinds of being in Bacchae. The familiar is defamiliarized. The strange is 
introduced into the midst of the ordinary world of the polis and its interactions. The polis is a 
scene of competition and mutual vigilance, a comic and tragic scene of mutual 
misunderstanding, of the overestimation of self and the misprision of the contents of others. 
The play is an imitation of a place in time: the city is a Lebenswelt, having all the tensions and 
characteristics – to an artistically enhanced degree – of the social world of persons. 
Knowledge is a problem, integrating the new is a challenge and productively uniting 
opposite domains of life and resolving fundamental tensions, a constant task requiring, 
paradoxically, not only vigilance but the Dionysiac release from normal orders of feeling 
and relating. 
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5 
 
Ou raidion zētēma: Abducting Dionysus 
 
οὐ ῥάιδιον ζήτη1α1 
 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
It is inherently difficult recognizing that others are persons and a fortiori determining what 
quality of person they possess. This is a theme in Euripides’ work, expressed, for example by 
Orestes, aporetic in the first episode of Euripides’ Electra, where he poses himself a very 
Euripidean question [Fῶς οὖν τις αὐτὰ διαλαβὼν ὀρθῶς κρινεῖ;] 2 “How then does one 
rightly distinguish good and bad men?”, Eur. El. 366-68: 
 
φεῦ· 
οὐκ ἔστ' ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲν εἰς εὐανδρίαν· 
ἔχουσι γὰρ ταραγ/ὸν αἱ φύσεις βροτῶν. 
 
Pheu. 
There is nothing exact [akribes] when it comes to virtue [euandria]. 
For the natures of mortals contain disorder [taragmon: disquiet, 
trouble]. 
 
Cognate with this problem is that of how we ought to know things that we do not already 
know. How are we to know objects of knowledge that require special, or as yet unacquired, 
ways of knowing? There are different qualities of mind and so are there different kinds of 
knowledge. This is made abundantly clear to the spectator of Bacchae. The prominence of the 
theme of knowledge and its problematization in the play has been remarked on and 
discussed by many of the commentators: knowledge is at issue with the epiphanic god3.  
                                                        
1 “Not something easily found”, 1139. Cf. also Kadmos’ further references to the ruined body of Pentheus diasparaktos, 1220 “torn to 
pieces”, 1218-19: οὗ σῶµα µοχθῶν µυρίοις ζητήµασιν / φέρω τόδ' “whose body here, in a thousand pieces, I am carrying with great pain”; 
and 1299: ἐγὼ µόλις νιν ἐξερευνήσας φέρω. “With difficulty I searched out [his body] and bring it”. 
2 Eur. El. 373. Note that this line (and 373-79) was deleted by Wilamowitz as a later interpolation, Diggle and other editors do retain this 
passage. 
3 Dionysus’ mission is an epistemic one, he has come to Thebes and travels the world of mortals “in order that he be known”. Conacher, 
1967: 73-7 “Appendix: A Note on sophos, to sophon, sophia, to phronein and nomos in the Bacchae”. Leinieks, 1996: “Perception” 217-
242, “Wisdom” 257-76; Reynolds-Warnhoff, 1997; Radke, 2003: 154-202 on “Die Abstraktheit der ‘dionysischen Weisheiten’ des Chores”. 
A good recent discussion of the epiphanic character of Dionysus’ identity (and thus of his being a phenomenon crucial to which is the 
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There is little need here to spell out again in close detail the theme of knowledge and the 
varied terminology used by the poet in Bacchae, in our effort to come at that complicated, 
hard-to-define quality. It may not be remiss only to point out that as well as kinds of 
knowledge, sources and seats of knowledge, references to sleep, inebriation, enthusiasm, 
frantic helplessness, panic, frenzy and mania are proliferate. The passing into and out of 
these conditions is also vividly narrated and even twice enacted onstage4. Much in the work 
serves to develop a highly differentiated picture of consciousness, its absence and retrieval. 
The mind is an elliptical thing around Dionysus; it moves in an orbit – caught between 
equally strong centripetal and centrifugal impulses. It is an orbit whose centre is nowhere, 
its circumference everywhere. It contracts and expands and when it is brightest day the 
mind can also be nearest its nadir, just as in the deepest dark it can be most uncannily 
illuminated.  
 
An intentional stance, an intentional posture, a present absence, an absent presence, a 
quality, a property, constituted of language, immaterial, an orbit, gravity and entropy – we 
use all kinds of metaphors to try to express what Euripides in his poetic work is handling – 
the essential and mysterious constituent of persons as agents. If person and mind is such a 
protean property, so hard to locate – οὐ ῥάιδιον ζήτη/α, /όλις ἐξερευνήσας – so opaque, 
so unclear as to its identity, how are persons to detect minds? On what evidence do we infer 
the given quality of intentionality? How, especially, do we secure the knowledge of the 
extraordinary and the extraordinary beings which are gods? How ought mortals to 
recognize divine minds? If they are ready to attribute mind, how will they further identify 
and qualify those minds or forms of agency? In this chapter we study the kinds of inference 
that it seems mortals are expected to rely upon in securing the precious quality of 
knowledge and recognition, which the vengeful Dionysus comes amongst humans, 
disguised, to make them learn, whether or not they wish to, kei mē thelei5. 
 
A defining feature of the human intentional posture is its transience and spectral character. 
The mind of mortals, their personhood, the immaterial part of themselves that matters so 
much to them that they consider it to be the necessary element of their identity seems to pass 
                                                        
problem of knowledge, the apprehending and integration of the different, the new or the strange) is Henrichs in Schlesier, 105-16: 
“Göttliche Präsenz als Differenz: Dionysos als epiphanischer Gott” and Thumiger, 2007: 107-121 on sight, the visible, invisible and 
epiphany. On the fundamental problem (and opportunity) that knowledge represents for religious ritual and belief, see Larson, 2016: esp. 
66-126 and Burkert, 1996: 156-76. Knowledge and methods of verifiability, of securing the piston “true, certain, credible” and an ultimate 
guarantor for belief presents a fundamental, existential problem of homo religiosus. 
4 683-94, 1233-1300. 
5 39: δεῖ γὰρ πόλιν τήνδ' ἐκµαθεῖν, κεἰ µὴ θέλει. 
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away, at least out of the historical durée, out of the accessible mortal world6. Mind, even in 
historical life with all its empirical opportunities, is a thing not easy to locate, something 
both there and often not there. It is a flickering, fluttery kind of property. Consciousness 
moves on a spectrum which is almost circular. It moves like a planet through phases of 
brightness and darkness, being radically subject to time and rhythm.  
 
The mind evaporates in contact with wine, and with Dionysus, but not entirely; and only 
slowly or partially. If it ‘passes out’ it will pass back in to “itself”. It dissipates and 
reassembles itself on a daily basis when undone in sleep, which is also often seen, through 
dreams, as something like a state of amplified mental power. Dreams have always been 
regarded not only as not properly corresponding to reality (‘That Joseph, he is just a 
dreamer’) but as corresponding more deeply to a reality which is not entirely apparent 
(‘Joseph is an inspired prophet and interpreter’). Mind and therefore agency is not either 
“there” or “not there”. Prophetic inspiration entails the disappearance of consciousness and 
the re-appearance in a much stronger, heightened form, of a special kind of 
knowledgeability. The same is true of poetic and telestic inspiration and even in some sense 
true of erotic mania, the effect of which may seem to be an effacement of self, but which is 
also connected with a deepening of awareness, a transformation of the ordinary, a special 
kind of knowledge we may justly call sensibility. 
 
The mind may be said, like the body, to go on four legs, two and then three7. Budding, birth, 
blossoming, maturity and decline: all these phases or events are present or evoked in 
Bacchae. From infancy (having no language); through adolescence (being a chatterer); to the 
real potential for self-control of adulthood (the epitome of this self-control and this estate, in 
its authentic rather than Penthean form, is the rhetorical master, who was Odysseus); and 
the increasing incontinence of senescence (think, for instance, of the flow of Nestor’s 
conversation and the view of Kadmos taken by Pentheus). The mind, with the body, has its 
phases and rhythms. It has its span and its parameters. Mortals fantasize that it survives the 
death of the body (as a city survives the passing away of its generations), but the mind is 
always determined and defined by mortality. Like everything, its character is shaped by its 
radical subjection to temporality. Mortality is the primary condition of human identity. In 
Tragedy mortality is definitive, the human identity: thanatos.  
 
                                                        
6 So that the disembodied shades of the Underworld in Homer “are” still the persons identified and identifying themselves as Elpenor, 
Achilles, Agamemnon, Antikleia, Ajax, etc. 
7 The contents of the riddle are not mentioned in the most famous Oedipus play, but see the fragments of Euripides’ own Oedipus, fr. 540a: 
P. Oxy. 2459 fr. 2 [ed.] E. Turner, 1962. 
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Tragedy has naturally been “read” more than it has been experienced, since the custodians 
of tragedy have been readers, philologists. Simon Goldhill’s subtle Reading Greek Tragedy8, is 
one outstanding example of the application to Tragedy of a modified semiotic approach, 
taking Tragedy as text and text as system of signs. Yet Tragedy will be more appropriately 
understood in the same way we ought to understand social life, through an anthropology of 
persons in constant and complicated encounters with one another (and others include also 
that unruly other that one projects and calls oneself and those “unmanageable” projected 
beings called gods). Tragedy, rather than semiotic system, to which we might apply a 
grammar of rules, ought to be seen as a social “ecosystem”, in time as organic beings are in 
time, not only a text but a kind of installation or mimetic re-instituting of Lebenswelt.  
 
Dionysus, famously, seems to collapse difference. Young and eternal; immortal son of a 
dead mother; present and absent; bright and dark; powerful and a victim; bringing madness 
and health and so on. Does he vitiate ordinary semiosis? Does he transcend it – is he the 
polysemic, polyonomos – having many names9 – deity of semiotic superabundance? Iphigenia 
at Aulis, Alcmeon at Corinth and Bacchae, on a Spring day in 405 BCE, enacted, as the primary 
concern, the eternal crisis of solidarity between people most proximate to one another – 
family – and even the crisis of solidarity with oneself. Drama itself fuses the eternal 
perspective of langue with the particular instance of parole, reveals the recursive unity or 
terminal entanglement of “paradigm” and “syntagm”, Zeit and Sein. The subject, the matter 
of these works are: relations with others, human and divine; psychological and cognitive 
bonds; affective and political connections between persons. The Euripidean human is homo 
sapiens sapiens, ignorans, religious and anthrōpos homilios: beings by turn ultra-social and anti-
social. 
 
With Dionysus there is something anterior to language and signs, that mortals ought to have 
had, something like faith, the right affective bearing, the healthy orientation towards others 
and their likewise time-bound selves. Signs can fail, or more precisely, interpretations fail. 
Semelē’s sisters were poor exegetes, incapable of divining an unfamiliar pattern – divine 
mingling with human – that was strange, unfamiliar or unanticipated, one that human elpis 
                                                        
8 Goldhill, 1986. Another fine example is Zeitlin, 1982 a semiotic study of Aeschylus’ Seven Against Thebes. 
9 Poluonomos: see Soph. Antig. 1115-7: Πολυώνυµε, Καδµείας νύµφας ἄγαλµα/ καὶ Διὸς βαρυβρεµέτα/ γένος,. Note that this designation is 
also given other gods, and should not be taken as too decisive evidence of a polymorphism peculiar to Dionysus. It, for example, is used of 
Artemis at Ar. Thesm. 320 and of Aphrodite at Theoc. Id. 15. 109. In Plato hubris, so much the subject of the theatre of Dionysos 
Poluōnomos, is called poluōnomos, having many names (Pl. Phdr 238a 2-5: ὕβρις δὲ δὴ πολυώνυµον – πολυµελὲς γὰρ καὶ πολυµερές – καὶ 
τούτων τῶν ἰδεῶν ἐκπρεπὴς ἣ ἂν τύχῃ γενοµένη, τὴν αὑτῆς ἐπωνυµίαν ὀνοµαζόµενον τὸν ἔχοντα παρέχεται.) and like Dionysus too having 
“many parts”: polumeles, polumeres. On the unity and multiplicity of Dionysus see Versnel’s “Heis Dionysos! – One Dionysos? A 
Polytheistic Perspective” in Schlesier: 23-46; Ford’s “Dionysus’ many names in Aristophanes’ Frogs”, Schlesier: 343-55; Henrichs, 2013: 
554-82; Encinas Reguero 2013: 349-65 “The names of Dionysus in Euripides’ Bacchae and the rhetorical language of Teiresias”; Gasparro, 
2013. 
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could not have planned for. Persuasion does not avail. Reason can be explained away. Force 
cannot win over those who are not ready or amenable in a prior way to know. What kind of 
inference is necessary with Dionysus, what kind of handling will suffice? In this chapter I 
argue that reading, deduction, induction, persuasion have not served well in Bacchae. What 
is called for, it is suggested, is a different, inspired, form of inference, of coming into 
knowledge – one prior to established semiotic, conventions, nomoi or usages. 
 
 
5.2.1 Art’s Agents 
 
“Welcome the god into the country, pour libations for him, be a bacchant, wreathe your 
head”, Teiresias admonishes the young tyrannos, Pentheus10. Embrace the Stranger and his 
god, Dionysus, he is saying, and by extension take – dechou – his gifts, everything he 
promises and signifies. Take the god’s postures and have his skeuē, the indexes – agentful 
objects, artefacts11 – by which you become invested with the god’s own agency. That is what 
the other protagonists all advise the king. To Pentheus, however, Dionysiac religion is mere 
anthropomorphism, a sham, a pretext – prophasis – for very ordinary vice. It dresses up 
human nature as divine, it describes divinity with the human ethical profile12. He thinks he 
detects, behind Dionysiac devotional community, only ordinary, human motivations: 
opportunity for sexual license, debauchery and otiose truancy amongst the women of 
Thebes; seduction and charlatanism in the Stranger; and the venality of the religious expert 
in Teiresias13. The Stranger, god in mortal form, is a mere “goēs”, a cheat, an illusionist (also a 
wizard or religious expert in mediating between this world and that of the dead14). From his 
effects on the city, on its women and old men, Pentheus infers a certain quality of human 
intention, a commonly intelligible agency when he should “abduct” divine agency, 311-1315.  
 
 
                                                        
10 312-13, see § 2.6 p. 118 above for text and translation of 309-13. 
11 See below § 5.2.3-4 on index and abduction and agency in the Gellian sense in which I employ these terms. 
12 224. 
13 The seer and priest as venal charlatan is a trope of Greek poetry. Most relevant for this discussion is to point out the identical aspersions 
cast on the seer figure Teiresias in Ba. and Chrysēs in IA. The point is not to register the trope, but to emphasize the meaning of its 
recurrence. The Lebenswelt of Tragedy is a “causative milieu”, a “precipitative context” in which social actors constantly, reflexively seek 
to identify the actual motive or cause behind the claims and acts of their fellow social actors. This is a context of perpetual mutual regard 
and interpretation, misinterpretation, communication, clarification and unpenetrated obscurities. The Tragic stage, like the household and the 
agora, is a scene of constant interpretation. On Teiresias in Bacchae, see Gallistl, 1979, Roth, 1984 and Verdenius, 1988; on the figure of the 
seer in Ancient Greece, see Flower, 2008. 
14 234: γόης ἐπωιδὸς Λυδίας ἀπὸ χθονός. On the goēs (magician but also expert on the dead and intermediary between the world of the 
living and the dead) in Antiquity, see Iles-Johnson, 1999: 82-126. 
15 See § 2.6 p. 118 above for text and translation. 
 298 
5.2.2 A Causal Milieu 
 
Alfred Gell’s anthropology of art and his conceptualization of the “art object” as index will 
be fruitfully deployed in reflecting on and theorizing agency in the world of Dionysus, that 
is, of Bacchae but also of Greek Tragedy more broadly, that transformation of the Lebenswelt 
of the Athenians. Art works exist only in a relational context; they are activated by and 
recursively activate relations in turn. Gell unpacks the social character of agency in his 
development of a theory about the relations between artists or craftspeople, “works of art” 
and those who experience those works16.  
 
Human life, as Gell puts it, is formed of a texture of social relations17. Social relations are to be 
understood on the basis of an inter-subjectivity in which subjects consider their fellows as 
intelligible – they impute intention to them and a mind within. Humans are inveterate 
theorizers, ascribing to others, by the logic of the Theory of Mind, the mind through which 
all of their own experience appears to come to them. In other words, subjects in the social 
world impute the agency, the capacity to relate, interpret and anticipate, which they feel that 
they themselves possess.  
 
Agency is an intellectual or cognitive faculty – in fact the matrix of all faculties and their 
perception and anticipation in others – for remembering and projecting. It is that capacity by 
which a person thinks of itself as causing events and being enmeshed in a world of often 
similarly intended, initiated and caused effects – what Gell calls the causal milieu. In a cognate 
way one commentator on Tragedy has written of its world of expressed causation as a 
“precipitative context”18. 
 
 
5.2.3 Index 
 
Gell wishes to replace the terms “art work” or “art object” (and all their irrelevant baggage, 
to do with questions of social practice and prestige, which are not his focus of study) with 
the term index, which he borrows from American Pragmatist philosophy and its more recent 
re-articulation in the semiotic theory of Eco: 
 
I propose that ‘art-like’ situations can be discriminated as those in which the material 
‘index’ (the visible, physical, ‘thing’) permits a particular cognitive operation which I 
                                                        
16 For the formulation of his theory and the definition of terms like Agents, Patients, Recipients, see Gell, 1998: 17-27. 
17 Gell, 1998: 135-6. 
18 See § 4.3.5.  
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identify as the abduction of agency. An ‘index’ in Peircean semiotics is a ‘natural sign’, 
that is, an entity from which the observer can make a causal inference of some kind. 
The usual example of an ‘index’ is visible smoke, betokening ‘fire’.19 
 
Bacchae is a work in which not only (as so typically in Tragedy and Comedy) the contours of 
the Lebenswelt are very sharply articulated and made perceptibly operative in the action, but 
in which also we experience a very “art-like” set of situations. It is a drama of disastrous 
inferences and misconstrued causation, of efficacious objects (skins, thyrsoi, wreaths, hair, 
wine, bodies as objects, fire) and mortal beings distinguished by their subjection to forms of 
divine motivation and agency, which they fail to appreciate. At its very heart the Bacchae is 
the story of forms of agency, mortal and immortal, their “abduction” and “non-abduction”. 
For this reason, the very faculty for human agency and sociality, which is cognition, is the 
recurrent, even constant topic on the lips of the protagonists in this work.20 
 
 
5.2.4 Abduction 
 
 “Abduction” is a logical operation. It is present or evoked in Bacchae largely through its 
omission, its special and consequential kind of failure to be brought into effect. Abduction is 
“a case of synthetic inference ‘where we find some very curious circumstances, which would 
be explained by the supposition that it was a case of some general rule, and thereupon adopt 
that supposition (Eco 1976: 131, citing Peirce ii. 624).” 21. As Eco defined it: 
 
Abduction . . . is a tentative and hazardous tracing of a system of signification rules 
which allow the sign to acquire its meaning. Abduction occurs with those natural 
signs which the Stoics called indicative and which are thought to be signs, yet 
without knowing what they signify’.22 
 
For Gell the usefulness of the concepts of index and abduction lies in that, although conceding 
that there is “something irreducibly semiotic about art”, they afford a circumventing of “the 
slightest imputation that (visual) art is ‘like language’ and that the relevant forms of 
                                                        
19 Gell, 1998: 13, his italics.  
20 There is a conspicuous abundance of synonymous and subtly differentiated terms for cognition, and its perceptual corollary, sight, in the 
play: eidein, horān, leussein, augazein; manthanein; to sophon, sophia, phrenes, prapis, euphronein, sōphrosunē, kakophronein, gnōsis,. 
Commensurately do we hear in different ways of the derangement of that faculty or capacity: mania, kakophronein, ou phronein, lyssa, 
baccheuein.  
21 Gell, 1998: 14.  
22 Eco, 1984: 40, my emphasis. 
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semiosis are language-like.”23 A Gellian anthropology has much to offer since he is focused 
not on any kind of linguistic binarism24. This is especially salutary for the interpretation of 
the Attic theatre and Bacchae, an example of Tragedy in which the relationships that emerge 
from or are constituted by seeing – the visible and invisible – and hearing are peculiarly 
brilliantly explored. Articulating the relationship between events and rules, like that 
between the spoken word, parole, and the conclusions we draw about speech, langue; or how 
acts become facts; how syntagm is entangled with paradigm; or how “seeings” become 
perspectives and ideas – these will be essential to interpreting Bacchae.  
 
It is hoped that conscripting Gell’s own conscription of (Peircean, Eco’s) index, abduction and 
social agency will serve well a work in which non-linguistic, extra-discursive, non-elenchic 
strategies of knowing are called for from the protagonists, and thus by extension perhaps 
also from the audience. Do we come to know through talk, by taking turns asking and 
answering questions, or do we know when we are unanimous singers – having one voice and 
thus being one person, athroōi stomati25 – of a kind of knowledge that is not arrived at but that 
arrives, as if of its own accord, has been and is there – such seems to be the present and open 
question of Bacchae. βούλο/αι /αθεῖν “I wish to know”26 – one way or another, the persons 
of Tragedy are ever seeking to find out things, to learn, to know and understand and their 
situations are always showing what a difficult problem the desire for knowing, mathos, 
perpetually remains. 
 
The inadequacy of a “linguistic model” of interpretation in the vicinity of Dionysus in the 
Bacchae is not only just made manifest, but even becomes thematic in the drama in a 
fundamental way27. It is as if, in Bacchae, semiotic convention – the language model – is 
displaced by, or at least subordinated to, phenomena and their experience; language 
(conventional, normatively semiotic) must give way to “natural signs” and “hypotheses 
derived ad hoc from the ‘case’ under consideration”. It is not ordinary logic but a kind of 
inspired, leaping logic of the imagination or of faith that is required to apprehend Dionysus. 
This leap and not the continuous strategic “jumping” of the wagerer like Kadmos is what 
                                                        
23 Gell, 1998: 14.  
24 Gell, 1998: 13, “To simplify the problem, I shall henceforth confine the discussion to the instance of visual art, or at least, ‘visible’ art, 
excluding verbal and musical art, though I recognize that in practice these are usually inseparable. So the ‘things’ of which I speak may be 
understood to be real, physical things, unique and identifiable, not performances, readings, reproductions, etc.”. 
25725-6: Ἴακχον ἀθρόωι στόµατι τὸν Διὸς γόνον / Βρόµιον καλοῦσαι. 
26 Eur.: πυθέσθαι βούλοµαι, Hipp. 910; βούλοµαι µαθεῖν, Supp. 750; El. 299, 773; HF 142 ἱστορεῖν ἃ βούλοµαι, 1126; βούλοµαι σαφῶς 
µαθεῖν, Phoen. 904; βούλοµαι δέ σ' ἐξελέγξαι, IA 335. Soph.: OC 504; fr. 1130. 3.  
27 On the common semiotic model, Gell, 1998: 66, “Semiologic or interpretative theories of art assume that works of art are vehicles of 
meaning (signs, symbols) which spectators have to decode on the basis of their familiarity with the semiological system used by the artist to 
encode the meanings they contain. I do not deny that works of art are sometimes intended and received as objects of aesthetic appreciation 
and that it is sometimes the case that works of art function semiotically, but I specifically reject the notion that they always do.” 
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Dionysus desires. Such a kind of daring – tolmān28 – or inspired leap did Eco (from Peirce) 
attribute to Kepler in the example he used to illustrate what abductive process is:  
 
Kepler noticed that the orbit of Mars passes through points x and y (this example is 
given by Peirce, C. P. 2.96): this was the Result, but the Rule of which this was a Case 
was not yet known (the consequents of this antecedent being, therefore, equally 
unknown). Points x and y could have been points of, among other possible 
geometrical figures, an ellipse. Kepler hypothesized the Rule (and this was an act of 
imaginative courage): they are the points of an ellipse.  Therefore, if the orbit of Mars 
were in point of fact elliptical, then its passing through x and y would have been a 
case of that Rule.  
 
Humans orbit one another in the social world passing through points in circuits, the shape 
and anterior cause of which, we may not know (their unclear motivations, the opaque forces 
that motivate them unbeknownst, also to themselves). What rules will we posit for the 
movements of those phenomena, which are the non-obvious acts and motivations of social 
actors, the persons always coming into being that are revealed ex post facto, through praxis or 
drān – that is the question that Drama implicitly posits.  
 
Pentheus is a man who reads acts as movements29, deducting from rules about human 
character and desire that he holds as a priori. He fails to make the leap to the Rule of Agency, 
so to speak, “others are not agents” he seems to say, and the effect will be to make of himself 
no agent: women are easily corruptible, they have not a man’s integrity; foreigners are not as 
healthy or intelligent as Greeks; being attractive means having made yourself attractive in 
order to get what you want out of others; people are moved unquestioningly by lucre; being 
liked and feared is an absolute value; to conceal is to deceive, not to preserve; things are 
what they seem and questions are not necessary, for by these deductive premises life and 
the polis are successfully negotiated. So runs Pentheus’ deductive logic. Eco, on the 
alternative to deduction and on Kepler’s inspired move, continued: 
                                                        
28 “Daring undertakings” are what Athens is famous for, in Bacchae they are thwarted, perverted forms of “courage” and misadventure, the 
wrong kinds of leap: failure to recognize leads to failing to “not dare” fight against a god, 635-6: πρὸς θεὸν γὰρ ὢν ἀνὴρ / ἐς µάχην ἐλθεῖν 
ἐτόλµησ'. Pentheus alone will dare to walk through Thebes dressed as a bacchant, where once he “alone travailed for the city”, 961-2: 
κόµιζε διὰ µέσης µε Θηβαίας χθονός· / µόνος γὰρ αὐτῶν εἰµ' ἀνὴρ τολµῶν τόδε. Kadmos calls what his maenadic daughters have done to 
Pentheus in the mountains, their tolmēmata, 1222: ἤκουσα γάρ του θυγατέρων τολµήµατα. Thucydides’ history of the contemporary war, 
might be said to be an account of tolmēmata, and by their “daring”, adventuresomeness he defines the Athenians, see for example, Thuc. 
1.70.3: αὖθις δὲ οἱ µὲν καὶ παρὰ δύναµιν τολµηταὶ καὶ παρὰ γνώµην κινδυνευταὶ καὶ ἐν τοῖς δεινοῖς εὐέλπιδες· τὸ δὲ ὑµέτερον τῆς τε 
δυνάµεως ἐνδεᾶ πρᾶξαι τῆς τε γνώµης µηδὲ τοῖς βεβαίοις πιστεῦσαι τῶν τε δεινῶν µηδέποτε οἴεσθαι 
ἀπολυθήσεσθαι. 
29 See on Wittgenstein’s question about movements and actions Giddens, 1984: 65-6, like Gell’s distinction between actions and 
happenings, see § 4.3.2. 
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The abduction, of course, had to be verified. In the light of the hypothesized rule, x 
and y were ‘signs’ of the further passage of Mars through the points z and k. It was 
obviously necessary to wait for Mars at the spot where the first ‘sign’ had led one to 
expect its appearance. Once the hypothesis was verified, the abduction had to be 
widened (and verified): the behaviour of Mars was hypothetically thought to be 
shared by all other planets. The behaviour of a planet thus became a sign for the 
general behaviour of planets. Abduction is a very complex mode of inference . . .  
 
While Kepler was describing the involuntary (non-voluntary) movements of planets, it is the 
case that people in the historical world and onstage in Attic drama move around one 
another and try to understand, predict, anticipate those movements. What we do with the 
movements that rise up or become perceptible within us, our motivations, is decisive. Do we 
develop a kind of inspired rule by which we understand ourselves and the persons around 
us and translate our and their “movements” into “actions”? Or do we act as if our impulses 
and desires were simply foreign bodies whose movements just happen? Do we act as ones  
resigned only to register, only ever partially to seize the significance our experiences? Do we 
commit only to deducing from prior, unchanging paradigms about what people are “really” 
like? These are questions that Bacchae, in the spectacle of Pentheus and the fate of the 
Kadmeians, poses to the audience. 
 
Verification, intelligibility and all manner of inference for explanation and readiness are the 
essential and ever-present operations of persons in the midst of other persons. What the 
movements of planets were for Kepler are, by my analogy, the impulses and motives of 
fellow social actors in the Lebenswelt. Persons qualify and interpret the “motions” of others 
and deploy different strategies to know and relate to them. Motives and impulses are not 
“motions”, one may object, but how would you represent motivation? Motive, desire and 
character are only ever inferred from acts (including, of course, talk and thought, the 
externalized or manifested voice)30. Drama shows acts because to do so is the way in which 
we will infer those non-phenomenal properties called motivations, desires and intention 
31.  
                                                        
30 Just as we habitually use the Metaphorik of space – “insides”, “interiority”, “depth”, “further realities” – in our dancing around the elusive 
property of agency and personhood, so may we further employ the imagery of “motion” to describe the dynamic environment of motivation 
and intentionality. This is not meant to equate motives with natural forces. See Taylor on the persistence of the spatial metaphor § 3.3.7 n. 
242. 
31 Arist. Poet.1450 a 16-23 ἡ γὰρ τραγῳδία µίµησίς ἐστιν οὐκ ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ πράξεων καὶ βίου . . . οὔκουν ὅπως τὰ ἤθη µι- 
µήσωνται πράττουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὰ ἤθη συµπεριλαµβάνουσιν [sumperilambanein] διὰ τὰς πράξεις· ὥστε τὰ πράγµατα καὶ ὁ µῦθος τέλος τῆς 
τραγῳδίας, τὸ δὲ τέλος µέγιστον ἁπάντων. Aristotle speaks of action and character as separate elements of Tragedy, but he prioritizes action 
and the structure of events “because tragedy is a representation not of people as such but of actions and life, and both happiness and 
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Bacchae problematizes knowledge and apprehending. There is a basic problem of integration 
in the play: how is the new, the strange, the foreign, the as yet unknown, to become part of 
the environment of the familiar, which is the historical, human, social context. To know, in a 
sense, means to integrate that which is outside (of the self, the house, the city, the culture, 
nomoi) into the inside order of existence, which is the scene of human sociality and exchange 
(with self, kin, co-presents, contemporaries, etc.). In his myths it is integrating Dionysus, 
incorporating him into the situation in the right way, that is always the problem or 
challenge. The healthy or inspired city integrates the god into its life, knows him through 
festivals, through dance, song, wine and theatre. Evaluate, admit, receive hospitably, detect 
innately, infer appropriately, have the right bearing: Euripides’ Dionysus wants all of this 
from mortals if he is not to punish them. We may suspect that not having those things in 
place is its own kind of punishment: and that may be the point of “Dionysus”, the recreation 
of the artist Euripides, in this context where it has been conceivable that there may be “some 
Zeus out there giving birth to new gods”32. 
 
Ordinarily, motives are assumed to be quite straightforward, that ultimately there are no 
surprises. People must become predictable in order that we feel in control of our 
environments. They seek to construe and devise rules about their fellows and how they go 
about doing so is decisive. Today, for example, the political orthodoxy in many countries is 
based on an economic (and ethical) logic with a fallacious premise: people are rational 
                                                        
unhappiness rest on action.” (trans. Halliwell, 1987: 37). Note Halliwell’s comments on the “challenging (and frequently misunderstood) . . . 
[of Aristotle’s] subordintaion of character to action”, Halliwell, 1987: 94, who notes ‘a slight equivocation’ on the point in the philosopher 
and concludes, “The fundamental principle, I think, is that many actions will necessarily have a degree of characterisation built into them, 
since their nature will presuppose particular ethical dispositions; but some actions are not of this kind, and in these cases characterless 
actions is a possibility. There is, then, probably a sense in which Ar. considers that character can be either implicit or explicit, but it is the 
latter – the positive ways in which a dramatist can illuminate the moral motivations of his agents – which he has in mind when making most 
of his remarks on the subject.” Characterless action may be possible, but is actionless character? Do we not only ever infer character from 
action, past and present. I mean by this to suggest that the equivocation in Aristotle is understandable when there is not a sufficient sense of 
the radically dynamic character of character. It is something always issuing out and into acts. If one imagines character is the structure of a 
person, something like the frame which patterns their acts, then one will introduce this ambiguity into one’s logic of the relationship 
between character and action. I suggest that character is not “there” in the normal way of thinking about things, that Aristotle seems to imply 
here. It is not a structure but structurational, i.e. it is the substantial framework which governs and shapes praxeis but what we discern when 
we wish to discern motivations, when we wish to form rules about acts. Character is like “institution” in Giddens, 1984. It is a dynamically 
recursive property, absent and suddenly apprehended, shaped above all by the fact of time and its constant movement, it is “produced” by 
acts and reproduces further kinds of acts. When we say such a person has such a character we are doing a binding act, gathering together 
different moments and acts and saying they constitute a pattern and the “structure” that produced that pattern is character. I suspect that 
drama “shows acts” and requires of the audience a certain kind of work, which is the ‘gathering together’ sumperilambanein, a kind of 
inference of character from praxeis. On this “equivocation” see also § 3.1 n. 9 and § 5.5.3 p. 230. Further on structure and structuration see 
Giddens, 1984: 1-40 and § 1.1 and § 6.7. 
32 So did Pentheus scornfully ask at 467: Ζεὺς δ' ἔστ' ἐκεῖ τις ὃς νέους τίκτει θεούς; New gods are not specious but contain truth and value. 
On New gods in contemporary Athens, see Parker, 1996: 152-98 
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animals who supposedly always act in their self-interest. Yet “self-interest” amongst 
humans, as we see them in fact behave, is clearly not exhausted by the basic accumulation of 
goods and competition for prestige or clinging to life as an absolute good an sich, that the 
economists and their acolytes in political power take it to be. Self-interest is an elusive thing, 
inevitably so when the ‘self’ is so hard to pin down or account for. Persons are not as 
predictable as they seem to those, like Pentheus, who are already in power. If you are in 
power, apparently, you seem to think that you understand things. If you did not, how could 
you have got into power – so runs the technocrat’s and autocrat’s self-satisfied logic, a 
feedback-loop of authority and self-affirmation, the epistemic basis of his hybris.  
 
Events and responses and the meaning of things, how they hang together, these are not 
foregone. Phenomena are indeed underdetermined and always coming into being. There are 
“new things”, there are unknown things, things that we may not even know we do not 
know33. Perhaps even what we ourselves are may be the next unfamiliar, new thing we shall 
come to discover, since no less than everything else are we subject time and difference. The 
question must be how we shall recognize new, strange things – ta nea – how interpret, how 
know them – how, that is, relate to them and understand them, (which means how 
understand their relating to their own parts and to other things). For Peirce, Eco and Gell 
invoking them, the most readily useful examples of ‘index’ are two phenomena, which 
happen to have a very prominent place in Bacchae. In this light, Bacchae can appear to be 
something of a case-study in detection of agency and the logic of inference: 
 
The usual example of an ‘index’ is visible smoke, ‘betokening fire’. Fire causes 
smoke, hence smoke is an ‘index’ of fire. Another very common example of an index 
is the human smile, indexing a friendly attitude. However, as we all know, smoke 
can arise in the absence of fire, and smiles may deceive.34 
 
Dionysus is profoundly linked with the blazing torch, and with fire-miracles, with his fiery 
conception by Zeus Keraunios, Zeus as thunder-bolt, with flames and the hearth. His 
followers are said sensationally to feast in their frenzy, on unfired meat35. Fire, with 
Dionysus, has not the technical function for processing, for softening and moulding that it 
                                                        
33 To paraphrase that most realpolitischer man, George Rumsfeld, who was using a differentiated ignorance as a kind of twisted epistemic 
pretext for action in the run-up to the invasion of Iraq (which had clearly been decided a priori). His actual words were “As we know, there 
are known knowns; there are things we know we know. We also know there are known unknowns, which is to say: we know there are some 
things we do not know. But there are also unknown unknowns—the ones we don’t know we don’t know.” This was of course not an 
inspired insight into the relativity of knowledge, but a rhetorical strategy for getting away with acting as if he did know. That said, in the 
vicinity of Dionysus, as in that of Socrates, we begin to glimpse that there are things we did not know we did not know. 
34 Gell, 1998: 13.  
35 139: ὠµοφάγον χάριν. Cf. Eur. fr. 472 Cretans and see Detienne, 1977. 
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ordinarily has with the god of fire in technē, Hephaistos36. It, rather, is a darting, glancing, 
animated phenomenon, something that elicits strong response, uncannily life-like. It is not 
matter that is plastos, mouldable, with Dionysus, but the human person and its motivations. 
The mind is his material.  
 
In Bacchae fire is evocatively juxtaposed with those liquescent fibres that dance and blow 
about: the hair37. A kind of somatic smoke, the conspicuous sign of the spark of life inside the 
human body, (a natural sign from which we infer so much about health, station, otium, 
gender, age), hair corresponds to fire in the typically Dionysiac manner of correspondence, 
not logically but in its phenomenal form, morphē, 144-50: 
 
Συρίας δ' ὡς λιβάνου κα- 
Fνὸν ὁ Βακχεὺς ἀνέχων                                         
Fυρσώδη φλόγα Fεύκας 
ἐκ νάρθηκος ἀίσσει 
δρό/ωι καὶ χοροῖσιν 
Fλανάτας ἐρεθίζων 
ἰαχαῖς τ' ἀναFάλλων   
τρυφερόν <τε> Fλόκα/ον εἰς αἰθέρα ῥίFτων. 
 
                                                        
36 Torch: the presence of Dionysus is very often accompanied by and thus marked by the fragrant (often pine) and dynamic (usually 
“tossed”) fire-torch. 144-7, 306-9. Cf. Aesch. Bassarids fr. 23b Παγγαίου γὰρ ἀργυρήλατον/πρῶν' †ες τὸ τῆς ἀστραπῆς† πευκᾶεν σέλας. 
Also Xantriai fr. 171: κάµακες πεύκης οἱ πυρίφλεκτοι. Conception and parturition: 2-9, 88-93, 288-91, 519-24. Fire apparitions: 594-626, 
1018. Keraunios: 6, 93, 244, 288, 598. On lightning and Zeus kataibatēs and enēlusios, see Dodds on 6-12, where he gives extensive 
remarks also in Semelē as Anatolian Earth Goddess, “Bride of the Thunderbolt”. Just as mortals carry the fire, a form or descendant of Zeus’ 
fire, his uncanny touching of the earth, so do they recreate in Dionysiac ritual and celebration the sound of thunder with the drums that are 
the god’s gift; so do we find in that rich evocation of the powerful sensory experience of Dionysus at Aesch. Edonians fr. 57. See Seaford at 
197 and Burkert, 1960/1961: 208-13, lightning-struck spots, enēlusia. See further discussion in the context of a study on Dionysiac and 
Orphic mystery religion at Edmonds, 2004: 85. For references to enēlusia see the Pindaric Dithyrambic fragment fr. 70b 15-20 and the 
fragment of the Aeschylean Women of Argos set in the aftermath of the internecine war of the Seven against Thebes in which the body of 
Capaneus, struck by Zeus’ lightning, like Pentheus’ corpse, has been reduced to the “remains of his joints”, Aesch. fr. 17. 
37 Cf. also the ‘fire miracle’ by which the maenads are seen to carry flames on their heads and yet not be burnt (just as they handle snakes 
and wild animals but are protected by a Dionysiac immunity from the dangers against which mortals need usually to be so vigilant (695-700, 
765-8 ), 757-8: ἐπὶ δὲ βοστρύχοις/ πῦρ ἔφερον, οὐδ' ἔκαιεν.; and the fire prodigy at 1082-85, where a voice speaks from the aithēr, the 
Stranger has disappeared, only his disembodied voice is now perceived, then all nature is held by silence and the “light of a holy fire” is 
seen to “bind fast” sky and earth, 1082-3: καὶ πρὸς οὐρανὸν/ καὶ γαῖαν ἐστήριζε φῶς σεµνοῦ πυρός. See also Sophocles’ great hymn to 
Dionysus, where Dionysus is very powerfully defined by fire, Soph. Ant. 1126-1152. There Dionysus is discerned through “flashing, thick 
smoke”, 1126-7: στέροψ ὄπωπε /λιγνύς. Dionysus honours Thebes with his “mother split by the thunderbolt” (‘bride of lightning’ in 
Fagles’, 1982 translation), µατρὶ σὺν κεραυνίᾳ·, 1139. Dionysus is the supreme link between the changeless domain of the stars and the 
world of perpetual change of humans, just as Zeus’ lightning instantaneously links earth and sky and the product is Dionysus; so with 
Dionysus’ dancing the stars are no longer only distant, immoveable signs but said to “breathe fire”, 1146-7: Ἰὼ πῦρ πνεόντων/ χοράγ' 
ἄστρων. 
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Like the smoke of Syrian incense 
The Bacchos holding up 
The fiery flame of the pine, 
With the narthēx he leaps38, 
Racing and dancing 
Exciting wanderers 
He is swinging them around with Iach, Iach-shouts  
And tossing his gorgeous curls in the aithēr. 39 
 
In the first episode, following these lines from the choral parodos, Teiresias will also invoke a 
Dionysus whom “you will see him leaping on the rocks of Delphi with pine torches, 
brandishing and shaking that bacchic wand (kladon ‘branch’) on the twin-peaked plateau 
and great throughout Greece”40. With this specially fiery and smoky quality of Dionysus’ in 
mind, both his ongoing presence and the aorist event of his birth (his original coming into 
presence), ought we to see that futile Pentheus rushing around calling all his servants 
pointlessly (matēn) into action to fetch water and put out an extraordinary, unquenchable 
fire – the still living flame on Semelē tomb that has flared up – which he has 
misapprehended as a ‘normal’ fire threatening to consume his palace41. This misprision is 
never corrected by Pentheus; soon after he will again speak of the fire of bacchic worship, 
like the disease, nosos, he had seen from the beginning as an infectious, communicable and 
existential threat to the polis, a reproach to all Hellas42. 
 
Dionysus is also that figure whose smile or laughter, gelān – its ambiguity and meaning in 
Bacchae – has been the object of much discussion in the scholarship on the play43. Laughter 
like fire is not necessarily a sign that needs to be seen and then deciphered. It is a natural 
phenomenon that can elicit an instantaneous reaction; it is infectious like fire and associated 
with pleasure like the sweet-smelling smoke that fills the nostrils wherever Dionysus is to be 
found. It has the manifest double-quality of being a natural reflex but also being expressive 
of cultural posture. Laughter indicates the presence of persons. Laughing alone, like 
                                                        
38 For ek as instrumental here, and not referring to the pervious line, i.e. so as to give “streaming out of the narthēx” see Verdenius, 1981: 
311-12. 
39 Iachos is one of the cult names of Dionysus. It does not refer, in the way that lingusitic signs ordinarily do, but is the vocalic trace of his 
presence. He is a god of the most spontaneous and vocative evocation. His names are almost constitutive rather than designative. 
40 On 306-9, ἔτ' αὐτὸν ὄψηι κἀπὶ Δελφίσιν πέτραις / πηδῶντα σὺν πεύκαισι δικόρυφον πλάκα, / πάλλοντα καὶ σείοντα βακχεῖον κλάδον, / 
µέγαν τ' ἀν' Ἑλλάδ'. Dodds: “Dionysus predicts the acceptance of Dion. ‘one day’ (ἔτι) at Delphi, which shall make him µέγαν ἀν' Ἑλλάδα.” 
Seaford translates: “You will see him made great throughout Greece.” On Thracian Dionysus and his acceptance at Delphi, and thence 
Greece, see Dodds pp. 108-110 and Rohde, 1892-94. 
41 622-6. 
42 778-9: ἤδη τόδ' ἐγγὺς ὥστε πῦρ ὑφάπτεται/ὕβρισµα βακχῶν, ψόγος ἐς Ἕλληνας µέγας. 
43 Foley, 1980, 1985. Chaston, 2010: 206-225. Halliwell, 2008: 133-9. 
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drinking alone, is often taken as a troubling “over-association” with self, a sign of unhealthy 
solipsism. Whatever the reason for laughter, an uncannily involuntary and also ordinary 
action, whether it is real or put-on, laughter is an index of the presence or dissipation of 
agency, like tears. To the god’s fire and smile we shall add a third important index in 
Bacchae, that of hair. Sometimes a ‘natural sign’ can serve to indicate the absence of agency; 
the agent we “motivate” behind hair is nature, physis. When hair is undone, ungroomed, in 
no way checked, kōluein, curbed, chalinōn, or given form, kosmein, it is a sure sign that that 
“alertness” or “tension” that ordinarily characterizes social interactions, has been relaxed or 
come thoroughly undone, luomenon. 
 
How are we to know this god who, before all super-natural figures in Greek poetry, makes a 
question and a problem out of knowledge, out of how we are to know and recognize divine 
agency and truth? Euripides’ Bacchae suggests that it is not by deduction, not by signs that 
are so easily refuted or denied as only masking arbitrary human motivation. We are induced 
to abduct Dionysus’ presence, to divine him from present, ‘natural signs’. The strategies of 
decipherment and inference that belong to and hold for the day-to-day durée of the city and 
its flow of transactions and ordinary encounters in the agora and in the chambers of 
persuasion and deliberation become inadequate and thereby also relative. 
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5.3.1 Pyr, Keraunos: Contained Fire, Uncontained Fire 
 
κρύψε δὲ Fῦρ 
He concealed fire.44 
 
As Dionysus is a god associated with the mind in certain free-flowing conditions, and of the 
streaming body and flying, untied hair, so too is he the god of fire in certain impressive 
states. The gift of Prometheus to mortals is an alchemical element, by which humans 
process, mould and refine, bending – gnamptein – the matter and bodies of nature to human 
purpose45. Through fire, mortals draw substances into the human economy of needs and 
functions, they turn matter into materials. It is a gift, which, like all gifts, obligates its 
recipient in unforeseeable ways. The price incurred for fire is the loss of a utopian world in 
which fire were not necessary.  
 
Beyond, however, the interpersonal politics of the Titan Prometheus and the “new god”, 
Olympian Zeus, whose son Dionysus is so much himself a “new god”, fire is an ambiguous 
force in itself 46. This is powerfully expressed in Bacchae, as it is elsewhere in Greek poetry. 
Fire is both creative and destructive: it enhances human agency, it is the tireless “servant” of 
human arts and industry, but it is also a dangerous element, an uncannily animate, 
engenered and further engendering, phenomenon (as human servants, or women, the 
engenderers and Pflegerinnen of the polis, can seem uncannily agentful when given the space 
on the Attics platform). It spreads quickly out of the control of human will, like a servant 
class that discovers its own agency and becomes uncontainable. Like pestilence, nosos, or 
hysteria, mania, it is a threat to the polis, but one with a paradoxical power both to destroy 
and to cleanse, to make katharos.  
 
Breathing, giving off heat, consuming: fire, like a child (like the vulnerable infant, Dionysus, 
who had to be so carefully shielded at birth), requires fostering and care47. Like a man it 
moves, ascends, utters and yields meanings to those empowered through an inspired mania 
                                                        
44 Hes. Erga 50. 
45 On fire in Greek ritual life, see Burkert GR: “Feuerrituale”, 100-104. Burkert is very good in evoking the sensual, olfactory power of fire 
at sacrifice, see esp. 102. 
46 Burk. GR, 100: “Feuer ist Grundlage zivilisatorisches Lebens, ist ursprünglichster Schutz vor Raubtieren – und darum auch vor bösen 
Geistern –, spendet Warme und Helligkeit, und doch bleibt es schmerzhaft-gefärhlich, ja Urbild der Vernichtung: was groß, fest und greifbar 
war, löst sich erglühend in Rauch und Asche auf.”   
47 Nursing fire, Burk. GR, 100: “Wie man im Haus den Herd nicht erlöschen lässt, wird auch in vielen Tempeln ein ewiges Feuer 
unterhalten, voran im Apollontempel von Delphi, aber auch etwa im Tempel des Apollon Lykeios in Argos, des Apollon Karneios in 
Kyrene.” cf. Aesch. Cho. 1037, Paus. 10.24.4. Woman is nurse in Euripides and even fire itself, see fr. 429 from Hippolytus Veiled Nursing 
Dionysus: 556-9; Dionysus accompanied by nurses at Hom Il. 6. 132-7. See the reference in the first Hypothesis to Eur. Med. to a Trophoi 
“Nurses of Dionysus”, by Aeschylus, in which the nurses of the god are boiled in a cauldron and rejuvenated, see also Ov. Met. 7. 294-6.  
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to take its signs48. If it is so that humans naturally distinguish between living and non-living 
things49, we also say that fire seems to “live”. The greatest enhancer of human agency in its 
gift of technology and its power to process and transform, fire appears itself to possess and 
indicate the possession of an inscrutable form of agency. Certainly it seems to have an 
appetite, and apparent “will” to live and enlarge itself. Fire, like the tyrant or the tragic 
protagonist or even the indomitable stomach of that most self-controlled and mental of men, 
polumētis Odusseus– γαστέρα δ' οὔ Fως ἔστιν ἀFοκρύψαι /ε/αυῖαν – which is never sated 
and not subject to concealment50. 
 
Fire, mastered and contained, preserved and reproducible – keeping the domesticated 
“breed” of fire – this is the pre-condition for the existence of the polis. Without fire the 
potential for humans to master their environment and create the artificial world, the world 
of artifice, of technology, the context produced through techniques, which is the city, is very 
curtailed indeed. As Aeschylus’ Prometheus assertively puts it in Prometheus Bound51: “All 
their skills have mortals received from Prometheus.” The difference between Dionysus and 
Hephaistos is the difference between the wild and the tame. Hephaistos is fire domesticated 
and appropriated for human purposiveness. Hephaistos’ is that fire, which in its form and 
usefulness, Prometheus had stolen from Zeus and given mortals. Dionysus’ fire is the 
pointless, non-utilitarian fire whose power is aesthetic and sensual, inhering in the effect it 
has on the co-present: its heat, fragrance, animacy, brightness and ambience. We light or 
preserve this kind of fire for its own sake and then derive its benefits; we do not seek those 
benefits and then light it up. 
 
So do the two gods differ in that Hephaistos is effective, Dionysus affective. Thus was 
Dionysus said by the Archaic poet, in a poem probably composed for consumption in a 
sympotic context, to have been the god who, with his wine, alone could disarm Hephaistos52. 
This was on the occasion that Hephaistos had used his technical skill to contrive another 
mythic dolos, the gift of a throne for Hera, which was in fact a trap. It was revenge for Hera’s 
having cast Hephaistos out of Olympos. It is the triumph of Dionysiac pharmakon – organic, 
dissolving cognition and the step-by-step calculative intelligence – over Hephaistion technē – 
                                                        
48 Such divination is the imposing of one’s own, common, human motivations, no natural signs being traced, according to Pentheus. So has 
he inferred when he first sets eyes on Kadmos and Teiresias in bacchant garb, that it is all only a scheme by the seer to introduce a new god 
and collect wages for the observing skopein of birds and empura fire offerings, 127: σκοπεῖν πτερωτὰ κἀµπύρων µισθοὺς φέρειν. 
49 See § 4.2.2, Gell, 1998: 127. 
50 Hom. Od. 17. 286, see 286-9, where men “fit out ships and sail the barren seas bringing evils to enemies” on account of the insatiable 
gastēr; and again cursing the stomach as a motivating force that cannot be subdued at Hom. Od. 473-4: γαστέρος εἵνεκα λυγρῆς, / 
οὐλοµένης, ἣ πολλὰ κάκ' ἀνθρώποισι δίδωσιν. 
51 Aesch. PD 506: πᾶσαι τέχναι βροτοῖσιν ἐκ Προµηθέως.   
52 Alcaeus fr. 349. 
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invention relying on successive reasoning and plodding strategy (he is the limp god, 
Dionysus the racing, dancing god, he comes, as the entering chorus had sung, racing and 
dancing, 148: δρό/ωι καὶ χοροῖσιν)53. So too is the fire of Hephaistos a servant and 
instrument towards a telos, while by contrast the fire of Dionysus is a phenomenon the 
meaning of which is in its immediate effect, which is sensuous, devotional, aesthetic and 
affective – it is the difference, again, between servitude and service54. The very point of 
Dionsyiac fire is its charismatic presence, not an unrealized or absent point to which one is 
intending in the future, elpizōn. It is not a sign pointing to an absent referent or future 
objective; it refers only to itself, “points” only to its own presence55. 
 
Essentially too, there is no storage vessel, pithos, without fire, no metallurgy, no surplus, no 
capital and only the most rudimentary forms of exchange. Without civilization, there are 
few of the things that most sweeten and relieve human life on earth, (and also, according to 
Hesiod, not the same need for relief). It is impossible to imagine a pre-urban world in which 
the gifts of Demeter and Dionysus were accessible to many people at all56. Storage, 
containment of stuffs – the dry stuff of Demeter, and the wet stuff of Dionysus57 – is the 
necessary condition for and thus the evidence of settled life. Without fire there cannot arise 
the techniques of manufacture to fabricate the vessels, houses and containing walls of the 
polis. Fire is the necessary condition for the emergence and sustaining of the polis. It has 
“proved mankind’s teacher and great affordance, poros”58. 
 
The house itself, at the centre of which stands the sacred hearth, hestia, is a vessel for storing 
and nursing fire. The narthex is a mobile house, a container for carrying the precious and 
dangerous little flame, nursed offspring of the human oikos or of the god’s original hearth in 
                                                        
53 At the opening of Prometheus Bound, Hephaistos has used his technē to chain Prometheus to the cliffs with “unbreakable fetters of 
adamantine bonds”. Kratos, “Force”, says to Hephaistos that it was the “flower of your skill, gleaming fire and all its skills” τὸ σὸν γὰρ 
ἄνθος, παντέχνου πυρὸς σέλας, Aesch. PD 7, which Prometheus had stolen and given humans, Aesch. PD 6-9. 
54 It is noteworthy how Dionysus and Hephaistos are both in many myths associated with binding and unbinding: Hephaistos with the chains 
that he smites in his workshop, Dionysus with garlands of flowers and ivy wreaths. Hephaistos ties up physically (Hera in Alcaeus, 
Aphrodite and Ares in Hom. Od.  8. 266-366); Dionysus ties persons together emotionally, marks them as common by dressing their heads 
with the same organic matter or undoes them cognitively, with wine or mania. On a context in which Dionysiac cult meets Hephaistion 
ritual see on the rites at Lemnos, Burkert HN: 212-218. 
55 Dionysus’ torchlight is not at all like that famous relay of torches in Aesch. Ag. 1-33 which are simple beacons averting to a fact, in this 
case the Fall of Troy. Their function is to point to something (information about the absent Agamemnon) other than themselves; their form 
and nature disappears into their instrumental usefulness as a conveyor of messages. 
56 In its immediacy, its closeness to the present rather than a projected future and past, pre-agricultural life, subsistence economies before 
surplus, trade, accumulation and exchange may have offered features its compensations. The fantasy of the hunt (throughout Bacchae 
literally and figuratively, χαίρω θηρεύου-/σα, 1005-6) or of the eroticized, timeless life of pure sensuality 402-16, may be seen as an 
expression of nostalgia for such modes. 
57 274-85. 
58 PD 110-11: ἣ διδάσκαλος τέχνης/πάσης βροτοῖς πέφηνε καὶ µέγας πόρος. 
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the temple, a container for hosuing gods59. Dionysus is said to ‘toss’ Pentheus’ house, as his 
bacchants ‘toss’ the narthex, the fennel rod60. That narthex is, since Prometheus’ first theft of 
fire from Zeus, the established vessel of choice for carrying fire, a kind of “Zeus’ thigh” for 
transporting the seed of flame61. 
 
 
5.3.2: Where there is fire 
 
φῶς σε/νοῦ Fυρός.62 
 
 
Although fire is “present in almost every cult act of the Greeks”63, it has a unique place in the 
Dionysiac cult, where alone we hear of fire prodigies: 
 
Von Feuerwundern is nur im Dionysoskult die Rede. Aber ein plötzliches 
Aufflammen des Altarfeuers gilt als Zeichen göttlicher Gegegnwart, was auch den 
Öl- und Weinspenden über dem Altar ihre eindrucksvolle Eigenart gibt.64 
 
The role of fire as index of divine presence is of special relevance, one may suspect, in the 
world of Dionysiac experiences. The presence of Dionysus – his entrance, proximity and 
manifestation in human communities – is the essential element of his nature and its 
meaning. Marks of his presence, not only signs but traces, are not incidental here, but 
fundamental. His meaning is not something that becomes clear, like that of one who has 
been by a while and taught a doctrine. It was always there, in his presence. For Dionysus is 
the god who craves – chrēzein – relationship, and his is the “ultrasocial” relationship that 
depends on co-presence.  
 
                                                        
59 On temple as house for a god see, for example, Coldstream in Easterling & Muir [edd.], 1985: 67-97. 
60 622-4: ἐν δὲ τῶιδε τῶι χρόνωι/ ἀνετίναξ' ἐλθὼν ὁ Βάκχος δῶµα καὶ µητρὸς τάφωι/  πῦρ ἀνῆψ'· 
61 Aesch. PD 109-10: ναρθηκοπλήρωτον δὲ θηρῶµαι πυρὸς/ πηγὴν κλοπαίαν. 
62 1083: “Light of a sacred fire.” 
63 Burk. GR, 100: “Daher die vielschichtige Faszination des Feuers, ohne das bei den Griechen kaum ein Kultakt vollzogen wird.” Much of 
the fascination of fire derives from its apparent animacy, its life. It offers a perfect example of what I think invests things with the quality of 
the uncanny: the appearance of having “life” or agency which is hard to locate, difficult to deny but equally so to place. Fire is uncanny 
because it violates any too easily familiar discrimination between living and non-living things, that faculty to discern which humans are 
supposedly born with, see § 4.2.2, Gell, 1998: 127. Idols like Dionysus, as a Maskengott, frustrate the supposedly innate capacity to 
distinguish between living and non-living; his ambiguity is an affordance for belief, a crack through which the doubting mind can enter. 
Thomas’ fault is that he did not enter in the spirit of belief but insisted on putting his finger through the “crack” in the resurrected Christ’s 
body, John 20. 24-9. 
64 Burk. GR, 100. Fire Miracles: [Plut. Themistocles 13]; [Arist.] Mir. Ausc. 842 a 15-24. 
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Nocturnal rites, especially, may be invested with dramatic power and mood, through the 
use of burning torches. These are a notable feature of festivals of Dionysus, where the god – 
it becomes evident through the mood and the wine and the dancing, the movement and the 
changed state of minds and bodies – is present65. Nocturnal events and the power of night’s 
occluding atmosphere, in which the senses are heightened, where fear mixes with awe, a 
slackening of social alertness, a loosening of the reins of self-control and a relaxation of the 
bindings of social life – these will take a central place in the drama of Pentheus, the Theban 
maenads and the foreign bacchants. The darkness of night will make Dionysus’ theophany, 
in the form of a column of fire – φῶς σε/νοῦ Fυρός – stretching between earth and sky, all 
the more spectacular. With Dionysus, darkness reveals. 
 
 
5.3.3 A Still Living Flame66: The spot where the first ‘sign’ had led one to expect its 
appearance 
 
Fire and smoke, in Bacchae as in cult, will function in a very articulated way to signal the 
spatio-temporal presence of Dionysus. Gell makes the helpful distinction between presence 
and appearance, one which is most pertinent for this play in which the audience is asked to 
discern presence, which does not depend on any given kind of appearance67. Dionysus, near 
the very beginning of his prologue, says that he “sees”, is “looking at . . . the memorial of his 
lightning-struck mother . . . a still-living flame of fire” 6-8. We cannot say for certain whether 
or not the mise-en-scène of the production would have included a real flame onstage68. It 
                                                        
65 Burk. GR, 101: “Nächtliche Prozessionen mit Fackeln gehören zu den elementaren, immer wieder eindrucksvollen Bräuchen; sie haben 
ihren Platz vor allem in Dionysosfesten.”. Cf. e.g. the late Euripidean Ion, where is mentioned a “torch procession of Bakkhos”: ἐς φανάς γε 
Βακχίου. Eur. Ion 550.  
66 8. 
67 Cf.  Gell, 1998: 26 on “natural signs” and representations of gods in his theory of the art nexus: “the aniconic image of the god in the form 
of a stone is an index of the god’s spatio-temporal presence, but not his appearance. But in this case, the spatial location of the stone is not 
‘arbitrarily’ or ‘conventionally’ associated with the spatial location of the god; the stone functions as a ‘natural sign’ of the god’s location 
just as smoke is a natural sign of the spatial location of fire.” 
68 Taplin, 1978, Greek Tragedy in Action is a classic on the staging of Tragedy does not discuss the issue of the fire, nor does Wyles, 2016. 
On Eur. Ba. 6-12, Dodds gives lengthy and detailed notes, but does not comment on the question of the flame as concrete stage prop. 
Seaford is good elsewhere on the question of seeing what is not there, seeing with the mind’s eye, but does not discuss the question of the 
possible pyrotechnical stage effects. See Seaford, 1987 and the lengthy notes at Seaford, 1996 on 918-9, for an argument that there is a 
mirror, instrument of initiatory ceremony, used on stage (although no mirror is explicitly referred to in the text). The crucial point is that 
there is a productive ambiguity here (and ultimate unverifiability, as much for modern interpreters as ancient believers and spectators). 
Theatre involves seeing things that are not there, seeing things and persons (actors) as if they were not there or not themselves and seeing 
things that are there differently. In different ways having a real flame and not having a real flame, which would nevertheless be ‘seen’ by the 
spectator’s eye drawn by the god’s words to see, would be equally powerful. On the questions of representing such hard-to-present events as 
earthquakes, see Dodds’ extensive remarks (and “the difficulties which have been invoked against the common view of the scene”) at 
Dodds: 147-9. See on 596-600 p. 315 n. 78 below. 
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would be surprising if it did not, since the sight of flame, the smell of smoke and its 
impressive materialization of earlier events, its abductive power, would be so effective, 6-9: 
 
ὁρῶ δὲ /ητρὸς /νῆ/α τῆς κεραυνίας 
τόδ' ἐγγὺς οἴκων καὶ δό/ων ἐρείFια 
τυφό/ενα ∆ίου Fυρὸς ἔτι ζῶσαν φλόγα, 
ἀθάνατον69 Ἥρας /ητέρ' εἰς ἐ/ὴν ὕβριν. 
 
I see the memory of mother’s thunder-bolt 
Here nearby the rubble of house and palace 
Smouldering the still-living flame of the fire of Zeus, 
Undying hybris of Hera against my mother. 
 
The flame that flickers in the ruins of his mother’s house is the trace of the events of 
Dionysus’ conception by Zeus. His legitimate status as son of Semelē and Zeus is for him 
very largely the issue at stake in the drama. It is a fact which has been repudiated by the 
god’s Theban relatives. The smouldering ruins of his blasted mother and the still living 
flame dancing over those ruins are the traces of an event (and an event can be either an 
“action” or a “happening”; we need further evidence to determine which it be). It is “’an 
undying outrage’”, i.e. both the outrage and “an undying token of the outrage.”70. So not 
merely the “happening” of a random lightning-strike then, this flame reveals an “action”. 
We are to abduct the agency – the erstwhile presence of the person – of Zeus (and Hera’s 
agency distributed through Semelē) from this index, and thereby the super-natural agency 
of this figure speaking to us in the disguise of a natural, historical human-agent.   
 
Aside from the question of stage effects, we should remember that fire and smoke and 
sacrifice or consecration to Dionysus at a fire-altar, form a feature of the theatrical ritual. In 
the temple sits the priest of Dionysus, over the action looks a statue of Dionysus71, behind the 
skēnē stands a precinct and temple to Dionysus, and in full view of all, stage front, 
smouldering and filling the nostrils of all present with the fragrance of its smoke, the 
thymelē, fire-altar to Dionysus. In a recent essay “The Impact of Bacchae at its Original 
Performance”, Edith Hall vividly evoked the ceremonials and ambience of the Dionysiac 
festival of which the dramatic performances formed a part. The presence of animals, their 
flowing blood and the smoke of roasting fires, on an extraordinary scale, must all have lent 
                                                        
69 Undying: Seaford ad loc. makes the good point that athanatos “immortal” suggests not only what the flame is or what its character, but its 
transitive power, what it does, its agency: “this adjective connotes its power to immortalise (both Dionysus and Semelē . . .” 
70 Dodds, 1960, ad loc.  
71 For an apparent reference to a statue of Dionysus in the theatre, see Ar. Eq. 536 and § 3.2.2 n. 77. 
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the Megala Dionysia a peculiar intensity, and fixed in it a very strong identity in the 
memories of the citizenry72. If we have any doubt, and we really ought not to, about the 
significance of this flame on the ereipia tuphomena, “smouldering ruins”, of Semelē’s house – 
oikos, domos – we may recall that it will come up again, at moments of great intensity. It is 
not a passive, inert object in the stage décor.  
 
In the midst of the play’s action, in the so-called “Palace Epiphany Scene” of the third 
episode, Dionysus has been locked up inside the palace compound of Pentheus. He remains 
ever master of the situation, causing the very earth to tremble and the palace of Pentheus to 
reel73. The Stranger will come out unharmed and perfectly in command to re-assure his 
dismayed bacchants. He calls out to them from within the palace to “light the shining 
lightning-torch”, keraunion lampada. We must assume that this is a torch to be kindled from 
the “still living flame of fire”, which burns in the smouldering ruins where Semelē was 
destroyed involuntarily by Zeus Keraunios, (in an act, which is volitionally an ergon mikton, 
as is typical of Tragic acts). That same flame of Zeus’ thunder-bolt kindled into life the 
divine person, Dionysus, 594-574:  
 
   ∆ι.     ἅFτε κεραύνιον αἴθοFα λα/Fάδα, 
σύ/φλεγε σύ/φλεγε δώ/ατα Πενθέος.   595 
 
Kindle the shining lightning torch, 
burn down, burn down Pentheus’ house. 
 
“Lightning torch”, keraunion lampada, is arresting. The flame on the tomb is the still-living 
descendant of the original heavenly flame, which has the power or quality in its 
instantaneous presence, to engender further fire. The fire is a progeny and trace of its divine 
parent, Zeus Lightning, just as Dionysus, who has come to vindicate his mother and assert his 
heavenly paternity, the truth of his descent from the original flame, is a god who kindles 
those in his proximity75. The thiasos, the choral throng of bacchants, leaves us in no doubt 
what this fire is, which must be used to set on fire the house of the king inadvertently at war 
                                                        
72 Hall in Stuttard: 19-20, “There were, in addition, hundreds of lesser sacrifices; the sanctuary of Dionysus must have resembled a massive 
sunlit abattoir attached to a barbecue.”, 20. 
73 On the scene of “Palace Wonders”, see Gakopolou, 2011. 
74 Cf. Pi. fr. 70b 15-17 [Snell]: ἐν δ' ὁ παγκρατὴς κεραυνὸς ἀµπνέων / πῦρ κεκίν̣η̣[ται τό τ'] Ἐν̣̣υαλί̣ου/ ἔγχος, ἀλκάεσσά [τ]ε̣ Παλλάδο[ς] 
αἰγίς/µυρίων φθογγάζεται κλαγγαῖς δρακόντων. Roux ad loc.: “Dionysos, mis au monde sous l’effet de la foudre, est considéré, rappelle 
Dodds, comme le ‘Master of the Lightning’”, see Dodds’ extensive discussion at 6-12 . 
75 And Pentheus fears that the city will “catch fire” 778-9; see also 624-6 for Pentheus’ wild efforts to have put out a fire that is not there and 
note Dodds’ comments on 625-6 “matēn ponōn, since the house was not on fire”. Similarly, thunder is an index of lightning, as Dionysos 
Bromios “Thunderer, roarer”, is a trace of Zeus, present through him. 
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with a god, theomachōn76. It is the flame which Zeus “left behind”, elipe. “Don’t you see it?” 
they call out, (corresponding to the earlier “I am seeing” of Dionysus at 6), 595-599: 
 
   Χο.    ἆ ἆ, 
Fῦρ οὐ λεύσσεις, οὐδ' αὐγάζηι77                   596 
 <τόνδε> Σε/έλας ἱερὸν ἀ/φὶ τάφον 
 ἅν Fοτε κεραυνοβόλος ἔλιFε φλόγα 
 ∆ῖος βροντά;78 
 
Ah, ah, 
Don’t you see the fire, or discern the light 
around the divine tomb of Semelē 
which once the lightning-shooting thunder 
                                                        
76 Theomachein: see § 2.5 p. 80 n. 273. 
77 Augazesthai, 596: this middle does not occur elsewhere in Tragedy. Roux: “‘ne vois-tu pas dans une claire lumière?’ (αὐγή). Ce verbe 
répète, à une nuance près, le sens du premier; mais les répétitions sont nombreuses dans ce passage où l’émotion est portée à son comble 
(577, 579, 582, 595, 600.”. Dodds, Rijksbaron and Seaford all concur that it is deployed here (on the analogy of the use of idesthai alongside 
horān, at Eur. Hel. 122, IA 295, 299) to convey that the subject “has a special interest in what he sees.” Rijksbaron ad loc. It can mean “view 
in the clearest light, see distinctly, discern”, s.v. LSJ and in the passive “be mirrored”, “simply appear”. The Septuagint “appear bright”, 
“shine”, in the New Testament, “‘enlighten’, 2 Ep.Cor.4.4; ‘set in a clear light’, Ph.1.659,al.”. LSJ takes the use here at 596 as passive and 
offers alongside it use of the sun “illumine” at Eur. Hec. 637. What is most significant is the ambiguity in sight between transitivity and 
intransitivity. Sight here is not mere “registering” but given an emphatic and differentiated character, as it is throughout the play. Subjects 
are “involved” through the act of seeing and their motives and interests are caught up in the manner of their seeing. In the phenomenon of 
sight we discern the passive dimension of an act and the active dimension of something experienced, perceived. 
78 Di Bendetto, as often, is the commentator most persuasive on these lines and those at 6-9, with their connected imagery of the flame of 
Semelē. At Di Benedetto p. 388, on 596-600 (b): “L’insistenza con cui sollecita l’atto del guardare dimostra che si trattava di un qualcosa 
che gli spettatori vedevano. Non doveva del resto essere difficile ravvivare la fiamma e provocare una vampata: tanto più che chi compiva 
questa operazione poteva agire con tranquillità senza essere visto degli spettatori”; he thinks the person on stage causing this flame to blaze 
up would have been hidden by that hedge of vines that Dionysus had told us he had used to dress his mother’s tomb at 11-12. It is not, 
however, the case of the same literal presence of what Pentheus sees, his toppling house: “La spiegazione mi pare debbe essere questa, che 
cioè lo scuotimento degli architravi dovesse essere inteso come una cosa reale, ma esso non veniva visto dagli spettatori.” His note is 
extensive and he gives good grounds for rejecting Roux’s interpretation of the scene. Roux does not make much of the fire and is 
surprisingly literal in her reading of these strange events and their import, e.g. ad loc. “Euripide confond ici deux monuments qui, au temps 
de Pausanias (IX, 16, 7), étaient distincts”; Pausanias did live half a millennium after Bacchae was written. Contrast Seaford’s handling of 
the question of fire, he is guided in his interest in showing a supposed telestic subtext throughout the work, not in the flame as trace, or in 
the inferential logic of abduction and its role in the question of evidence of divinity, as I am. He does raise the relevant issue of ‘seeing what 
is not there’: “As for staging, many have tried to answer the unanswerable questions ‘Did Eur. intend the stage palace to be seen to collapse? 
or suffer some damage? or no damage or Semele’s tomb to be seen to flare up . . .  I suppose that the thiasos’ evocation of thunder and 
earthquake destroying the royal building predated tragedy, and so did not require stage buildings (though with their advent some stage effect 
may have been devised, perhaps to suggest something happening behind the front (courtyard) wall. After all, characteristic of the adherent 
of D. is to see things which others do not see (918-24).” Seaford: p. 198. See also for a theoretical discussion Goldhill 1986, 277-84 and the 
response of Wiles, 1987. In the context of theatre where sight is so manipulated and problematized and in which hearing also takes on an at 
least equivalent epistemic power, we are in a context, whatever the case may be concerning the staging or realization of any given effects at 
any given moments, of the ‘beneficial crisis’ of inference, the healthy ambiguity through which performed, made-up, plastos pathos 
becomes real mathos. 
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of Zeus left behind? 
 
When Dionysus does emerge from the palace it will be to explain the fearful prodigies to the 
“Foreign women, so struck with fear”, 604. While inside the palace a baffled Pentheus was 
pursuing phantoms, “Bacchos” super-naturally causes the place to shake and the flame, as if 
sentient, corresponds to this high excitement, 622-4: 
 
                                                   ἐν δὲ τῶιδε τῶι χρόνωι 
 ἀνετίναξ' ἐλθὼν ὁ Βάκχος δῶ/α καὶ /ητρὸς τάφωι 
 Fῦρ ἀνῆψ'·  
 
                                                    and during this time 
Bacchos came and shook the house and on mother’s tomb 
the fire flared up (anēps’)79.  
 
The still living flame in the smoking ruins, now the taboo precinct – abaton sēkon – of 
Semelē’s tomb set apart by Kadmos80, is just such a case “where we find some very curious 
circumstances, which would be explained by the supposition that it was a case of some 
general rule”81. A general rule which we might adopt if, unlike Pentheus and his family, we 
“knew how to be of healthy mind”, might run as follows: the gods do enter into this 
mundane, mortal world, they do forge connections with mortals and do comprise a part of 
the intensely social world of humans and not only a remote perspective on it. They are 
involved, not a “view from nowhere.” As well as being remote, like the rules of langue 
standing apparently above the incidents of parole, they are at hand potentially, like our co-
present mortal actors. It were well to live as if we are going to die and as if there are persons 
moving through the world who are not what they seem. 
 
Lightning ‘betokens’ Zeus’ presence but, paradoxically, the remnants of the flame here 
“living” on Semelē’s tomb invite us not merely to deduce that “Zeus was here”, but to 
abduct the capacity of mortals to become bound to divinity and further engender god-like 
persons or person-like gods. We abduct this because we are compelled to follow all 
Dionysus’ assertions – his movements through x and z – and make an imaginative leap 
about the nature of those movements. Zeus, Lightning, has not just “happened” here. His 
flame lives still and traces a set of “actions”, the acts of a person, not the happenings behind 
                                                        
79 Flared up: anaptein denotes “light up”, “kindle”, fire like hair is made of threads, has a similar form and anaptein has for principal 
meaning “fasten”, “bind”, “attach”, “hang up”. 
80 10-11. 
81 See § 5.2.4 p. 299, Gell, 1998: 14. 
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which stands no person. There has been here a series of intentions, desires and initiated acts 
by actors in social (intentional, mutual, recursive, will-manifesting) relations, not merely 
arbitrary relations of contingent circumstance.  
 
Dionysus, incarnate and present, moving embodied amongst the Thebans, underwrites and 
vindicates the abductive reading of the fire. Where there is smoke, we say proverbially, 
there is fire. We trace intentions behind events, read things and circumstances as evidence. 
Here, where there is fire, there has come into being and is present the body of that god born 
from fire, whose mother was destroyed by a lightning-strike, the motive behind which has 
been diversely read82. There is present here that class of being, a god, which thrives on the 
smoke of sacrifices offered by humans on their “smoking altars”, thusia83. This flame and this 
“smoke”, which is the nebulous personhood, the divine identity of Dionysus, is itself the 
trace of the congress between mortality and immortality, from which in this drama we are 
expected to abduct the present agency – natural and super-natural – which Pentheus will fail 
to detect84. 
 
The “causal inference” which any given actor makes about the fire is decisive in Bacchae. The 
sisters of Semelē had inferred that her incendiary death had been punishment for having 
“lied”, epseusato, about relations with Zeus. On the too realistic, too discrediting premise that 
fellow humans have only the most recognizable motives and strategies, they deduce that 
their sister was promiscuous and in her attempt to cover-up her “sexual error”, impious to 
boot 26-3185: 
 
ἐFεί /' ἀδελφαὶ /ητρός, ἃς ἥκιστ' ἐχρῆν, 
∆ιόνυσον οὐκ ἔφασκον ἐκφῦναι ∆ιός, 
Σε/έλην δὲ νυ/φευθεῖσαν ἐκ θνητοῦ τινος 
ἐς Ζῆν' ἀναφέρειν τὴν ἁ/αρτίαν λέχους, 
                                                        
82 Her sisters and Pentheus say it was Zeus’ revenge for her thrasonical, blasphemous behaviour, for Actaeon-like boasting; Dionysus, 
Teiresias, the bacchants and perhaps the Kadmos who consecrated the debris (ἄβατον ὃς πέδον τόδε/ τίθησι, θυγατρὸς σηκόν·, 10-11) say 
that it was an involuntary act by Zeus deceived into destroying his own lover.  
83 Hom. Il. 8.48, 23.148, Od. 8.363; Hes. Theog. 557. 
84 For the divinity not only of Dionysus but also of Semelē see Hes. Theog. 940-2; and in Pindar Pi. Ol. 2. 25-7, where Semelē “died amid 
the roar of thunder / but she lives on among the Olympian gods . . .”; at Pi. Pyth. 11.1 she is “neighbour of Olympian goddesses” Σεµέλα 
µὲν Ὀλυµπιάδων ἀγυιᾶτι; at Pi. Pyth. 3.99 one of the only consolations in Kadmos’ long and often unfortunate life is that Zeus had made his 
way to his daughter’s desirable bed, (trans. Verity, 2007). 
85 This reading is put on things by Pentheus too, see 242-47. Cf. Edith Hall on the thread that runs through all three of the tragedies of the 
trilogy performed in 405 BCE “The issue of cognitive confusion certainly ran through the tragedies.  . . . in Bacchae, of course, failure to 
apprehend reality accurately, epitomized in Pentheus’ failure to recognize Dionysus physically, a concrete reiteration of the denial of 
Dionysus’ godhead by Semele’s sisters which had stimulated the action of the tragedy in the first place, is a major structuring motif . . . The 
fundamental question asked by epistemology – how do we know what we know – seems to have underpinned the play’s metaphysical 
signification.”, Hall in Stuttard: 21. 
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Κάδ/ου σοφίσ/αθ', ὧν νιν οὕνεκα κτανεῖν 
Ζῆν' ἐξεκαυχῶνθ', ὅτι γά/ους ἐψεύσατο. 
 
Because my mother’s sisters, who least ought to have, 
Claimed that Dionysus was not sprung from Zeus, 
And that Semelē having lain with some mortal 
Ascribed her sexual error to Zeus, 
That it was Kadmos’ clever scheme, and that’s why Zeus killed her 
Blasting her as lightning, because she had lied about their union. 
 
Dionysus in his prologue wants the audience not to deduce what the flame signifies, not on 
the basis of a pre-established notion to conclude what it means,86 but to abduct, from the 
flame to infer the special, ad hoc rule of the community and even the hybridity of mortal 
and immortal. Just as Dionysus is too human in his passion, so in humans (since abduction 
is a “tentative and hazardous tracing”), there is something of the divine, some quality of 
intentionality that does transcend87. His presence and subsequent actions will guarantee or 
make credible the truth of this inference that we are to make from this flame. It is the trace 
not only of Zeus’ agency but of the human Semelē’s effective, if inadvertent, part in the 
conception and production of this god88.   
 
It is not disputed that Semelē was destroyed by Zeus’ fire, the lightning strike, but the 
meaning or intention behind this fiery death and therefore the possibilities of its outcome 
                                                        
86 For example, that “it is evidence of divine punishment for the usual human vices”; “it is a mark of the natural contingency of events, [here 
of meteorological phenomena]”; or even that “it is the stage effect that someone has placed there”. 
87 1348: ὀργὰς πρέπει θεοὺς οὐχ ὁµοιοῦσθαι βροτοῖς. Dionysus’ too human orgē contrasts with the human potential for nóos theoudēs, the 
great danger in and for the complex social entanglement of the polis is the citizen who becomes too unaware of self, not self-reflexive, 
acting solipsistically, like one with no nóos (270-1: θράσει δὲ δυνατὸς καὶ λέγειν οἷός τ' ἀνὴρ/ κακὸς πολίτης γίγνεται νοῦν οὐκ ἔχων.). Cf. 
Deichgräber, 1952: “Tragisches Erlebnis der Menschen ist keine leicht verhüllte Götterkritik. Der Mensch soll un muß sich an Maßstäbe 
halten. Die Götter brauchen es nicht. Dort die Welt des leichten Spiels, hier die Welt des schweren Leids.”. He is writing here specifically of 
Homer and his world, we might say of Dionysus in Bacchae that he is not entirely light, his own desire matters to him and the honour of his 
mother, which he has come to defend, apologēsasthai 41. It is a “Spiel” in Bacchae, but not entirely “leicht”. 
88 Production of gods: that the coming into being, the being made or born, quality of divinities is an important theme in Bacchae is patent. 
Dionysus’ strange hybridity, uniting technē and physis, is much referred to; see esp. 88-98, 288-97. He is a neochma as Pentheus 
contemptuously refers to the new Dionysiac menace about (κλύω δὲ νεοχµὰ τήνδ' ἀνὰ πτόλιν κακά 216). Is there a “Zeus [in barbarous 
Asia] who gives birth to new gods?” (Ζεὺς δ' ἔστ' ἐκεῖ τις ὃς νέους τίκτει θεούς; 467), asks Pentheus in the same spirit. Unlike the almost 
entirely invisible god of the Hebrews [but cf. Exodus 33.12-34.9, where Moses is a kind of Semelē / Thebes asking to see God and God 
offers to pass by before the eyes of Moses so that he will be seen, but only from behind] the multifariously visualized gods of the Greeks 
have come into being, been born. Theogonia, the birth of the gods, is not an idea that monotheists might comfortably integrate into their 
cosmological schemas. Behind birth and fabrication there lie prior intentions and inadvertencies. What was the first intentionality? The 
question for the Greeks is not so much the uniqueness and omnipotency of an original agency but that agency per se by which an original 
and perhaps only ever temporarily suppressed chaos (the unbearable absence of any ordering intentionality), was first overcome. That 
agency is a quality of which humans, even if in a compromised and all too weakened and ephemeral way, partake. 
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(i.e. the veracity of Dionysus’ claims to legitimacy), are what remain at issue89. The world is 
full of evidence of events and unexplained phenomena. The danger for humans, habitual 
interpreters that they are, with their insuperable need to establish orders of explanation and 
deny the possibility of meaningless chaos90, is finding, discerning, judging or choosing the 
correct explanation of the will or agency that motivates given events.  
 
At the opening of Bacchae the Thebans have deduced and bet. To “bet” here means to show a 
deficit in spontaneous feeling, to calculate and anticipate (bet on) also calculation and 
stastical probabilities in others, to be faithlessly disposed. They have bet on human rather 
than divine agency: intelligible, probable, ordinary and typically in the order of 
comprehensible human desiring. Bacchae will be the story of this “bet” on human agency, 
which is disastrously lost by human agents, and of the insufficiency of “betting” (both 
strategizing and the assumption that there is ever “value-free” perception). This wager was 
itself a wager – though not a consciously expressed or reflective one – on the optimum kind 
of strategy in dealing with others and, in this case with this strange, new, foreign god who 
brings the uncanny into the banausic and banal theatre of life in the polis. Dionysus can only 
be perceived and received, but not conceived; the drama of his arrival at Thebes and the 
subsequent events show that what is most important to him is an emotional bearing. The re-
orientation he requires is both a sign of health and a reproducer of the cognitive, social and 
emotional well-being which is the gift – the opposite of a dolos – he wants mortals to receive 
from him. 
 
The flame that dances on Semelē’s tomb is an index of divine desire, of divine agency and of 
its erotic, social and productive entanglement with the human world. It is not, therefore, an 
index of divine remoteness and the assertion of difference, but the trace of the communion 
of mortal and immortal, which Dionysus will incarnate. Humans are by definition not 
divine. Gods are deathless, but in uncanny ways – best exemplified in the timeless touch, 
hapsis, of the lightning strike, which binds earth and aithēr – the two kinds come 
                                                        
89 Semelē loses her life, aiōn, by Zeus’ lightning blow, κεραυνίωι πλαγᾶι, and Dionysus is born from his mother’s womb. So much is clear 
to the bacchants, Ba. 88-93. And equally to Teiresias, who tells how it is (διδάξω σ' ὡς καλῶς ἔχει τόδε, 287) and speaks of a Dionysus 
snatched from the fire by Zeus, 288-89: ἐπεί νιν ἥρπασ' ἐκ πυρὸς κεραυνίου / Ζεύς. Birth from a burning body: cf. Asclepius born and taken 
from Coronis’ body after she was killed by Artemis and Apollo’s plague Pi. Pyth. 3.1-23; Apollo snatches his unborn child, Asclepius, from 
his pregnant mother’s funeral pyre, Pi. Pyth. 3.40-44. It is a poem (by the Theban Pindar) with much of interest for the House of Kadmos. 
Kadmos’ fate was such as is typical of the mortal’s generally: an uncertain, slippery existence (αἰὼν δ' ἀσφαλής/οὐκ ἔγεντ' Pi. Pyth. 3.86-7); 
one of his few consolations is that Zeus found his way to the desirable bed of the king’s daughter Semelē also called Thyonē, bringing his 
family name the honour of a a divine grandson, Pi. Pyth. 3.99: ἤλυθεν ἐς λέχος ἱµερτὸν Θυώνᾳ. Kadmos’ existence, like Oedipus’, would be 
marked by great highs and great lows, never done being done until like Oedipus, he would be received amongst the blessed, 1339. Cf. 
Solon’s great description of the uncertainty of human fate, while a person still lives being always still subject to contingency and fortune, 
Hdt. 1.32. 
90 See Geertz, 1973 and Gould, 2001: 203-34, and § 4.3.6 on predicting highest levels of organization. 
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dramatically into contact. The transcendent, immaterial and the vital, material are bound 
together or entangled in a dynamic, never settled dialectic.  
 
Dionysus the immortal god walks and talks amongst humans, as a human; and divine 
timelessness is seen to improbably penetrate the mortal, historical mode of being. How time-
bound humans should know, recognize, communicate with or come in contact with timeless 
beings is a problem for humans in whom has always been rooted such an irreducible 
religious instinct, an instinct to have social relations with divine persons. This is a riddle 
expressed in various permutations through different episodes in the composite bios we draw 
together for Dionysus. The fiery person of Dionysus, child of the momentary contact of sky 
and earth, is himself an incandescent thread binding the society of human persons with the 
society of ahistorical divine beings. The god Dionysus is a special person but also a social 
person. He requires special modes of relation adapted to his incommensurability. The fire of 
mind, which seems to distinguish humans from all other animals, is inoperative or it blazes 
up in his proximity. Not ingenuity, stratagem or forward planning but knowledge as 
relation, as the end in itself, the right bearing, a social and affective posture alone, will suffice 
for this god who annuls the most basic laws of cause and effect, identity and permanence: 
continuously in turn human and divine, gentle and full of terror, a destroyer and the 
greatest benefactor of mortals. 
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5.4 Bacchic Hair 
 
τῶι θεῶι δ' αὐτὸν τρέφω91 
 
 
Human hair is a kind of index, which allows for the abduction of uniquely human agency 
and self-consciousness. Alternatively, it can be the evidence of no agency, an absence of self-
reflexive personhood, which would be the evidence of a social sense of self , aidōs. The wild 
hair of the bacchants is an index of their mindlessness, just as the flowing hair of the 
Achaean warrior is an index of an intentional person in impressive full-flight – in a state of 
frenzied purposiveness – towards his conscious, pre-articulated goal. From the Iliadic hero’s 
hair we may infer the state of fullest agency, as he makes his way in all his physical and 
emotional splendour towards the enemy and his telos which is renown, kleos. 
 
In Bacchae a lock of flame dances on a tomb and does not burn out, and elsewhere flame is 
seen to dance miraculously on the heads of bacchants without burning them92. Locks of hair 
set on graves serving as traces of the presence of agents is something of a trope in Greek 
drama. It is one that Euripides has exploited and even ridiculed elsewhere93. In Bacchae hair 
provides occasions for misprision. In the complex hunting and tracking down – ichneuein – 
that takes place at Thebes, hair is a spoor misidentified, connected with which comes 
typically the misattribution of agency or non-inference of person.  
 
Ivy and vine – plants most hair-like, trichina, curling, helikes – always so strongly associated 
with Dionysus, are regularly evoked in Bacchae. From the opening lines we hear that he has 
dressed his mother’s tomb in his plant, an act of dignification or veneration, opening his 
                                                        
91 “I nurture it for the god”, 494. 
92 757-8: ἐπὶ δὲ βοστρύχοις/πῦρ ἔφερον, οὐδ' ἔκαιεν. 
93 See Aesch. Cho. 170-72, 225-230 Soph. El. 446-52, 900-903. In Euripides the reliable trace of presence is not that at all, it is unrealistic to 
infer too much from this kind of spoor, according to the world-wary Electra, Eur. El. 520-537. It is a play in which there is much asking 
about how to judge authentic identity. The cynical figure of Orestes despairs that one can discern the true value and nature of other persons, 
Eur. El. 367-90. There is a truly remarkable chastizement of the Athenian audience, in which again we see how important strong and noble 
judgement is to the poet, Eur. El. 383-5: οὐ µὴ ἀφρονήσεθ', οἳ κενῶν δοξασµάτων/ πλήρεις πλανᾶσθε, τῆι δ' ὁµιλίαι βροτῶν/ κρινεῖτε καὶ 
τοῖς ἤθεσιν τοὺς εὐγενεῖς; Eventually he declares that Apollo’s prophecies are “steadfast” but human divinatory reading he can do without, 
Eur. El. 399-400: Λοξίου γὰρ ἔµπεδοι / χρησµοί, βροτῶν δὲ µαντικὴν χαίρειν ἐῶ. What kind of signs identify persons and can be used to 
make strong inferences is a fundamental problem of the play with its homecoming son disguised, who needs to be recognized by his kin but 
also remain concealed until the right moment. Echoing the famous scar of the disguised homecomer, Odysseus, recognized by the old 
servant Eurykleia (see Hom. Od. 19. 386-502 and Auerbach’s famous essay, which still repays study, in Auerbach, 1953), Electra is 
persuaded by a local old man to rely upon the proof of an old scar above Orestes’ eye to detect his identity. He got it when he fell once 
chasing that beast whose body becomes the sign of the bacchant, a fawn, nebros, 572-4: El. ποῖον χαρακτῆρ' εἰσιδών, ὧι πείσοµαι;/ Old 
Man: οὐλὴν παρ' ὀφρύν, ἥν ποτ' ἐν πατρὸς δόµοις/ νεβρὸν διώκων σοῦ µέθ' ἡιµάχθη πεσών. 
 322 
drama of self-vindication94. He has laid his abundant vegetable hair on his mother’s grave, 
marking his presence and her erstwhile presence. He re-invests the smouldering ruins with 
fresh, vital life. Contrast that vivid image of Dionysiac homage with the scene after 
Pentheus’ death when Agauē, carrying her unrecognized son’s head, the head of a now 
absent person, refers to it as a “freshly cut tendril”95. In a similar way, soon after, she refers to 
Pentheus, now the trophy of her “blessed hunting”, as a “young bullock, newly sprouting 
down under its soft-haired crest”96.  
 
Hair and the head, animal and human, dressed or undressed, receive much attention in 
Bacchae. The quality of human hair as being a most prominent and symbolically loaded part 
or emission of the body, suggests that it will repay our interpretive attentions. It is 
definitively a thing of phusis, “springing”, “shooting” – phuein – as it does from the flesh at 
the most culturally dense points of the human frame: head, face (mouth, eyes), pudenda. It 
distinguishes persons along the most significant social and cultural lines: gender, age, 
ethnicity, and (in its treatment or non-treatment) class. In this paradoxical way, this 
substance which is literally a phusis stuff – the vegetable growth of the human body – is 
definitively also a thing of nomos.  
 
A vegetable substance, hair is more amenable to the formative intentions, more plastic, 
“shapeable”, than any other part of the body. Of the body’s parts hair is most “always 
coming out”, externalized, most natural or spontaneous, least subject to human wish: born 
with straight hair you cannot cause yourself to grow curls; if you lose your hair you cannot, 
wish as you may, cause your hair to regrow; if no beard sprouts or if hair “insists” on 
springing up where one would rather it did not, one has only recourse to technique, tools, 
prosthetics. Immanent and eminent, it belongs uniquely to a body but is also separable – a 
ritually most useful exuvium. As such human hair is always taken and made to indicate 
something about the intangible contents inside the given human person.  
 
                                                        
94 11-12: ἀµπέλου δέ νιν/ πέριξ ἐγὼ 'κάλυψα βοτρυώδει χλόηι. 
95 1169-71: φέροµεν ἐξ ὀρέων / ἕλικα νεότοµον ἐπὶ µέλαθρα, / µακαρίαν θήραν. 
96 1185-7: νέος ὁ µόσχος ἄρ- / τι γένυν ὑπὸ κόρυθ’ ἁπαλότριχα/ κατάκοµον θάλλει. This is evocative of the scene at 927-9 where Dionysus 
calls attention to a lock of Pentheus that has fallen out of place. That luminous detail has always struck me as showing a very sure poetic 
hand in its economic suggestiveness. Reading it one may recall Burkert in “Greek Tragedy & Sacrificial Ritual”, 1966: 108, describing the 
procedure of animal sacrifice, “There is still a last delay: the ἱερεύς cuts off a few hairs from the victim’s forehead and throws them in the 
fire. With extraordinary obstinacy, scholars have looked for daemons who demanded hair, though the Greek expression again is both clear 
and simple: this, too, is ἄρχεσθαι, the beginning. The first cut does no harm, does not yet draw blood, but the victim is no longer physically 
inviolate. This step is irreversible.”; see exactly such a ritual killing of a moschos by Aegisthus narrated by a messenger in Euripides’ 
Electra 810-14.  
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It is no surprise then, that hair receives the prominence it does around the god repeatedly 
referred to by his appearance and his abundant head of hair97. Dionysus has himself 
undergone a ‘make-over’ in the late 5th Century: he no longer has the white hair of the 
Olympian senior but the dark full head of the ephebe; he no longer has the long beard from 
which we automatically infer a certain station in social life, but is a beardless ephebe98. It can 
be no surprise, then, that Pentheus’ first act against the Stranger would be to cut off his hair, 
which the god inside the man’s form impassively explains, he “nurtures”, “keeps” for the 
god, 492-499. It makes sense too that the Baccheus inciting the bacchants with shouts, running 
and dancing, is said to “fling his soft hair into the aithēr”, that domain that Dionysus 
incarnate links with this domain of earthly existence gē, chthōn100 150: τρυφερόν <τε> 
Fλόκα/ον εἰς αἰθέρα ῥίFτων. 
 
Here let it suffice to have invoked the theme of hair and to suggest that it is a ‘vital matter’ 
having the indexical character of the smile101. In Bacchae hair manifests an absent agency, a 
vacancy of mind where there ought to be social self-consciousness, in the absence of its 
dressing, its unbound looseness. This is conveyed with no little delicacy in the penultimate 
episode. Pentheus, now fallen into the “light frenzy”, has emerged from the house 
transformed into a bacchant, he is asking how he looks, Dionysus approves, but must help 
him with a lock of hair that has fallen out of place, 928-9: 
 
ἀλλ' ἐξ ἕδρας σοι Fλόκα/ος ἐξέστηχ' ὅδε, 
οὐχ ὡς ἐγώ νιν ὑFὸ /ίτραι καθήρ/οσα. 
 
But a lock of your hair is out of place here, 
Not as I fixed it under the snood. 
 
Hair is a natural sign, which humans are naturals at reading. Yet, it is also coverable (with a 
snood, mitra), falsifiable (donning a wig or mask). It is powerfully connected both to to 
natural gender and biological process and also to impersonation102. It is a fundamental 
element in the suite of indexes by which we infer person and the social identity of persons. It 
                                                        
97 Cf. the youthful figure of Dionysus from the Parthenon frieze, see also Carpenter in Masks: 185. 
98 On the “beardless Dionysus” see Carpenter in Masks: 185-206; Carpenter, 1997. 
99 See § 2.2.5 pp. 87-8 for text and translation. 
100 τήνδε Θηβαίαν χθόνα, 1; the bacchant’s air flies in the aithēr, it feet and thyrsos dance over the earth: θύρσωι κροτῶν γῆν, 188. Demeter 
is Gē and Dionysus is the substance which flows or is caused to flow over gē, 274-83, 142-3. 
101 On “vital matter” see Hodder, 2014. 
102 See also for this theme the nearly exactly contemporary Aristophanes’ Frogs (Lenaea 405 BCE, performed only months before Bacchae) 
and also that other great comedy which brought Euripides onstage again, with its themes of concealment and men as transvestite impostors: 
Thesmophoriazusae. 
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embodies the tension between the arisen and spontaneous on the one hand and the shaped, 
intentional and synthetic on the other. Dionysus’ person, as it is represented in Bacchae itself, 
personifies this enigmatic dialectic and the tendency for one mode to become the other, for 
the natural to be revealed as intentional and the normal as becoming the natural. 
 
 
5.5 Gelān: Laughter in Bacchae 
 
5.5.1 A Smirking Man 
 
Kadmos fears that he is acting in a manner undignified, that “someone” may think that he is 
not properly mindful of his age, οὐκ αἰσχύνο/αι “unashamed”, in wreathing his head with 
ivy and intending to dance, 204-5:  
 
ἐρεῖ τις ὡς τὸ γῆρας οὐκ αἰσχύνο/αι, 
/έλλων χορεύειν κρᾶτα κισσώσας ἐ/όν;103 
 
Won’t someone say that I have no shame for my old age 
Meaning to dance and dressing my head with ivy? 
 
When Pentheus first detects the two old men (he has arrived on the scene from abroad, 
ekdēmos 215, speaking for some while as if unaware of the presence of others 215-47), it is as 
“ridiculous”, “ludicrous” that he sees them; the import of this laughable situation is 
shameful, Fολὺν γέλων 250104. Ridiculousness and laughableness is a matter of contention in 
                                                        
103 On ‘the shame of old participating in Dionysiac song’ see Plato Leges 665d-e. For the shamlessness of old age, 251-2: ἀναίνοµαι, πάτερ, 
 τὸ γῆρας ὑµῶν εἰσορῶν νοῦν οὐκ ἔχον. See also Eur. Alc. 727 φεῦ φεῦ· τὸ γῆρας ὡς ἀναιδείας πλέων. 
104 What is laughter doing on the Tragic stage, what is the significance of Thersites’ buffoonery in that font of Tragedy the Iliad (Il. 2. 211-
77), where ordinarily only Olympus rings with laughter and earth with groans, wailing, talk and song? The Theatre of Dionysus does ring 
with laughter and with mournful shrieks during dramatic festivals at which dithyrambs were performed, comedies, tragic drama and satyr 
plays. Socrates thought the writing of comedy and drama required the same qualities in an author and “the true tragic poet was a comic poet 
also”, Pl. Sym. 223d 3-6: προσαναγκάζειν τὸν Σωκράτη ὁµολογεῖν αὐτοὺς τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἀνδρὸς εἶναι κωµῳδίαν καὶ τραγῳδίαν ἐπίστασθαι 
ποιεῖν, καὶ τὸν τέχνῃ τραγῳδοποιὸν ὄντα <καὶ> κωµῳδοποιὸν εἶναι. Laughter is the blade which, in the social world of polis, persons hold 
over one another’s necks, cf. 897-901. Seidensticker, 1982: see esp. 115-25, is a good treatment of the question of comic elements in Greek 
Tragedy. As he shows, with good bibliography, in the reading of such a scene, (comic or grotesque?) as opens the first episode “ist 
besonders kontrovers”, “stark umstritten” 1982: 115, 117. His reading of Bacchae and the laughter of Dionysus there and in his article on 
comic elements in Bacchae, Seidensticker, 1978 is one with whom I concur; see also Taplin, 1986 on the sunkrisis of comic and tragic. 
Scholars like Seaford (1996, 167) argue, implausibly categorical, that there is no humour in Bacchae (see Seidensticker, 1982: 115-6 for a 
list of scholars on either side of the argument). Seaford wants us to see the atmosphere and tone of the first episode as ‘not comic but 
festive’: “The easiest way producing the scene is for laughs. But P.’s ‘how laughable!’ (250) expresses the hostility of the uninitaited (cf. 
1080-1, and the Skythians laughing at Bacchic ritual in Hdt. 4.79.4). The mood is not comic but festive, like the festival it prefigures.”, 
Seaford p. 167.  Yet we are induced to see characters on the stage from several perspectives, and from Pentheus’ they are ridiculous, see also 
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Bacchae, a question of focalization: “This young105 god whom you laugh at”, Teiresias chides 
Pentheus: οὗτος δ' ὁ δαί/ων ὁ νέος, ὃν σὺ διαγελᾶις 273. In his extensive explanation of 
Dionysus to the young king (266-326), he uses this intensive form of ‘laugh’, a full three 
times106.  
 
Pentheus has excluded himself from the community experience represented by the mirthful 
world of the symposium, a world which is powerfully evoked in Bacchae, as Halliwell saw107. 
If the symposion is evoked in the play, so too is the ‘revel’, kōmos108. Pentheus, a young man 
who has been unwilling to enter the symposiac world (by which is meant chiefly the spirit 
or tenor of that particular form of community formation), although being “the paradigmatic 
age for the youthful vigour (hēbē) . . . documented as a topos of sympotic texts”109, will 
become enchanted by the Stranger and, through this uncanny impressment110, press-ganged 
into only another kind of Dionysiac social community, a kind of perverted kōmos: 
 
In the real social world of classical Greek cities, especially Athens, there was one 
readily recognisable context in which certain men might move through the streets in 
female or feminised dress. This was precisely a (Dionysiac) kōmos . . . So Dionysus’ 
                                                        
Morwood in Stuttard: 91-6, on laughter and its meaning in Bacchae. I think Halliwell puts it best when he writes on laughter in Bacchae, 
that its quality, what kind of laughter we are confronted with, just like the meaning of the mask, changes over the course of the play, a work 
marked by its ‘thematic intricacy’: “The expressiveness of a laughing face (and voice) is equally capable of encompassing ostensible 
amiability or destructive hostility, yet there is no guaranteed way of reading the difference between the two from the face alone. As the play 
progresses, we move away from the clear-cut antithesis that structured the chorus’ perspective in the first stasimon, and are forced to 
contemplate the disturbing presence of both kinds of laughter within the realm of the Dionysiac itself.”, Halliwell, 2008: 137. Dionysus with 
his theatre is the god of changing perspectives. We must be a little like everyone onstage to enter fully into the emotional world of the 
drama, an emotional, pathetic world not a doctrinal explication. The complexity and ambiguity of import is a poet’s strategy both to 
manifest and to appeal to the nature and crucial value for persons of import. The appearance of Teiresias and Kadmos after the high 
Dionysiac emotion of the choral entry hymn is in sharp tonal contrast, precisely because the emotional tenor has the slackened and 
slackening quality of the faintly absurd, the laughable (see Seidensticker, 1982: 118-20). Bacchae – and several of Euripides’ other 
Tragedies – is more mixed, more tonally variegated (poikilon) and multi-faceted than the “ritualist” reading of Seaford necessarily allows 
for. Ridicule and fear of ridicule and the strange proximity of laughter to solemnity is an essential and complex, sophisticatedly handled 
element of the play. 
105 Neos – also “new”, “fresh”, “odd”. For the pejorative use of neos: 216, 256, 362, 467. At Rome threats to political stability was quite 
simply novae res, cultures that survive are conservative, those that thrive too are ones that learn how to integrate the new and foreign. On 
neos “the new” in Greek culture, see D’Angour, 2011. 
106 “And do you deride the fact that he was sewn in his father’s thigh?” καὶ διαγελᾶις νιν ὡς ἐνερράφη Διὸς/µηρῶι; 286-7; “Myself and 
Kadmos, whom you laugh at”, ἐγὼ µὲν οὖν καὶ Κάδµος, ὃν σὺ διαγελᾶις, 322. 
107 Halliwell, 2008: 133-5. For Dionysus and the symposion see Díez-Platas’ “The symposiast Dionysos: a god like ourselves” in Bernabé, 
2013: 504-25. On Dionysus’ figuration in symposiac contexts see Schmitt Pantel in Schlesier: 119-36, “Dionysus, the banquet and gender” 
and plates XVI-XXII. 
108 See Foley, 1985: 230-1. 
109 Halliwell, 2008: 135. 
110 As those Tyrrhenian sailors of Hymn. Hom. 7 had failed to press-gang the god once, for their economic profit. 
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plan to lead Pentheus through Thebes in this manner carries pervertedly komastic 
connotations. 111 
 
Here is a persuasive argument about what is happening in Bacchae. It does not primarily 
enact a ‘perverted sacrifice’ or chiefly manifest a wish to allude to sacrificial ritual112. Drama 
shows acts, agency and persons, and persons are social or fail to be healthily social. When 
sacrifices are perverted or corrupted in Tragedy, that expresses the essential concern with 
the breakdown in social relationships and the consequences of actions and omissions. That is 
dramatized in Bacchae through the Tragedy of anti-social Pentheus and the corrupted 
sociality of the Kadmeians113. He has not known how to enter in to new forms of community 
and take on different, new identities. This need not be code for a thwarted 
Pubertätsweihung114, but the initiatory ritual is the codification of what is being expressed here: 
healthy people change – they move from being four-legged to two and three. They take on 
different identities and this changefulness is necessary and authentic, as is not the arresting 
of identity, which mistakes stasis for permanence and permanence for the good. Pentheus 
could not change roles voluntarily, which is what social life requires. He did not recognize 
how complex and intersubjective his world was. He did not willingly enter into renewing, 
defamliarizing forms of homilia, as afforded in the symposiac and komastic contexts, just as 
he did not recognize that the god was there before him homartei – ὁ θεὸς ὁ/αρτεῖ, 923115 – like 
time transforming him whether he wished or not and seeking to institute relation, establish 
his identity and identity. 
 
To Halliwell as to Foley before, Euripides has woven “sympotic-komastic elements into the 
fabric of the drama”: laughter is one strand in a “tightly woven texture of imagery” sharing 
with other strands this fundamental ambiguity. This ambiguousness has become the 
outstanding, a most discussed quality of the work and its god. In Bacchae Euripides has 
transmuted the “ambiguities of laughter . . . into the material, the motivations and the 
                                                        
111 Halliwell, 2008: 139. See also Foley, 1980 and on the kōmos motif and the admixture of what Halliwell calls “tragic and ‘comic’ 
structures” esp. 117-21. 
112 Much has been written and said about sacrifice and sacrificial patterns and their perversion in Greek poetry, see for example Burkert 
(1966, 1972) and Vernant (in Detienne & Vernant [edd.] 1979). As often providing a very balanced and judicious perspective on Dionysiac 
questions, Henrichs in Faraone & Naiden, 2012: 180-93 “Animal sacrifice in Greek Tragedy: ritual, metaphor, problematizations”, is very 
useful. See also Hamerton-Kelly [ed.], 1987 Violent Origins – Walter Burkert, René Girard, Jonathan Z. Smith on ritual killing and cultural 
formation. See also Zeitlin, 1965 “The Motif of the Corrupted Sacrifice in Aeschylus’ Oresteia” and on the question of sacrifice and 
Bacchae, Seidensticker, 1979.  
113 For the sisters of Semelē, Kadmos, as we have seen, has failed to enter into the spirit of Dionysiac community, a spiritual combination of 
persons with other persons and with that person which is oneself, psychan thiaseuein (75), in the desirable, Dionysiac spirit. 
114 Cf. Seaford, 1981. 
115 There has been an arc by this point, stretching from 43-6, where Dionysus described Pentheus as omitting Dionysus from his prayers and 
libations, spondai, to this moment here, where they are finally enspondai, 923-4: ὁ θεὸς ὁµαρτεῖ, πρόσθεν ὢν οὐκ εὐµενής, / ἔνσπονδος 
ἡµῖν· νῦν δ' ὁρᾶις ἃ χρή σ' ὁρᾶν. 
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disastrous consequences of tragic conflict”116. The poet has caused to overlap most manifestly 
human and divine laughter, and “super-imposed” joyous laughter with the “bleakest face of 
tragedy”. In the ambiguities of laughter we discern the inherent potentialities to possess and 
manifest different qualities, different judgements and bearings or to manifest the failure to 
take appropriate bearings. The nature, the presence or absence and the quality of persons – 
divine and mortal – are at the centre of Bacchae and the problems its protagonists face.  
 
Pentheus, who himself will prove especially sensitive to the dangerous laughter of others 
(because it is so compromising of social capital, credibility) is confronted in Bacchae by the 
infuriatingly slippery, smiling foreigner, Dionysus. In the remarkable transition that 
Pentheus undergoes in the third episode (787-861), Pentheus is falling under the sway of 
Dionysus; the disguised god lures Pentheus into the fatal espionage that will precipitate his 
catastrophic death. Pentheus must disguise himself as a woman. He still shows vestigial 
resistance, 827-8: 
 
Di. ἐγὼ στελῶ σε δω/άτων ἔσω /ολών. 
Pe. τίνα στολήν; ἦ θῆλυν; ἀλλ' αἰδώς /' ἔχει. 
 
Di. I will dress you inside the palace. 
Pe. In what dress? A woman’s? Embarrassment is taking hold of me. 
 
The description of the suggested bacchic transvestiture and the subsequent emergence from 
inside the palace of the by now possessed Pentheus, in the outfit of a female bacchant, offer 
some of the most impressive moments of Greek Classical theatre, unforgettable for their 
simultaneous strangeness and psychological and situational plausibility. Before the 
costuming takes place, increasingly subject to this almost mysterious velleity, Pentheus still 
has the wits to ask how he will avoid the eyes of his fellow Kadmeians, his Theban subjects, 
840. Dionysus will lead him and they shall go along empty streets, explains the god: 840-42: 
 
Pe. καὶ Fῶς δι' ἄστεως εἶ/ι Καδ/είους λαθών; 
Di. ὁδοὺς ἐρή/ους ἴ/εν· ἐγὼ δ' ἡγήσο/αι. 
Pe. Fᾶν κρεῖσσον ὥστε /ὴ 'γγελᾶν βάκχας ἐ/οί.  
 
Pe. And how shall I get through the city unseen by the Kadmeians? 
Di. We shall take deserted streets, I myself shall lead. 
                                                        
116 Halliwell, 2008: 139. 
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Pe. Anything is better than that the bacchants laugh at me. 117 
 
Pentheus leaves the stage, now one manifestly bewitched, and enters the palace for his 
transformation into a ridiculous transvestite figure. Dionysus says plainly to the chorus 
what is happening: Pentheus “will pay the penalty by dying”, θανὼν δώσει δίκην, 847; “We 
are going to avenge ourselves on him”, τεισώ/εθ' αὐτόν, 850. This is the moment for “your 
action, ergon”, νῦν σὸν ἔργον, says the disguised god apostrophizing his own self, “for you 
are not far”, οὐ γὰρ εἶ Fρόσω, he says with now characteristically loaded connotation, 849118. 
Dionysus’ ergon, then, (“deed, action”), is revenge and this revenge is a two-fold murder. 
Pentheus will “pay the penalty” literally, by dying at the hands of the maenads, but first 
figuratively will Dionysus kill him – he will kill him socially. Sustaining the legal imagery of 
847, Dionysus declares that he wants him to become liable to the Thebans119 for laughter 
gelōta, 854-56: 
 
χρήιζω δέ νιν γέλωτα Θηβαίοις ὀφλεῖν 
γυναικό/ορφον ἀγό/ενον δι' ἄστεως 
ἐκ τῶν ἀFειλῶν τῶν Fρὶν αἷσι δεινὸς ἦν. 
 
I want him to incur laughter to the Thebans 
When I lead him through the city in the form of a woman  
After his earlier threats, in which he was so scary, deinos120. 
 
The mocking irony in deinos 856, shines through all the more brightly in the conclusion of 
this address, when Dionysus, succinctly summarizing his notorious ambiguity, as both a 
friend to humans and an awesome divinity, designates himself superlatively, deinotatos, 859-
61121: 
 
                             γνώσεται δὲ τὸν ∆ιὸς 
∆ιόνυσον, ὡς Fέφυκεν ἐν /έρει θεὸς   860 
 δεινότατος, ἀνθρώFοισι δ' ἠFιώτατος.   
 
                  He will recognize the son of Zeus 
                                                        
117 842: The sense seems evident but, editors see here a corruption, the ‘blending’ of two different expressions Roux: “Il y a ici mélange de 
deux constructions . . . ‘tout est bien pourvu que . . .”; Rijksbaron finds this only “partly correct”, but that Roux’s offered gloss ‘all will be 
well as long as’ covers at least part of this ‘contaminated’ line. Di Benedetto: “Tutto è meglio piuttosto che essere deriso dalle baccanti.” 
118 On apostrophe or prosōpopoiia in Bacchae see § 6.1.2 below. 
119 Rijksbaron ad loc.: “Θηβαίοις: dativus iudicantis, for a similar usage with ζηµίαν ὀφλισκάνει, cf. Med. 580-1.”. 
120 Deinos: This will be a key term for discussion here; I am here rendering “scary” to bring out the sarcasm of the god. 
121 On these lines see also § 7.1. 
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Dionysus, as a god by turns utterly 
Terrible or most gentle to mortals. 
 
No less than Pentheus, of course, Dionysus is preoccupied with timē, hyper-sensitive to his 
standing in the eyes of others, extremely jealous of his honour and that of his closest kin, 
which must define him. This, after all, has been the pretext for the events of the drama. In 
this world it is, presumably, an immediately intelligible anxiety and comprehensible motive. 
At the climax of the play, when Dionysus’ revenge is being executed, a voice, “his voice 
most likely”, comes out the air and proclaims to the maenads, 1078-81: 
 
ἐκ δ' αἰθέρος φωνή τις, ὡς /ὲν εἰκάσαι 
∆ιόνυσος, ἀνεβόησεν· Ὦ νεάνιδες, 
ἄγω τὸν ὑ/ᾶς κἀ/ὲ τἀ/ά τ' ὄργια 
γέλων τιθέ/ενον· ἀλλὰ τι/ωρεῖσθέ νιν. 
 
Out of the aithēr a voice, as it seemed likely 
Dionysus’, it shouted out, “Young women, 
I bring you the one who makes laughable 
Me and your and my orgia, now make him pay. 
 
Again, the crux is ridicule, gelōn tithemenon, and the redemption of personal value by taking 
revenge for laughter, for that unpardonable insult, the motivation and bearing, which 
laughter means to these figures. In this economy of honour where the coin is recognition, the 
failure of xenia to welcome the Stranger in the right spirit, is a thwarted theoxenia. It is the 
incurring of a debt, paid back in kind with the coin of laughter. Thersites too, in Iliad 2, must 
memorably pay for his disrespect to a “god-nurtured king” in an epic setting in which it 
belongs more to the gods to laugh, than it does to mortals122. Humans pay for laughter, for 
laughter represents a grave danger, a threat to kings and a threat to gods; it is like that 
touchstone – basanos – against which the social currency that persons have accumulated is 
revealed to be either counterfeit or true, in spite of suspicion and discredit. 
 
 
  
                                                        
122 Thersites: Il. 2. 211-77. 
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5.5.2 Polygethes Dionysos123: Bacchic Laughter 
 
The indexical character of the smile is plain. It is a natural sign from which we abduct an 
emotional state or intentional character. It is one, however, that can be falsified: “smiles may 
deceive”. True, false or ambiguous, a smile is really always indexical; some form of social 
agency, of ‘state of mind’ or intention, is always abductable124. This is what makes it such a 
useful model for the explanation of index and of abductive inference generally.  
 
The god of Euripides’ Bacchae is smiling and his smile is ambiguous. It is, so to speak, the 
sign of an invisible, unidentified but irrefutable intention. Whatever the quality of intention 
to which it refers, the smile is evidence of intentionality (or the release from intentionality, 
which is tantamount to the same thing). Dionysus is not always depicted or described as 
smiling or laughing in accounts of him125, so it is all the more significant that in Bacchae 
Euripides presents a laughing Dionysus126. He laughs through it all in the play. His is a face 
the meaning of which is constantly shifting in relation to the shifting of circumstances127. 
Through all, whatever it signifies about the god’s bearing, his meaning or intention, the 
smiling face is the powerful index (this the brilliant stroke of Euripides) of the god’s 
intentionality, his divinely self-assured agency, he who is both by turn “sweetest and most 
awesome to humans” 861128.    
 
A redeemer of face, (and rebuked for his cheek) that very familiar figure of Greek Poetry, the 
vindicator of his timē129, Dionysus is not only derided and ridiculed (diagelān) in Bacchae130, but 
himself “laughing, smiling”, with a very different meaning than is understood by his main 
interlocutor. This son of Semelē, the chorus chants in the first stasimon (370-433), is the first 
                                                        
123 “Joyful Dionysos” see Hom. Il. 14.325, Hes. Erga 614. 
124  Except in such medical exceptions as involuntary rictus, but just the uncanniness of such instances demonstrates the special character of 
the smile as natural sign. 
125 Although, cf. Hom. Hym. 7. 14-15: ὁ δὲ µειδιάων ἐκάθητο/ὄµµασι κυανέοισι. Seaford on 1021 writes “As here so too in the Dura-
Europos graffito it is as γελῶν, laughing, that D. is invoked to make his epiphany.”; on pictorial representation of Dionysus laughing or 
smiling, see Seaford’s extensive comments on 439. On tragic masks, see Foley, 1980: 127 n. 32. On Dionysiac imagery, see Carpenter, 
1986, 1997 and Dodds xxxiii- xxxvi. 
126 And he more deeply establishes, this powerful work canonizes a certain perspective on the god. 
127 “One mask represents two meanings in a manner that captures the central irony of the dramatic action” Foley, 1980: 128. 
128 Foley’s essay “The masque of Dionysus” (Foley, 1980, but also Foley, 1985) is the outstanding discussion on the smiling mask of 
Dionysus and the inwardness it indexes, but on the subject of “reading” Dionysus and his social agency, mention should be made of the 
essay by Vernant on the facialité peculiar to this god, a very illuminating discussion. On the power of the face, see also Vernant’s La mort 
dans les yeux, Vernant 1985, and on the nature and function of mask, a social prosthetic, concealment and depiction of the inner, invisible 
character, see also Frontisi-Ducroux, 1991, 1995. A recent contribution is Chaston, 2010: esp. 179-238. 
129 208, 321, 336, 1081. 
130 The god and his followers are ridiculous to Pentheus: Eur. Ba. 251,273, 286-7, 322 
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god among the blessed ones “in merriments, festivities”, euphrosunais 376131. To him it 
belongs to dance, to “laugh with the flutes”, meta t’auloū gelasai 380, and to bring an end to 
worries, 377. It is gelōn de, “laughing”, with a ‘brightness in the face’ so to speak, that he 
surrenders himself to the men sent out by Pentheus to arrest the Stranger, making their 
office easy, 439-40132: 
 
γελῶν δὲ καὶ δεῖν κἀFάγειν ἐφίετο 
ἔ/ενέ τε, τοὐ/ὸν εὐτρεFὲς Fοιού/ενος. 
 
Laughing he told me to tie him up and lead him away 
And he waited, making himself amenable to my task. 
 
The face is a single aspect, but with a variety of meanings. These are always contingent on 
the perspective and disposition of the interlocutor or co-present. The inferential strategies of 
the social actors in his vicinity (“neighbourhood” or “nexus” as Gell would put it) will be 
decisive. This dynamic diversity, it seems, is integral to the meaning of Dionysus and his 
natural connection to drama, that complex art of inter-woven and tragically or laughably 
unconciled perspectives. Dionysus’s face, the actor’s mask, is “laughing” prosōpōi gelōnti 
1021133. In this instance a more sinister kind of smile, and a different quality of agency, is 
inferred, 1020-23: 
 
ἴθ', ὦ Βάκχε, θὴρ ἀγρευτᾶι βακχᾶν 
FροσώFωι γελῶντι Fερίβαλε βρόχον 
 θανάσι/ον ὑF' ἀγέλαν Fεσόν- 
  τι τὰν /αινάδων. 
 
Go Bakkhos, beast  
with laughing face, on the hunter of bacchants 
throw, with smiling face, a deadly 
noose, as he falls under your herd 
                                                        
131 Halliwell, 2008: 133 on this line and the symposiac mood evoked in Bacchae, from which Pentheus excludes himself “[the bacchants] 
characterise Dionysus as prime deity of euphrosunē, the archetypal mood of the symposium (‘first of the gods in the elated celebrations 
where beautiful garlands are worn’, τὸν παρὰ καλλιστεφάνοις εὐφροσύναις: 376-8).” 
132 On γελῶν here, Dodds writes, “the actor who played the Stranger no doubt wore a smiling mask throughout. Cf. 380… It is an 
ambiguous smile – here the smile of a martyr, afterwards the smile of a destroyer (1021).” 
133 Seaford on 439: “Dionysus is a θὴρ and γελῶν (a striking combination)”, a further blurring of classifications to express the sense of 
spectrum rather than binary opposition, a dynamic continuum between categories – person, god, human, animal, plant, object, matter, non-
person, virtual person, person – which invests the work with so much of its vitality and sense of shimmering life.  
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of maenads. 134 
 
In an Homeric hymn to Dionysus, we hear it recounted how the glorious son of Semelē 
appeared on a beachhead135, like a young man in his very prime136. The Tyrrhenian pirates, led 
by a disastrous fate, see him and abduct him, delighted at heart for they believed they had 
got hold of the son of one of the “god-fostered kings”137. Dionysus sat, “smiling, with dark 
[unreadable, opaque] eyes”, ommasi kuaneoisi 138. That tension of the lips, which is a smile, 
together “with dark eyes”, beautifully conveys the tension inherent in the situation, and 
something fundamental about Dionysus more generally: a certain tension between bright 
appearance and opaque, invisible thoughts and hidden points of view. Even in that scene, 
and all the more so on the Attic stage, there is an interplay of ignorance, scheming and true 
knowledge, which will become more evidently thematic the more one studies accounts of 
Dionysus. These situations in which Dionysus finds himself, the configurations of ignorance, 
false knowledge, partial knowledge (the sailors do see that he looks like the son of a god-
fostered king), recognition fatally ignored139, serve to illuminate something peculiar about 
this god and what he means for humans, their constitution and their social world: when 
Dionysus comes into human social situations, human knowledge and ordinary social 
strategies are simply inadequate. 
 
 
5.5.3 Gelōs: Waving or drowning?140 
 
Laughter, like fire, is both strange and common. Like fire it is most often sure evidence that 
there are people together where it is found. A person who laughs in private, like one 
drinking alone, can be seen as suspicious or unwell: laughter, fire, wine are indexes of the 
presence of different formations of community. Laughter, like fire, is immaterial, and a trace 
partaking of both the modes of nature and culture. It manifests the entanglement of mind 
                                                        
134Winnington-Ingram, 1948: 127 “The irony of it will be pleasant to Dionysus, and he will smile, not for the first time. Now at last the 
meaning of that enigmatic smile with which the ‘gentle beast’ surrendered to his captors (439) is made clear.” Note also the musical 
emphasis that gelônti 1021, receives from hup’ agélan 1022, in the same position in the following line.  
135 Hymn. Hom.  7.2 ἐφάνη. 
136Hymn. Hom. 7.3-4. 
137 Hymn. Hom. 7.11. 
138 ὁ δὲ µειδιάων / ἐκάθητο ὄµµασι κυανέοισι, Hymn. Hom. 7.14-15. 
139 The kubernetēs here Hymn. Hom. 7.15-24, like the unheeded messenger of Bacchae realizes that they have to do with a god νοήσας 
Hymn. Hom. 7.15. 
140 The famous lines from Stevie Smith’s poem “Not waving but drowning”, (Collected Poems of Stevie Smith, 1972), the first stanza of 
which runs: “Nobody heard him, the dead man, / But still he lay moaning: / I was much further out than you thought/ And not waving but 
drowning.”  
It is a poem and an image which powerfully captures the drama always potentially inherent in the ambiguity of the body’s gestures. 
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and body141. For the Greeks gelōs was, rather than an independent deity, according to the 
expert on the subject “something more like a force of nature that could show itself both 
inside and outside the human world”142. The natural, phenomenal quality of laughter is 
expressed in its strong association, for the Greeks, with “brightness, lustre, or gleaming 
light”. Here one is reminded of 596, where evidence of Dionysus’ presence – as his laughter 
is a trace of whatever motivation it is he conceals within – is perceived as “illumination”, 
“radiance”: augē143.  It will come as no surprise then, that the only god with whom are 
associated fire miracles, this god of manifestations and bright epiphanies, becomes also the 
god laughing.  
 
Dionysus is the most sensual of gods, in the sense that he is most apprehended through 
sensual experience144: he is noisy (bromios), visible (emphanēs), tactile (habros, trupheros), tasted 
(hedus are the liquids he causes to flow: milk, wine, honey 142-3) and sweet-smelling (his 
miraculous wine145 or the sweet smoke emitted by the fire that burns when he is by 144-5, 
Συρίας δ' ὡς λιβάνου κα-/Fνὸν). Halliwell argued that the cultural premise of laughter as a 
natural phenomenon informs something as old as Homer: 
 
 . . . the application of gelastic vocabulary of laughter to large-scale effects of light, 
sound and even fragrance in the natural world . . . It appears likely (though not 
certain) that the Greek gel- root (gelōs: ‘laughter’; gelan: ‘laugh’) has an etymological 
connection with ideas of brightness, lustre or gleaming light, as though the essence 
of laughter were a kind of vital radiance – an idea not without some physical basis.146  
 
Halliwell continues to make the important point that though there be such an association 
between light and laughter, it is not easy to distinguish this from “the tendency to personify 
the natural world”. It is surely true that the most interesting point about the connection 
                                                        
141 The most important and wide-ranging study of “Greek laughter” is Halliwell’s 2008 Greek Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology 
from Homer to Christianity. 
142 Halliwell, 2008: 13. 
143 See 5.3.3 and p. 315 n. 77 above. 
144 See Hall in Stuttard: 25 “. . . the proof of the existence of god by signs and wonders experienced phenomenologically and sensually 
rather than through language,”. In a related way Henrichs makes a very important point about the significance of the sensuality of Dionysus 
and his apprehending, “The Greeks themselves never attempted to detach the divinity of Dionysus from his physical manifestations. they 
believed with Aby Warburg that “god lies in the particulars (der liebe Gott steckt im détail) . . . If it is true that Dionysus was perceived in 
antiquity essentially as an epiphanic god who revealed himself in concrete physical manifestations, as his myths and images suggest, we 
need to concentrate recognition, on the encounter of particulars . . . His divine status is inseparable from the ability of his worshippers to 
recognize him not only in human form, but also behind the particulars of his other manifestations – for instance, his sacred plants or animals, 
his mythical entourage, or his special gift to mortals, the wine.”. 
145 Hymn. Hom. 7. 36-7: ἡδύποτος κελάρυζ' εὐώδης, ὤρνυτο δ' ὀδµὴ/ ἀµβροσίη. 
146 In Dionysus – neos theos – come together the radiance of light, laughter and the “radiance of the new”, on the last of which see 
D’Angour, 2011: 141-8, discussing the birth of Athena.  
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between laughter and light is not a possible etymological connection, but what I think is 
anterior and most telling about human culture and its cognitive character, that is, humans 
habitually and pervasively discern and attribute person-like qualities in and to phenomena.  
 
Olympus rings with laughter in Homer147, and humans ought to be cautious lest their 
laughter, like the smoke of their fires, reach heaven and its jealous inhabitants looking down 
on the ephemeral upstarts of the earth. Laughter is an uncanny and ambiguous 
phenomenon, binding individuals together, a mark of happiness, release and catharsis; but 
also, an expression of aggression, segregating and excluding; or the shudder of aporia in the 
face of absurdity and break-downs in communication or sense. Laughter may be the index 
of either social health or of hysteria and cognitive breakdown.  
 
A smile, however, may be slightly different. It is the index, when not of assent, positive 
bearing to a social other or of emotional delight148, then of something potentially dangerous, 
sadistic, an anti-social privacy, a concealment of intention or the concealment of the absence 
of intentionality, something vacuous. A smile is less a spontaneous reflex than laughter is, 
more nuanced and several in its potential meanings. In Hesiod, Prometheus’ “gentle smile” 
is the index of his opacity, his hidden meaning or intentions. Just as what is best of the slain 
ox is concealed in the stomach of the animal, and the mere bones, disguised under the 
gleaming fat149, so too is hidden the truth of this false figure’s intentions, this friend of 
humans who teaches humankind its crafts and bestows upon it the knowledge and skills 
necessary for civilized, social life150. His smile is a social sign and also the mark of a private 
purpose, of unrevealed individualistic intent, of all the danger that so often entails in 
encounters between social actors in Greek poetry.  
 
As the “index of an inner state”, of “state of mind151” and an almost universal form of 
voluntary and involuntary communicating, the smile is a physical mark or natural sign with 
important social consequences. As a sign it is definitively social, as a phenomenon it has 
                                                        
147 On the laughter of Homeric gods and men, see Halliwell, 2008: 51-99. Of peculiar pertinence to our study are his remarks at 2008: 13 “. . 
. when mainstream paganism ascribes laughter to its gods, not least in their Homeric moments of ‘unquenchable’ laughter, it does so in ways 
that make the anthropomorphic impetus evident. Yet such depictions leave room for a sense that the natural energies of gelōs are not only 
magnified among the Olympians but take on something of the incomplete intelligibility of everything associated with the gods . . . the 
laughter of the gods both is and is not like that of humans.” Henrichs in Masks: 33-4 , cites Vernant on Gernet: “‘Even in the world of the 
Olympian gods. . . Even more, he abolishes the distance that separates the gods from men and men from animals’ . . . in this eloquent 
statement, Gernet’s Other coexists, however precariously, with Otto’s polar Dionysus.”  
148 Aphrodite is winningly philommeidēs, she “loves to smile”, “tends to be smiling”: Od. 8.362, Il. 3.424, Cypr. Fr.5, Hes. Th. 989;. Sappho 
1.11, NB.  association in B. with her; Philomeidēs Dionysos Stob. 4.23.7. 
149 Theog., 536-41. 
150 See Aesch. PV 441-71. 
151 Gell, 1998: 20. 
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originated not out of human minds or practices, apparently, but out of nature and the 
contingent, phenomenal world that does not rely on humans; it seems absolute of culture. It 
partakes of this duality that comes into relief in Dionysus’ presence: the dialectical relation 
between natural or spontaneous phenomena on the one hand, and on the other, the 
interpreting posture of culture, habitually discerning meaning, tracing agency behind events 
and phenomena, so that they become or are translated as “signs”. Much has been written 
about Dionysus’ smiling/ laughing expression referred to several times in Bacchae.152 The 
mask worn by the thespian playing the Stranger and Dionysus, will have been, judging by 
the references in the text, the mask of a laughing face: as much as he may be der kommende 
Gott, Dionysus, by the end of the 5th C. is clearly also a lächelnder and lachender Gott. Laughing 
or smiling – interpretations diverge 153.  
 
Most interesting about this, once again, is the meaning of the ambiguity here. I think a 
crucial question is how to represent movement and sound, which by its nature is dynamic 
and always moving into and out of presence. “Things” do not move but if they seem to feel, 
to have emotion, as a smile suggests, they may very well be capable of moving, and having 
those internal movements called emotions. A smiling god, idol or mask, may simply be so 
inclined as not to move just now. The power of the smile is that it always contains inherent 
within it the potential for ambiguity, it poses a question of motivation, boulēsis.  
 
                                                        
152 Foley, 1980, 1985; Vernant, 1985 ; Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant &Vidal-Nacquet, 1986 ; Frontisi-Ducroux, 1995; Chaston, 
2010. On Dionysus represented in vase painting as laughing or smiling, see Seaford: 186 on l. 439.  
153Laugh or smile?: 439: γελῶν δὲ: “smiling”: Dodds; Foley, 1985: 218 “We know that the mask of Dionysus was smiling”; Kirk; Grégoire 
& Meunier, “tout souriant”; Susanetti, “il sorriso sulle labbra”; Stuttard“smiling”. 439: “Laughing”: Roux, “tout riant”; Von Armin, 
“lachend”; Guidorizzi, Di Benedetto, “ridendo”; Carson, 2015, “he laughed”.   
1021: προσώπωι γελῶντι: “smiling” – Dodds; Winnington-Ingram; Foley, 1980; Kirk; Carson, 2015: “with your fatal smile/ your little 
smile”; Stuttard“with a smile on your sweet lips”; Roux, “souriant”; Grégoire & Meunier, “le sourire aux lèvres”; Susanetti, “con il sorriso 
sulle labbra”; even Guidorizzi’s very muted “con volto sereno”. Segal: 249 on line 1021 “your smiling countenance” but later at Segal: 290 
“The joyful laughter of the flute in Asiatic worship of the god (380) and the Stranger’s imperturbable laughter at his captors (439) now 
change to the sinister ‘laughing’ on the face of the hunter-god-beast (1021).”. Gelān ‘laugh’ –  Von Armin “mit Lachen”; Di Benedetto “col 
volto ridente”; Seaford “with laughing face”. Seaford on 1021 and 439 argues for ‘laugh’: 439 “γελᾶν often certainly means ‘laugh’ and 
never (so far as I know) certainly ‘smile’”. I think he is quite right to account for the translation ‘smile’ as an “unconscious memory of 
Hymn. Hom. 7.14”, where Dionysus is described as “smiling” ὁ δὲ µειδιάων. Perhaps even more the reason is that readers have remembered 
the calm, hesychia, that has been the mark of the Stranger throughout. Meidiān is certainly the word that designates “smile” as opposed to 
gelān, laugh. For thorough discussion with full bibliographical references on this point, see Halliwell, 2008: 13-14 n. 33. See also 136-7 n. 
86, Appendix 1: 520-29. Also his earlier 1993 “The function and aesthetics of the Greek tragic mask”. The comments on the vocality of 
laughter versus smiling (“laughter as facio-vocal and smiling as purely facial”), this fact that laughter is sound and smiling ‘voiceless’ being 
“without a doubt the basis of the distinction between γελᾶν (laugh) and µειδ(ι)ᾶν (smile)” at Halliwell, 2008 520-1, are particularly relevant. 
Laughter and smiling naturally “shade into” one another, the relationship between them is “intricate”: “there are varieties and gradations of 
both behaviours, and these complicate classification [my emphasis]. In particular, the visual impressions of laughing and smiling can be 
thought of as forming a blurred continuum.”, Halliwell, 2008: 520. Translators who render “smile” may be thinking of the actor’s mask, a 
static thing, and the fact that the Stranger does not spend the entire play making “staccato vocalisations”, i.e. laughing, but talks and talks 
calmly.  
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This ambiguity, so useful if one happens to be an idol154, is identical to the “usefulness” of the 
ambiguity of Dionysus’ smile in Bacchae. How to figure movement and change (laughter as 
opposed to only smiling) is connected to the problem of how to perceive those entities 
capable of initiating significant movement and change, persons, and especially of the 
enhanced mutability of divine persons. In the theatre actors are lending their bodily 
presence to the more purely imaginary or virtual persons of the poet’s imagination, so it 
would seem that the challenge that faces the plastic artist – how to convey movement – is 
not relevant. While physical movement is not a problem in theatre, the change in 
perspective and meaning and how to express that constant shifting is. The diversity of 
translations of gelān at 439 and 1021, is a mark of the dynamic conditions that the poet has 
succeeded in conveying. Now static and dynamic, animate and inanimate, emotion and 
tranquillity are not opposites, but form the kind of ‘blurred continuum’, on which we have 
been induced to see moving the mortal and immortal, human and animal. Interpretation is a 
kind of mobilization or dynamizing; it requires or simply is, par excellence, the form of 
human agency, dunamis.  
 
Everything in human life and on the Tragic stage is coloured by or takes its character from 
temporality. Character, is not terminal or static hexis but ēthos, it is habituation, what one is 
become through having done or having suffered over time. Being anthrōpos is not just dying, 
being thanatos, as opposed to not dying. It is being subject to change, living in a context of 
day-today interactions, being ephemeros. Knowledge, facts or truths identified, are things 
grasped and comprehended, they are threads held together. In turn they hold persons and 
communities together, when they form a shared body of knowledge. Yet empirical life, the 
day-to-day life of the embodied person in the historical durée, like the encounter with 
Dionysus, is a dynamic situation. The problem of what one is becomes apparent in the 
vicinity of Dionysus, and what one is is contingent and shaped by circumstance. It is never 
final, but is determined by pressures and forces and persons in one’s vicinity. It is 
determined by a character that is not simply given, but that manifests itself constantly 
through its acts. Every act, desire, choice to greater or lesser degree modifies all the other 
acts that, aggregated, sumperilabomena, we infer to be the person’s ēthos. Character is always 
a kind of synopsis, a synoptic view taken over acts. It is always partial, for one does not 
know what is to come; we never say a living person is definitively blessed or happy. While it 
lives it is subject to this indeterminate order of time, in which things and characters are 
“always coming into being”155. 
                                                        
154 See Gell, 1998: 106-54. 
155 See § 5.2.4 p. 301 n. 31 on Arist. Poet.1450 a 16-23. And cf. Hdt. 1.32, where the great Athenian, Solon, explains that a person, while it 
lives, cannot be said to be olbios, definitively blessed or happy, only to have “good chance”, being eutuchos, for things to fall together 
fortunately for it [πρὶν δ' ἂν τελευτήσῃ, (Hdt. 1.32.37-8 ἐπισχεῖν µηδὲ καλέειν κω ὄλβιον, ἀλλ' εὐτυχέα). We cannot say of a person that it 
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The tension between knowledge – thought to be of static, tenable facts – and empirical 
experience – the flowing, dynamic order of acts – is one that expresses itself in many ways, 
not least in the complex ambiguities attendant upon Dionysus, his claims and the experience 
of him suggested in Bacchae. I suspect that this is the tension that accounts for the “slight 
equivocation” that Halliwell identified in Aristotle’s discussion of praxeis and ēthos in the 
Poetics156. It is the basic epistemic problem that issues from the enigma of time and how to 
‘hold perspective’, so to speak, how to unite perspective (viewpoint, even state of mind) 
with that of others and ensure that it corresponds in a valid way to phenomena (what ‘valid’ 
will mean will of course depend on values and vice versa). It is the tension that explains the 
need felt to distinguish between “character-viewpoint” and “personality-viewpoint” by Gill, 
discussing Greek Tragedy157. It accounts for the way in which interpreters feel confronted, in 
Dionysus, by the complexities of absence and presence. Always coming into being and 
tending to hide itself, the person of Dionysus is much like Heraclitus’ phusis, for he too 
“likes to conceal itself”: the drama of epiphany requires the character of concealment158. 
Concealment entails also occasional apparition, if intermittent and more or less 
unpredictable. It entails a certain receptiveness in persons commensurate with this 
dynamism, forms of inference that are apposite to the dynamic character of phenomena.  
 
The space on the mask of Dionysus, the mouth (from which apparently debouches a god’s 
voice and mind), is the very pattern of this tension. It is like a conduit from the inferred fact 
of character within, to the acts of person without, constantly ‘flowing out’ into the public 
domain, co-presence. These form a kind of electric circuit, flowing in and out, it is not a 
question of substance, but rather of “charge”. Dionysus’ gelān, his laughter, is the painted, 
static smile dynamized or made animate as laughter through the closing of the circuit with 
co-present humans – those natural theorizers, dazzling interpreters – who are the ones 
bristling with vitality, the ones who conduct, invest with meaning. They make the static and 
                                                        
‘gathers together’ – sullabein – all the elements of any condition, because as a time-bound being the elements are always coming into being, 
Hdt. 1.32.38-9: Τὰ πάντα µέν νυν ταῦτα συλλαβεῖν ἄνθρωπον ἐόντα ἀδύνατόν ἐστι, see also § 3.3.3 p. 122 n. 163, § 5.3.3 p. 219 n. 88. 
156 See p. 51 n. 26, p. 137 n. 9, pp. 302-3 n. 31. 
157 Gill, 1986: 252-3.  
158 Heraclitus fr. 123 <φύσις> δὲ καθ’ Ἡράκλειτον <κρύπτεσθαι φιλεῖ>. See also 4.3.4 p. 181 n. 137. Just as implicit character becomes 
explicit, the pattern of things is concealed, becoming occasionally apparent. Dionysus comes rhythmically, a presence at his festivals, or 
there in the midst of social well-being and cheer. Dionysus, son of Zeus, son of Kronos is like phusis and underwritten by nomos: he is just 
the material to bind together being and becoming, a magic thread. The gods conceal time, 888-9: κρυπτεύουσι δὲ ποικίλως / δαρὸν χρόνου 
πόδα. Whatever is divine becomes instituted and becomes natural, nomos is the habituated divine daimonion, it is instituted, naturalized and 
natural, 894-6: ὅτι ποτ' ἄρα τὸ δαιµόνιον, / τό τ' ἐν χρόνωι µακρῶι νόµιµον / ἀεὶ φύσει τε πεφυκός, see on these important lines also § 4.3 p. 
248 n. 101, § 7.3 p. 400-401. Perhaps in this light might we read the famous words ascribed to Heraclitus, fr. 119 ἦθος ἀνθρώπωι δαίµων.  
On time as a rhythm of concealment and revelation, see also Ajax’ lines at Soph. Aj. 646-7: Ἅπανθ' ὁ µακρὸς κἀναρίθµητος χρόνος/ φύει τ' 
ἄδηλα καὶ φανέντα κρύπτεται·. 
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the transcendent to move and they bind the threads of identity. If this seems a lot to read 
into the smile on a mask, it is really that Euripides has turned the mask into a complex 
instrument, something that seems animated, that changes as the situation changes. In other 
words, he has succeeding in making it animate, a model of just that which is radically 
subject to the continuous shifting of temporality. 
 
En merei, by turns, “most terrible and most gentle to humans”, δεινότατος, ἀνθρώFοισι δ' 
ἠFιώτατος 861, Dionysus says of himself, and both sweet and daunting is the smile and 
laughter of other people. 159 The smile that wreathes the face of Dionysus, either sweet and 
attractive or the sign of a dangerous occlusion of meaning and purpose is, like the human 
smile, always the index of a sociable (interpreted) agency160. Laughter, that strange human 
reflex, a temporary relaxation of will, (an uncanny penetration of the everyday, like those 
other involuntary reflexes: communicable yawns, the jerk of the somnolent, slips of the 
tongue, hiccoughs, déja vus, the bubbling up arbitrarily of vivid memories and compulsive 
behaviours of countless sorts161) in its contortion of the face and involuntary shaking of the 
body, laughter represents a social danger. Laughter can be the smoke, one may say, that 
indexes the fire of burning shame, that corroding solvent of kleos and timē, as one stands in 
the polis amongst one’s social fellows.  
 
 
5.6 Summary 
 
Dionysus requires inspired modes of inference. The faculty of mind, the gift of Promethean 
fire, by which humans are so impressively deinos, awe-inspiring – Πολλὰ τὰ δεινὰ κοὐδὲν 
ἀν-/ θρώFου δεινότερον Fέλει162 – has only a relative value in Dionysus’ proximity. The 
encounter with this god constrains us to review our epistemic and emotional postures. 
Dionysus cannot be deciphered the way humans ordinarily read characters. His signs are not 
of the linguistic kind, untranscribed. They are “natured” signs becoming abducted into the 
body of knowledge, which we call tradition, custom or common sense, “what the common 
people cherish”. There is as if a perpetual circle of transformations from natural into 
normative and normative into natural, with Dionysus. By the familiar patterning of thought 
and its syntaxis of experience, events, phenomena, cause and effect: modes and identities are 
distinct. With Dionysus they seem to move on a dynamic spectrum. The meaning of the 
                                                        
159 Cf. “The Bacchae not only exhibits the ambiguities of laughter, its involvement in both celebration and cruelty; it transmutes them into 
the material, the motivations and the disastrous consequences of tragic conflict.”, Halliwell, 2008: 139.  
160 “. . . the god's mask remains smiling, but the visual effect of this smile does not remain consistent.” Foley, 1980: 129. 
161 Cf. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111a and above § 2.2.2 p. 56 n. 140. See also Giddens and Goffman on the significance of control of the body in 
interactions, Giddens, 1984: 78-80. 
162Soph. Ant. 332-3. 
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same thing becomes its very opposite: the contents of things changes with events in time. 
While the outward form of the god is mutable, his purpose is unbending, agnamptos. 
 
Probability, deduction, the usual modes of decipherment: these are neutralized or even 
invalidated with Dionysus. Inspiration, emotion, disposition are all-important. The power of 
calculation, planning ahead and anticipation – elpis – fades and with them the effectiveness 
of human technē and the validity of an orientation towards the absent telos. The notion of the 
“natural sign”, a trace of presence rather than a conventional mark typically indicating 
absence, is a complex and difficult one. What I am here calling Dionysiac abduction is the 
imaginative, habitually personificatory mode, of inference uniquely commensurate with the 
dynamic personhood of Dionysus.  
 
Those phenomena adduced by philosophers to exemplify “natural signs” and explain the 
abduction of agency, happen also to be phenomena seen in Bacchae as the conspicuous traces 
of agency. Dionysus is a certain kind of fire-god, distinct from fire in its utilitarian modes or 
character. He is a god in whose dramatization we are encouraged to discern the double 
potentiality of something like hair: either or in turn revealing agency or absence of agency. 
Dionysus is a laughing god: the meaning of his laughter changes and it is this 
changefulness, the dynamism or animacy of Dionysus’ “signs”, which also entails an ad hoc 
responsiveness not quite equivalent to the reading of conventional, arbitrary signs.  
 
The human mind “seizes” meanings and the mental objects of its intentionality. Dionysus 
challenges this very cognitive mode of possessing knowledge. For Dionysus’ world is one 
not of static objects but of things in motion and qualities impossible to represent in signs, but 
which must be experienced in person. Dionysus’ face and his proximity seem to call for a 
divinatory posture. We have to become mainomenoi, paradoxically also out of person, inspired 
like Teiresias, whose craft is so violently impugned by Pentheus. We require the healthy 
mania of mantic inspiration, as Plato put it, which the Thebans did not have. The god of fire 
prodigies – thaumata – is a person through whom becomes articulated the problem of 
communication, just as he promises special modes of communing, which solve that 
problem. Pentheus’ body is described in the final scenes as something “not easily 
discovered”, something like a gruesome puzzle “pieced together with difficulty”. Dionysus 
is a special category of person, revealing how vague and difficult to locate meaning and 
identity always are. It takes an inspired quality of knowledgeability to begin to apprehend the 
truths implicated in Dionysus’ presence. 
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6 
 
Ōps ops1: A Voice in the Aithēr, a Face in the Clouds 
 
Human cognitive systems have generated a stunning array of cultural forms. Any 
method of controlling this splendor theoretically offers a glimpse of the structure of 
the imagination. Dionysus dances not in heaven but in our heads.2 
 
In Bacchae Dionysus neither dances only in heaven, nor only “in our heads”. He dances as a 
body amongst humans who are not any more subjects of thought and feeling and language 
than they are embodied presences, flesh and fluid. Perhaps if the Theatre of Dionysus were a 
cinema, the argument could be made that this was a spectacle designed to take place in the 
minds of the audience its realities only activated cognitively. Yet this is a theatre of present 
bodies, live voices and sensual effects. In Bacchae still more, it is the very entanglement of the 
virtual and the physical, of presence and absence, which constitutes the dance. Perhaps if we 
feel that interpretation entails finding a method to “control splendour”, then we shall find 
that Dionysus is a cognitive god, one revealing the structure of human imagination and 
working through it. And yet, Dionysus’ presence seems to reveal that the mind and its 
capacities shows only one face of being. He is the most emphatically incarnate of Greek gods 
and his dance is not only, or even primarily, a cognitive dance. It is the dance of human 
bodies – of mind and body poikolōs, forming a variegated whole or continuum – in the midst 
of other like bodies and minds. The mysterious, the irreducibly opaque dimension of 
existence is the life of the body, the being matter and mind, alternately a subject of 
experience and a natural object. In this chapter I attempt to come to grips with Euripides’ 
Dionysiac vision as a vision of the enigmatic contiguousness of mind and body, voice and 
flesh, presence and absence. 
 
The Romans called a mask a persona: an object ‘through which’, per, a voice ‘sounds’, sona. 
The Greeks called it simply “face”, prosōpon. Ōps in Greek designates “eye” and “face”. Ops 
is a poetic word for “voice”. These are the two tools – body and its verbal contents – that 
form the components of the actor’s suite. They are also the two necessary elements for the 
historical, embodied presence of persons. This is shown in different ways through the action 
of Bacchae. 
 
                                                        
1 LSJ s.v. ὄψ: “voice, whether in speaking, shouting, lamenting . . . word (Cogn. with ἔπος, εἰπεῖν.). ὤψ: “eye, face, countenance . . . θεῇς εἰς 
ὦπα ἔοικεν in face she is like the goddesses, Il.3.158”. 
2 Lawson & McCauley, 1990: 184. 
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The Pronomos Vase, dating to the period of the composition and performance of Bacchae, 
depicts Dionysus with the cast of a satyr-play3. It is a most striking set of scenes of actors 
partly costumed and partly clothed. Theatrical masks – heads – of satyrs, maenads and other 
dramatic characters are held, regarded, or gazed at in a posture that will become a visual 
trope of Ancient painting4, or they are free-floating, or set to the side or simply carried as 
portable props. Lyres, flutes, dancing, costume; winged Eros, actors in the accoutrements of 
specific characters (like Heracles); dressed heads, a vine, a narthex; the enthroned, beardless 
Dionysus, sensual  and ringleted, with Ariadne on his lap: the scene is a marvellous tableau 
of the world of theatre and its god. It is also a useful resource for getting some kind of idea 
about what Greek theatrical masks were like: not simply façades, not surfaces covering the 
front of the head, but three dimensional heads, containers in which to place the actor’s own 
head. 
 
The frescoes preserved at the Campanian town of Pompeii very often evoke bacchic scenes. 
Those, however, convey Hellenistic and Roman views of Dionysus, which seem at first 
glance, in most cases to betoken a reduced sense of the meaningfulness of the god. By that 
period he has become a token of Eastern Mediterranean cosmopolitan “life-style” and 
sophistication. Roman Bacchus designates metnonymously: Wine, pleasure, the life of otium 
and tryphē, a Roman symbol for the life of luxuria5. Dionysus has become the patron of a 
certain kind of global consumer’s understanding of pleasure and the good life. “A regulated 
ecstasy has lost its germ of danger”, wrote Martin Nilsson memorably6. Certainly by the 
Roman period, at least in that provincial and culturally aspirational Campanian town, with 
its merchant’s view of Dionysiac religion, that germ seems vanished, if those frescoes are 
anything to go by.  
 
Modern interpretation of Dionysus, since Nietzsche that is, may be seen as an effort to 
reclaim the more dangerous and enigmatic god of depths, of the Greek Classical period, 
from the expurgated, Roman imitation of Bacchus, god of surfaces7. The cultic, solemn, 
                                                        
3 Circa 410 BCE. ARV2 1336, 1; Museo Archeologico Nazionale: Side A: Dionysus and the cast of a satyr play. Side B: Dionysos and 
Ariadne with satyrs and maenads. On the Pronomos Vase, see Giacobello in Giacobello, [ed.] 2015: 61-73; Taplin &Wyles, [edd.] 2010; 
Beazley, 1963. 
4 The “Yorick” attitude, we might call it, for it brings so forcefully to mind that scene in Hamlet (and its visual depictions) in which the 
prince finds the dead Fool’s skull and holds it aloft, inspired to deep reflections on the nature and identity of mortal persons. 
5 The affair of the Bacchanalia and it suppression, 186 BCE, described by the Roman historian Livy, does suggest that Dionysus and his 
rituals could still represent a threat to the powers that be. This does not in itself mean that he held a dangerous religious significance, but 
more likely the opposite, that he was seen as Pentheus saw him, as only a pretext for the immorality and disorder which was the threat, see 
Livy Ab urbe condita 39; on this incident Walsh, 1996 and on bacchic Religion at Rome, Nilsson, 1953. 
6 Nilsson, 1949: 194, 208. 
7 Which is the same hedonistic character found depicted again later in Renaissance painting. On the frescoes at Pompeii and the bacchic 
atmosphere and lifestyle of the civilized East they are meant to evoke, see Zanker, 1998. 
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fearsome god who upsets the foregone conclusions and established values of the “city as 
economic community”, would come to require a cautious, anthropological approach. With 
this redeemed god for a godless modernity, the usual strategies for interpreting persons and 
our own unexpressed assumptions will have to be made manifest and relativized.  
 
In Euripides’ time it seems Dionysus has not yet lost that germ of danger. Perhaps, however 
this “germ” is a seed or “vine-cutting” planted by poets like Euripides. Carpenter in his 
study of Archaic, black-figure vase representations of Dionysus suggests that it is not the 
case that there was an original, authentic “deep” Dionysus which fades with some supposed 
cultural decadence and loss of seriousness. Not unlike the Pompeiian Bacchus, Dionysiac 
motifs in the 6th Century seemed to have an ambient function, associated with the utensils of 
the symposion and the mirth of company, until the 5th Century and the effects of Greek Drama 
on the perceptions of the gods8. It is Tragedy, we may suspect, which through its 
articulateness and responsiveness, through the opportunities that poets have to develop and 
modify the versions (handling, “drafts”) of their predecessors and contemporaries, invests 
figures like Dionysus or Oedipus with such “depth”. New angles, new versions like layers, 
every performance a different kind of new lighting on a subject, a newest portrait, a fresh 
draft: these create the conditions for an ever more dimensional development of the meaning 
of their acts and lives. Tragedy is a creative and constitutive tradition, not simply a phase in 
the objective transmission of an original person or essential, timeless character. It is 
historical – an historical engagement with questions and persons that are only ever as if not 
themselves entirely historical. 
 
Wine does not simply mean harmless pleasure. It is associated with inspired mania: in 
Euripides’ hands Dionysus becomes a remarkably ambivalent figure. The potential character 
of wine, either it will reduce or heighten, seems to have served almost as an inspiration for 
the Metaphorik of ambiguity of Bacchae. The wine god is one kind of person within another. 
He inspires not only merriment but reveals a different aspect of reality through its 
estrangement, the alternately healthy or insane alienation of humans from their daily 
identity. In this chapter, we explore the mask and face of Dionysus and its implication for 
the themes of personhood and identity treated of throughout this study. The mask too, has a 
double potentiality and invites an interpretive posture – some see in it only escape, 
hedonism and flight from seriousness, others recognize its power to bind individuals 
together, to refresh and heighten the sabbatical mind. The mask inspires our questioning: 
does it merely cover and dissemble or does it conceal in such a way that we find a deeper 
meaningfulness, a new perspective on personhood and agency? 
                                                        
8 Carpenter, 1986. 
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6.1.1 Presence and Appearance 
 
        τίς αὐτὸν δεῦρ' ἂν ὄψιν εἰς ἐ/ὴν 
καλέσειεν, ὡς ἴδηι /ε τὴν εὐδαί/ονα;9 
 
Who would summon him here face-to-face with me 
So that he may see the fortunate one that I am? 
 
Human personhood is not co-extensive with its appearance. Yet the existence of a person 
does depend on its physical form. The body is a necessary but insufficient condition for the 
presence of a person. Presence is not identical to appearance. Agauē carries her son’s head, 
the actor’s mask. She wants him summoned to her – “before me”, “into my presence”, “face-
to-face”, opsin eis emēn. He is dead, no longer there, no longer capable of “seeing being seen”, 
horōn horōnta10. He is also “not there” as long as Agauē is not cognitively there – in her right 
mind, conscious – to recognize him. There is a symmetry with Actaeon, who when he had 
lost his human form was still “there”, conscious as himself, but that virtual element of self 
remained undetected by others in the body of a stag, hunted down by his own dogs, which 
were incapable of discerning his personhood in its new bestial form.  
 
Pentheus has lost both face and voice, the two crucial components of personal identity and 
also the two dimensions of the stuff from which drama is made: visible, public identity and 
talk, issuing from within, out into the public domain. Dionysus as immortal is a versatile 
person: he can be there as disembodied voice; he can be there as an embodied entity 
amongst others11. The human person must be potentially always both physical presence and 
voice, in order to meet the requirements of the possession of the potentiality of personhood. 
The decisive criterion for human personhood is the presence together of body and voice. The 
criterion for agency will be the presence of self-reflexive mind, which we infer from a voice 
which “hears itself hearing” and knows itself heard.  
 
The crux with Dionysus – and with all persons that matter to other persons – is not whether 
their form be visible, but that they actually be there, that their unique identity be present. We 
console ourselves with images, icons and effigies, even though we know this to be only 
salve. We feel our dead are gone, phroudoi. We mourn and regret the absence of the dead 
and lost. They are irreplaceable; there is no substitute for the persons we love, they are not 
fungible – as is one of the themes of Euripides’ Alcestis. We have icons of them or the record 
                                                        
9 1257-8. 
10 470 ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα, καὶ δίδωσιν ὄργια – “Seeing him, seeing me”. 
11 The stranger was not there, Dionysus becomes a disembodied voice: 1077-79.  
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of their words which can seem to bring them back to mind momentarily, but we do not have 
their living faces freely producing new words in le temps irréversible. We represent them, but 
never succeed in really making them present again. Humans master Vorstellung and 
Herstellung, but time and mortality remain agnampta, unbending and unpenetrated. Presence 
would mean co-presence in shifting time – occurrent, indeterminate and always coming into 
being.  
 
Dionysus in his myths, such as in Bacchae, is distinguished by his becoming co-present with 
specific, historical humans12. He is for a time not a representation, behind which to motivate 
some mortal intention or normally intelligible agency, but a person who has come into being 
in that organic, inadvertent way that natural persons, having bodies and being subject to 
time, come into being: much is made of Dionysus’ conception, gestation, surrogacy, birth, 
infancy and career travelling in the historical world of “the cities of men” in Bacchae. 
Representations are sufficiently effective for those purely virtual beings, the gods, for they 
are always circumscribed by the limits of their representations. They are often only 
intermittently incarnate or materialized; their presence is strange and wondrous. Their 
presence is not as tightly bound to a peculiar form or appearance as it is with mortals.  
 
Gods can be worshipped in an endless number of forms, their personhood not depending on 
any specific shape. In Ancient Greece as in many places in the world, gods took iconic and 
aniconic form. Wooden masks, liquids, statues, effigies, natural phenomena, anything 
perceptible it seems, could be impersonated, invested with personhood. At Samos, Hera was 
worshipped as a wooden plank, sanis, as was Artemis at Ikaros, as a piece of wood13. One of 
the most ancient forms of worship is that of sacred stones. The Greeks, Philo of Byblos 
recorded, possessed these, calling them baitulia, their word for meteorite, derived apparently 
from the Semitic “beth el”, house of god14. They saw these as lithoi empsuchoi, stones having 
mind within. Virtual mind is not contingent on its containers, (it can be transmitted through 
space in ciphers, after all, such as in texts or over time such as in the inherited beliefs and 
practices of a people, their paradochai, nomoi and orgia borne along by successive 
generations). Inversely, bodies can seem to be emptied of mind, as in the case of the 
maenads in Bacchae. 
 
                                                        
12 Historical in that even if “mythic” they have been temporally and geographically delimited and seen as subject to the physical laws of 
ordinary, historical life unlike super-natural or daemonic beings. 
13 Hera: Callim. Fr. 100; Phoronis fr. 4: Καλλιθόη κλειδοῦχος Ὀλυµπιάδος βασιλείης,/  Ἥρης Ἀργείης, ἣ στέµµασι καὶ θυσάνοισι/ πρώτη 
κόσµησεν περὶ κίονα µακρὸν ἀνάσσης. Artemis: Clem. Al. Protrep. 4.46.3. 
14 F.H.G. III 567B-568 A. “It appears, from the examination of all the evidence, that the name βαίτυλοι was appropriated to certain small 
stones of peculiar character, to which various daemonic – or as we might say, magical – properties were ascribed.”, Moore, 1903: 204-5. 
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Alfred Gell’s discussion of these issues, of idols and their animation, in his anthropology of 
art, which rests on his sophisticated notion of agency, is very rich and suggestive for the 
scholar of Greek polytheism and its poetry. From face and voice we may reduce still further 
the minimal conditions for the attribution of person, of mind within body. Eyes – ops, a 
window out onto the world that suggests and interior, space – promise insides and that is all 
it requires, only the implication, for humans to infer the potential presence of person within15: 
 
Eyes are, of all body orifices, those which signify ‘interiority’ (i.e. the possession of 
mind and intentionality) most immediately. The particular attention paid to the eyes 
of these idols arises, not from the need to represent the body realistically, but from 
the need to represent the body in such a way as to imply that the body is only a body, 
and that a much more important entity, the mind, is immured within it.16 
 
This is the cognitive realism of Attic drama too: it is synecdochic. It needs only show parts for 
the audience to react as if to a whole. Pentheus is reduced to his mask/face17. He becomes 
literally only a part and it has become revealed that by an habitual inference we have 
interacted with something that is never “there” in the way that objects are. Inference is 
always this assembling or perfective action, moving from parts to whole, from facets to 
identities. Persons in the theatre are like gods, in having this only too manifestly virtual, 
timeless character. Person, one’s own and that of one’s others, in life the dearest “property” 
– ktēma – for humans, has this absolutely paradoxical and enigmatic nature. Nothing else is 
like it, nothing else so precious and yet it is only ever the promise of a whole or consummate 
identity, only an implication abducted or divined. 
 
 
  
                                                        
15 And person is always a kind of elemental potentiality within, always something inferred rather than a phenomenon more directly, or at 
any rate empirically experienced. Hence, since it is always by implication that we know its presence, the implication is sufficient to indicate 
a presence. 
16 Gell, 1998: 135-36.  
17 Earlier, his name was a part of him that he could not realize would stand for his whole fate, penthos, woe, 367-9: Πενθεὺς δ' ὅπως µὴ 
πένθος εἰσοίσει δόµοις/ τοῖς σοῖσι, Κάδµε· µαντικῆι µὲν οὐ λέγω,/ τοῖς πράγµασιν δέ. And subsequently, he had offered his name and 
origins as the whole containing his entire identity, 507:  Πενθεύς, Ἀγαυῆς παῖς, πατρὸς δ' Ἐχίονος. 
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6.1.2 Prosōpopoiia: Apostrophe 
 
In the spectacle of apostrophe – the address of an absent person as if it were present – we 
become constrained to reflect on what person is and what it is not, on the power and reality 
of the personal fiction. Bacchae complicates any too self-evident conception of the presence 
and absence of persons. We witness persons who are bodily present but in fact absent and 
the god who is thought by Pentheus not to be (there), or treated as a probability by Kadmos. 
He is alternately a verified embodied presence, a disembodied presence or, simultaneously, 
a misapprised phantasm and an hallucinatory double of himself.  
 
Personhood, identity, character, psychology, subjectivity: these qualities – like Euboulides of 
Miletus’ “heap”, soros18 – are marked by vagueness and paradox. They are qualities of 
composition, impossible to quantify. They are only as graspable as the ghost of Antikleia, 
whom Odysseus in the world of incorporeal persons pathetically tries to hold, three times in 
vain19: 
 
ὣς ἔφατ', αὐτὰρ ἐγώ γ' ἔθελον φρεσὶ /ερ/ηρίξας 
/ητρὸς ἐ/ῆς ψυχὴν ἑλέειν κατατεθνηυίης. 
τρὶς /ὲν ἐφωρ/ήθην, ἑλέειν τέ /ε θυ/ὸς ἀνώγει, 
τρὶς δέ /οι ἐκ χειρῶν σκιῇ εἴκελον ἢ καὶ ὀνείρῳ 
ἔFτατ'·  
 
Thus she spoke, but my heart was torn [mermērixas] and I wished 
To console [eleein] the spirit [psuchē] of my deceased mother. 
Three times I sprang forward, my heart [thumos] bidding me to pity, 
Three times like a shadow or a dream out of my hands 
She flitted [eptat’].  
 
The Homeric notion of a person was of something composed of two distinct elements: solid 
flesh that melts away and an immaterial, fluttery part that becomes disengaged from matter 
at death; it survives the pyre having always been like a wisp of smoke itself. The living 
human subject is a commingling of congealed matter, it holds together – xunechei – and some 
breath-like, sublimated quality that disperses. Like “winged words” – ἔFεα Fτερόεντα – 
this flits away, weightless. His mother’s sorrowfully intangible spirit explained this Homeric 
                                                        
18 On the so-called sorites paradox of Euboulides, see Diog. Laert. 2.108 and 7.44 ff. 
19 Hom. Od. 11. 204-8. 
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view of the ontological nature and fate of the human person to the still embodied, historical 
person of her son, Odysseus20: 
 
’ὤ /οι, τέκνον ἐ/όν, Fερὶ Fάντων κά//ορε φωτῶν, 
οὔ τί σε Περσεφόνεια ∆ιὸς θυγάτηρ ἀFαφίσκει, 
ἀλλ' αὕτη δίκη ἐστὶ βροτῶν, ὅτε τίς κε θάνῃσιν. 
οὐ γὰρ ἔτι σάρκας τε καὶ ὀστέα ἶνες ἔχουσιν, 
ἀλλὰ τὰ /έν τε Fυρὸς κρατερὸν /ένος αἰθο/ένοιο 
δα/νᾷ, ἐFεί κε Fρῶτα λίFῃ λεύκ' ὀστέα θυ/ός, 
ψυχὴ δ' ἠΰτ' ὄνειρος ἀFοFτα/ένη FεFότηται. 
 
“Oh me, my child, ill-fated of all men, 
Persephone, Zeus’ daughter, is not deceiving you at all, 
But this is the very law for mortals, when one should die. 
For your sinews no longer hold together the flesh and bone, 
But the mighty ferocity [menos] of gleaming fire subdues these, 
And as soon as the soul [thumos] should first leave the pale bones, 
The spirit [psuchē] flits away, fluttering like a dream. 
 
In Iliad Achilles is a man in his prime, a being of physical splendour, god-like for his body, 
while in Odyssey or in Euripides’ Hecuba, where he is a vengeful ghost, his body is no more, 
he is only a presence, not present. He has the same ontic identity as Antikleia, and he longs 
above all for the embodied condition of mortal existence, which he has lost21. He is phroudos: 
“gone away”, “vanished”. Hector’s body is there, glorious as a Trojan Achilles, he is a loved 
presence amongst his people, to his wife and the son he has sired. By the end of Iliad Troy is 
emptying out and Hector’s body has been drained of its most valuable contents. Hector the 
person is phroudos. In Iliad he has become an object for Achilles to outrage and the gods look 
down on the husk of Hector with pity22. The body was so much the man, it remains 
vestigially Hector, a spoor of the person, and it therefore matters how it is treated – by this 
emotionally plausible contradiction that thing is still partially Hector. Odysseus is a body 
full of mind. He is nagged at by his body, he must keep it going, cover it up, disguise it and 
dissemble. He must pretend it is another body and feign that it is “no one’s” body.  
 
The prologue of Bacchae is a manifestation, a dramatic theophany to the audience. I am a god 
and I am a human body, explains Dionysus. He describes his conception and birth and the 
                                                        
20 Hom. Od. 11. 216-22. 
21Hom. Od. 11. 487-91. 
22 Hom. Il. 24. 23-4. 
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thrust of what he says is the establishment of his spatio-temporal presence, specifically here 
at Thebes, now at this moment, the first visitation in Greece. The ritual hymn of the 
bacchants, the parodos, provides the verification of a third party. In mythic, lyric terms they 
underwrite what he has said, again emphasizing Dionysus’ origins and incarnation. In the 
first episode Dionysus is disputed flesh: to Pentheus the son of Semelē is no god; to Kadmos 
it will be useful to act as if he were; for Teiresias this is a divine being. Pentheus arrives in 
Thebes, he has been phroudos in the self-evident way: simply ekdēmos. To Pentheus’ mind it is 
flesh and physical impulse which defines persons and their motivations. Identity and 
causation is exhausted by these. How persons are present, bodily, explains why they are 
present, for the satisfaction of their bodies’ desires. “Get your hands off me”, he bursts out, 
he fears being infected by Teiresias and Kadmos, who himself will ultimately be carried in, 
as body parts in the smeared arms of his grandfather: a body but no presence.  
 
In the second episode Dionysus is made present and accounted for, and every attention is 
given to his body, while his own responses reflect a concern with Pentheus’ mind. In the 
third episode the Stranger’s imprisoned body comes magically free and the imprisoned 
bacchants are emancipated to become themselves “gone”, 445: φροῦδαί γ' ἐκεῖναι 
λελυ/έναι. Dionysus sits by, visible but unseen, while Pentheus frantically chases and stabs 
at a phasma he takes for Dionysus. By the fourth episode, Pentheus has succumbed to the 
“light frenzy”, which the Stranger has set in him. He talks to the Stranger but now sees 
double persons, bodies and illusions – the man before him is, magically or madly, also a 
beast.  
 
In the scene of the leading to the mountain of the king by the Stranger, the thwarted 
espionage and sparagmos of Pentheus, Dionysus will undergo a mysterious transformation, a 
disappearance. He leads the party to the mountain, an escort of the spectacle – pompos theōrias23 
– but suddenly is not there, “vanished”24. The next time he is perceived it will be 
disembodied: an incandescent thread of holy fire like lightning stretching from earth to sky. 
Dionysus resounds, a voice in the aithēr25. The voice summons the cognitively empty bodies 
of the maenads to break apart the flesh and bones of Pentheus’ person.26 
 
In the Messenger’s speech in the fifth episode, the king who has been walking and talking, 
surmising and scheming, is described reduced to parts of a body, a puzzle impossible to put 
together again. His mother carries in his head, his grandfather the disassembled members, 
                                                        
23 1047: ξένος θ' ὃς ἡµῖν ποµπὸς ἦν θεωρίας. 
24 1077: καὶ τὸν ξένον µὲν οὐκέτ' εἰσορᾶν παρῆν. 
25 Holy fire: 1082-3; Voice: 1079-81. 
26 1079-81. 
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so hard to carry, shattered into a thousand pieces – muriois zētēmasin – never to be bound 
together again27. Pentheus has become unembodied. Agauē has come onstage in rejuvenated 
splendour, a fit and triumphant hunter, most skilled of all in the sport28. She is a marvellous 
body but out of her mind, physically present but still essentially absent. Slowly she will be 
brought around, into her mind29. Kadmos will bring her back into focus, a mind recognizing 
itself, its body and the faces and identity of those in her co-presence30. Agauē will come to 
herself and become tragic, only when she becomes self-reflexive again31. She is co-present 
with Kadmos; Pentheus is gone and they too shall have to go in the literal sense, becoming 
exiles from Thebes just as the maenads and Pentheus had been exiled from themselves32. 
Dionysus returns in the body of the Stranger speaking in a different person again, the one of 
the divine being incarnate that has established itself in the prologue33. He addresses ruined 
Thebes and the fugitive House of Kadmos. Agauē will be terminally unhoused. The old king 
and his queen will become re-embodied; theriomorphosed they will wander the world of 
human cities as snakes34. In this exile from physical form they will retain their identities and 
one day re-enter themselves and take their seats among the Blessed35.  
 
While it may not at first seem an apostrophe, Pentheus’ address to his mother in the final 
moments of his life is surely one to an absent person. It becomes clear that a definitive 
quality of a healthy, sufficient person is its responsiveness to others in its co-presence. Mania 
of the unhealthy kind consists precisely in the loss of responsiveness to the voice of others 
and the extinction of one’s own personal, internal voice. Equally the positive effects of 
Dionysus may be described not as the annulment of self but of the enhancement of its 
responsiveness, The internal voice of mind is a necessary element of fully qualified presence 
of person, 1115-21: 
 
                          ὁ δὲ /ίτραν κό/ης ἄFο 
 ἔρριψεν, ὥς νιν γνωρίσασα /ὴ κτάνοι 
 τλή/ων Ἀγαυή, καὶ λέγει Fαρήιδος 
                                                        
27 1218-19: οὗ σῶµα µοχθῶν µυρίοις ζητήµασιν / φέρω τόδ'. 
28 1202-15. 
29 1259-96. 
30 1271-76. Note that she has somehow recognized her father all along (πάτερ, µέγιστον κοµπάσαι πάρεστί σοι, 1233), but is otherwise 
alienated from herself, her own words and incapable of recognizing her son’s head that she is holding, e.g. 1272: ὡς ἐκλέλησµαί γ' ἃ πάρος 
εἴποµεν, πάτερ. 
31 1260-2: εἰ δὲ διὰ τέλους / ἐν τῶιδ' ἀεὶ µενεῖτ' ἐν ὧι καθέστατε, / οὐκ εὐτυχοῦσαι δόξετ' οὐχὶ δυστυχεῖν. 
32 Maenads’ exile, 36: ἐξέµηνα δωµάτων. Agauē’s future, 1365-87. 
33 1340-3. 
34 1330-39, 1352-62. 
35 1339: µακάρων τ' ἐς αἶαν σὸν καθιδρύσει βίον. But cf. Kadmos more optimistic outlook on his future, 1360-2: οὐδὲ παύσοµαι / κακῶν ὁ 
τλήµων οὐδὲ τὸν καταιβάτην / Ἀχέροντα πλεύσας ἥσυχος γενήσοµαι. 
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 ψαύων· Ἐγώ τοι, /ῆτερ, εἰ/ί, Fαῖς σέθεν 
 Πενθεύς, ὃν ἔτεκες ἐν δό/οις Ἐχίονος· 
 οἴκτιρε δ' ὦ /ῆτέρ /ε /ηδὲ ταῖς ἐ/αῖς 
 ἁ/αρτίαισι Fαῖδα σὸν κατακτάνηις. 
 
                           He tore the snood from 
His hair, so that recognizing him, wretched 
Agauē might not kill him, and he says, touching 
Her cheek: “I am, look mother, your child 
Pentheus, whom you bore in the house of Echion. 
Have pity on me my mother and do not murder me 
For my mistakes, your own child. 
 
Agauē cannot recognize Pentheus’ voice or his face. The name “Echion” here, as names have 
been throughout the play, is a kind of map or spatio-temporal bearing, a social and 
existential co-ordinate, which Agauē is unable to take36. Her possession by “Bacchos” causes 
her eyes to roll, they are as if unattached, incapable of focus or making connection. The eye 
is detached from the mind as acts are decoupled from agents; and the relation between 
Agauē and her past self, present or future is collapsed, just as her relation to the being in 
front of her, Pentheus, is a thread snapped, 1122-4: 
 
ἡ δ' ἀφρὸν ἐξιεῖσα καὶ διαστρόφους 
κόρας ἑλίσσουσ', οὐ φρονοῦσ' ἃ χρὴ φρονεῖν, 
ἐκ Βακχίου κατείχετ', οὐδ' ἔFειθέ νιν. 
 
She spewed foam and her rolling eyes 
Were spinning, she could not recognize what she had to, 
She was possessed by Bacchos, and he couldn’t change her mind 
[epeithe: “persuade”]. 
 
Later, in the scene in which Kadmos recuperates Agauē’s identity –the Psychotherapy Scene 
– it is a process of re-focusing the eye37; and a gradual regaining of language and then names 
                                                        
36 Cf. 1274, where Agauē is coming round, and it is just this “co-ordinate” which she herself uses to locate herself, 1273-6: Ka. ἐς ποῖον 
ἦλθες οἶκον ὑµεναίων µέτα; / Ag. Σπαρτῶι µ' ἔδωκας, ὡς λέγουσ', Ἐχίονι. / Ka. τίς οὖν ἐν οἴκοις παῖς ἐγένετο σῶι πόσει; / Ag. Πενθεύς, 
ἐµῆι τε καὶ πατρὸς κοινωνίαι. Cf. Strepsiades in Aristophanes’ Clouds 206-16, incapable of reading a map; capable of registering and 
perceiving, but not of making symbolιc inference or connecting wholes to parts. 
37 1264: πρῶτον µὲν ἐς τόνδ' αἰθέρ' ὄµµα σὸν µέθες. 1267: λαµπρότερος ἢ πρὶν καὶ διειπετέστερος. 
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and the relationships they encode38. This is how she will be made to begin to recognize 
relations and thus become her self again, to reconstitute a relationship with herself, that is. 
This is a demonstration of what being a person having and apprehending identity consists 
of ,1264-75. 
 
Present persons are heads you can hold, cheeks you can touch – embodied human entities – 
which you can also talk to. They know themselves addressed and exchange vox transitoria in 
kind39. In a moment of more obvious apostrophe and high pathos, Kadmos has Pentheus’ 
head at hand. He has his body most dismayingly present physically but addresses a person 
that is no person, it is phroudos, not knowing itself addressed, no longer capable of ever 
“knowing” anything again, 1308-2240: 
 
                           ὃς συνεῖχες, ὦ τέκνον, 
τοὐ/ὸν /έλαθρον, Fαιδὸς ἐξ ἐ/ῆς γεγώς, 
Fόλει τε τάρβος ἦσθα· τὸν γέροντα δὲ 
οὐδεὶς ὑβρίζειν ἤθελ' εἰσορῶν τὸ σὸν 
κάρα· δίκην γὰρ ἀξίαν ἐλά/βανες. 
νῦν δ' ἐκ δό/ων ἄτι/ος ἐκβεβλήσο/αι 
ὁ Κάδ/ος ὁ /έγας, ὃς τὸ Θηβαίων γένος 
ἔσFειρα κἀξή/ησα κάλλιστον θέρος. 
ὦ φίλτατ' ἀνδρῶν (καὶ γὰρ οὐκέτ' ὢν ὅ/ως 
τῶν φιλτάτων ἔ/οιγ' ἀριθ/ήσηι, τέκνον),   
οὐκέτι γενείου τοῦδε θιγγάνων χερὶ 
τὸν /ητρὸς αὐδῶν Fατέρα FροσFτύξηι, τέκνον, 
λέγων· Τίς ἀδικεῖ, τίς σ' ἀτι/άζει, γέρον; 
τίς σὴν ταράσσει καρδίαν λυFηρὸς ὤν; 
λέγ', ὡς κολάζω τὸν ἀδικοῦντά σ', ὦ Fάτερ. 
 
                                You my child, you who held together  
My house, born of my own daughter, 
You were the terror of the city, no one would be prepared  
                                                        
38 1269-72: Ag. οὐκ οἶδα τοὔπος τοῦτο· γίγνοµαι δέ πως / ἔννους, µετασταθεῖσα τῶν πάρος φρενῶν. / Ka. κλύοις ἂν οὖν τι κἀποκρίναι' ἂν 
σαφῶς; / Ag. ὡς ἐκλέλησµαί γ' ἃ πάρος εἴποµεν, πάτερ. 
39 See Augustine Conf. XI on human, historical speech and the eternal voice of god, which enters the world of time and its voices falling 
away. 
40 See also § 2.5 and cf. the interplay of persons near and far from the point of view of Dionysus apostrophizing himself, 849 
 Διόνυσε, νῦν σὸν ἔργον· οὐ γὰρ εἶ πρόσω· echoing the bacchants’ words at 392-4: πόρσω / γὰρ ὅµως αἰθέρα ναίον- / τες ὁρῶσιν τὰ βροτῶν 
οὐρανίδαι. See also Segal, 2000 on these passages, in “Lament and Recognition: A Reconsideration of the Ending of the ‘Bacchae’”. 
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To insult the old man seeing your head, because you would exact due 
punishment. Now, dishonoured am I to be cast out of my own house 
Great Kadmos, who sowed the race of Thebes 
And reaped the finest harvest. 
Oh, dearest of men, and even though you are no more, 
Still to me you will be counted with the dearest persons, child. 
No longer touching this chin of mine, with your hand 
Will you clasp me to you calling me ‘mother’s father’, my child, 
And say, “Who injures you, who is insulting you, old man? 
Who is troubling your heart and giving you pain? 
Tell me, so that I may punish who it is that is injuring you, my father. 
 
Pentheus had touched his mother’s cheek, but she was unresponsive or comatose – the kōmas, 
“revel”, has become a cognitive and social “deep sleep”, kōma. In ironic symmetry with that 
situation, the sorrowful Kadmos here projects in this moment of prosōpopoiia an unrealizable, 
future “Pentheus”, who will never touch his grandfather’s responsive cheek and address 
him as dearest kin.  
 
Identity in Bacchae is something inside always coming out and going in – connective – a 
continuous internalization and externalization. Just as the bacchants had celebrated the 
“grace of raw-flesh eating”,41 the consumption of bodies unprocessed, the maenads are 
themselves outside of process and time, and we witness what it has meant to be fully a 
person: being in self-reflexive co-presence with others, recognizing self and other, both 
embodied and empsuchos. The maenad lives in a timeless mode of pure externality, like the 
animal. She becomes literally, spatio-temporally ekdēmos, out of the city and its community. 
She is also cognitively phroudē, absent. The competency of persons, their agency, it has 
become evident, consists in this social and cognitive faculty. This faculty situates others and 
self in responsive relation and recognizes the likeness of self and other: the identity or 
sameness of persons with themselves. Agauē’s madness has been an extreme version of the 
flutteriness of spirit – “Is this fluttering still present in your spirit [psuchē]? – which had 
marked Pentheus, when first he was seen approaching42. They have been too entirely thumos, 
too flutteringly psychos or too vacuously demas, “body”, “frame”. A person is someone with 
whom co-presence can be shared, someone who says, “you and me are feeling, thinking, 
enjoying, watching the same thing”, to paraphrase Teiresias, 189: ταὔτ' ἐ/οὶ Fάσχεις ἄρα. 
 
                                                        
41 138-9: ἀγρεύων / αἷµα τραγοκτόνον, ὠµοφάγον χάριν. 
42 Kadmos of Pentheus in the first episode, 214: ὡς ἐπτόηται· τί ποτ' ἐρεῖ νεώτερον; Kadmos to Agauē in the last, 1268: τὸ δὲ πτοηθὲν τόδ' 
ἔτι σῆι ψυχῆι πάρα; 
 353 
Count no one happy until they are dead, runs the proverbial Greek wisdom expressed 
famously in Herodotus but also shaping Tragic fate, as exemplified in such figures as 
Oedipus and Kadmos. This notion finds a subtle development in Bacchae. Here we cannot 
count happy or unhappy, lucky or unlucky anyone while they are there. The existence which 
is sufficient is not a minimal condition, having a body with breath in it, subsistence or 
merely being alive, it means more than that. It means knowing you are alive, knowing you 
are there amongst others who also have this knowledge. This is brought into relief in Bacchae 
in this scene between Kadmos and his daughter, lost to bacchic possession. She seems alive 
but is not in fact present, not there, 1259-6243. 
 
Properly speaking, only in the condition of cognizance can a person be tragic, and only a 
tragic person is a full person having agency. In them alone do distinctions between good 
fortune and bad make sense, for to them alone does anything really have meaning. A 
forensic-legal, constitutional or normative conception of person and agency does not 
determine or explain the complex picture of personhood one finds on the Attic stage. 
Euripides’ in Bacchae is experimental and innovative, handling the riddle of personhood 
with as much sophistication as he does the riddle of desire and will.  
 
 
6.2.1 Horōn Horōnta44: Co-presence is Face-to-Face Encounter 
 
The mask is a social prosthetic. In Bacchae humans stream to the mountains, they go by foot 
not in a carriage. Because it gives the god more honour to do so, they renounce the body’s 
prosthetics (such is a vehicle45), and take up the god’s skeuē, paraphernalia, instruments with 
non-practical purposes46. The natural prosthetics, skeuē, of the god’s teletai – consummatory 
                                                        
43 See § 2.6 p. 122 for text and translation. 
44 “Seeing him, seeing me”, 470. 
45 Vehicle to the mountain: 191-2, see § 3.3.1 n. 132. 
46 Identification (the function of a uniform to exclude and include, both to mark persons off both in their own eyes and in those of others) 
may be argued to be a very practical purpose. But I mean “non-practical” in the sense that they are not instruments for the accomplishment 
of a further telos but the telos in themselves; they “point” only to themselves so to speak, as traces of Dionysiac wisdom, which in Aristotle 
is phronēsis “knowledge of how to secure the ends of life”, Arist. Eth. Nich. 1140a 24- b 30. This is distinct from wisdom that is poiēton or 
prakton in which there is always a goal to bring something else into being. Dionysiac skeuē, Dionysiac indexes and signs “come into being”, 
are “not brought into being”: their origin is not “in the maker”, they are not objects of contrivance or consideration (τὸ τεχνάζειν καὶ 
θεωρεῖν) as in poiēsis, see Arist. Eth. Nich. 1140a. Dionysiac wisdom in Bacchae, of which bacchic paraphernalia is expressive or the 
presence of which their ritual equipment indexes, is very close to Aristotelian phronēsis, which is “concerned with the good life”. It is the 
advantage of the person with the capacity for deliberation, bouleusis, Cf. Arist. Eth. Nich. 1140a 30-1 ὥστε καὶ ὅλως ἂν εἴη φρόνιµος ὁ 
βουλευτικός. Aristotelian phronēsis is sustained by that most highly regarded of virtues in Bacchae, Sōphrosunē [see throughout Bacchae: 
314, 316, 329, 504, 641, 686, 940, 1002, 1150, 1341 and 386-94]: ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύοµεν τῷ ὀνόµατι, ὡς 
σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν, 1140a 11-13. It preserves or maintains the faculty of judgement, σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν: moral 
judgement that is, the judgement of “what is to be done”, how to act, τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν (1140b. 15-16). Phronēsis is what it takes to do 
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rites – displace the tools, technai, of human purposiveness, telē. His teletai transform the 
relation of persons to time, their identity in time: they will become initiated and 
consummated through adopting these, inducted into new “forms of life”. Human telē are 
aims for changing things and circumstances, not the quality of the person or its relation to 
things and purposes. Time, it seems, is not something “out there”, but something between 
persons and worked out through their co-present bodies – it is relational and cannot be 
subjected to human technical ingenuity and its habitual manners of aiming and handling 
telos. Dionysus transforms time because he transforms relations. 
 
The timeless gods are not only looking down from afar, 392-4. Dionysus, and Zeus before 
him, penetrate the historical durée and come into the social midst of human life; they become 
momentarily co-present, 1-2: Ἥκω ∆ιὸς Fαῖς τήνδε Θηβαίαν χθόνα/∆ιόνυσος. The mask 
is a face with that especially useful quality possessed by hair, it is detachable and 
identifying: it is a link between acts and identity or character – a link stretched between acts 
and moments, it constitutes experience as time, binding past to present. The Greek theatrical 
mask is, judging by the many depictions on vases, more of a head, complete with hair, than 
just a visage, viz. not a surface but a three dimensional object, effectively a container for the 
actor’s head, as noted above. When Dionysus is present, humans let down their guard. They 
are released from social alertness – they may “let down their hair”, as one says. They also set 
aside or lose control of that mutable mask, which is the human face (with this god it 
happens whether voluntarily or involuntarily, as we have seen). Driven out of mind means 
to be no longer ‘inside one’s face’,47 to become unhoused, to be a person exiled from the 
body’s house, 32-3: 
 
τοιγάρ νιν αὐτὰς ἐκ δό/ων ὤιστρησ' ἐγὼ 
/ανίαις, ὄρος δ' οἰκοῦσι FαράκοFοι φρενῶν,48 
 
Therefore have I stung them to frenzy out of their houses 
raving, and they inhabit the mountain, driven out of mind. 
 
                                                        
what Pentheus failed to do, to “hold together houses”, ξυνέχει δώµατα 392, 1302 ff., e.g. 1308-9: ὧι δῶµ' ἀνέβλεφ', ὃς συνεῖχες, ὦ τέκνον, / 
τοὐµὸν µέλαθρον, παιδὸς ἐξ ἐµῆς γεγώς. Pericles and men like him are said to have phronēsis “because they can see what is good for 
themselves and what is good for men in general; we consider that those who can do this are good at managing households or states”, 1140b 
7-11. Dionysus’ skeuē, like his presence and the kind of wisdom honoured when he is honoured is an end in itself – its only end is its 
presence, its being there, when it is manifest it is already consummated, ἔστι γὰρ αὐτὴ ἡ εὐπραξία τέλος, 1140b 7. 
With the running contrast between technical and somatic, contrived and spontaneous, it is notable that Pentheus is said to only “think that 
his tongue is a smoothly turning machine”; when he is only sick, there are no contents in his words, 268-9: σὺ δ' εὔτροχον µὲν γλῶσσαν ὡς 
φρονῶν ἔχεις, / ἐν τοῖς λόγοισι δ' οὐκ ἔνεισί σοι φρένες. 
47 Similarly, in colloquial English, to be ‘off one’s face’ means to be completely inebriated. 
48 Also 36: ἐξέµηνα δωµάτων. 
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The maenad is a model of the asocial, the “desocialized” actor. She has lost self-
consciousness and consciousness of others. She is an intensified, dramatic picture of what 
constitutes both sickness and, a contrario, health. The competent social actor is self-reflexive. 
Its face is an instrument of either communication or deception, and countless nuances 
between on a highly differentiated spectrum of meanings. A competent actor (adult, self-
aware, feeling shame, having language, interpretive of and sensitive to situations) is a 
creature of tact, responsive and perpetually monitoring self and other in its interactions.  
 
There is in all social interactions between competent social actors a kind of tension. This 
tension is relieved on those private or ritualized occasions, when one may let down one’s 
guard, when consciousness and the social, cognitive reflexes of mutual monitoring can for a 
time be released: when one is at home; in the symposion; the revel, kōmas – wherever wine is 
shared, social guard relaxed and self-regard less watchful, when actors have any kind of 
permission to become more spontaneous and less deliberating. One becomes relaxed and 
thus in a state for a different quality of attention, on just those occasions when one can say 
“you are feeling the same things as me”, as Teiresias says to Kadmos, 189: ταὔτ' ἐ/οὶ 
Fάσχεις ἄρα.  This social tension is what Goffman and Giddens called “a sort of ‘controlled 
alertness’”49. Dionysus’s gift, which is not prosthetic, not “put on” but put in (it ‘fills’ the 
imbiber of wine:  ὅταν Fλησθῶσιν ἀ/Fέλου ῥοῆς, 281) is the substance which has such a 
powerful, loosening, unbinding effect on the mysterious property called mind – nóos, or what 
is inside the body, phrenes – the cognitive faculty through which identity, social personhood 
and agency are constituted, continuously dissolved and, in turn, re-constituted. 
 
Presence of mind is a necessary condition for viable social interactions. Presence of mind in 
the social context always means presence of minds. Even in solitude, a competent person, 
because self-reflexive, is not one always unitary mind but minds: a mind conscious of ‘itself’, 
being not a unit but, in moments of reflection and the interpersonal reflection of discourse, 
unified, binding itself together, projecting and thereby constituting itself qua self. Being 
present means knowing one is present and that others “know” identically. In encounters, 
competent actors must not only have but also show they have this reflexivity, a kind of 
cognitive discretion: “actors have to ‘exhibit presence’”50. Absence and presence of mind and 
their social (and therefore, in Tragedy, existential) costs, are what is revealed in this drama 
                                                        
49 Giddens, 1984: 79. 
50 Giddens, 1984: 79. See Giddens’ interesting pages on the psychotic and the incompetent social actor, Giddens, 1984: 64-7, 78-80. As with 
the autist in Tomasello’s work, (Tomasello, 1999: 56-93, esp. 76-7 and 189-90) we learn a great deal about what is “required” of persons 
and the nature of their interacting from observing broken or deficient interactions, see also Baron-Cohen, 1997. The same may be said of 
Tragedy, from which the audience may learn a great deal about what healthy minds and behaviour would constitute in the vision of persons 
who have not avoided tragedy because they have been too instrumental, too zombie-like, too unsympathetic or solipsistic. 
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of the god, whose meaning inheres in his parousia, presence51, whose mindful or mindless 
bacchants (this is an essential ambiguity) celebrate the higher value of attending to what is at 
hand, the present: ta paronta. 
 
Tragedy is a microsociological form52. Fundamental in it is the problem of “face”, which is 
also a key concept with the father of microsociology, Erving Goffman53. Goffman reads social 
situations dramaturgically, with his lexicon of “interactions, encounters, performances, 
roles”54. Persons monitor one another, monitor themselves, monitor their situations and, 
when they are socially competent, are constantly “working” to save the face of their 
interlocutor and of themselves – this is their “tact”. The delicateness of relations, the 
breakdown of encounters and the coming undone of roles is precisely what we find in Greek 
Tragedy. Tragic persons are angular, “squares”, in a world of ongoing frictions, one that 
would be better served by the personal “roundness” that would make the social context and 
its interactions smoother55. Social friction is ineradicable and “roundness”, or the smoothing 
out of difference accomplished extraordinarily by Dionysus, only ever a temporary utopia. 
Dionysus’ utopia is temporal not spatial. Dionysus’ regular, rhythmic festivals and the 
mood that marks his presence is in every sense a social amnesty: losing memory, mnēmē, 
losing mindfulness entails gaining a temporary liberation from the tension and abrasiveness 
of the historical durée56. In Euripides’ vision, Dionysus, wine god and pharmakon, which alone 
smoothes out social distinctions, is the god who brings the only relief from the cares and 
                                                        
51 Parousia: The notion of the epiphanic presence of Dionysus is, according to Henrichs, one of Otto’s most fruitful contributions and finds 
its further development most notably in the “Parisian Dionysus of Jean-Pierre Vernant [1969] and . . . Detienne”. Parousia, “presence”, is 
the term used by Diodorus Siculus (4.3.3.5-7 τὰς δὲ γυναῖκας κατὰ συστήµατα θυσιάζειν τῷ θεῷ καὶ βακχεύειν καὶ καθόλου τὴν παρουσίαν 
ὑµνεῖν τοῦ Διονύσου) for that which belongs to Dionysus which “the women of the Greek cities” hymn. It is preferable to “epiphany” for 
Detienne, 1986.  See Henrichs in Masks: 31 nn. 45-46. For a recent discussion of epiphany in Bacchae, see Marcías Otero in Bernabé, 2013: 
329-48. The parousia of Dionysus is indeed, as Henrichs eloquently shows, a vital part of the meaning of Dionysus. That he is there is the 
spark of life that kindles the drama of Bacchae. The reader of Bacchae will see this patently and ought to connect this central fact to the 
bacchantic morality expressed at 395-9, where retaining those things “present at hand”, ta paronta, is hymned as an absolute value unto 
itself, distinct from the values of those who mindlessly pursue the unrealistic and do not think thoughts appropriate for mortals, 397-9: ἐπὶ 
τούτωι / δὲ τίς ἂν µεγάλα διώκων / τὰ παρόντ' οὐχὶ φέροι;. See also 3.3 n. 137. Cf. the great lines of Pindar at Pi. Pyth. 3. 58-62: “Men 
should seek from the gods only what is consistent with mortal minds, / Knowing what lies before our feet, and the nature of our destiny. / 
Do not, my soul, long for an immortal life, / but make the most of what you can realistically achieve.” (trans. Verity, 2007). 
52 Giddens, 1984: 68. Erving Goffman, developing the notion of “social action” in Max Weber, is most strongly associated with the notion 
of “microsociology”, the sociology of life as it is lived by the body, in encounters and interactions, not only the sociology of systems and 
ideologies. 
53 “The primacy of the face as a medium of expression and of communication has moral implications, many of which are very acutely teased 
out by Goffman.”, Giddens, 1984: 67. 
54 See Goffman, 1959: 15-16 and § 4.3.7 n. 160.  
55 By roundness I mean also the amenability, eutrepes, of persons who see not only the one face of their fellows, but assume those have 
depth and volume and something over the horizon of the present face turned toward them. On Dionysus and “amenability” see § 3.3.1 n. 
132, § 3.3.2 n. 49. For Abba Matoes’ remarks, see above, § 4.2.1 p. 240. 
56 See Mazzaro, 1993 on memory and forgetting in Bacchae. 
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travails of the durée of day-to-day life57. That relief is one that slackens the social alertness 
ordinarily essential for the functioning of society. As Goffman interpreted social life through 
by dramaturgy of “encounters”, so may we fruitfully also approach Tragic Drama, through 
a sociology of human interactions58.  
 
To his credit, Goffman’s sociology – and Giddens’ work, which drew upon it – founds itself 
upon a sensitivity to the social world as one of embodied presences and such a sensitivity 
will always be most fruitful in the interpretation of drama59. Human life unfolds in a milieu 
of visual presence, it is always local. In Goffman’s sociological work two themes are 
essential: “the control of the body in fields of action in co-presence” and “the pervasive 
influence of face”60. The two, of course, are entangled with one another. Giddens conscripts 
Goffman’s notion of co-presence which is defined as: “anchored in the perceptual and 
communicative modalities of the body. What Goffman calls ‘the full conditions of co-
presence’ are found whenever agents ‘sense that they are close enough to be perceived in 
whatever they are doing, including their experiencing of others, and close enough to be 
perceived in this sense of being perceived.”61.  
 
The social context is one of complex mutual surveillance or “monitoring”, to use Giddens’ 
term. It is a highly reflexive context. The social self is one not at all like a thing or an 
ordinary object, but determined by the idea that a subject has of itself and that its co-
presents have of it62. Tact, sōphrosunē, and the amenability, eutrepes, demonstrated by 
Dionysus and the servants of Pentheus63; discretion, aidōs; face, timē – these are wanting or 
corrupted in the social world of Dionysus’ Theatre and in our play.  
 
In Bacchae we have experienced a revenge Tragedy and as most often the case with 
vengeance, the debt to be repaid in this vendetta is a debt of honour or face revindicated64. 
The consciousness of others and of self in the eyes of others, and of others seen as identically 
                                                        
57 Only relief: 282-3: ὕπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ' ἡµέραν κακῶν / δίδωσιν, οὐδ' ἔστ' ἄλλο φάρµακον πόνων. 381-3: ἀποπαῦσαί τε µερίµνας, / 
ὁπόταν βότρυος ἔλθηι / γάνος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν. 
58 On the sociology of Tragedy, see Hall, 1997. 
59 On the body in social interpretation, see esp. Giddens, 1984: 64-73. 
60 Giddens, 1984: 67. 
61 Giddens, 1984: 67, my emphasis. 
62 Giddens, 1984: 64-5, “The body, Merleau-Ponty points out, does not ‘occupy’ time-space in exactly the same sense as material objects do. 
. .”. Merleau-Ponty, 1945: 114, “Le contour de mon corps est une frontière que les relations d’espace ordinaires ne franchissent pas.”. 
63 These are the necessary conditions for the mutuality or reciprocity on which everything depends in human situations, the gentleness that 
belongs to human politesse, the domesticated world, is paradoxically the mark of the hunted down Dionysus who is praos “kind”, “gentle”. 
For his amenability – eutrepes – see § 3.3.1 n. 132, § 3.3.2 n. 49 and gentleness see 436-7: ὁ θὴρ δ' ὅδ' ἡµῖν πρᾶος οὐδ' ὑπέσπασεν / φυγῆι 
πόδ', cf. also “most gentle/sweet/mild”, 861: δεινότατος, ἀνθρώποισι δ' ἠπιώτατος.   
64 Incur a debt of revenge: 516-18; ἄγω τὸν ὑµᾶς κἀµὲ τἀµά τ' ὄργια/ γέλων τιθέµενον· ἀλλὰ τιµωρεῖσθέ νιν. 1080-1. 
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conscious, is the mark of the social world of adults, when these are fully competent agents. 
Giddens defined face with recourse to Ernest Becker’s formulation as follows: 
 
But the self has to submit to social engagement, given that this is done with proper 
deference to the tactful recognition of the needs of others. The infant does not yet 
know this, nor its connection with face. Face as Becker puts it, is ‘the positive feeling 
of self-warmth turned to the world for others’ scrutiny and potential sabotage’.65 
 
“The positive feeling of self-warmth”, “scrutiny” and “sabotage”: these have been the 
thwarted feelings, the deeds and events of Bacchae. Dionysus’ great gift to humans is that 
happy co-efficient of frictionless mutuality available through the sympotic and komastic 
context, moments of special inter-subjectivity. That we may rightly call a “positive feeling of 
self-warmth”, it is a social emotion as the self is a social phenomenon. In Bacchae the denial 
of Dionysiac reciprocity and the required recognition and equality with others has caused a 
breakdown. It has made of Pentheus and the Thebes for which he speaks, a scrutinizer who 
has himself not recognized the need for self-scrutiny. Like his mother and aunts, Pentheus 
has failed to want to be a participant in a healthily intersubjective community that, in 
Dionysiac well-being, becomes bound together in consubjective unity66.  
 
In the spectacle of Pentheus’ dissipated “self-presence”, we have learnt the meaning of 
Dionysiac co-presence. The king has been tactless with a divine social agent, whose 
performance he has not understood67. His story is one of sabotage – lochos – but Dionysus, the 
impersonator, has been the ultimate saboteur, who has shown that Pentheus’ sabotaging has 
in fact been his own undoing. It is a lack of indispensable “alertness” that we may impute to 
Pentheus.  
 
 
  
                                                        
65 Giddens, 1984: Chapter 2 “Consciousness, Self and Social Encounters”, 54. He is citing from Becker’s The Birth and Death of Meaning 
(New York, 1962). Also: “Moreover, most (all?) societies tend to recognize a linguistic similarity between the face as a term referring to 
physiognomy and face as concerning the maintenance of self-esteem.”, Giddens, 1984: 67. On the infant and its cognitive development, 
which reveals so much about the nature of mature, comepetent agency, see Tomasello, 1999, esp. on the so-called “Nine Month 
Revolution”. 
66 Instead of paredros, “seated next to”, as at a symposion; sunemporos “companion”, [57]; summetechōn chorois, “joining in dancing” [63] 
symmachos, an ally, “Mitkämpfer” [1343]. 
67 “A ‘performance’ may be defined as all the activity of a given participant on a given occasion which serves to influence in any way any of 
the other participants. Taking a particular participant and his performance as a basic point of reference, we may refer to those who contribute 
the other performances as the audience, observers, co-participants.”, Goffman, 1959: 15-16. 
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6.2.2 Subject as Object of a Moment 
 
Even person, in the mutability and plasticity of face, even the subject itself, can become the 
object of intentions. That is the premise, after all, on which philosophy as therapy can come 
about. Subjectivity itself – so this theatre reveals and teaches us – can become an object of 
attention. “Yourself” is some thing you can come to “know”. Like all objects, (things we 
have separated sufficiently from ourselves that we can operate upon them or submit them to 
inspection), subjectivity and its identity can become modified, transformed and also 
counterfeited and manipulated. In doing so, of course, the view point and the point viewed 
become changed, since they are essentially different postures of the same entity.  
 
Just so is the mask in the theatre an object submitted to prior or ulterior intention. For 
person has this unstable, slippery – sphales – character: it depends on its apprehending. It is 
not there but constituted through relating. The mask is something like a kind of technology – 
a ritual, aesthetic and sociological prosthetic – by which, as through so many kinds of 
technology, the nature of the human subject, becomes re-articulated, a thing now as 
dynamic and fungible as “things” become when they are discrete and submitted to the 
intentions of agents, a materialized projection, the objectivisation of subjectivity itself. The 
god’s being is mental: his identity, as something mental, is not something in space and time 
in the way that objects are. His identity is immaterial and can take any number of outward 
forms. Dionysus and the problems associated with mortal experience of him, activate and 
illuminate the epistemic and ontological riddles and complexity of personhood, divine and 
mortal.  
 
The sufficient condition of personhood is something like the possession of a property, which 
is like an absence that becomes momentarily present when we look for it. Pentheus had not 
understood what he was, who he was, what his life was. He is reduced to remnants of a 
body and carried back on stage, a mask, the mere shell of the person. “He” was not his body, 
though, as a living human being, his bodily presence was a necessary condition of his 
person. “He” is not the mask brought back in. What was Pentheus, then, who was he and 
what was the nature of his life and identity? It was the combination of certain elements and 
something more than the sum of its parts. It was quality of the relation between his parts 
and between Pentheus and those around him.  
 
The uncanny, dancing spark in Pentheus that bound his acts to his body and his person, 
through talk, to other persons, has been revealed in its complex nature – something as 
dynamic and immaterial as fire, some property, which like fire, also makes other things 
malleable and, like fire, is usually the sure sign of human sociality or divine contact in the 
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epiphany of lightning. The invisible property of mind has been dramatized and ingeniously 
“manifested” without ever having been “seen”. Rather than a seed or ‘spark’ hidden in some 
mysterious depths, it has been the little flame of fire dancing around the human head, 
breath, language, laughter, all traces or natural signs of its living agency. 
 
Dionysus takes on a human body and a human nature, as humans put on prostheses. At 
Thebes he does so for the same reason as humans usually take up implements, not to enter 
more fully into more meaningful relations with others, but for the accomplishment of his 
telos, which in this case is revenge. The mask is not an instrument to create the illusion that 
something is “there”, that there are "further realities lying behind it,"68 but because the face of 
the mask, minimal as it is, with lines and holes in the right compositional relation, shape and 
dimensions, is the sufficient condition for social interaction. We never know what or if there 
are further realities lying behind it, but we engage with faces and even masks, prosthetic 
faces, as if there were.  
 
 
  
                                                        
68 “In short, Dionysus' mask, by becoming ambiguous, comes to owe its interest not simply to what it formally represents in a way 
characteristic of the normal tragic masking convention, but to "the further realities lying behind it," the invisible forces that unite the benign 
and destructive aspects represented by the single sign of the god's smiling mask.”, Foley, 1980: 129. 
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6.3.1 Prosōpon: Face, Prop, Mask, Masque 
 
τίνος FρόσωFον δῆτ' ἐν ἀγκάλαις ἔχεις;69 
 
ἔτι δὲ κυριωτέρα Fερὶ τὴν ἀFεργασίαν τῶν ὄψεων ἡ τοῦ σκευοFοιοῦ τέχνη τῆς 
τῶν Fοιητῶν ἐστιν.70 
 
And, futhermore, with regard to mise en scène the art of the mask-maker is more 
powerful than that od the poets. 
 
 
Alfred Gell was most penetrating on art, the relationship of humans to their creations and its 
significance. Gods (idols, iconic and aniconic; effigies; masks) no differently than “art 
objects” (icons, paintings, statues, masks: indexes), articulate human agentfulness and 
personhood. They express the insoluble reality of the sociality – the entanglement – that 
characterizes all human doings. The mask of Dionysus, its worship in cult as much as its 
ambiguity in the theatre, reveals, primarily, a fact about human beings: 
 
Humanity has a lien on God because his objectification is in their hands. Even if God 
is the ultimate author of his resemblance in the form of magnificent structures and 
works of art, it remains the case that, at a critical point in the sequence of causes, 
instruments and results, human agency is essential. Since, in this world, God’s 
presence is inherent in these works of human agency, he is bound to human 
purposes, the this-worldly prosperity and other-worldly salvation of his ostensible 
servants, rather than to purposes entirely his own. His agency is enmeshed in ours, by 
virtue of our capacity to make (and be) his simulacrum.71 
 
Much excellent work has already been done on the face and the mask, both in Bacchae and 
with regard to Dionysus more broadly. We need, therefore, only underline some points 
pertinent to the argument for Bacchae as presenting, in its proliferation of “natural signs”, 
something like an alternative to semiosis and the strategies of reading and structural 
analysis they have elicited72.  
                                                        
69 1277: “Whose face then do you have in your arms?” 
70 Arist. Poet. 1450b. 17-20. 
71 Gell, 1998: 114. 
72 The work of Foley, Halliwell, Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux and Chaston stand out: Foley, (1980): “The Masque of Dionysus”. Vernant, 
1985: La mort dans les yeux: figures de l’Autre en Grèce ancienne – Artémis, Gorgô ; Vernant & Vidal-Naquet 1986 offers three pertinent 
essays on the subject: “Le dieu de la fiction tragique”; “Figures du masque en Grèce ancienne”, Vernant & Frontisi-Ducroux; and “Le 
Dionysos masqué des Bacchantes d’Euripide”; Schlesier’s “Mixtures of Masks: Maenads as Tragic Models” in Masks: 89-114; also 
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Foley, in an influential paper, took up the helpful terms in John Jones’ On Aristotle and Greek 
Tragedy. Euripides, wrote Jones, is uniquely marked by the techniques in his drama of 
“mask-exploiting” and “mask piercing”73. For Jones the mask and its handling in Bacchae 
were “modern”, highly original and instantiating the greatness of the play, which “rests in a 
vivid spirituality”. He sees that Euripides’ handling of masks is unique and represents an 
innovative challenge to the normal Attic, dramatic conventions74. A most productive idea in 
Jones, is that of absence, which Euripides has engaged in his inspired handling of Dionysus’ 
mask, this adopted morphē and the meaningful adaptability of form exhibited in this 
scenario. Vivid it is indeed, a bright absence, like that luminous pillar from which issues the 
voice of the god in the violent and strange culmination of the play, 1082-85: 
  
καὶ ταῦθ' ἅ/' ἠγόρευε καὶ Fρὸς οὐρανὸν 
καὶ γαῖαν ἐστήριζε φῶς σε/νοῦ Fυρός. 
σίγησε δ' αἰθήρ, σῖγα δ' ὕλι/ος νάFη 
φύλλ' εἶχε, θηρῶν δ' οὐκ ἂν ἤκουσας βοήν. 
 
And even while he was saying this, both into the sky 
And in the earth stood a column of light of awesome fire. 
The aithēr was silent, the forest valley held 
Every leaf in quiet, you heard the voice of no creature.75 
                                                        
Frontisi-Ducroux, 1995, a full-length study of the topic. Segal, 1997 [1982], discusses the mask extensively from the point of view of his 
metatragic interpretation of Bacchae, see esp. his chp. 7 pp. 215-71. See also “Der Maskengott” in Athenissche Mitteilungen Walther 
Wrede, (Berlin, 1928); and “Das Symbol der Maske” in Dionysos, Otto, 1933: 80-5; Detienne, 1986; Henrichs in Masks: esp. 31-9. Wyles in 
Stuttard: 68-9. A recent contribution, from a cognitive perspective germane to much in the approach of the present study is Colleen 
Chaston’s Tragic props and cognitive function: aspects of the function of images in thinking, Chaston, 2010: Chp. 3 “The mask of Dionysus: 
Euripides’ Bakkhai”, 179-238, esp. 180-91. See also Larson, 2016: 111. 
73  “. . . a whole range of mask-piercing and even, at the end of his life, mask-exploiting effects (the smiling mask of the Stranger in 
Bacchantes is meant to be inscrutable; it is a modern mask) declares Euripides’ huge originality. In fact, the greatness of Bacchantes rests in 
a vivid spirituality, which we encounter in three or four earlier plays . . .” Jones, 1968: 270.  
74 “Jones argues that Euripides' career is uniquely marked by a whole range of ‘mask-piercing’ and ‘mask-exploiting’ effects which 
challenge the ancient masking convention. Euripides ‘pierces’ masks by creating conflicts between a character's internal state and his role in 
the action of the drama.”, Foley, 1980: 128. See also Foley, 1985: 246-54. 
75 Dodds on 1082-3 “And as the voice spoke these words, a light of awful fire was set betwixt heaven and earth”, and 1084-5: “The high air 
went still (σίγησε aor.), and the woody glade held its leaves in stillness, and you could not have heard the cry of any beast.” He comments 
on these lines that they “describe wonderfully the hush of nature at the moment when the pent-up forces of the supernatural break through . . 
. Stillness is the traditional response of nature to divine epiphany: Ar. Av. 777 f. . . . Thesm. 42. ff.”. The control of movement and stillness, 
sound and silence, vision and the invisible (presence and absence of phenomena and the phenomenon of person) is the main instrument of 
the poet, whose purpose is to reveal truth and elicit emotion through effects and lead the audience from effects back to causes and their 
significance. The tension and release, the contrast of values and assimilation of difference is the rhythm that becomes manifest when 
Dionysus is at hand, or may be. He is the god of the drama of presence, something so fundamental as is appreciated by infants in the game 
of peekaboo (see Freud on object constancy and the meaning of the game he observed his nephew Ernst play with his mother, Freud, 1920: 
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In Bacchae what we find are figurations not of “vivid spiritualities” but something more “at 
hand” – ta paronta – something elusive but not vague and that is person and its defining 
element, mind, the necessary condition of the intelligible social agent, the element without 
which a person is only an object or zombie. Personhood does not consist in a substance or a 
form or a manikin that can be lodged in space, Euripides’ vision suggests, but in something 
so immaterial as absence itself: in a relation. Hence it is that mind, intentional identity, can 
stand outside of time, being a relation that can be mediated symbolically.  
 
 
6.3.2 Identity as the Capacity for Change of Identity 
 
Dionysus can change form, but his mask-face and posture and person are unchanging as 
historical, mortal faces and persons are not. The divine attitude is fixed, as a smile on a mask, 
as ambiguous and opaque, concealing undiscerned motivations. Human attitude is like 
human talk or laughter, cedit et succedit76; its condition is that of constant change – it comes 
out and falls away. This perpetual dwindling of mortals is also a facet of their great 
potentiality: it is what leads them to exploring themselves as entities having and obtaining 
depth and dimension, since having not infinite temporal extension. 
 
Humans are ethically plastic, mutable. Pentheus had identified the bacchant rites as plastos 
218, “specious” and its instigator as meretricious. He sees the Stranger as having a certain 
look, contrived in the manner that he understands humans contrive to have certain 
appearances, 453-9. Later he will be the one whose look is modified, his aspect changed in 
the way that humans do so, having not the god’s capacity for effortless self-transformation, 
925-36. Dionysus, on the other hand, is not shown changing. We have taken his word for it 
that he is a god who has adopted human form and a man’s nature, but we never witness any 
transformation of the divine figure, as we both hear narrated and see the effects of the 
reduction of Pentheus from a whole to disconnected parts. The Stranger, explains the 
commodious servant who first brings him to Pentheus, “did not change” but was constant, 
438-40.77 
 
 
                                                        
Jenseits des Lustprinzips and Piaget, 1937: La construction du réel chez l’enfant, and § 4.1 n. 20). With Dionysus object permanence finds 
its dramatic, illuminated pendant in person impermanence. The super-natural deploys very human-like cognitive strategies of self-
dramatization and revelation.  
76 See Augustine Conf. XI. 7, for human speech, vox transitoria, distinguished from God’s divine speech which is eternal but enters history, 
vox aeterna. 
77 See p. 82 for translation and text, also p. 270. 
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The meaning of Dionysus changes as the circumstances change, but he sits calmly 
unchanged in appearance78. Humans have changed because meanings have accumulated and 
changed. The god of commotions and joyful mobility is still what he always was. We learn 
about the constant shifting and reshaping of perspective, the plasticity of the mind (its being 
protean, transformable, plaston) in our encounter with other minds and most 
paradigmatically with the mind of this person, Dionysus, who dissolves mindfulness, whose 
face seems to laugh throughout, a laughter the meaning of which constantly changes. His 
smile becomes the animacy of laughter when he moves in the temporally dynamic context of 
human co-presence. 
 
Foley thought that the manipulability of form and therefore apparent identity, which 
belongs to Dionysus but does not to Pentheus, serves to mark the difference between mortal 
and immortal79, that immortal controls access to its identity much more efficiently and 
masterfully than the mortal. We are to deduce something defining about the difference 
between mortal and god – a fact, part of our body of knowledge is here confirmed by 
particular events. Yet the lesson may be not just that there is this fundamental difference, 
which we ought to learn to discriminate, between mortal and immortal persons. It may also 
induce the new knowledge that we are apprehending an absence when we engage with 
persons; that personhood, on which for humans, everything depends, is a quality or 
property that frustrates the conventional means of seeing, identifying and knowing, when 
these are conceived as a kind of holding or redeeming from the strong current, and its 
complex under-currents, of time’s flux.  
 
There is a bond between the two aspects of the mask in Bacchae – the simultaneously 
representing and misrepresenting visage – and that thread is an immaterial one. It is a 
thread which Dionysus draws describing himself, and which we draw. We connect one act 
to another or we seem to discern the connection. This threading is the stuff of agency. It is 
the thread of intention and constitutes that intentional identity, which is the person we call 
Dionysus. In Bacchae we are being implicitly encouraged to abduct in the movement 
                                                        
78 Foley describes the function and meaning of Dionysus’ mask in Bacchae to both represent and misrepresent: to the audience to whom the 
prologue is addressed it represents a god disguised as a man; to the actors on stage it represents a mortal fellow. It invites misprision: “The 
mask, then, represents the god to the audience, misrepresents him to the characters and, as we will now see in more detail, in the final scene 
the mask must be interpreted as an artifact or symbol representing the god, or as much as we, or the characters, can ever visually and directly 
experience of him.” Foley, 1980: 129. 
79 This division is at the heart of the meaning of Bacchae: “The visual juxtaposition of the masks here also becomes a precise theatrical 
expression of the division between divine and human nature that lies at the heart of the play.”, Foley, 1980: 130; and, “By reducing Pentheus 
to his tragic mask, and by allowing Dionysus to exploit his mask in an extraordinary way, Euripides demonstrates through theatrical 
convention the nature of the division between god and man.” Foley, 1980: 131. On the distinction god-mortal and its articulation in the 
person and proximity of Dionysus, see Henrichs in Masks: 13-43. 
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between the x of the manifest identity and the y of the concealed identity, which becomes 
later revealed: the uncanny, ineffable Rule of Dionysus. This is the ironically uncodifiable rule 
of the reality and presence of his otherwise invisible or vanishing, hard-to-detect and often 
refuted divine personhood.  
 
Here is not a lesson – mathos – about some supposed substantial quality of reality in 
Dionysus, so much as a relocation of identity, even its dispersion. That not easily found 
quality is “de-placed”. Neither is it on the surface nor immanent in some inexhaustible 
depth or “further realities”. Personal identity seems to “reside” outside of space-time, it has 
the quality of absence, something, call it a flashing space, between things80. And yet human 
person does not stand out of space-time, embodied presence being its sufficient condition. 
Human person is this paradoxical condition of embodied presence bound together – 
sunthentes logon81 – through a fiction, a thread of identity or an identifying thread, 
transcending space-time and linking past self to present instantiation and future self.  
 
We use these spatio-temporal metaphors as circumventions to get around the problem of 
“something” which is not “there”, in the habitual way that we have for formulating things 
and negotiating the time-space in which we embodied persons exist. We talk and act as if 
what constitutes the mind were the “contents“ of a person, and so perhaps we must. Bacchae 
is an interpretation and dramatization of the nature of and recognizing of personhood, mind 
and agency an sich. It is not only a case of mortal versus immortal agency, but of agency tout 
court. 
 
In this relocation of person – really a terminal dislocation, a scattering or dispersion like a 
divinatory smoke – Euripides has not only re-affirmed divinity and the difference between 
mortal and god. He has re-articulated person and its locateability. The Euripidean 
“piercing” and “exploiting” of masks addressed by Jones and Foley is deeply significant. It 
is an expression of that social and ethical problem, with which Euripides often confronted 
himself and his audience (and his brilliant handling of which finds it culmination in 
Dionysus in Bacchae): the self, identity, intention, these are malleable, dissimulable and not 
easy of evaluation. They are both the affordances of communication and of 
miscommunication, they express intentions, truths and facts but also falsified intentions, 
counterfeitures and impostures.  
 
                                                        
80 That the gods exist outside of time-space, in a condition similar to thought itself, is expressed the Homeric Hymn to Apollo, where the 
god is said to move at the speed of a “thought”, nóēma, Hymn. Hom. in Apollinem, 186-7: ἔνθεν δὲ πρὸς Ὄλυµπον ἀπὸ χθονὸς ὥς τε νόηµα/ 
εἶσι Διὸς πρὸς δῶµα θεῶν µεθ' ὁµήγυριν ἄλλων. 
81 297. 
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6.3.3 Dionysus qua Mask 
 
In the final scene of Bacchae we see Dionysus in the machine. He is wearing the same mask, 
which now we see differently; he has shuffled off his disguise, but looks no different. 
Identity, then, is not the same thing as appearance. His disguise it may be said has consisted 
simply in the cloak of ignorance that has covered not him but the perspectives on him. It has 
been a subjective rather than an objective concealment. We have accepted his divinity 
throughout. In a different way we accept it again, but now as much also because he is 
speaking from the daemonic perspective over the stage, which the theologeion represents. Up 
to now it has been “indirectly and symbolically” that we have accepted Dionysus’ divine 
identity, in a manner that entailed our accepting that we could not “see” the actual Dionysus. 
The action of the play stands in tension with this final epiphany, so Foley argued, for now 
we do “see” the actual Dionysus as god, yet in the same mask.  
 
The mask has a ritual power to make present the god. Such power the mask in the last scene 
too possesses, Foley suggests. It makes visible that which mortals cannot see. Yet, we may 
argue, it is not only divine identity that mortals cannot “see”. It is all identity. Human selves 
are as invisible as divine ones; through the same techniques – indirect, symbolic, allusive, 
inferential – do they become inferred. Foley argues that the action of the play up to the final 
scene “demonstrates the god's divinity indirectly and symbolically and denies that we can 
adequately ‘see’ Dionysus with human vision.”82 Yet everything that is considered most 
valuable in human life, certainly it seems in Euripides’ view, is exactly so hard of seeing and 
verifying.  
 
Tragedy principally shows acts, as Aristotle makes a point of explaining in his Poetics, not 
characters. Tragedy is also fundamentally ethical, affective and pathetic. The audience is 
counted on to connect acts to one another in a web of significance and to infer meanings and 
values from these acts performed before them. Ēthos is what a person always does; it is 
statistical, like parole, so we say that person is likely to do that again or act in a similar way 
in different situations and, inversely, when we see someone acting and speaking in a certain 
fashion, we say such and such is the character, by which we may predict probable future 
behaviour. We infer the rule, langue, of ēthos from the parole of acts, praxeis. Ēthos is a 
function of time and the perspective on acts in time, a kind of biographical synopsis drawn 
from acts drawn together into a set, sumperilabomena83. 
 
                                                        
82 Foley, 1980: 132. 
83 See § 5.2.4 n. 31and § 5.5.3 p. 336. 
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Character and meaning and value, in the polis as in the theatre, these are never anything 
other than inferred or passed on (conferred and received) in some way. Like drōmena, orgia – 
ritual acts – praxeis, dramata – biographical, theatrical, historical acts – are expressive of an 
agency. They manifest motivation and intention but are not identical with those. A person is 
somehow more than the sum of its acts. It is a vague, unseeable value, something like the 
relation – binding thread – between acts, composite of such intangible properties as desires, 
aversions, knowledge and ignorance.  
 
People are opaque because they conceal person and person is invisible but all-important, the 
necessary and sufficient condition for social agency. Person and identity, being immaterial, 
are only ever apprehended or conveyed through the traces of their presence or absence. 
They are the invisible “contents” that become momentarily manifest. This most captivating 
Dionysus is ultimately uncapturable an ungraspable by humans. It is not that Euripides 
mystifies Dionysus as a terminally elusive phenomenon. His representation has served to 
show him, to celebrate and publicize him and complicate his identity and our possible 
relations to him. It has shown him as familiar and estranged, both mysterious and partaking 
of the everyday order in which human life unfolds. The Tragic drama does not simply vaunt 
human skill – as fateful Actaeon, Pentheus, Agauē did theirs – but fosters a sense of the 
always relative value of knowledge and skill. The drama itself has been the most impressive 
act, a human envisioning of human and divine agency. Foley credited it with an agency 
almost as if independent of its human creators: 
 
Dionysus' divinity in the Bacchae can be understood through this power to control 
representation. Euripides makes his anomalous "untragic" mask become the central 
mocking image of what we as men can understand of a force that cannot be fully 
captured by human vision.84  
 
By this reading Dionysus becomes a kind of producer-artist-deity, who will only too 
naturally invite a Charles Segal two years later to devise an interpretation of theatre as meta-
theatre and Bacchae as an unpacking of the operations of symbol and illusion85. “Dionysus”, 
from the anthropological perspective being taken here, controls nothing. He is expressly 
made to do whatever he seems to do. His purposes, dangerous as the utterance of this 
knowledge may be, are what Taylor called “derived purposes”, they originate in human 
                                                        
84 Foley, 1980: 133. 
85 Segal, 1997 [1982]. Cf. also Foley, 1985: 219, “The language and action of the play allow Dionysus, until the return of the second 
messenger, to make the play and the manifestation of the divinity an indivisible process. His role as stage director/ actor corresponds with 
his role in the plot – to demonstrate and then to avenge his divinity . . . Dionysus makes his chorus his players and the destruction of 
Pentheus a ‘play’, replete with set, costume, and spectators.” 
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minds. The point is not simply that Dionysus is a god because he possesses a plastic mastery 
over form unavailable to humans and that mortals must not confuse themselves with 
divinity. It is rather that Bacchae is one re-interpretation of Dionysus and his myth, in which 
the complexity of the human’s nearly animal involuntariness and nearly divine forms of 
agency are glimpsed.  
 
This re-interpretation is not simply a remoulding of something “there”, but a re-instituting of 
Dionysus, his katastasis “establishment”. It does the very work that Dionysus in the play 
says he has come to Thebes and travelled to the cities of the world to do: to instititute 
Dionysus86. And that is what it really means to apprehend a person, to identify the character 
from its acts, which we witness in its presence: to establish it. We construe identity, we read 
persons and protagonists biographically, discerning a thread in time that is not there in a 
simple manner, but that we first draw and bind. In this re-interpretation by the poet 
Euripides (already himself absent, the historical premier of the play having been 
posthumous), whose play was performed together with two other plays that afternoon 2421 
years ago, what is at stake is identity and the detection of persons and qualities of person. 
 
The capacity for metamorphosis is common with the gods. In his entanglements with the 
human species, Zeus is always becoming embodied in the shape of all manner of creatures. 
Having become manifest to human perceiving as ungraspable, uncanny and awful as 
lightning87, in his more “authentic” divine form, Zeus destroyed the mortal Semelē. Athena, 
another offspring like Dionysus of strange artificial parturition, is a great impostor. 88 
 
Other gods and daimonioi too are represented through masks; it is not unique with 
Dionysus89. In his sophisticated handling of the mask in Bacchae, which in its shifting 
character and dynamic relation to both the audience and to the identity of the speaking 
person of the mask, seems to materialize an immaterial quality, that function of presence 
and perspective, Euripides has explored and articulated more richly, Dionysus as der 
Maskengott90. This is because he has interpreted so brilliantly and made so manifest the social 
                                                        
86 20-2: ἐς τήνδε πρώτην ἦλθον Ἑλλήνων πόλιν,/ τἀκεῖ χορεύσας καὶ καταστήσας ἐµὰς/ τελετάς, ἵν' εἴην ἐµφανὴς δαίµων βροτοῖς. 
87 In Ovid, the form commensurate only with his divine wife Hera; when they are both undisguised at home she becomes naked to receive 
him amorously. See [Apollod.] 3.4.3; Ov. Met. 3. 273-291, see § 2.2.1.2 n. 127. 
88 There are wonderful scenes in Odyssey 13, for example, of Athena interacting with her favourite mortal, Odysseus, himself a human 
master of concealment and dissimulation. There the mortal tries to bluff the goddess incognita in a scene of lightly comic mutual mendacity. 
Hera disguised herself as an old crone, Beroë, to persuade Semelē to ask of Zeus the gift that would mean her own death: congress with a 
god unadapted to the human scale and nature, see § 2.2.1.2 p. 73 n. 127. 
89 Artemis, Gorgo, see Vernant, 1985. 
90 Otto, 1933 [2011]: 80-4. 
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meaning of his dramatic art, the currency of which is intercourse – homilia – exchange itself, 
and its conduit, the face. 
 
 “How did this get to be here?” is a question that scholars ask of Dionysus in Greek religious 
and cultural life. That is another way to ask what the god has to do with theatre91. An 
interpreter like Rohde read Dionysus’ presence as an incursion into the Hellenic scene 
tracing historical events, the spread of an Asiatic cult westwards through Thrace92. Since the 
1950s we have known for certain what Nietzsche, Rohde’s friend, had intuited: Dionysus is 
Greek and was worshipped or known in Crete and Mycenae since at least the mid-2nd 
Millennium BCE, not an “non-hellenic” aberration93. “How did he get here?” keeps being 
asked in Dionysiac myth: what is he, what is he not? He is a god whose origins in the world 
of persons is always a topic. In Bacchae, as we have seen, much space is given to explaining 
Dionysus’ divine and earthly origins and his movement through the historical, human 
world. We are told in detail how Dionysus came about and how he goes about. And still, in 
the “person” Dionysus we discover just that indeterminacy which Gell traced between 
performances and artefacts: 
 
. . . there is a seamless continuity between modes of artistic action which involve 
‘performance’ and those which are mediated via artefacts. The distinction has no 
theoretical significance. Every artefact is a ‘performance’ in that it motivates the abduction 
of its coming-to-being in the world. Any object that one encounters in the world invites 
the question ‘how did this thing get to be here?’ Mostly, the answers to such 
questions are so taken for granted as not to play any part in one’s conscious mental 
life (but somewhere in one’s psyche, there must be a device which identifies the familiar 
as familiar).94 
 
We have been taking Dionysus’ point of view in Bacchae. We have taken several perspectives 
– the performance has been an artefact, an index composed of person-indexes: embodied, 
theatrical characters. We have taken the point of view of these persons and this question that 
Gell speaks of about the familiar, has been posed with force. The everyday has become 
estranged. Person, which is so familiar that we ordinarily take it for granted, has become 
something about which we ask: ‘how did this thing get to be here?’ Euripides has 
illuminated a device by which we identify the familiar and come to recognize also the 
                                                        
91 On the famous proverb ouden pros ton Dionyson, “nothing to do with Dionysus”, see Winkler and Zeitlin, in Winkler & Zeitlin, 1990: 3-
11. 
92 Rohde, 1892-4. 
93 See Burkert in Schlesier: 15-22. Bernabé in Bernabé: 23-37.  
94 Gell, 1998: 67-8. 
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unfamiliar. Asking how Dionysus came to get here, when it is done in the right way, not as 
if we already knew the answer, means asking productively about the nature of agency, of 
our agency and our identity as persons. It is a manner of framing, through the contact 
between mortal and divine persons, of fundamental questions about human identity and 
values. 
 
The poet has unfolded or explicated some essential features of personhood and agency. He 
has shown that in certain lights, these impalpable qualities, so central in human life and 
meaning, can require special modes of inference, extraordinary strategies of knowing, which 
are adapted to the special “object of knowledge”, which is subjectivity. There are different 
ways of knowing things and different ways of being related to them – not least is adopting a 
certain affective posture or bearing towards life and others, one determined by a sensitivity 
to the essentially mortal, temporal identity of human existence. In Bacchae the mask is an 
index of complex or implicated personhood. In the play it is the creation of the wearer, 
Dionysus, skeuopoios95. He is a generator of forms – human (at Thebes, at Thrace in 
Aeschylus), animal (bull, snake, lion), always containing within his diverse, adopted forms 
the same divine personal identity: Dionysus. Through it, by a kind of magic of art and 
perspective, we are as if constrained to abduct the presence of a complex person, by which 
to account for this reflexive and ambiguous artefact. Euripides has created the illusion of a 
complex, original agent by investing Dionysus and this smiling mask with the 
changefulness of something in time. He has animated the person of Dionysus, turning the 
characton – mark – of a smile, into a laughing character. 
 
 
6.4 Facialité: The Mask as Social Performance 
 
Social interactions have an aesthetic dimension, and aesthetic experiences, a social. The 
attractive Dionysus enchants those in his co-presence, he is finally irresistible. Humans must 
have the due social relations with him. He fascinates and he wants the recognition, in 
situations of appropriate tact, from the mortals in his proximity. Dionysus is the fascinating 
god, the captivating96. His enchantment is exercised – as human social actors exert their 
influence and charm upon one another – through his voice, ops, and his face, ōps. With the 
concept of “fascination”, we discern the unity of the aesthetic and the social, which is 
essential to understanding Dionysus and his depiction in Bacchae.97  
                                                        
95 See Arist. Poet. 1450b. 17-20, epigraph to § 6.3.1 above. 
96 “. . . captivation, the primordial kind of human agency.”, Gell, 1998: 69; also Gell, 1988 and 1992. 
97 As Gell read art objects as social persons, so may we seek to delineate the social situation of Tragedy as an “art situation”, and social 
actors as similarly “distributing agency”. See Gell, 1998 on performances and distribution: 96-154, 221-3. 
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Of all the many fascinating points raised in Vernant’s several essays on the theme of the 
mask, and Dionysus’ laughing face, the one that bears emphasizing here is found in the 
paper by Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux: “Figures du masque en Grèce ancienne”, 1986. 
Dionysus is not simply a god who shows his face amongst mortals (periodically in the life of 
the city, sensationally and unpredictably in myth and drama): still more he is a god of very  
facialité.  
 
Le texte tragique ainsi que les représentations figurées mettent en évidence une des 
caractéristiques fondamentales de cette puissance divine: la facialité. Comme Gorgô, 
Dionysos est un dieu avec qui l’homme ne peut entrer en contact que dans un face-à-
face: impossible de le regarder sans tomber du même coup sous la fascination de son 
regard, qui vous arrache à vous même.98 
 
Thus does the Stranger, a god feigning – eirōn “dissembler”, “ironic” – to be a devotee, tell 
Pentheus, that he has seen the god “face-to-face”, ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα 470, literally “seen him 
seeing (me)”. Attention is drawn to the face and the mask in Bacchae99. This is a play in which 
the poet deploys an apparently unique and highly original “non-tragic” mask in a Tragedy, 
one bearing the expression of laughter that belongs properly only in Comedy100. In diverse 
ways, to those onstage and to those in the audience, the mask is an exceptional artefact, 
something with that quality of the unfamiliar which gives pause. 
 
It is especially from the evidence of the plastic arts, however, that Vernant and Frontisi-
Ducroux draw their evidence for the suggested facialité of Dionysus. On the so-called 
François Vase this, they argue, is dramatically figured101. The gods move in procession and all 
are depicted in profile; Dionysus alone “turns” and faces the viewer full-frontal102. The 
spectator is thus supposedly placed in the position of the initiand, according to Vernant and 
Frontisi-Ducroux. Even presented in profile on drinking cups, the god holds the mortal’s 
gaze, whoever is in his presence they wrote, “regarde encore dans les yeux celui qui le 
regarde.”, clearly invoking Bacchae, 470: ὁρῶν ὁρῶντα103.  
 
                                                        
98 Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 39. 
99 Genus: οἰνωπὸν γένυν, 438, 456, 698, 1186; Stoma: 70, 387, 725; Prosōpon: 1021, 1277; Gelān: 380, 439; προσώπωι γελῶντι, 1021. 
100 See Seidensticker, 1978, 1982; and Taplin, 1986. Most interesting and suggestive in this regard are the remarks that close that 
symposium supposed to have taken place in the same year as Bacchae, where Socrates tries to persuade his drowsing companions that the 
same skills are required by the comic and the tragic poets: Pl. Sym. 223-c-d. 
101 See LIMC III “Dionysus”, pl. 496.  
102 Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 39. 
103 Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 39. 
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Beyond only the exceptional posture of the François Vase, it is still more in the 
representations of Dionysus as mask-idol that we will discern the inescapable power of 
fascination that belongs to the god, they argue104. All gods have faces, one may caution. Of 
course, that is how and why we regard them as persons. With Dionysus this feature is most 
prominent – and hence, Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux can speak of the god’s peculiar 
facialité – because the problem and nature of persons and their agency becomes most 
conspicuous with Dionysus and that most paradigmatically in Euripides’ Bacchae. 
 
This is an imaginative interpretation of these painted scenes. There are some problems. An 
inspection of the vases of similar scenes105 does not ambiguously provide us with a picture of 
a god to whom peculiarly belongs a power to fascinate , “du même coup”, or a unique 
faciailité, as they are proposing. “Sous le regard du dieu,” they explained, “vers qui leurs 
regards convergent, trainant à leur suite les yeux du spectateur, elles distribuent le breuvage 
dangereux, maléfique si on l’absorbe sans les précautions rituelles.”106 And yet if our eyes 
converge on the mask of the god fixed on the pillar, it is not by reason of a mystifying power 
to entrance. His figure stands in the very mid-point, the bodies of the women form a 
symmetrical frame making him the centre of the scene to which the human eye, by reflex, is 
drawn. The painter draws the viewer’s eye to the mask by use of lines and compositional 
nous. It is not in fact clear that the lines of sight of the painted figures “converge” on the 
mask. It could just as well be said that they seem focused on the ritual task with which they 
are occupied, carefully ladling the wine from the large kratēr (like the stamnos on which the 
scene is itself painted) into the cups they are holding.  
 
If we compare this with a very similar scene on another famous red-figure vase in the Museo 
Archeologico in Naples107, we see again a similar composition of bodies centralizing 
Dionysus. Here there is a more dynamic quality as there is not only careful pouring in front 
of the god’s idol (of the god in his liquid form), but also revelling bacchants, one carrying a 
tambourine aloft and others thyrsoi, fennel wands, their heads thrown back and their arms 
describing the dancer’s motion. None of the human sight lines here converge on a single 
point. This only enhances the sense of movement around a motionless central person, calm 
                                                        
104 “Mais ce sont surtout les représentations de son idole masquée qui expriment le mieux la fascination de ses yeux inéluctables.”, Vernant 
and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 39. 
105 See LIMC III “Dionysus”, pl. 25-80 and the vase they offer as a sketched illustration in their essay, a 5th C. BCE red-figure stamnos by 
the Villa Giulia Painter, one of the “Lenaia Vases”, Boston 90.155, ARV2 621.34. On Dionysus in ancient art, see especially Carpenter, 1987, 
1996; Isler-Kerényi, 2007; Moraw in Schlesier: 233-52 and Plates XXXVII-LXV; Carpenter in Schlesier, 2011 on Dionysus in red-figured 
Apulian vases, 253-61. See also March, 1989 on Bacchae in the light of vase-painting; and Peirce, 1998 “Visual Language and Concepts of 
Cult on the ‘Lenaia Vases’”. 
106 Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 39-40. 
107 LIMC III “Dionysus”, pl. 33. 
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and self-possessed, as Dionysus describes himself in the second episode: parōn hēsuchos 
thassōn108. 
 
Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux think that a different aspect of Dionysiac ritual is expressed 
in the images of the double or single mask in profile, danced around by maenads109. Here the 
devotees are seeking to evoke, fix and encircle the god in the milieu of their worshipping 
bodies. They are striving to make the god present at a specific point (“circonscrire en un 
point du sol”) in a natural setting, in the way that gods usually are “placed” indoors in 
temples. This presence is radically elusive, the spectre of a strangeness never to be 
familiarized or domesticated, yet anywhere: “cette présence divine dont le masque creux 
aux yeux vacants souligne l’insaissisable ubiquité, l’irrémédiable altérité.”110 This is very 
much a mainstream late 20th Century reading of Dionysus111, Dionysiac imagery and ritual, 
and its colouring remains Nietzschean. An alternative interpretation is available112. 
  
In many images, such as in the so-called “Lenaia Vases”, offerings are made to Dionysus-
idols, the mask affixed to a shaft and given a robe as torso; around him male and female and 
satyric figures play musical instruments, dance, bow, lay gifts. The most striking effect in 
these situations is of the sociability conveyed. If Dionysus can fascinate it is because he is 
engaged by humans and engages them back auf Augenhöhe. He sees the one seeing him: 
horōn horōnta. The striking element in these scenes, is the peculiar reciprocity with this 
divine person, not the one-sided domination by a bewitching god, but a charisma in 
encounters of a certain kind of mutuality. Dionysus seems to look back at the viewer; that is 
all it takes for a viewer to feel personally engaged. If there is fascination here it is of the same 
                                                        
108 621-2: πλησίον δ' ἐγὼ παρὼν/ ἥσυχος θάσσων ἔλευσσον. “I was present nearby, peacefully seated I idly looked on”. 
109 Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 40. 
110 Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 40. On otherness and Dionysus, see Schlesier [ed.], 2011 A Different 
God, and here esp. Gödde, 85-104 and Henrichs: 105-116, also Henrichs in Masks: 13-43, an insightful discussion of the transition in the 
20th Century view of Dionysus as a god defined through polarity to one defined, after Gernet, through his otherness or alterity. Henrichs in 
Masks: 33-4 compares Otto’s polarity approach and the French alterity approach as follows: “Otto’s Dionysus is composed of opposite 
characteristics; the two side of each pair are treated as equivalent. By contrast alterity is a more discriminating category; it establishes a 
hierarchical relationship between opposites by treating one as normal and the other as abnormal. Vernant and Detienne tend to 
overemphasize the negative side of the polarity because it reflects their notion of the Other as a subversive and disruptive force (cf. Bierl 
1991, 14-16, esp. nn. 34, 37, and 40). The two models, though deceptively similar, are difficult to reconcile.”, see also Vernant 1985a, 11-
13, 25-30. 
111 A god of “altérité”, the dark, irrational alternative of luminous Apollo, a symbol for all the formerly oppressed and suppressed emotional 
and libidinal life, now liberated, positively valorized and healthily re-admitted, since Nietzsche, Freud, sexual emancipation, 
enfranchisement and the end of colonialism and its artificial distinctions. On the Apollo-Dionysus antithesis, see § 3.1 nn. 12, 13 and see 
Wood, 2011 and Suárez de la Torre in Bernabé: 58-81. 
112 A red-figure amphora in the Louvre, for example, depicts a Dionysus idol in profile on the periphery of the composition, while a 
kneeling, ithyphallic satyr bends over a large kratēr in the centre. The satyr, here, looks directly out at the viewer. The facialité here does 
not belong to Dionysus, unless we say that it is distributed through the servant of Dionysiac purpose, the satyr. LIMC III “Dionysus”, pl. 37. 
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quality (even if escalated) as the very everyday fascination that other persons hold – to 
greater and lesser degrees – for human beings. His mystical power derives from his 
purchase on human person as himself a charismatic person. Dionysus is placed at face-
height, he stands amongst persons as a person, propped up for some mode of social 
intercourse. The prominence of Dionysus’ face is itself only an expression of the primary fact 
of Dionysiac sociality, homilia.  
 
The effects and meaning of cult practice is seen as identical to, or at least cognate with, those 
of the theatre by these influential Parisian scholars. The readings of Bacchae allegedly 
support the readings of the imagery and of what they show about cult and vice versa: 
 
Ces accesoires vides, le masque barbu, la couronne de lierre, la robe flottante figurant 
la divinité avec qui, en un face-à-face fasciné, le fidèle peut se fondre, l’homme peut 
lui-même les revêtir, endossant ainsi les marques du dieu, les prenant sur soi pour 
s’en mieux laisser posséder. Devenir autre, en basculant dans le regard du dieu ou en 
s’assimilant à lui par contagion mimétique, tel est le but du dionysisme qui met l’homme en 
contact immédiat avec l’altérité du divin113. C’est un phénomène parallèle qui s’accomplit 
au théatre . . .114   
 
Their argument is forceful and seductive, not least for a certain lyrical élan115. Nevertheless, 
Dionysus in Bacchae has not come seeking the dissolution of identities or the melting down 
of the believing person into any kind of bacchic amalgam. Dionysus has come to Thebes to 
reclaim a social identity and a social relation. He never ever seeks to promulgate anything so 
doctrinal or congealed as a dionysisme. As the Homeric gods occasionally did, Dionysus 
moves amongst mortals, in the historical world, the horizontal plain of face-to-face 
encounters. Yet Dionysus stops for a while. He dances with humans, as a human116; he does 
not only devise a strategy and then come amongst mortals to accomplish or defend that, but 
his presence and company have some inherent purpose in itself. His presence is itself his 
telos. He does not show himself and then get on with some ulterior goal – showing himself is 
his goal, being there and marking time with his mood and ambience, an emotional 
enhancement of experience. He stands across from humans, in their midst: he is co-present 
                                                        
113 On the notion of the “Dionysian”, a Nietzschean legacy, see also Henrichs in Masks: 24-6. 
114 Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 40-1. 
115 “Otto was a spiritual disciple of Nietzsche, who inspired Otto’s dithyrambic style and emphasis on Dionysian emotionalism.”, Henrichs 
in Masks: 29. For Otto’s influence on the Paris school, see 31-3. On Otto and his influence, see Bremmer in Bernabé: 4-22 and the essay by 
Alessandro Stavru in the 2011 edition of Otto’s Dionysos 1933. 
116 Or is it that humans, when they dance, become somewhat like gods for a time, transcending historical time, being in the time of the 
music? Most likely humans become momentarily divine, and the god becomes an historical being amongst them. In Dionysus the two 
modes come face-to-face. 
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with mortals. In Dionysus’ co-presence we see, in sharp relief, what mortal, ephemeral, 
over-inflated things, humans are, what creatures of low cunning, forgetting themselves too 
easily and judging poorly. In Bacchae they are also potentially capable of a grace and beauty 
and a joyous community if they enter into their common forms of life in the right spirit.  
 
Dionysus has not wanted assimilation of humans, through his rites and moods, by 
involuntary means. Mania has been a punishment, a contagion. He has not automatically 
bewitched those who have looked into his face, only that man, Pentheus, who has looked 
and seen but not realized that and how he is looked back upon; the man who has seen in 
others only his own understanding of motivation. The madness of the Theban maenads in 
Bacchae is infected out of revenge, as is the lussa cast on Pentheus117. Dionysiac community is 
healthy assimilation, whereas frenzied dissolution is a sure symptom of disease and cause of 
the most abject suffering. Euripides’ Dionysus in Bacchae does not arrive to displace human 
persons but, since their lives cannot be lengthened, extended in time, to as if deepen them by 
offering alternative modes of sociality and a restructured will and self. He does not want to 
negate individuals or subjectivity, but transiently unite them into a common person. He 
does so and achieves, temporarily, the most difficult and urgent challenge that faces all 
human communities everywhere: the binding together of diverse minds and purposes, a 
brief relaxation of social tension and conjoining of many into one. That necessary element of 
public “alertness” is released in the common, public domain for a while, through Dionysus. 
This is an integrative, wholesome act, that reveals the Dionysiac motive. 
 
By the end of Bacchae, yes, we have seen again how different gods are from mortals, but we 
are also impressed by how very similar and intelligible, even if also unkown, they can be. 
This god is too much like mortals in his passionate anger, his orgē118. Gods talk, (like 
foreigners, women, children and slaves, they even speak Greek); they are thoroughly 
intelligible, tactful performers. They are motivated, they scheme and plot and are moved by 
the same social emotions that mark so much of human life: shame, face, competitiveness. 
Reading Bacchae as a lesson in alterity or on a cryptic telestic pattern will induce us to read 
pictorial representations of the god in a like fashion, to deduce from this prior idea about 
Dionysus how the various modalities of his representation hang together119. The attempt 
being made here is to interpret Dionysus in a manner commensurate with the modes of 
evaluation and interpretation Bacchae, qua theatrical drama, itself seems to summon forth. 
                                                        
117 For lussa personified in a Dionysiac context, Lussa, see Aesch. fr. 169 from Xantriai. 
118 1348. 
119 On the strangeness and alterity that is a definitive feature of Dionysus, who is nevertheless Greek, a good recent discussion is Gödde’s 
“‘Fremde Nähe’: Zur mythologischen Differenz des Dionysos” in Schlesier [ed.], 2011: 85-104. On this theme there is much in Schlesier’s 
work, A Different God: Dionysos and Polytheism, of very great value to the interpreter of Dionysus. See also Bernabé: Redefining Dionysos. 
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The play is not simply a vehicle for conveying us to the holy mountain of Dionysiac 
knowledge. It is about the map of “hidden paths” by which mortals arrive, with no 
prosthetic, at that knowledge. The knowledge is a knowledge concerning the manner of 
knowing, a manner of going. There is a priori no reason why we should interpret Bacchae in 
an Euripidean or Dionysiac manner. It is, however, worth the attempt to help define further 
how the play works and what it may intend. 
 
 
6.5 The Captivation of Others 
 
Scholars have wanted to see in Dionysus in Euripides’ Bacchae an eruption into the 
“everyday durée of interactions” a force of estrangement that healthily upsets routine and 
revitalizes a culture, and surely this element is there in the phenomenon of Dionysus120. Yet 
Dionysus does not only erupt. He comes regularly and punctually in sympotic gatherings; 
annually in the Megala Dionysia, the Lenaia, the Anthesteria; triterically in maenadic 
oreisbasia121. His advent is awaited. Dionysus’ worshippers celebrate the “everyday” as an 
inherent value: to de kat’ hēmar biotos122. The Dionysus of Euripides emphatically does not 
stand in opposition to the ordinary. His very otherness validates the quotidian and binds 
together social actors in a single action, in the experience of joint-attention, which for a time 
turns the intersubjective community of agents into an integrated, consubjective whole123. 
 
The most ordinary constituent of the human social world – a social relationship and the 
value and identity that relationship incurs and entails – is what interests him above all. His 
festival too is an extraordinary, “ultrasocial” occasion, a moment of renewed and deepened 
solidarity, a special kind of encounter of the polity with itself: seeing itself seeing. Through the 
episodes from the life of Dionysus, such as in Bacchae, what is brought into sharp relief is 
that the gods are radically different, and yet not so terminally other as to be utterly 
unintelligible or unrecognizable. Their presence is a fearsome thing, but potentially, we 
learn through Dionysus, as sweet and desirable as the most joyful human companionship. 
                                                        
120 “Ce que réalise Dionysos, et ce que provoque aussi le masque, quand l’acteur le revêt, c’est, à travers ce qui est rendu présent, l’irruption, 
au centre de la vie publique, d’une dimension d’existence totalement étrangère à l’univers du quotidien.”, Vernant and Frontisi-Ducroux in 
Vernant & Vidal-Naquet, 1986: 41-2. 
121 Dodds 132-4: ἐς δὲ χορεύµατα / συνῆψαν τριετηρίδων, / αἷς χαίρει Διόνυσος. 
122 910-11: τὸ δὲ κατ' ἦµαρ ὅτωι βίοτος / εὐδαίµων, µακαρίζω. Cf. also κατὰ φάος νύκτας τε φίλας / εὐαίωνα διαζῆν, 425-6. Note also that 
this validation of everyday life is, perhaps, possible because Dionysus has brought the only cure for its ills: he transforms routine into 
rhythm, 282-3: ὕπνον τε λήθην τῶν καθ' ἡµέραν κακῶν/ δίδωσιν, οὐδ' ἔστ' ἄλλο φάρµακον πόνων. 381-3: ἀποπαῦσαί τε µερίµνας, / ὁπόταν 
βότρυος ἔλθηι / γάνος ἐν δαιτὶ θεῶν. 421-3: ἴσαν δ' ἔς τε τὸν ὄλβιον / τόν τε χείρονα δῶκ' ἔχειν / οἴνου τέρψιν ἄλυπον. 
123 On the “Joint Attention Hypothesis” see Tomasello’s important The Cultural Origins of Human Cognition (2000) and Metcalfe & 
Terrace [edd.], 2013 Agency and Joint Attention. 
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We learn just how much there exists a sociality, not only that marks both the human and 
divine world, but an homilia shared between human community and a god.  
 
In his drama as in the rituals depicted on Greek vases, Dionysus is a figure given all the 
attributes necessary for interaction: the eccentric upright posture of a human, the face at a 
level with the human face that forms an horizon of reflexivity, the eyes and mouth124. In 
Dionysus, in representations and in idols generally, it holds as it does for human beings: 
“the face is not simply the proximate physical origin of speech but the dominant area of the 
body across which intricacies of experience, feeling and intention are written.”125.  It is 
sufficient to have a mouth and eyes and to “stand” in order to potentially see back when 
seen. Dionysus habitually takes or is given this life-sized human form, on the plain of 
human interaction. It is not on the basis of his difference or of divine power that he becomes 
recognized. Euripides is “spiritualizing” divine identity, as he dematerializes all identity. 
The complex implications of the poet’s vision of the encounter of man and god lead to a 
profound and defamiliarizing re-assessment of the most fundamental categories and 
concepts: personhood, agency, mind, knowledge, identity. 
 
Even the opaqueness of Dionysus is the opacity of a person: does he not move because he 
does not wish to move; is his hēsuchia, instead of being a sign that he is an inert object, ironic 
evidence that he is indeed a sovereign and imperturbable god? He smiles, he has intentions 
and, potentially, he may respond – are they good for us or bad? These need not be expressed 
as theory or doctrine: ritual and theatre make them facts that seem there, in the moment. 
Their persuasive power inheres in constituting the god as phenomena that are immediately 
experienced just as social others ordinarily are experienced. With Dionysus all the minimal 
conditions are in place to satisfy the potential that he is a person. He meets the requirements 
for the full conditions of co-presence which, as we have seen, are “found whenever agents 
‘sense that they are close enough to be perceived in whatever they are doing, including their 
experiencing of others, and close enough to be perceived in this sense of being perceived.”126  
 
                                                        
124 This is not to say that Dionysus is only ever upright. He is figured seated for example in LIMC  135-47, 325-46, 363 ff. He is figured 
variously reclined on couches, enthroned, seated on leopards, bulls, donkeys. He is at human level, nearly invariably in situations of social 
contact, so very socially versatile that he is engaged also by animals and hybrids like satyrs. The impression is not of a god who is bestial or 
reduced but of a person who brings all, even non-human creatures, into forms of social community. The point is assembly, gathering, forms 
of communing that all take place in the proximity of the god of sociality in its diverse forms. That the primary contents of Dionysus’ identity 
are his persona, the face, is strongly suggested by the easily dispensed-with body. It is not having a body that is essential here but only 
having the eccentric posture of an anthropoid. See LIMC 161-2, 170-2 for examples of rectangular pillars showing little concern to figure 
anything like a realistic body, even one concealed by clothing. 
125 Giddens, 1984: 67. 
126 Giddens, 1984: 67. 
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Alfred Gell discussed the ideas of fascination, captivation and enchantment through several 
of his inspired works on the anthropology of art and agency. Art objects and performances, 
he suggested, are not simply rhetorical but bewitching and, in inducing a kind of aporia 
through their indecipherability (their being hard to characterize), they can “trap” the viewer 
or audience. Here dazzlement, incomprehension and forms of social entanglement are very 
close: we have gone beyond signs and their power to convey and distort judgements. 
Indexes are like those gifts, doloi, by which an agent – a cognitive subject – is trammeled by 
the intentions of the originator of the index, experienced as a presence inhabiting the index: 
 
Captivation or fascination – the demoralization by the spectacle of unimaginable 
virtuosity – ensues from the spectator becoming entrapped within the index because 
the index embodies agency which is essentially indecipherable.127 
 
Generations of scholars have benefitted from the “demoralizing” power of Bacchae. The 
indecipherability of Dionysus has haunted minds and not let them go. It is an unfinished 
business; its meaning (its intentions, its mind) is not easily located, its being possessed of 
presence hard for the scientist explainer and the humanist interpreter to account for. It is a 
performance that has entangled the audience, or the reader. Perhaps it is this power of 
entanglement and this easily entangled character of the naturally sociable, so readily 
engaged mind, that is one of its secrets. We are apparently very eutrepes, amenable, to feeling 
in the proximity of persons. We find that persons fascinate us.  
 
The admirer of Dionysus as mysterious life-force may be disappointed with this too 
reasonable interpretation of Bacchae and its god. To address a phenomenon with the mind 
and through the mind’s strategies is not to claim to have exhausted the possibilities in that 
phenomenon. There is not much point of speaking of that about which one cannot speak. On 
this note we conclude this discussion of Dionysus’ face and its meanings. 
 
 
6.7 Summary 
 
From the time of Nietzsche to the middle of the 20th Century, Dionysus was a god defined 
through polarity, an antithetical counterpart – antipalos – to Apollo. In the symbolist, time-
freed, ahistorical interpreting of Otto, Dionysus was defined through certain attributes, 
values defined by their opposite (darkness, moisture, indefiniteness, wildness, vitality, etc.). 
After Gernet, it is not above all through polarity but alterity, an otherness which can be the 
                                                        
127 Gell, 1998: 71. 
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opposite of anything standing before it, that Dionysus has been interpreted. This otherness 
found its image for scholars in the mask of Dionysus, behind which was the infinitely plastic 
substance which is no substance: empty space.  
 
The story of the modern trend of understanding Dionysus is a story of a transition from a 
poetics of presence to one of absence, from the substance of structure to the hollowness of 
post-structuralism. Yet Dionysus is a god who calls most suitably neither for the structural 
analysis of binary difference, which he mocks, nor for any kind of constructivism. He 
summons just that dynamism, the sense of fundamental temporality and movement so well 
served by Giddens’ theory of structuration, a dynamized structuralism or historiography 
with agency. In Giddens, the primacy of the body and face, in the context of encounters and 
talk, which is the always local, historical context of human beings, provides a salutary 
antidote to interpretive strategies like that of the symbolists and morphologists 
(structuralists, any hermeneutics of pattern-recognition)128. Everything the symbolic 
interpreter touches turns into something timeless. This is not always apposite with the most 
extemporaneous, the most ad hoc of gods: Dionysus keeps materializing, coming into being 
in history not only vanishing into the timelessness of structure, mythe, langue, logos, doctrine, 
transcendence or law129. 
 
To speak and to laugh is to “put out there”; it is to constitute a public space. Wherever two 
or more are gathered there is already an agora and a boulē. The face of others is the horizon to 
which social persons are always oriented. Divining the lay of things beyond that horizon is 
the ongoing activity of persons in co-presence. Every act of communication is an 
interpretation, an intention conveyed and received to greater or lesser degrees of candour 
and truth-value. Voice and face are radically subject to time, they constantly shift, are 
constantly sealing and unsealing the substance (more like an electric current than a 
‘substance’), which constitutes the living network of human social life: meaning. How to 
catch the meaning of words and looks is intricately caught up with the problem of holding 
them, retaining them in time, in order to know their identity and pass on or transmit it, as 
one holds up and passes on a mask or a portrait. Dionysus in Bacchae modifies and 
differentiates the notion of what is true and valuable. It is not simply that which can be held, 
                                                        
128 On structuration see Giddens, 1984: 16-25. 
129 Cf. Burkert on the representation of Dionysus in the “Lenaia Vases”: “Sie zeigen Frauen Wein schöpfend, trinkend, tanzend vor einem ad 
hoc hergestellten Dionysosidol: eine bärtige Maske - oder auch zwei gegenständige Masken - an einer Säule aufgehängt; ein Tuch zur 
Andeutung des Körpers, um die Säule geschlungen, gelegentlich von einer Querstange gehalten wie bei einer Vogelscheuche; Arme und 
Beine sind nicht einmal angedeutet . . . Das Idol im Zentrum ist ohne Zweifel Dionysos; offenbar ist dieser Gott nicht dauerhaft in einer 
Statue präsent, er wird für das Fest, ja in seinem Verlauf erst ‘gemacht’.” Burkert, 2011 (1977): 362. See also Burkert, 2011 (1977): 256 
“Der Gott selbst ist vielgestaltig. Er kann in der schlichtesten Form vergegenwärtigt werden…”, and my forthcoming “Dionysos 
Autoschediastikos: the ad hoc hergestellte God”. On the “Lenaia Vases”, visual language and cult practice, see Peirce, 1998. 
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but a certain bearing towards the passing of things. Correspondingly, forms and meaning 
that change are not as a result meanings that are false, but only differently oriented toward 
time’s current.  
 
Personhood like the face and the voice, is defined by its being in time. it is subject to and 
constitutes an environment of perpetual shifting. The human visage may be seen as a 
moveable, articulable mask, I argued here. The dynamism of the face makes it different to 
the mask in the same way that speech is different to writing. It is much more plastic, much 
more changeable and subject to emotions and intentions (which are largely indeterminate 
and always coming into being) than the fabricated, stamped faces, which are masks, prosōpa. 
Indeed, the peculiar nature of character is betrayed in the original sense of charassein: 
“stamp”, “notch”, “engrave”. There are two senses of ‘character’: as cipher or identifying 
mark and (therefore also) of the identity inferred. Character is an inference drawn from acts. 
Habitually Pentheus acts in such a manner. His kin characterize him as doing so, different 
actors imply that they know him as acting in such a way, we see him acting in such a way. 
From the experience of Pentheus and the experience of accounts of Pentheus made by 
others, we put together a “Pentheus” in our minds as having such and such a form. Yet 
human acts are never done until death. We cannot say that a man was blessed until he was 
and is no more. So do the vicissitudes in the fortunes of a Kadmos exemplarily teach, and 
such is a very strong theme in the contemporary of Euripides, Herodotus, and throughout 
Greek Tragedy130. But no drama explores more brilliantly than Bacchae the recursive nature of 
things, their manner of morphing into their opposite in a rhythmic pattern that seems to 
make time, experienced as partial and fragmentary, as if a force of consummation: telein. 
 
The face is more in time than the mask. The face is animate, the mask becomes animated. The 
mask is fungible but not changeable. The human face is changeable and plastos, mouldable, 
but not fungible: it cannot be exchanged only changed or covered, painted, enhanced131. 
Fungibility of aspect, metamorphosis, is a divine capacity. Humans can only cover up, 
counterfeit, dissemble and seek to control their expressions and how they are taken. Often 
they let on or give themselves away, reveal their intentions in spite of themselves. Mortals 
are far more complex than gods. This is not because gods are fictions and humans not, but 
because humans are more dynamic fictions, radically subject to the constant shifting of 
perspective in time. Human ēthos is unfixed, hence did philosophers like Socrates and 
Aristotle put so much effort into reflecting upon what a good life would be: what one is is 
what one has become and is always becoming through acting in certain ways and valuing 
                                                        
130 Hdt. 1.32 Solon and Croesus; and the story of the Samian king, Polykrates at Hdt. 3.39-44. 
131 See 457-9. 
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certain values, such that certain desires become one’s effective desires132. Ēthos does not have 
object permanence, in the way that a temple or piece of wood seems to do. It is like little 
Ernst’s mother described by Freud, fort und da, da und fort133. 
 
 
 
                                                        
132 Cf. § 3.2.2. 
133 Freud, 1920, Jenseits des Lustprinzips: 11-15. On object permanence, constancy see § 6.3.2 n. 40 and Larson, 2016: 111. 
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7 
 
Conclusion  
 
Silhouette of an Anthropology of Tragic Subjects 
 
 
ἃ /ὲν συνῆκα, γενναῖα· οἶ/αι δὲ καὶ ἃ /ὴ συνῆκα·1 
 
 
7.1 En merei/ en telei: A Meristic Reading  
 
At 860 there is a phrase that has been diversely interpreted and translated. One recent editor 
has emended the text in a way that gives us an opportunity to draw this long discussion to a 
close. Dionysus has begun his bewitchment of Pentheus, whose resistance is crumbling. The 
man has left the scene in a strange condition halfway between having his own will and 
having lost it to the Stranger. He is caught in a state, which is neither knowledge of self nor 
entirely ignorance of self, 859-612: 
 
                             γνώσεται δὲ τὸν ∆ιὸς 
∆ιόνυσον, ὡς Fέφυκεν ἐν /έρει θεὸς     
 δεινότατος, ἀνθρώFοισι δ' ἠFιώτατος.   
 
                  He will recognize the son of Zeus 
Dionysus, as a god by turns utterly 
Terrible or most gentle to mortals. 
 
I retain Diggle’s emendation of 860 ἐν /έρει θεὸς 3, which in nearly all other editions is the 
ἐν τέλει θεὸς retained from the manuscript, P. On this line Diggle has written “The 
literature on the lines is voluminous . . . ‘He will learn that Dionysus is by turns a most 
awesome and a most gentle god to mortals’. As Roux notes, ‘L’opposition entre la bonté et la 
                                                        
1“What I understood was excellent, and I think also what I did not understand”, Socrates on the book of Heraclitus given him by Euripides,  
Diog. Laert. 2.22.6-7. 
2 860-1: Roux “ἐν τέλει a été diversement interprété: Hermann et d’autres le rattachent à πέφυκεν et comprennent ‘en fin de compte’. Mais 
Dodds objecte avec raison qu’il y a contradiction entre les deux termes, car ce qui est ‘par nature’ existe nécessairement dès l’origine.”  See 
extensive notes in Rijksbaron on the difficulty with these lines, their punctuation and syntax. The P manuscript’s ἐν τέλει is retained by most 
editors and commentators – Dodds [ἐν τέλει θεός = τελείως θεός], Meunier & Grégoire, Roux, Seaford, Di Benedetto, González Merino, 
2003; Kopff: ἐντελὴς.  
3 Which he discusses at Diggle, 1994: 468-70. 
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cruauté du dieu paraît avoir été un lieu commun.’” Roux gives a long list of references in 
Antiquity to Dionysus as possessing both certain qualities and their very opposites4 – sweet 
and savage, peaceful and bellicose, gentle and wild and so forth – to which Diggle adds Plut. 
Dem. 2.3, ‘most dread in war, bringing most cheer in peace’.  
 
Seaford translates 859-61 “and he will recognise Dionysos the son of Zeus, that he was born 
to be a god in initiation ritual most terrible, but to humankind most gentle.” Some other 
typical renderings of ἐν τέλει are, for example: Gibbons, 2001: “was born a god in full”; Di 
Benedetto similarly “è un dio nella pienezza dei poteri”; Carson, 2015: “true and 
consummate god”; Stuttard “a god born truly of a god, a god of terror and a god of gentle 
comfort for mankind”. Line 860 has always struck me as one of those cracks in the text 
through which the light that the reader is shining on its insides – phrenes – or meaning, 
becomes visible as such. It throws the reader’s own silhouette. This is most patently 
exemplified in Seaford’s translation, in which is expressed so clearly the desire to 
demonstrate the primarily ‘ritual’, telestic, import he has detected throughout the work, by 
which he seeks to explains it.  
 
None of this is to say that Seaford’s reading is wrong; he certainly has the majority on his 
side in favouring ἐν τέλει. The “meristic” reading is eccentric. Still, it is helpful in bringing 
into relief the subjective character of interpretation and of translation. On the face of it this is 
an obvious point perhaps, but one which is most manifest in its significance with this god, 
and which I think is the strongest clue to what he means in Euripides. By turns seen in this 
way, by turns in another, indefinitely – in such a predicament, what “ought one to do”? The 
surest thing is to enter into and commit to social, human relationships in a certain spirit of 
joy and humility, Euripides implies. This applies also to the modern interpretation of 
Dionysus and Euripides’ dramatization of this particular episode in his ‘life’.  
 
Dionysus is the god who shimmers with the animacy of internal tensions, the god who 
brings into relief the contrastiveness of evaluation, but who also complicates contrastive 
articulacy and can embody a dynamic movement between opposite values in time. Diggle 
explains and justifies ἐν /έρει with many parallel examples, “The phrase ἐν /έρει 
(sometimes ἐν τῶι /έρει) has two main applications: ‘in (re)turn’, vicissim . . . and ‘in turn’, 
alternis vicibus, one action following another, whether only two actions . . . or more than two 
. . . or with the implication (as here) of indefinite repetition ‘by turns’.”5 In terms of the 
Dionysus/Stranger we know through the rest of the play, this is the most persuasive 
reading. It keeps the thread of the text connected with the fundamental property at issue in 
                                                        
4 Roux, 1972: Tome II, 507. 
5Diggle, 1994: 469. 
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Tragedy, viz. the diversity and constant shifting of perspectives and the vicissitudinous 
character of human experience. This is a dynamic context, and the embodied god of Tragedy 
is dynamic, by turns and indefinitely, showing one face and then another, as the very 
structure of 861 – δεινότατος, ἀνθρώFοισι δ' ἠFιώτατος – graphically expresses.  
 
Dionysiac religiosity has an alternately daylit, public, communal-ritual face; and a nocturnal, 
concealed, mystical face. Aeschylus himself, author of several works on Dionysus (including 
a Pentheus, the likely model for Euripides’own Dionysiac Tragedy), was said by Aristotle to 
have been accused of inadvertently revealing the ineffable mysteries6. In public, and even in 
the public rituals of Dionysus, his dramatic festivals, there is often this threat that the 
mystery rites, which must be covered up (like the unspeaking Greek women themselves, 
kept remote, out of the public domain), might be revealed. Aristophanes makes great 
comedy out of a fictional Euripides’ penetrating the ritual of the Thesmophoria, through his 
proxy kinsman7. Famously in Pseudo-Demosthenes, in the case against Neaera, the threat to 
the city of illegitimate access to exclusive, properly contained, Dionysiac ritual is raised – 
τὰς δὲ θυσίας . . . τὰς σε/νοτάτας καὶ ἀρρήτους8. The making public of what must remain 
private and hidden is a constant anxiety in this culture, and Dionysus, the only cure mortals 
have for release from anxiety, merimnai, happens also to be a god who straddles the hidden 
and revealed. He shows whichever face he wishes, being now seen and now unseen. He is a 
person seen alternately, in phases of concealment and revelation, light and shadow. 
 
It may have been partially Euripides’ intention to allude cryptically to secret ritual 
procedures in replaying a myth about Dionysus. Naturally, Bacchae is rich in 
Mysterienterminologie9. It is definitely the case however, that if he did wish to dramatize the 
mystery rites of Dionysus á clef, that is not all, and not even principally, what he was doing 
in Bacchae. The pattern of resistance and explosive revelation has been co-opted by the poet 
into the service of a study in human and divine will and identity. Pentheus is at first both 
willful and unwilling. He is not persuadable and will not see the strangeness of the events 
around him, and thus does not infer well about the agents and motives behind them. 
Dionysus attacks him in his desiderative posture and the king becomes a study in desire and 
its reversal. He becomes merely involuntary, the victim of a light frenzy, and thereby less 
unwilling and eventually, most desirous of that for which he originally felt the strongest 
                                                        
6 Arist. Eth. Nich. 1111a 8-11: ὃ δὲ πράττει ἀγνοήσειεν ἄν τις, οἷον †λέγοντές φασιν ἐκπεσεῖν αὐτούς,† ἢ οὐκ εἰδέναι ὅτι ἀπόρρητα ἦν, 
ὥσπερ Αἰσχύλος τὰ µυστικά, ἢ δεῖξαι βουλόµενος ἀφεῖναι, ὡς ὁ τὸν καταπέλτην. 
7 See Ar. Thesmophoriazusae, esp. 130-573, for transvestiture, penetration of the women’s rites and discovery. 
8 Demosthenes, In Neaeram 59.74: τὰς δὲ θυσίας ἁπάσας ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔθυε, καὶ τὰς σεµνοτάτας καὶ ἀρρήτους ἡ γυνὴ αὐτοῦ ἐποίει, εἰκότως, 
βασίλιννα οὖσα. 
9 Cf. Riedweg, 1979: 5-10; Seaford, 1996 is as a reading, largely speaking, a tracing of Mysterienterminologie, and allusion to ritual and its 
language, see also Seaford, 1981, 1987, 2006. 
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aversion. His reversal is a volitional reversal. At points throughout the work we are induced 
to revise what we think persons are: we are shown that they can be dispossessed of will and 
mind, that they can be seen to be so different from what they thought, and become so other 
than what they have been. 
 
 
7.2 Silhouette – A Tentative and Hazardous Tracing10 
 
Jean-Pierre Vernant called the work on agency in Greek Tragedy, from which this study of 
Bacchae has much benefitted, an ébauche, “una bozza”, “a draft”11. Dennett’s theory of 
consciousness describes a process of perpetual, cognitive “redrafting”12. Pierre Bourdieu 
called the work, in which he developed the useful concept of habitus, although detailed and 
lengthy, an esquisse; and more recently Walter Burkert offered a Skizze of the history of the 
divine identity the Greeks designated Dionysus13. Although this has itself been a long and 
detailed close-study of Bacchae, it represents an attempt to draw – following Alfred Gell’s 
example14 – what may be called the silhouette of an anthropology of person and agent in a 
Greek Tragedy. The posited relationship of outline to contents, form to meaning, like that 
between praxeis and ēthos, will be decisive for any given interpretive posture and its 
conclusions. One does not spontaneously sketch the profile of Dionysus, but must combine 
many sketches together in an endless interpretive drafting. It is hard to get at his contents, so 
one binds together outlines in the hope of achieving a commensurately animated picture. 
 
Although the intention then has been to devote close attention to this particular, already 
much and well studied play, it is hoped that some of the elements for a fuller profile of 
Greek Tragedy, generally, have been helpfully sketched out. Bacchae is a work of peculiar 
pertinence for all other drama in its making the god of the theatre a chief protagonist15. It is 
certainly a work which repays close examination as an end in itself. Nevertheless, it is also 
an excellent portal into the corpus of preserved Classical Tragedy, not only because it is 
Dionysiac in theme as well as format, but because, together with Iphigenia at Aulis and the 
fragments of Alcmeon at Corinth, it is the last of the Classical Tragedies of the great 5th 
                                                        
10 See § 5.2.4. 
11 “Ébauches de la volonté dans la tragédie grecque”, Vernant, 1972.  
12 See Dennett, 1991. 
13 Bourdieu, 1972. Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique; “Dionysos – ‚different’ im Wandel der Zeiten. Eine Skizze” Burkert in Schlesier: 
15-22. 
14 Gell, 1998: 10-11. 
15 By which logic, Aristophanes’ Frogs, produced within months of Bacchae, ought to have a similar status. If we are ever tempted to 
mystify Dionysus and discern in him a symbol only of the spoudaion, the earnest, we are healthily reminded of the other face of Dionysus 
that we see in Aristophanes’ great play, see also Seidensticker, 1978, 1982; Taplin, 1986. 
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Century. Its poet has had the benefit of being able to draw on, innovate, respond to and 
modify the work of many predecessors, many perspectives, as well as the experience of his 
own career. It is a work that can be peculiarly reflexive about the tradition it will form part 
of and that tradition’s abiding themes and questions, the problems raised and solutions 
suggested. 
 
From his historically privileged perspective over the tradition of dramatic poetry since the 6th 
Century, Euripides has selected an episode from the life of Dionysus. He has brought into 
relief, in his version, themes of great dramatic and philosophic interest: desire and volition; 
judgement, decision and choice; self-ignorance; the emotional life inside individuals and 
emotions communicated between them; thought and thoughtlessness, and freedom from 
thought’s characteristic sequences; presence and absence; the dynamic relationship between 
the natural and the normative; the nature of agency and personhood and what distinguishes 
divine and mortal persons. 
 
The exploration of values, implicit and explicit, was consistently the project over the course 
of Euripides’ career. This finds a strong and sophisticated expression in Bacchae. Euripides 
dramatizes the introduction of Dionysiac worship and rites. But this is no documentary or 
neutral narration of that introduction, but a re-interpretation of a mythic episode from the 
life of the god quite expressly conscious of the reality that humans do not merely transmit 
but compose stories, sunthentes logon. They refute them, stitch them together, embrace them 
wholeheartedly or accept them, merely because they expect they have nothing to lose in 
doing so16. What he has offered is an interpretation of those rites and that Dionysiac 
religiosity. Revealing its meaning does not mean “showing” what form the ritual acts take – 
τὰ δ' ὄργι' ἐστὶ τίν' ἰδέαν ἔχοντά σοι; 471. In Bacchae it has rather meant exploring the 
contents of those acts, what they mean, what they intend or what motivates them. Those 
“contents” are affective, having to do with the quality of relations between persons – mortal 
with mortal, mortal with divine17 – and the quality of agency in the relation that persons 
have with themselves, their desires and what they are in a position to recognize and know.  
 
Dionysiac contradiction, strangeness and ineffability inspire Euripides’ explorations. Nature 
and the city, the community and the individual, the self and its parts – its identity as person, 
its potentiality as ethical agent of its self, its contents’ “subjectivity”, which can be also the 
objects of various forms of attention – all are presented with great intensity and freshness in 
                                                        
16 297. 
17 The Dionysiac rites unify persons with one another and with themselves, and Dionysus’ existence is owed in a sense to the original 
mistake, hamartia, of Hera’s coming to know of Zeus’ relations with Semelē and her strategy for taking revenge for the insult to her own 
honour, the breach in her relationship with Zeus being a rupture in her timē, how she might see herself, her own identity. 
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Bacchae. None are what they may self-evidently seem, but are deepened and complicated by 
the drama’s voices. The estranging power of the drama constrains us to adopt an 
anthropological posture. We are confronted with the normative, relative and contingent 
character of our own basic categories and definitions. The normal, the self-evident, person, 
knowledge, the identity of desires: we may not take for granted what these are. We are not 
sure about the source of desires and thoughts. We cannot be certain about the presence of 
the identity, which really is doing the modifying, checking, articulating and evaluating of 
“its” desires. The identity of the agent of acts is as hard to locate and opaque (do they 
originate from without, exōthen or within, endothen?) as the personhood, and its nature, of 
Dionysus of pollai morphai.  
 
If a divine person like Dionysus can transform desires, and do so because desires were 
insufficiently transformed to begin with; if he can extinguish mind and presence of self; if 
persons in collectives can feel that they are not individuals but part of one corporate person 
– what then is the person and what the nature of this unstable agency to apprehend one’s 
own desires, one’s own mind and self? These are some of the questions that issue, with great 
and immediate force, from the presence of Dionysus, the divine being who makes things 
flow, turns subjects into objects and throws a bright, flashing light on the complex nature of 
subjectivity. That nature is ontologically peculiar, something that has the changing shape of 
time’s currents or of fire. It is cognitive, social, volitional and ethical in its contours. This 
interpretation has searched out these contours of Bacchae and sought to trace them under the 
always interrelated themes of agent and person. 
 
The 20th Century disagreed over the nature of free will or the freedom to act in Greek 
Tragedy. Some scholars argued that Greek poetry shows suffering humans in an existence 
radically constrained by Necessity and governed by external, demonic persons and forces. 
Others argued that there is a development from a view of external agents – daimonioi, 
daimones – shaping mortal existence, to an increasingly internalized picture of human 
persons, having interiority and a developing sense of autonomy – a psychological agency 
within individuals. Even the frustration at feeling constrained would be the expression of an 
emerging sense of autonomy and its valorization. Other scholars, like Lesky18, argue that 
there is a fusion of planes in the tragic world, that there is freedom and constraint. These last 
interpreters are more persuasive, not least because it is hard to imagine that anyone, least of 
all the gifted poets of Ancient Greece, could really imagine that humans were either 
completely the objects of forces larger and stronger than themselves, or that some part of 
individuals could be completely independent of their social, psychological, historical and 
                                                        
18 Lesky, 1966. 
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cosmic contexts. Between the two extremes there are doubtless many positions taken, 
whether consciously or through acting in certain ways. Historical people seem to live as if 
independent and caught up in a web of causes and effects, both, or alternately, subject to 
external forces and subjects of their own lives. Other scholars point out that our notion of 
Free Will is itself a historical value19. We distort the ancient material when we apply to it an 
anachronistic value and the conceptions related to it, a product of Christian theology and 
Enlightenment concepts of the self. Parallel with this is the disagreement over questions of 
how to interpret character in Greek drama. The problem it seemed was that we should not 
esteem Greek Tragedy very highly, if we judged it by modern conceptions of 
characterization20. Some scholars argue for the psychological reading of character, others that 
this is completely inappropriate21. Some see the entire Attic play, and not individual 
protagonists, as the character or person having depth, in the way that a Shakespearean 
character seems to have this highly prized quality22. Some see characters as serving the play’s 
mandate to absorb and thrill an audience, and say they should be judged successes or 
failures on this basis. Others point out, more sensibly, that that is a very low standard to 
have for dramatic creations23. They also point out that divorcing character from 
psychological interpretation will be only another kind of distortion, a highly artificial one. I 
place myself with those of that opinion.  
 
The notion of the real and realistic is what changes. What remains the same is that when 
certain – surprisingly minimal – necessary conditions of cognitive social and psychological 
intelligibility are in place, we react to, learn from and are moved by persons and their 
predicaments24. The modern view of character is not the realistic one finally arrived at in 
some great civilizational culmination. We speak of realism and naturalism and a 
modernism, which feels it has achieved a closer correspondence to existence, but this is quite 
misleading. Shakespeare’s persons, Balzac’s, Dickens’, Flaubert’s, Joyce’s, the contemporary 
“legal person”, or politically enfranchised “citizen”: all are historical stylizations, 
sophisticated fictions. Just as notions of the will and its freedom, the autonomy of the subject 
and agency are historical, so too are notions of character. If “real” means having more 
information and details about a person, their biography and their insides, then 
Shakespeare’s characters are far more real to us than almost all the living persons we meet in 
our lives. However effective they are though, they lack just that essential element that 
                                                        
19 Rivier, 1968; Vernant, 1972; Gill, 1996. 
20 Easterling, 1973; Gould, 1978. 
21 On this division, see Easterling, 1973. 
22 Gould 1978. 
23 For this so-called Tychoismus see Dawe, 1963; Easterling, 1973; Thumiger, 2007. 
24 On tragic “intelligibility” see Easterling, 1973; Gould 1978; Budelmann and Easterling, 2010. 
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matters most to people: their being alive in time and place, being in embodied co-presence 
with others, being sufficient persons.  
 
 
7.3 In Conclusion 
 
Dramatic characters are intense creations which derive their memorableness and power 
from the fact that we encounter them in extraordinary moments, in moments of crisis when, 
whatever it is that a person is or contains as latent potentiality, becomes vividly manifest 
through what they do and say and how they react. Bacchae represents such a crisis. It is a 
moment of destruction and loss originating from improvident desirousness and tragical 
imprudence. Acts are effective wishes, the wishes we really have, as opposed to the ones we 
wished or thought we did or ought to have had. Dionysus was a manipulator of fictions, 
motivated by a strong, structuring desire. Pentheus was a poor interpreter of fictions, 
structured volitionally against his conscious will. He was a man of desires presenting and 
dissembling themselves, going unrecognized or denied to himself. The desires that motivate 
the actions of Pentheus, Dionysus, Kadmos and his daughters, Zeus, Teiresias and all the 
others have been given central place in Bacchae. The drama has been a manifesting and 
bringing into articulated relief of the difficulty of recognizing one’s own desires, as well as 
the personhood and motives of others. Bacchae has dramatized a crisis of volition and 
identity which has complicated the normal and estranged the habitual, familiar ways of 
seeing these things. Identity is not what it may have seemed and perhaps humans do not 
know so well what they really want, what they mean or what kind of life they are living. 
The identity of the subject, its desires and its knowledgeability are all terminally entangled. 
Somewhere between fictional and real, ignorance and knowledge, subjects and objects of 
desire, inside and outside: person is problem. The crisis at Thebes has demonstrated this.  
 
Setting out this express awareness of the historicity of the posing of the question concerning 
free will and of the conception of dramatic character and human subject, we turned to a near 
contemporary of Euripides: Aristotle on agency. The diction of the poet is very close to that 
which we find in the philosopher’s formal and differentiated terminology of voluntariness, 
desire, deliberation, choice, judgement, imputability and evaluation. We find that the 
ancient scholar of drama and ethical agency is explicitly concerned with many of the same 
problems, implicit and explicit, that are found in the poet. We see that, just as we not only 
retroject modern notions onto Aristotle, but have in fact long been Aristotelians – in part via 
Thomistic, Christian readings of the Greek – so too Aristotle was not simply retrojecting his 
interests onto Tragedy: Tragedy was probably one of the sources in his culture that had 
taught him how to think, what to identify as valuable and how to identify it. Tragedy, and 
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not least the drama of the most philosophicus scaenicus, had set Aristotle his terms and 
parameters of value. Reading Euripides with Aristotle has been a complicated, circuitous 
way of expressing fidelity to the poet’s vision. 
 
In chapter 3, we turned to a reading of Bacchae on the terms of a modern philosophy of 
agency. Being most historical means also embracing our own time and articulated 
perspectives, not denying them by taking a view as if “from nowhere”, as Pentheus thought 
he could do. After studying Bacchae in the light of Aristotelian theory we submitted the 
drama to a discussion of person and agency in terms of the modern philosopher’s 
exploration of these themes, their definition, nature and importance. Charles Taylor adopts 
the same premise as both Aristotle and Euripides: human life ought to have an objective and 
that objective should itself be living a good life: attaining eudaimonia. It may be that this 
imperative is shown most powerfully through negative examples in Bacchae, but it is 
certainly no less the case that it is what is shown needs to be in place, valued and celebrated, 
395-925:  
 
τὸ σοφὸν δ' οὐ σοφία, 
τό τε /ὴ θνατὰ φρονεῖν 
βραχὺς αἰών· ἐFὶ τούτωι 
δὲ τίς ἂν /εγάλα διώκων 
τὰ Fαρόντ' οὐχὶ φέροι; 
 
Science is not wisdom, 
Thinking not mortal thoughts 
A short life, in this light 
Who would pursue great things 
And not attain what is there? 
 
Euripides has taken a strong ethical position and, furthermore, that position consists partly 
in recognizing the manner and significance of one’s parti pris, viz. that one is always taking a 
position even if that is to remain unconscious or unexploring of one’s positions. This, 
however, is not only a rationalist ethics, but one that seems to require emotional 
transformation; both an articulacy concerning one’s desires and a kind of pre-articulate 
rightness of orientation towards values – such as the value of articulateness – in the first 
place. One is always living a life, choosing one’s orientation towards one’s circumstances; it 
                                                        
25 See also § 3.3 “Knowledge concerning Knowledge”. 
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ought to be the best possible life. One has always a bearing or posture, and it will be 
decisive, investing circumstances with its own values. 
 
In Bacchae we have not simply to do with belief and acceptance of rites, but with the 
recognition of and the determining character of human choice, judgement, emotion and 
something so vague and yet all important as bearing and the mode of going to things – the 
receptiveness and attentiveness of disposition. In just the same way Dionysiac religion is 
Dionysiac relation, for which formulaic fulfilment of obligation is insufficient. Dionysiac 
knowledge is not reflective, rule-based knowledge and not transmitted discursively or as 
codes. It is something both more nebulous and more intense than talk, transaction and 
exchange can comprehend. It is nearer mood and dynamics than something deducible by 
rules and conveyable through normal language and rational strategies. 
 
In Euripides’ handling of the drama of Pentheus, Dionysiac telein is fulfillment in the richest 
social, psychological and emotional sense: not simply ritual rules or formal acts, but the 
feelings and posture that motivate those acts. The meaningfulness and motivation of belief 
becomes strongly connected with praxeis in Bacchae. In the drama the meaningfulness of 
relations between persons is paramount; they are not simply formal but substantial. It is not 
sufficient to simply dress one’s head and pour out wine and “bacchize”, baccheuein26; one 
must do so in the right spirit. Drama itself is a drafting or sketch, in the short space of time 
that each performance admits, of the outlines of the fundamental questions that 
predicaments bring into relief. It was the work of the first Athenian audience, as it was of 
the reader, Aristotle, and all subsequent audiences through time, shaped by and modifying 
the interpretations of their predecessors, simultaneously to fill in and uncover the substance 
of the work, its ever living import.  
 
Homo sapiens sapiens defines itself and distinguishes itself through its unique cognitive make-
up. Knowledge, however, is unstable and comes in different kinds with different values. The 
most valuable kinds of knowledge may be also the rarest and least accessible. It may be 
paradoxical, teasing us out of thought like Dionysus, a dancing Sphinx whose identity 
Thebes does not guess, with disastrous results. In Euripides’ world of Dionysus, sophia has a 
special character; it is not what we thought it was, not what has been self-evident. It is 
suggested that to access sophia we must sincerely desire it, but to desire it we must accept its 
worth – that is act as if we already know that it is most precious and worth knowing. 
Unclarity, uncertainty, instability, recursiveness, circularity or contradiction, some kind of 
                                                        
26 312-13: τὸν θεὸν δ' ἐς γῆν δέχου / καὶ σπένδε καὶ βάκχευε καὶ στέφου κάρα. See § 2.6 p. 118 for translation. 
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dynamic frustration of logic and identity, these seem always moving through the world in 
the presence of Dionysus.  
 
Equally dynamic, vague and hard to locate is person. In the second part, chapters 4 through 
6, the ontic property of person and its detection or manner of inference in Bacchae was taken 
up through the perspectives of some recent anthropology of social interaction, religious 
belief, art and ritual. In Bacchae identity, and with it personhood, is deracinated and 
problematized. It becomes evident that it is a property, in other words virtual, only ever 
inferred or expressed symbolically. It is detachable from the body in some instances, but 
death itself is also in effect just such a detachment of the property of person from the body. 
 
In Chapter 4 I regarded person in Bacchae as something not self-evident. Humans do not 
know for certain what the nature and intentions of their interlocutors and co-presents may 
be. Other people are opaque. We need to assume other persons have minds, are the subjects 
of thoughts, in order to communicate and relate to them as persons and agents. We rely on 
different conceptions of mind, internal or external, or some combination of the two. Gods 
are special categories of person, peculiarly and notoriously hard to read, though they are 
typically encountered as intelligible persons in the way that unfamiliar mortals are expected 
to be minimally intelligible, by default. The concealability of intentions and the dissembling 
and feigning of humans makes the human social world a context of pitfalls. Human 
relations are inherently tenuous and people not only make themselves unreadable to others 
but overestimate their interpretations of their own selves. People are slippery and 
treacherous, strategic and interpretive, or they are unreflecting, acting automatically. The 
polis is a context of solidarities and their crises. It is not simply a community in place but a 
Lebenswelt of agents, a community of successive communities faced by similar challenges of 
integration, transmission and durability. Dionysus brings all of this into relief and throws a 
peculiarly intense light over this social and anti-social world of the polis and the challenges it 
faces to secure truth, verify intentions and endure over time. 
 
Detecting the quality of person or agent is difficult. In Chapter 5 we discussed its 
“dislocation” and difficulty of location in Bacchae. The god who, to be identified as god, 
requires a mode of inference which humans in Thebes lack, estranges personhood per se and 
problematizes its identifiability. Humans do not detect divine identity or attain Dionysiac 
knowledgeability through rules, by inductive or deductive inference. Dionysus is a god of 
phenomena and their traces, a god of natural signs, who requires something nearer the 
abductive mode of inference, if that implies something like a leap of faith or an inspired 
form of reasoning. The natural sign is perpetually being absorbed into the social world of 
interpretive agents; and the denatured sign, the conventional symbol – like Semelē’s tomb, 
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sēma, covered by her son in his luxuriant, winding growth – is “re-natured”, made a trace of 
phenomena and not simply of conceptions, through Dionysus. Fire, hair, laughter, the 
smiling face – these all show a world of meanings that are not identical with a virtual order 
of arbitrary or purely cultural values, but the insoluble entanglement of natural and normal. 
 
Chapter 6 represents a re-exploration of a theme that has understandably intrigued many 
scholars: the Dionysiac face and presence. A mask is a complex object, an objectification in 
Bacchae of an inner identity or a subjectivity. It is an instrument as much vocal as visual, a 
portal and a cover for reshaping or disguising voice. The relationship between presence and 
appearance is complex, representing an opportunity that can be exploited by artists whose 
materials are appearances and by gods concerned above all with presence and co-presence 
and their “face”, timē. Like light and shade, presence and absence set each other off in 
Bacchae in a complex enlacement. This is dramatically exemplified, on one hand, through the 
pathetic apostrophe of Pentheus, a man reduced to parcels of flesh, whose body parts and 
head are present as objects, while he is absent; and on the other hand, through the address of 
a daughter who is bodily present but not really there, insofar as she cannot respond or share 
reciprocal relation or even be said to be in a state of good or evil fortune. To be present is to 
know oneself so and to know that others can know that too. It is a cognitive and social and 
phenomenological estate. When its sufficient conditions are in place, co-presence is face-to-
face, responsive reciprocity of embodied, time-bound persons.  
 
The spectator in the Theatre of Dionysus is not part of a flock in a congregation, but 
addressed as an agent, one expected to be capable of self-reflexivity, to whom human 
subjects are intelligible; one expected reciprocally to abduct agency and infer cause and 
motives in others, such as he or she experiences in him or herself. Events and actions on the 
stage, talk and feeling, these imitate and re-constitute the human life in a cosmos populated 
also by non-human persons, agents not subject to that force most defining for human life, 
time. Life, like knowledge and other persons, has not been what we may have thought. In 
Euripides’ Theatre of Dionysus, existence as predicament is reviewed. We are made to look 
again at what a person’s true identity may be, how it stands or flows, and how that is 
expressed; what being mortal, changeable beings must mean for the manner of our living 
and our bearing towards things and persons. The a priori value of reflection and the 
acceptance of established moral yardsticks, a certain level of ethical self-reflexivity calling 
for the re-evaluation and recognition of both received wisdom and the new: this is the 
special kind of moral wisdom prescribed in Bacchae. The wisdom of the Euripidean 
Dionysus is really a bearing towards wisdom itself, a being receptive and holding it dear, 
philon. Dionysiac wisdom is a knowledge concerning knowledge. 
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When Socrates told Euripides that he “understood” and also did not “understand” 
Heraclitus’ words, he used the verb suniēmi, which means understand because it means 
“bring together”, “connect”, like the English “to make the connection” or “piece together”. 
The Greek view of cognition has this dimension of a process of linking or binding and 
setting elements in the order they properly have. Similarly, to interpret a riddle is 
sullambanein, “bring together”. Knowing is not only passive registering or perceiving, but 
has this active element, which I have called “bearing” and which is always determining. 
Seeing this is the work of Dionysiac interpretation. It means knowing that one is there, 
seeing and shaping how one is seeing. Pentheus fails to make connections in the right way; 
he draws conclusions, deduces relationships from what he thinks he already knows and 
becomes himself traumatically “unbound”. It is a great paradox that persons like Pentheus 
act and commit unreflectively but not spontaneously. They act out of impulses yet cannot 
enter into the immediacy of Dionysiac relation and knowledge and the abductive inference, 
free of pre-supposition, that Dionysus summons forth. Dionysiac sophia is a binding action 
with a binding effect. Individuals are bound together in forms of community and in forms of 
attention through Dionysus.  
 
Dionysus is en merei “continuously in turn” of one kind and then of another: absent and 
present; partially understood and partially misunderstood; showing a human face and a 
divine one; creative and destructive; cruel and gentle. The world of Dionysus is a condition 
somewhere between knowledge and ignorance. He is a god of rhythms, returns and circuits. 
We try in vain to canonize the Dionysiac – establish a fixed rule or measure, kanōn – but 
perhaps we flout his main intention when we codify a “Dionysianism”. No timeless 
paradigm suffices with Dionysus, only a perpetual receptiveness to the unforeseeable, the 
strangeness and newness of an order of time – aei ta epigignomena – perpetually unfolding: 
bringing both eudaimonia and kakodaimonia in turn.  
 
This has been an interpretation that sought to be commensurate with the peculiar character 
of Dionysus en merei. It has been, one might say, a meristic reading rather than a telestic one 
seeking to identify an underlying initiatory or ritual pattern, or a maniac reading in the 
tradition of the most influential, vestigially Freudian style of Dodds, which saw Dionysiac 
exuberance as a healthy “canalizing”, through ritual, of libidinal energy. The meristic posture 
wants only to remain receptive – paradechomenos – to all possibilities as the emphasis falls 
differently, now here and then there. It can hardly be said that the telestic approach of 
Seaford or the maniac one of Dodds, and the forms these have taken in Roux, Di Benedetto, 
Segal and others, are not full of profound insights, they truly are. This interpretation owes a 
great deal to the work of these scholars.  
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In Greek drama, in complex unreadable rhythms, alternis vicibus what is low becomes high; 
what is light, darkness; good fortune metamorphoses into evil, over time. Kadmos, Pentheus, 
Oedipus are the models of this alarming subjection to vicissitude. There is a heightened 
sensitivity always to the dynamic character of existence. The paradoxical nature of things is 
powerfully expressed through the reversals of Tragedy and its intense studies of mortals 
caught in the irreversible current of time. A person is now blessed and now wretched; now a 
king and now a slave; now ignorant and now learning. Circumstances constantly shift and 
illuminate things differently. In Dionysus’ co-presence mortals are dancers on flashing feet, 
tireless in the dark night – en pannuchiois chorois . . . leukon poda – mortals joyfully transform –  
anabaccheousa – throwing back their heads (deran: lit. “neck”) into the dewy aithēr, 862-5. 
With Dionysus mortals assimilate themselves to timelessness itself, for a while. They become 
dynamic and harmonized, the dancer indistinguishable from the dance. What is timeless – 
homēlix chronōi – was once new, what is nomos once emerged or sprang out as phusis. Time 
congeals and dissolves; knowledge follows, turning into ignorance and ignorance into a new 
knowledge. In all things there is a complex rhythm, a plaiting of qualities. Concealment 
leads to revelation, of nature and norm, just as Dionysus is a divine identity now one way 
and now another – ὡς Fέφυκεν ἐν /έρει θεὸς.  
It is a great and dangerous mystery; perhaps it remains better not uttered, arrhēton. The 
human world of culture and reason, logoi and nomoi, rises always out of matter and nature, 
phusis, and they are terminally entangled with each other in radical reciprocity. Humans 
divine meaning in nature, finding everywhere “natural signs” which enter into and re-
constitute their symbolic worlds of culture – polis and oikos. Such signs are uncanny, 
partaking of human time and cosmic timelessness, the human and the non-human; so too 
does the daimonion, the divine person that is Dionysus, 888-96: 
 
κρυFτεύουσι δὲ Fοικίλως 
δαρὸν χρόνου Fόδα καὶ 
θηρῶσιν τὸν ἄσεFτον· οὐ 
γὰρ κρεῖσσόν Fοτε τῶν νό/ων 
γιγνώσκειν χρὴ καὶ /ελετᾶν. 
κούφα γὰρ δαFάνα νο/ί- 
ζειν ἰσχὺν τόδ' ἔχειν, 
ὅτι Fοτ' ἄρα τὸ δαι/όνιον, 
τό τ' ἐν χρόνωι /ακρῶι νό/ι/ον 
ἀεὶ φύσει τε Fεφυκός. 
 
[The gods. . .] cover up in complex ways 
The lingering foot of time and 
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Hunt down the unholy man. For 
Nothing is ever stronger than acknowledgement 
Of the nomoi and mortals must attend to them. 
Light is the expense to hold  
That it contains power,  
Whatever it is that is the daimonion,  
And this, over the long durée, is nomimon  
Will be [phusei] and always has been [pephukos]. 
 
 397 
Works Cited 
 
Ackerman, R. 2002. The Myth & Ritual School – J.G. Frazer and the Cambridge Ritualists. New 
York & London. 
Adkins, A.W.H.  
¾ 1960. Merit & Responsibility. Oxford. 
¾ 1970. From the many to the one: a stduy of personality and views of human nature in Greek 
society. London. 
Arthur. M. 1977. “Classics and Psychoanalysis” The Classical Journal, Vol. 73, No. 1 (Oct. - 
Nov., 1977): 56-68. 
Ayer, A.J. 1963. The Concept of a Person and other Essays. New York. 
Baron-Cohen, S. 1997. Mindblindness. An Essay on autism and theory of mind. Cambridge, 
Mass.  
Barrett, J. 1998. “Pentheus and the Spectator in Euripides’ Bacchae”  
 The American Journal of Philology, Vol. 119, No. 3 (Autumn, 1998): 337-360. 
Barrett W.S. 1964. [ed.] Euripides, Hippolytus. Oxford. 
Bather, A.G. 1894. “The Problem of the Bacchae” The Journal of Hellenic Studies, Vol. 14: 244-
263. 
Beazley, J.D. 1963. Attic Red-Figure Vase Painters 2nd Ed. Oxford.  
Becker, E. 1962. The Birth and Death of Meaning. New York. 
Bellinger, A.R. 1939. “The Bacchae and Hippolytus”, Yale Classical Studies, Vol. 6: 15-27. 
Bernabé, A.  
¾ 2013. [ed.] Redefininig Dionysos. Berlin/ Boston. 
¾ 2013. “Dionysos in the Mycenaean World” in Bernabé, 2013: 23-37. 
Beresford, A. 2008. “Nobody’s Perfect: A New Text and Interpretation of Simonides PMG 
542”. Classical Philology, Vol. 103, No. 3 (July 2008):  237-256. 
Bierl. A. 1991. Dionysos und die griechische Tragödie: Politische und ‘metatheatralische’ Aspekte im 
Text. Tübingen. 
Bloch, M. 1992. Prey into Hunter: the politics of religious experience. Cambridge. 
Bourdieu, P. 1972. Esquisse d’une théorie de la pratique. Geneva. 
Bowersock, G.W., Burkert, W., Putnam, M.C.J. [edd.]. 1979. Arktouros: Hellenic Studies 
Presented to Bernard M.W. Knox on the Occasion of his 65th Birthday. Berlin & New York. 
Boyer, P.  
¾ 1994. The Naturalness of Religious Ideas – A Cognitive Theory of Religion. Berkeley/ Los 
Angeles/ London. 
 398 
¾ 2001. Religion Explained: The Human Instincts that Fashion Gods, Spirits and Ancestors. 
New York. 
Braudel, F. 1998. Les mémoires de la Méditérranée: préhistoire et antiquité. Paris. 
Bremmer, J.N.  
¾ 1984. “Greek Maenadism Reconsidered” Zeitschrift für Papyrologie und Epigraphik, Bd. 
55 (1984), :  267-86. 
¾ 1994. Greek Religion. Oxford. 
¾  2013. “Walter F. Otto’s Dionysos (1933)” in Bernabé, 2013: 4-22. 
Brentano, F. 1924-5. Pscychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt {Band I-II}. Hamburg.  
Brown, P. 1978. The Making of Late Antiquity. Cambridge, Mass. 
Bruhn, E. 1891. Ausgewählte Tragödien des Euripides. Erstes Bändchen: Die Bakchen. Berlin. 
Budelmann. F. & Easterling, P. 2010.  “Reading Minds in Greek Tragedy” Greece & Rome, 
Second Series, Vol. 57, No. 2 (Oct. 2010):  289-303. 
Burkert, W.   
¾ 1960/1961. “Elysion”, Glotta, 39. Bd., 3./4. H. (1960/1961): 208-213. 
¾ 1966. “Greek Tragedy & Sacrifical Ritual” Greek, Roman and Byzantine Studies Vol.7 
No. 2.: 87-121. 
¾ 1983. [trans. Bing, P.] Homo Necans. The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual 
and Myth. Berkeley/ Los Angeles. 
¾ 1993. “Bacchic Teletai in the Hellenistic Age” in Carpenter & Faraone 1993: 259-75. 
¾ 1997 [1972]. Homo Necans: Interpretationen altgriechischer Opferriten und Mythen {2., um 
ein Nachwort erweiterte Auflage}. Berlin. 
¾ 2011 [1977]. Griechische Religion der archaischen und klassischen Epoche  {Zweite, 
überarbeitete und erweiterte Auflage}. Stuttgart. 
¾ 1979. Structure and History in Greek Mythology and Ritual. Berkeley. 
¾ 1996. Creation of the Sacred Cambridge, Mass. 
¾ 2011. “Omophagia” in Walter Burkert. Kleine Schriften V: Mythica, Ritualia, Religiosa 2 
[ed. Graf, F.]: 97-103. Göttingen. 
¾ 2011. “Dionysos – ‚different’ im Wandel der Zeiten. Eine Skizze” in Schlesier 2011: 
15-22. 
Burnet, J. 1900. [ed.] Aristotle’s Ethics. London. 
Burnett, A.P. 1970. “Pentheus and Dionysus: Host and Guest”Classical Philology, Vol. 65, No. 
1 (Jan., 1970): 15-29. 
Buschor, E. 1977. Euripides – Sämtliche Tragödien und Fragmente {Band V}. Berlin.  
 399 
Buxton, R.G.A. 2000. [ed.] Oxford Readings in Greek Religion. Oxford. 
Cabrera, P. 2013. “The Gifts of Dionysos” in Bernabé, 2013: 488-503.  
Cairns, 1993: Aidos: The Psychology and Ethics of Honour and Shame in Ancient Greek Literature. 
Oxford. 
Carpenter, T.H. & Faraone, C.A. 1993. [edd.] Masks of Dionysus. Ithaca, New York.  
Carpenter, T.H. 
¾ 1986. Dionysian Imagery in Archaic Greek Art: Its Development in Black-Figure Vase 
Painting. Oxford. 
¾ 1993. “On the Beardless Dionysus” in Carpenter & Faraone 1993: 185-206.  
¾ 1997. Dionysian Imagery in Fifth-Century Athens. Oxford. 
Carson, A. [trans.] 2015. Euripides. Bakkhai. London. 
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